



From Détente to the end of the Cold War, c1963-1972

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Name:

Class:

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1.1 Seminar Reading: Introduction

A crucial element of your A level studies is wider reading. You should aim to complete six hours of wider reading a week, establishing a base of knowledge using textbooks before expanding on your understanding using academic texts.

During this academic year, you will be set further reading as part of your directed independent learning, which will be followed by a seminar-style lesson. These lessons will help you to explore the ideas presented in the readings, allowing for discussion in depth and debate which will in turn inspire analysis, interpretation and critical thinking. This style of learning is highly favoured within humanities undergraduate degrees.



At the head of each reading list you will be given a **topic title** and a number of **enquiry questions**. These are designed to focus your reading and assist your note taking.

You will be expected to complete three tiers of reading:

- 1) **Core Reading:** This will be from a textbook aimed at A level students.
- 2) **Essential Reading:** This will be a chapter from an academic book or article.
- 3) **Further Reading:** You will then choose one piece of further reading. These lists will consist of journals, articles and book chapters.

You will need to provide evidence of your completed essential and further reading. There are a number of ways you can indicate you have engaged with the material including:

- Highlighting or making notes around your reading (if printed)
- Creating summary notes
- Creating a mind map of ideas

To assist you in accessing these texts, the vast majority will be available via the Moodle course*. You must therefore ensure you have a login and regularly access the course. There are also a number of books available in the school library**.

You will be expected to contribute your ideas verbally during our lessons and on some occasions lead discussions with the presentation of your findings

1.2 The Vietnam War

Questions to consider: Why did the Vietnam War start? Why did the US get involved in Vietnam? Which president is most responsible for the escalation/continued involvement in Vietnam? Why did Johnson escalate the war? Why did the US lose the war? Did Nixon achieve 'peace with honour'?

CORE READING:

J Aldred, A Mamaux, S Waller (e.d.) *Oxford AQA History for A level: The Cold War c1945-1991* (Oxford, 2015) pp.103-121

OR

D Williamson, *Access to History: Europe and the Cold War 1945-1991* Third Edition (London, 2015) pp. 154-163

ESSENTIAL READING:

* Fredrik Logevall, 'The Indochina Wars and the Cold War, 1945-1975' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume II Crises and Détente* (Cambridge, 2010) pp. 281-304

FURTHER READING (select one of the following):

- * Edward Cuddy, 'Vietnam: Mr Johnson's War or Mr Eisenhower's?' *The Review of Politics* 65(4) 2003 pp.351-374
- * Jeffrey Kimball, 'The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of Misunderstanding' *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36(1) 2006 pp.59-74
- * Fredrik Logevall, 'Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam' *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 34(1) 2004 pp.100-112
- * David A. Raymond, 'Communist China and the Vietnam War' *Asian Affairs* 2(2) 1974 pp.83-99
- * Richard C. Thornton, 'Soviet Strategy and the Vietnam War' *Asian Affairs* 1(4) 1974 pp.205-228

ADDITIONAL READING (optional):

- * Mai Elliot, *RAND in Southeast Asia: A History of the Vietnam War Era* (Santa Monica, 2010) pp.285-347
- * George C. Herring, 'The Cold War and Vietnam' *OAH Magazine of History* 18(5) 2004 pp.18-21
- * Peter C. Rollins, 'The Vietnam War: Perceptions Through Literature, Film and Television' *American Quarterly* 36(3) 1984 pp.419-432
- * Robert Pisor, *Siege of Khe Sanh: The Story of the Vietnam War's Largest Battle* (New York, 2018)
- * Mark Bowden, *Hue 1968: A Turning Point of the American War in Vietnam* (New York, 2017)
- * Neil Smith, *The Vietnam War: History in an Hour* (London, 2012)

1.3 The extent of détente

Questions to consider: How did US view of communism change during the Nixon administration? How did the strategy of containment change? What role did Henry Kissinger play? How significant was rapprochement to China?

CORE READING:

J Aldred, A Mamaux, S Waller (e.d.) *Oxford AQA History for A level: The Cold War c1945-1991* (Oxford, 2015) pp.149-148

OR

D Williamson, *Access to History: Europe and the Cold War 1945-1991* Third Edition (London, 2015) pp. 164-176

ESSENTIAL READING:

* Jussi M. Hanhimäki, 'Détente in Europe, 1962-1975' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume II Crises and Détente* (Cambridge, 2010) pp. 198-218

AND

* Robert D. Schulzinger, 'Détente in the Nixon-Ford years, 1969-1976' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume II Crises and Détente* (Cambridge, 2010) pp. 373-394

FURTHER READING (select one of the following):

- * John W. Garver, 'Sino-Vietnamese Conflict and the Sino-American Rapprochement' *Political Science* 96(3) 1981 pp.445-464
- * Gerald Segal, 'Sino-Soviet Relations: The Road to Détente' *The World Today* 40(5) 1984 pp.205-212
- * Gerald Segal, 'Sino-Soviet Détente: How Far, How Fast?' *The World Today* 43(5) 1987 pp.87-91
- * Adam B. Ulam, 'Détente under Soviet Eyes' *Foreign Policy* 24(1976) pp.145-159
- * Phil Williams, 'Détente and US Domestic Politics' *International Affairs* 61(3) 1985 pp.431-447
- * Philip Windsor, 'The Boundaries of Détente' *The World Today* 25(6) 1969 pp.255-264

1.4 The Collapse of Détente

Questions to consider:

CORE READING:

J Aldred, A Mamaux, S Waller (e.d.) *Oxford AQA History for A level: The Cold War c1945-1991* (Oxford, 2015) pp.159-168

OR

D Williamson, *Access to History: Europe and the Cold War 1945-1991* Third Edition (London, 2015) pp. 181-186

ESSENTIAL READING:

* Olav Njølstad, 'The collapse of superpower détente' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume III Endings* (Cambridge, 2010) pp. 135-155

FURTHER READING (select one of the following):

- * David C. Gompert, Hans Binnendijk and Bonny Lin, *Blinders, Blunders and Wars: What America and China Can Learn* (Santa Monica, 2014) pp.129-138
- * Robert McGeehan, 'Carter's Crises: Iran, Afghanistan and Presidential Politics' *The World Today* 36(5) 1980 pp.163-171
- * Wolfgang Mueller, *A Good Example of Peaceful Coexistence? The Soviet Union, Austria and Neutrality, 1955-1991* (Budapest, 2010) pp.245-252
- * Scott D. Sagan, 'Lessons of the Yom Kippur Alert' *Foreign Policy* 36(1979) pp.160-177
- * Peter Wallensteen, 'American-Soviet Détente: What Went Wrong?' *Journal of Peace Research* 22(1) 1985 pp.1-8

1.5 The Cold War in Africa

Questions to consider:

CORE READING:

J Aldred, A Mamaux, S Waller (e.d.) *Oxford AQA History for A level: The Cold War c1945-1991* (Oxford, 2015) pp.169-173

OR

D Williamson, *Access to History: Europe and the Cold War 1945-1991* Third Edition (London, 2015) pp. 177-180

ESSENTIAL READING:

* Michael E. Latham, 'The Cold War in the Third World, 1963-1975' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume II Crises and Détente* (Cambridge, 2010) pp.258-280

AND

Chris Saunders and Sue Onslow, 'The Cold War and Southern Africa, 1976-1990' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume III Endings* (Cambridge, 2010) pp. 222-243

FURTHER READING (select one of the following):

- * Peter Schwab, 'Cold War on the Horn of Africa' *African Affairs* 77(306) 1978 pp.6-20
- * Michael McFaul, 'Rethinking the "Reagan Doctrine" in Angola' *International Security* 14(3) 1989-1990 pp.99-135
- * Richard E. Bissell, 'Southern Africa: Testing Détente' *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 33(1) pp.88-98
- * Gerald J. Bender, 'The Eagle and the Bear in Angola' *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 489(1987) pp.123-132
- Donna R. Jackson, 'The Ogaden War and the Demise of Détente' *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 632(2010) pp.26-40
- Vladimir Shubin and Andrei Tokarev, 'War in Angola: A Soviet Dimension' *Review of African Political Economy* 28(90) 2001 pp.607-618

1.6 The Gorbachev Revolution

Questions to consider:

CORE READING:

J Aldred, A Mamaux, S Waller (e.d.) *Oxford AQA History for A level: The Cold War c1945-1991* (Oxford, 2015) pp.178-185 (186-200)

OR

D Williamson, *Access to History: Europe and the Cold War 1945-1991* Third Edition (London, 2015) pp. 187-210

ESSENTIAL READING:

* Archie Brown, 'The Gorbachev Revolution and the end of the Cold War' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume III Endings* (Cambridge, 2010) pp. 244-266

FURTHER READING (select one of the following):

- * John M. Battle, 'Uskorenie, Glasnost and Perestroika: The Pattern of Reform under Gorbachev' *Soviet Studies* 40(3) 1988 pp.367-384
- * David Holloway, 'Gorbachev's New Thinking' *Foreign Affairs* 68(1) 1988-89 pp.66-81
- * Robert G. Patman, 'Reagan, Gorbachev and the Emergence of 'New Political Thinking'' *Review of International Studies* 25(4) 1999 pp.577-601
- * Dimitri K. Simes, 'Gorbachev: A New Foreign Policy?' *Foreign Affairs* 65(3) 1986 pp.477-500
- * Philip D. Stewart, 'Gorbachev and Obstacles Toward Détente' *Political Science Quarterly* 101(1) 1986 pp.1-22
- * Peter Zwick, 'New Thinking and Foreign Policy under Gorbachev' *Political Science and Politics* 22(2) 1989 pp.215-224

ADDITIONAL READING (optional):

- * Marshall I. Goldman, 'Gorbachev and Economic Reform in the Soviet Union' *Eastern Economic Journal* 14(4) 1988 pp.331-335
- * Mikhail Gorbachev, *The New Russia* (Cambridge, 2016)
- * James Graham Wilson, 'Did Reagan Make Gorbachev Possible?' *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 38(3) 2008 pp.456-475
- * Robert G. Kaiser, 'Gorbachev: Triumph and Failure' *Foreign Affairs* 70(2) 1991 pp.160-174
- * William Taubman, *Gorbachev, His Life and Times* (London, 2017)
- * W. J. Tompson, 'Khrushchev and Gorbachev as Reformers: A Comparison' *British Journal of Political Science* 23(1) 1993 pp.77-105

DUE DATE:

1.7 The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe

Questions to consider:

CORE READING:

J Aldred, A Mamaux, S Waller (e.d.) *Oxford AQA History for A level: The Cold War c1945-1991* (Oxford, 2015) pp.174--177

OR

D Williamson, *Access to History: Europe and the Cold War 1945-1991* Third Edition (London, 2015) pp. 177-180

ESSENTIAL READING:

* Jacques Lévesque, 'The East European revolutions of 1989' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume III Endings* (Cambridge, 2010) pp. 311-332

FURTHER READING (select one of the following):

- * Helga Haftendorn, 'The unification of Germany, 1985-1991' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume III Endings* (Cambridge, 2010) pp. 333-355
- * Silvio Pons, 'Western Communists, Mikhail Gorbachev and the 1989 Revolutions' *Contemporary European History* 18(3) 2009 pp.349-362
- * Robert Service, *The End of the Cold War 1985-1991* (New York 2015) pp.284-293
- * Vladimir Tismaneanu, 'The Revolutions of 1989: Causes, Meanings, Consequences' *Contemporary European History* 18(3) 2009 pp.271-288
- * John W. Young, 'Western Europe and the end of the Cold War, 1979-1989' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume III Endings* (Cambridge, 2010) pp. 289-310

ADDITIONAL READING (optional):

- * John Besemeres, *A Difficult Neighbourhood: Essays on Russia and East-Central Europe since World War II* (2016)
- * Timothy Goodman, 'Chronology of Political Developments in Hungary: May 1988-December 1989' *World Affairs* 151(4) 1989 pp.156-158
- * Ramnath Naratanswamy. 'Causes and Consequences of the East European Revolutions of 1989' *Economic and Political Weekly* 27(7) 1992 pp.365-371
- * Robert Service, *The End of the Cold War 1985-1991* (New York 2015)

1.8 Additional Reading Lists

Topics:

1. The Sino-Soviet Split
 2. Nuclear Proliferation and Non-Proliferation
 3. The Prague Spring 1968
 4. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
 5. The Cold War in Latin America
 6. Cuba and the Cold War
 7. US Foreign Policy under Reagan and Bush
 8. The Collapse of the Soviet Union
-

1) The Sino-Soviet Split

- * Mikhail Klockko, 'The Sino-Soviet Split: The Withdrawal of the Specialists' *International Journal* 26(2) 1971 pp.556-566
- * Danhui Li and Yafeng Xia, 'Competing for Leadership: Split or Détente in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1959-1961' *The International History Review* 30(3) 2008 pp.545-574
- * Sergey Radchenko, 'The Sino-Soviet Split' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume II Crises and Détente* (Cambridge, 2010) pp.349-372
- * Michael M. Sheng, 'Mao and China's Relations with the Superpowers in the 1950s: A New Look at the Taiwan Strait Crises and the Sino-Soviet Split' *Modern China* 34(4) 2008 pp.477-507
- * Donald S. Zagoria, 'Mao's Role in the Sino-Soviet Conflict' *Pacific Affairs* 47(2) 1974 pp.139-153

2) Nuclear Proliferation and Non-Proliferation

- * Thérèse Delpech, *Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy* (Santa Monica, 2012) pp.61-92
- * Francis J. Gavin, 'Nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation' *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume II Crises and Détente* (Cambridge, 2010) pp.395-416
- * William Burr and David Alan Rosenberg, 'Nuclear Competition in an Era of Stalemate, 1963-1975' *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume II Crises and Détente* (Cambridge, 2010) pp.88-111
- * Paul Boyer, 'From Activism to Apathy: The American People and Nuclear Weapons, 1963-1980' *The Journal of American History* 70(4) 1984 pp.821-844
- * David B. Cohen, 'From Start to Start II: Dynamism and Pragmatism in the Bush Administration's Nuclear Weapon Policies' *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 27(3) 1997 pp.412-428
- * George Perkovich, 'Nuclear Proliferation' *Foreign Policy* 112(1998) pp.12-23
- * Francis J. Gavin, 'Same as It Ever War: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation and the Cold War' *International Security* 34(3) 2009/10 pp.7-37
- * Dimitris Bourantonis, 'The Negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1965-1968: A Note' *The International History Review* 19(2) 1997 pp.347-357
- * Samuel B. Payne, 'The Soviet Debate on Strategic Arms Limitation: 1968-72' *Soviet Studies* 27(1) 1975 pp.27-45

3) The Prague Spring 1968

- * Scott Brown, 'Prelude to a Divorce? The Prague Spring as Dress Rehearsal for Czechoslovakia's 'Velvet Divorce' *Europe-Asia Studies* 60(10) 2008 pp.1783-1804
- * Laura Cashman, 'Remembering 1948 and 1968: Reflections on Two Pivotal Years in Czech and Slovak History' *Europe-Asia Studies* 60(10) 2008 pp.1645-1658
- Anna J. Stoneman, 'Socialism with a Human Face: The Leadership and Legacy of the Prague Spring' *The History Teacher* 49(1) 2015 pp.103-125
- Milan Svec, 'The Prague Spring: 20 Years Later' *Foreign Affairs* 66(5) 1988 pp.981-10001
- Jeremi Suri, 'The Promise and Failure of 'Developed Socialism': The Soviet 'Thaw' and the Crucible of the Prague Spring, 1964-1972' *Contemporary European History* 15(2) 2006 pp.133-158

4) The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

- * Charles G. Cogan, 'Partners in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan since 1979' *World Policy Journal* 10(2) 1993 pp.73-82
- * Joseph Collins, 'Soviet Policy toward Afghanistan' *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 36(4) 1987 ppp.198-210
- * Andrew Hartman, 'The Red Template: US Policy in Soviet-Occupied Afghanistan' *Third World Quarterly* 23(3) 2002 pp.467-489
- * A Nearby Observer, 'The Afghan-Soviet War: Stalemate or Evolution?' *Middle East Journal* 36(2) 1982 pp.151-164
- * Rafael Reuveny and Aseem Prakash, 'The Afghanistan War and the Breakdown of the Soviet Union' *Review of International Studies* 25(4) 1999 pp.693-708
- * Amin Saikal, 'Islamism, the Iranian Revolutions and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan' *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume III Endings* (Cambridge, 2010) pp. 112-134
- * H. Sidky, 'War, Changing Patterns of Warfare, State Collapse and Transnational Violence in Afghanistan: 1978-2001' *Modern Asian Studies* 41(4) 2007 pp.849-888

5) The Cold War in Latin America

- * Jorge G. Castañeda, 'Latin America and the End of the Cold War' *Transition* 59(1993) pp.45-64
- * John H. Coatsworth, 'The Cold War in Central America, 1975-1991' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume III Endings* (Cambridge, 2010) pp. 201-221
- * Tanya Harmer, *Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War* (North Carolina, 2011)
- * Patsy Lewis, 'Introduction: Grenada: Revolution, Invasion and Beyond' *Social and Economic Studies* 62(3/4) 2013 pp.i-xii, 1-8
- * Robert A. Pastor, 'Does the United States Push Revolutions to Cuba? The Case of Grenada' *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 28(1) 1986 pp.1-34
- * George Philip, 'The Nicaraguan Conflict: Politics and Propaganda' *The World Today* 41(12) 1985 pp.222-224
- * Linda Robinson, 'Peace in Central America?' *Foreign Affairs* 66(3) 1987/88 pp.591-613

6) Cuba and the Cold War

- * Anthony T. Bryan, 'Cuba's Impact in the Caribbean' *International Journal* 40(2) 1985 pp.331-347
- * Gordon Connell-Smith, 'Castro's Cuba in World Affairs, 1959-79' *The World Today* 35(1) 1979 pp.15-23
- * Jorge I. Dominguez, 'U.S.-Cuban Relations: From the Cold War to the Colder War' *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 39(3) 1997 pp.49-75
- * Richard R. Fagen, 'Cuba and the Soviet Union' *The Wilson Quarterly* 2(1) 1978 pp.69-78
- * Piero Gleijeses, 'Cuba and the Cold War' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume II Crises and Détente* (Cambridge, 2010) pp.327-348
- * Wolf Grabendorff, 'Cuba's Involvement in Africa: An Interpretation of Objectives, Reactions and Limitations' *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 22(1) 1980 pp.3-29
- * Tony Platt, 'The United States, Cuba and the New Cold War' *Social Justice* 15(2) 1988 pp.4-21
- * Jiri Valenta, 'The Soviet-Cuban Alliance in Africa and the Caribbean' *The World Today* 37(2) 1981 pp.45-53

7) US Foreign Policy under Reagan and Bush

- * Ken Adelman, *Reagan at Reykjavik: Forty-Eight Hours That Ended the Cold War* (New York, 2014)
- * Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, 'Who Won the Cold War?' *Foreign Policy* 87(1992) pp.123-128, 130-138
- * Beth A. Fischer, 'Toeing the Hardline? The Reagan Administration and the Ending of the Cold War' *Political Science Quarterly* 112(3) 1997 pp.477-496
- * Beth A. Fischer, 'US foreign policy under Reagan and Bush' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume III Endings* (Cambridge, 2010) pp.267-288
- * Paul Kengor, 'Comparing Presidents Reagan and Eisenhower' *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 28(2) 1998 pp.366-393

8) The Collapse of the Soviet Union

- * Alex Pravda, 'The collapse of the Soviet Union, 1990–1991' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume III Endings* (Cambridge, 2010) pp.356-377
- * Mark R. Beissinger, 'Nationalism and the Collapse of Soviet Communism' *Contemporary European History* 18(3) 2009 pp.331-347
- * Coit D. Blacker, 'The collapse of Soviet Power in Europe' *Foreign Affairs* 70(1) 1990/91 pp.88-102
- * Ron Hill, 'The Collapse of the Soviet Union' *History Ireland* 13(2) 2005 pp.37-42
- D.F. Fleming, 'The Costs and Consequences of the Cold War' *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 366(1966) pp.127-138

2.1 Source Analysis: Introduction

The first component of your examination will test your ability to analyse **primary source material**. This section will take you through the exam board's expectations and advise you on the necessary techniques needed to be successful in your analyses.

What can you expect in the exam?

The first question in your Cold War paper (AQA Paper 2R: The Cold War c1945-1991) is compulsory and will ask you to **evaluate the value of three primary sources** to a historian studying a particular issue or development. In your assessments you are expected to evaluate the sources, considering, for example, **provenance, style** and **emphasis** and the **content** of the sources.

You must provide evidence of your own knowledge and understanding of the historical context when making your assessments and, in doing so, avoid generalised comment about the value of sources without reference to context. Knowledge that does not relate to the sources receives no credit.

The question carries 30 marks (out of 80 for the entire paper) and you are advised to spend 60 minutes on your analyses. It is best to approach the question as though you are analysing the three sources as separate, but balanced, evaluations reaching a supported judgement. You should also dedicate 5-10 minutes of your allocated time reading the sources carefully and making any short hand annotations to effectively plan your answer.

The question will always be phrased as such:

“With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these three sources to an historian studying ... [30 marks]”

What are the common mistakes?

1. Writing large sections on context with no relation to the source or the question.
2. Forgetting one of the 'ingredients' – you **must** consider the provenance, content, tone/emphasis for every source evaluation.
3. Forgetting balance – you must be balanced not only in studying value and limitation but in examining all the 'ingredients.'
4. Copying out the provenance – it's simply not needed. In essence your wasting your own time writing out information the examiner already knew.
5. Missing information – there's a good reason your teachers have always encouraged you to plan examination answers.
6. 'Stereotypical limitations' – by this we mean simplistic statements that have no little or no supporting evidence such as *'This source is limited because it's bias.'*
7. Tailing off – to reach the top marks your analysis must be consistently supported and focused throughout, which highlights the need to plan and time your answer adequately.
8. Time management – Often poor time management can lead to an underdeveloped answer, which usually impacts the final source evaluation preventing you from moving beyond a Level 3 (60%).

An example of a source:

Sources are labeled A, B and C. They are range between 5 and 15 lines long.

| | |
|------------|---|
| Provenance | Source A |
| | An extract from Hitler's Political Testament, which was prepared the day before his suicide in 1945: |
| Content | After the collapse of the German Reich, and until there is a rise in nationalism in Asia, Africa or Latin America, there will only be two powers in the world: the United States and Soviet Russia. Though the laws of history and geographical position these giants are destined to struggle with each other either through war, or through rivalry in economics and political ideas. |

Provenance: Essentially the origins of the source, but you need to consider: Who wrote it? When was it written? What kind of source is it? Why was it written? Who is it directed at?

Content: What claims does the source make? What evidence does the source use? What claims does the source dismiss?

Language (tone/emphasis): How does the writer use language? What kind of impression is the writer trying to create? What does the source emphasise?

Context: How does the source relate to the events of the time?


Make a balanced argument about the source's value.

Reach a well substantiated judgement about the source's value

Structure:

1. No need for an introduction
2. No need for a conclusion
3. No need to compare, or cross reference the sources
4. Write in three sections, one dealing with each source
5. Balance each source evaluation, half looking at the source's value and the second half examining limitation, before reaching a supported judgement.

How to approach the question:



Technique checklist:

- Have you discussed provenance?
- Have you exemplified provenance with quotes from the Source?
- Have you linked provenance to your judgement?
- Have you discussed content?
- Have you exemplified content with quotes from the Source?
- Have you linked content to your judgement?
- Have you discussed tone?
- Have you exemplified tone with quotes from the Source?
- Have you linked tone to your judgement?
- Have you discussed context?
- Have you exemplified context with quotes from the Source?
- Have you linked context to your judgement?
- Have you used the language of explanation?
- Have you used the language of evaluation?
- Have you backed up your judgement?

How is the question marked?

| Level | The answer will: | Marks |
|-------|---|-------|
| 5 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Show a very good understanding of content and provenance of all three sources• Present a balanced argument on the Sources' value• Reach a well-substantiated judgement• Demonstrate a very good understanding of context | 25-30 |
| 4 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Show a good understanding of content and provenance of all three sources• Provide a balanced argument on the Sources' value• Reach judgements, which may be partially substantiated• Demonstrate a good understanding of context | 19-24 |
| 3 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Show some understanding of content and provenance of all three sources• Attempt to consider the Sources' value, but this may lack balance or may be unconvincing• Demonstrate an understanding of context | 13-18 |
| 2 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Be partial• Provide some comment on the value of the sources, <i>either</i> without addressing all of the Sources <i>or</i> without focusing on the question.• Demonstrate some understanding of context | 7-12 |
| 1 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Offer some comment on the value of at least one source• Provide unsupported, inaccurate vague or• Generalised comments on source value• Demonstrate a limited understanding of context | 1-6 |

My marking codes:

- P+** Examination of the value of provenance
- P-** Examination of the limitation of provenance
- C+** Examination of the value of content
- C-** Examination of the limitation of content
- T+** Examination of the value of tone/language/emphasis
- T-** Examination of the limitation of tone/language/emphasis
- K** Incorporation of historical context (Knowledge)
- J** Judgement provided

A top level response, when marked, will have each of these marking codes present for each of the source evaluations.

**Under timed conditions, you are aiming to write at least one A4 sides for each source evaluation.
The majority of completed answers are between 3 - 3 ½ A4 sides.**

What does a full mark answer look like?

The following student response gained full marks in the 2017 June paper.

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these three sources to an historian studying the causes of the Korean War [30 marks]

Source A

From a radio broadcast by Kim Il Sung to the people of North Korea, 26 June 1950.

Dear brothers and sisters! Great danger threatens our Motherland and its people. What is needed to destroy this menace? In this war, which is being waged against the Syngman Rhee clique, the Korean people must defend the Korean People's Democratic Republic and its constitution; they must destroy the unpatriotic fascist puppet regime of Syngman Rhee which has been established in the southern part of the republic; they must liberate the southern part of our Motherland from the domination of Syngman Rhee and his narrow group of reactionary henchmen; and they must restore the people's committees there as the real organs of power. Under the banner of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, we must complete the unification of the Motherland and create a single, independent, democratic state. The war which we are forced to wage is a just war for the unification and independence of the Motherland and for freedom and democracy.

Source B

From an announcement by President Truman to Congress, 27 June 1950.

In Korea, the Government forces, which were armed to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security, were attacked by invading forces from North Korea. The Security Council of the United Nations called upon the invading troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the thirty-eighth parallel. This they have not done, but, on the contrary, have pressed the attack. In these circumstances, I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support. The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations, and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations, issued to preserve international peace and security. I know that all members of the United Nations will consider carefully the consequences of this latest aggression in Korea which is in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations.

Source C

From Khrushchev's memoirs, published in 1971.

At the time of the outbreak of the Korean war, Khrushchev was part of Stalin's inner circle of advisors. The North Koreans wanted to help their brethren who were under the heel of Syngman Rhee. Stalin persuaded Kim Il Sung to think it over. Kim returned to Moscow when he had worked everything out. Stalin had his doubts. He was worried that the Americans would jump in, but we thought that if the war was fought swiftly – and Kim Il Sung was sure it could be won swiftly – intervention by the USA could be avoided. Nevertheless, Stalin decided to ask Mao Zedong's opinion. I must stress that it wasn't Stalin's idea, but Kim Il Sung's. Kim was the initiator. Stalin of course, didn't try to dissuade him. In my opinion, no real Communist would have tried to dissuade Kim Il Sung from wanting to liberate South Korea from Syngman Rhee and reactionary American influence. Mao Zedong also agreed. He approved Kim Il Sung's suggestion and put forward the opinion that the USA would not intervene since the war would be an internal matter which the Korean people would decide for themselves.

Exam board full mark answer

Source A is a valuable source as it shows the Communist motivations for invading the South of Korea on the 25th June 1950. Kim Il Sung was the primary cause in the conflict as it was his initiative and determination to invade the South to create a unified Korea under Communist leadership. The source shows the attitude of the North Korean government towards Rhee's regime; "unpatriotic fascist regime." Sung's views of Rhee as unpatriotic shows his abhorrence towards Rhee's alliance with America is valuable as Rhee lived in America for over 40 years. The source rightly shows Kim's attempt to foster communist revolution over the south.

The source is however, arguably limited due to its obvious propaganda purposes. Sung is declaring his decision to his people, he is evidently looking for support and thus encourage people to want to fight for his cause. Whilst the source does accurately display Sung's view on the south, the statement that "we are forced" is untrue. Rhee's government did directly threaten the north as he too wanted a unified Korea however the source does not disclose that Sung's decision to act occurred largely due to the wider international scene. Sung understood the significance of the USSR's atomic bomb and the February 1950 Treaty of Friendship; rather than the June 1950 invasion being a result of immediate threat as presented, it was a result of Stalin's shift in deciding to indirectly support Sung. Furthermore, Sung's interpretation of the politics on Korea must be considered as incredibly subjective. Sung's "democracy" was a one-party state under the North Korean Communist Party. However this does demonstrate the Communist propaganda's rhetoric – it is very inspiring "Brothers and Sisters" – and can show why the USA became concerned about Communism in Asia.

The source overall is valuable at demonstrating the ideological causes of the Korean War but it is more limited in its ability to demonstrate the chain of events that allowed Sung to launch an invasion over the 38th parallel.

Source B is valuable as it demonstrates the American reaction to Sung's invasion and its use of the United Nations. Truman demonstrates in the source the shift of the USA policy to containment in Asia. The government forces in South Korea in June 1950 were not significant or aggressive. The source shows how Truman now directly links communism in Eastern Europe with Korea. The "use of subversion" discussed is an obvious allusion to Stalinist expansion in 1945-47 that led to the policy of containment being created through the Truman Doctrine. Truman now connects this idea with Asia showing a shift to global containment. Furthermore, the source shows how the USA used the Korean War as its justification to directly intervene in Korea. Despite a UN force opposing the North, the force was largely American and was led by American General MacArthur. Truman highlights and emphasises the UN collective intervention to Congress because he wishes not to be viewed as the single aggressor. Through the UN, the USA was able to intervene in Korea and continue to condemn the Soviet Union for their direct action in Eastern Europe.

The source is limited however in both its portrayal of the UN shift to global containment and the UN collective action. The source portrays Truman's decision to act in Korea as based solely upon preserving international peace. It is arguable, however, that the source fails to show the government's other motivations to act in Korea. This statement shows a changed attitude to Acheson's 'White Paper' of July 1949 and this was arguably due to the shift in international relations that also motivated Sung's invasion, for example that of USA monopoly. The source does not demonstrate the pressure domestically and the pressure on Truman to reassert USA strength after the 'loss of China.' McCarthyism was emerging as a significant influence on policy by 1950; these are all factors that would influence Truman's speech to Congress. For example, he discusses American troops in Korea but omits to note that South Korea was not included in the January 1950

Strategic Defensive Perimeter. Furthermore, Truman's reference to "all members" of the United Nations is flawed as the USA refused the PRC to take China's seat on the Security Council.

The source is flawed as it does not show the longer term causes to Truman's commitment to Korea or how he utilised the UN but it does show Truman publically announcing a shift in USA policy that was a considerable cause of the Korean War and as a result it is more valuable than it is limited.

Source C is valuable in supporting the ideological motives behind Sung's desire for intervention shown in Source A. The source is also valuable as it demonstrates the role of Stalin and Mao. Khrushchev demonstrates the active role that Sung played and that was not a 'Soviet puppet' as such. Sung was incredibly determined and pursued support from both Stalin and Mao in order to being intervention from May 1949. Khrushchev emphasises that the communists did not believe the US would intervene. This is largely due to containment in Asia not being evident until June 1950. And Korea was omitted from the Defensive Perimeter. It is useful to a historian to understand that Stalin did not wish to provoke the USA in 1950, this is arguably due to the continued US nuclear monopoly at that time. This is the reason that Stalin did not offer direct support in 1950, instead supporting through military and economic aid.

The source is arguable limited to its provenance as Khrushchev memoirs in 1971 were likely an attempt to reinstate popularity after his removal from power in 1964. Khrushchev was criticised for not supporting revolutionary movements with enough enthusiasm, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 was viewed as a failure and this could explain his view that all "real" Communists had to support Sung. However, this assumption does demonstrate the ideological cause of Stalin's support of Sung, whilst it doesn't discuss Stalin's defence to counter USA influence in Japan. Overall, whilst the source has limitations in terms of provenance that could overemphasise ideological motive, it is valuable because it demonstrates Sung's ideological motive, the support from both Stalin and Mao and belief that US containment would not be globalised.

In conclusion, Source C is the most valuable as it demonstrates the motives and causes of the initial aggression over the 38th parallel. However, a historian would not be able to gain a comprehensive understanding of the causes of the Korean War without simultaneously studying Source B, which shows the shift in US policy away from the expectations of Source C. These sources together show a war that was arguably accidental on behalf of the Communists in terms of its significance and magnitude. Source A does have value in demonstrating the ideological position of the North Korean government but does not explore the multi-faceted causation of the conflict, perhaps due to its provenance as a propaganda message.

(End comment from examiner – excellent focus with deep understanding of provenance, impact and use of context to generate a balanced and nuanced judgement on each. Sustained analysis throughout.)

2.2 Limiting Nuclear Weapons

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to a historian studying **the reasons for limiting nuclear weapons in the early 1960s**.

Source A

From a carefully crafted commencement speech delivered by Kennedy to students at American University in Washington DC in June 1963, in which he stated his position with regard to US-Soviet relations:

Some say that it is useless to speak of world peace or world law or world disarmament – and that it will be useless until the leaders of the Soviet Union adopt a more enlightened attitude. I hope they do. I believe we can help them do it. But I also believe that we must re-examine our own attitude – as individuals and as a nation – for our attitude is as essential as theirs.

No government or social system is too evil that is people must be considered as lacking virtue. Both the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies, have a mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace and in halting the arms race. Agreements to this end are in the interest of the Soviet Union as well as ours – and even the most hostile nations can be relied upon to accept and keep those treaty obligations, which are in their interest.

Source B

From the first article of the Moscow Test Ban Treaty, referring directly to what forms of testing are not allowed:

Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapons test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

- a. in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or underwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or
- b. in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a Treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve.

Source C

From Khrushchev's memoirs, written after he resigned which his son Sergey smuggled out of the Soviet Union and published after his death. In *Khrushchev Remembers*, he wrote about how an arms race had the potential to harm a country:

We must make sure that we don't allow ourselves to get involved in a lot of senseless competition with the West over military spending. If we try to compete with America in any but the most essential areas of military preparedness, we will be doing two harmful things. First we will be further enriching wealthy aggressive capitalist circles in the United States who use our own military buildups as a pretext or overloading their own country's arms budget. Second, we will be exhausting our material resources without raising the living standard of our people. We must remember that the fewer people we have in the army, the more people we will have available for other, more productive kinds of work. This would be a good common point of departure for the progressive forces of the world in their struggle for peaceful coexistence.

| Source | Value – provenance and purpose | Value – content and tone | Contextual knowledge to corroborate | Limitations – provenance and purpose | Limitations – content and tone | Contextual knowledge to test the argument |
|--------|--|---|--|---|---|--|
| 1 | Kennedy is President at this point and was integral in assuring the peaceful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis (CMC) October 1962 - Shelling stated that the CMC was the best thing to happen since the Second World War as “it helped us [the US] avoid further confrontation with the Soviets; it resolved the Berlin issue; and it established new basic understanding about US-Soviet interaction.” | “we can help them do it” → movement towards détente? Commercial flights began between New York and Moscow in 1963. Indicates a desired movement towards a re-evaluation of American attitudes (General Leon Johnson, the director of the National Security Council’s Net Evaluation Subcommittee estimated that the USSR and US would have a combined 93 million casualties in the event of nuclear war 1963 or 1964. | The CMC was in October 1962 – moves towards cooperation can be seen in the setting up of the Hotline (established June/August 1963) Khrushchev allowed for the speech to be rebroadcast without any censorship in the Soviet Union → “Moreover Kennedy was also someone we could trust.” Dean Rusk also emphasised that Kennedy’s peace speech has a remarkable effect on world opinion. | American University a very politically active centre – Project Camelot (aimed to enhance the army’s ability to predict the influence of ‘social developments’ in Latin America) Aimed at future political leaders? “Carefully crafted” - Kennedy attempting to persuade a continuation of his legacy? | “the Soviet Union and its allied have a mutually deep interest in a just a genuine peace and in halting the arms race” → China launched the radical policies of the Great Leap Forward (1958-60), leading Moscow to withdraw all Soviet advisers from China in 1960 and PRC continue to develop nuclear weaponry (success 16 th October 1964) “even the most hostile nations can be relied upon...” but France and China do not sign the MTBT | Kennedy continued to produce SLBMs and ICBMs to strengthen defence. The USSR develop ABM system in retaliation USA developed MIRVs to combat this As a demonstration of his good faith, he promised that the US would not conduct any further tests as long as other countries refrained from doing so but there were 140 nuclear tests in 1962, compared to less than 50 in 1963. |

| | | | | | | |
|-----------------|--|--|--|--|---|---|
| <p>2</p> | <p>Moscow Test Ban Treaty 5 August 1963 Indicates continued movement towards limiting nuclear weapons testing Signed in Moscow by US Secretary Rusk, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and British Foreign Secretary Lord Home (ironically one day short of the 18th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima).</p> | <p>Demonstrated the signatories understood the dangers of nuclear technologies and were willing to limit their usage Mentions some reasoning for limiting nuclear weaponry such as “radioactive debris” – harm of nuclear fallout illustrated by Hiroshima and Nagasaki (6th and 9th August 1945) Ban extends to outer space → interesting as the Soviets were most developed in this area (12 April 1961 Gagarin orbit)</p> | <p>External monitoring of nuclear tests made more viable by the fact that by 1963 the USSR also had relatively sophisticated satellite reconnaissance systems.</p> | <p>10 months after the CMC crisis – a significant delay. The treaty was a result of failed negotiations from as early as May 1955 (UN Disarmament Conference)</p> | <p>The question is asking to study the reasons for limiting nuclear weapons. This is not discussed by the treaty only gives indication of movements towards limiting nuclear testing – you can however link this treaty back to context.</p> | <p>Agreement was partial (or limited) because it did not include underground tests. Difficult to detect or differ from earthquakes. USA withdrew insistence about on-site inspections in order to monitor underground tests. Treaty was signed by the USA, USSR and the UK – France and China refused to sign, France continued to test its nuclear weapon in the south Pacific well into the 1990s and China until 1996.</p> |
| <p>3</p> | <p>Personal recollections of Khrushchev – unhampered by party line and avoids censorship</p> | <p>“we don’t allow ourselves to get involved in a lot of senseless competition” “exhausting our material resources”</p> | <p>→ can be linked to the MAD theory</p> | <p>Memoirs are usually designed to give a positive memory or legacy so might be painted by hindsight. Entry was written between 1964 – 1971 (after he was ousted but before he died)</p> | <p>Paints a negative light of the US “aggressive capitalist circles”</p> | <p>Khrushchev: Kennedy was “a man who understood the situation correctly and who genuinely did not want war. Kennedy was realistic enough to see that now the might of the socialist world equalled “that of the capitalist world. “</p> |

A Level 5 response:

Source C is the most valuable of the three sources due to both its content and provenance. The content of the source is valuable as it specifies Khrushchev's reasons for trying to limit arms in the early 1960s, owing mostly to it being "senseless competition". Rather than the idealistic portrayal of unity described in Source A, Source C notes the political and economic purposes: the arms race allowed the USA to massively increase military spending and the USSR could use its money previously spent on arms to invest in industry and raising living standards of Soviet citizens. Khrushchev also alludes to the need for compromise within 'peaceful coexistence.' This is likely to be reflecting upon the change in attitudes after the Cuban Missile Crisis, as well as Khrushchev's more long-term policy. The provenance of Source C also makes the source valuable. Khrushchev was the Premier of the Soviet Union in the early 1960s; therefore his attitudes reflect that of the Soviet Union in terms of their stance in diplomacy. Furthermore, the source was written after he resigned and published posthumously, therefore the message is unlikely to be attempting to shape the diplomatic situation of the moment, unlike Source A. The memoirs were also smuggled out of the Soviet Union, meaning they were no subject to Brezhnev's censorship and remained true to Khrushchev's recorded experience.

Both the content and provenance of Source C do have limitations, however, in explaining the causes of arms limitations. Khrushchev is writing in his memoirs about his motives, not those of the USA. However, it could be argued that the reasons stated were likely to apply to the USA also. Whilst the USA did not have such pressure to decrease military spending to increase living standards as the USSR did, such pressures were mounting. Furthermore, deep mistrust of the Soviet Union meant that many Americans feared that the USA were not superior in the arms race, therefore reducing Soviet spending in arms was beneficial. These commonalities are noted in Source C with 'good common point of departure'. Notably, due to Source C being a memoir from a Soviet Premier, there is a high chance that it will harbour an agenda, likely being the preservation of Khrushchev's legacy. Thus, although the source has high authority, its credibility is impacted by its provenance. Khrushchev's use of language could also be seen as a limitation as he notes the US as having 'aggressive capitalist circles' indicating the USA to be more responsible for the developing arms race, when in reality he MAD policy drove both nations to play a substantial part in the development of nuclear weaponry. This subjective nature can be seen to further devalue the source, although the language also reveals a deal of honest reflection on the situation, appreciating that competition with the US would ultimately do more harm than good.

Overall, Source C is by far the most valuable as it clearly presents the reasons for why limiting nuclear weapons in the early 1960s was an important and necessary move with the source focusing on why it needed to happen, rather than how.

Having looked over the table and student response to Source A, I would like you to write **two further evaluations** for **Source A** and **Source B**. You can spend however much time you feel you need in annotating the sources and planning, but you should complete the writing of your evaluations in **no more than 40 minutes** (20 minutes per source).

Advice:

- Consider each source separately – you do not have to write an overall introduction or conclusion. However, you should come to a separate judgement at the end of your section on each source.
- Be clear about what the source is saying overall.
- Be clear about how the content of the source links to your contextual knowledge about the period.
- Comment on the provenance of the source.
- Comment on the tone of the source.
- Make a judgement about the value of the source for the purpose stated in the question.

2.3 The Vietnam War

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to a historian studying **why the war in Vietnam lasted so long without a clear victory for either side in the years 1963 to 1968?** [30 marks]

Source A

From a resolution issued by the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers Party, December 1963, shortly after the assassination of JFK.

As for us, we became more confident in the victory of our armed forces... to create a basic change in the balance of forces between the enemy and us is within our grasp. In the days ahead, our force will be increasingly developed, whereas the enemy will certainly encounter a great deal of difficulties and he will be demoralised. If the US imperialists send more troops to Vietnam to save the situation... the struggle will become stronger and harder but it will certainly succeed in attaining the final victory.

Source B

Speech on Vietnam (September 29, 1967) made at the University of Virginia by President Johnson

United States is willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this will lead promptly to productive discussions. We, of course, assume that while discussions proceed, North Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation. But Hanoi has not accepted any of these proposals.

So it is by Hanoi's choice—and not ours, and not the rest of the world's—that the war continues. Why, in the face of military and political progress in the South, and the burden of our bombing in the North, do they insist and persist with the war?

From many sources the answer is the same. They still hope that the people of the United States will not see this struggle through to the very end. As one Western diplomat reported to me only this week—he had just been in Hanoi—"They believe their staying power is greater than ours and that they can't lose." A visitor from a Communist capital had this to say: "They expect the war to be long, and that the Americans in the end will be defeated by a breakdown in morale, fatigue, and psychological factors." The Premier of North Vietnam said as far back as 1962: "Americans do not like long, inconclusive war Thus we are sure to win in the end.

Are the North Vietnamese right about us? I think not.

Source C

North Vietnamese leader, Le Duan in Letters to the South, a n open letter to the communists in South Vietnam, 1965

In order to combat the enemy’s policy of “pacification” of rural areas, we have to reduce their advantages in the lowlands, coordinate well the three spearheads, enhance our guerrilla war, and simultaneously encourage political struggle and agitation and propaganda among the enemy troops; we have to consolidate and develop combat villages, dig underground shelters, build underground passage ways to avoid air fire and to fight with the enemy.

In the near future will we be capable of destroying an important part of the American troops? I believe that we do. Our victory in the recent Van Tuong battle is a lively evidence. In this battle, the US chose the battleground, used 9000 troops, concentrated their advantage of fire-power and war facilities. But two of our core battalions defeated them badly; our loss is one twentieth theirs. If the Ap Bac battle in early 1963 showed the capability of defeating the American troops’ “helicopter mobilization,” “tank mobilization” techniques in support of the puppet troops’ raids in the low lands, if the Binh Gia battle in late 1964 marked a step of growing up of our core troops in destroying the large combat units of the core puppet troops, then the Van Tuong battle has rhetorically proved that we are capable of defeating the American troops when they are at an absolute advantage in terms of weapons and fire-power.

A different kind of grid might be helpful to you:

| | Valuable | Less valuable |
|---|----------|---------------|
| Content And argument (CAT): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overall argument • Content – linked to contextual knowledge | | |
| Provenance And Tone (PAT): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provenance – i.e. the origin of the source (Who wrote it? When? For what purpose?) • Tone – e.g. factual/informative/persuasive/angry/self-justifying | | |
| Judgement on value for purpose of Q | | |



2.4 Pressures faced by the USSR

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to a historian studying **the pressures faced by the USSR between 1963 and 1970**. [30 marks]

Source A:

From a six-point statement issued by the Czechoslovak Communist Party Presidium on 21 August 1968 to the people of its country. Below are points 1, 3 and 5:

The deputies of the National Assembly have met and unanimously agreed on the following declaration at a time when the Government and other organs cannot carry out their functions:

(1) We fully agree with the declaration of the Central Committee... protesting against the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the armies of the five countries – members of the Warsaw Treaty – and considering it a violation of international law, of the provisions of the Warsaw Treaty, and of the principles of equal relations among nations.

(3) We categorically demand the immediate withdrawal of the armies of the five States – members of the Warsaw Treaty – and full respect for the sovereignty of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

(5) We call on all the people not to commit any violent actions against the occupation armies and not to let themselves be provoked by various forces who wish to gather proof for the justification of the intervention and to use the situation for self-appointed actions.

Source B:

From a speech delivered by Brezhnev to the Polish Party Congress in November 1968, in which he justified the action in Czechoslovakia and outlined the rationale for future Soviet actions:

The peoples of the socialist countries and Communist Parties certainly do have and should have freedom for determining the ways of advance of their respective countries. However, none of their decisions should damage either socialism in their country or the fundamental interests of other socialist countries, and the whole working class movement, which is working for socialism.

This means that each Communist Party is responsible not only to its own people, but also to all the socialist countries, to the entire communist movement. Whoever forgets this, in stressing only the independence of the Communist Party, becomes one-sided. He deviates from his international duty ...

The sovereignty of each socialist country cannot be opposed to the interests of the world of socialism, of the world revolutionary movement. Lenin demanded that all communists fight against small nation narrow-mindedness, seclusion and isolation, consider the whole and the general, subordinate the particular to the general interest.

Source C:

From an editorial published by the *People's Daily*, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party in January 1963:

Since the international situation is complicated and is changing rapidly, and since each fraternal Party finds itself in different circumstances, the emergence of different views among fraternal Parties on one question or another can hardly be avoided. The important thing is that, once differences have emerged among fraternal Parties, they should iron out their differences and achieve unanimity through inter-Party consultation on the basis of equality. In no circumstances should they make the differences among the fraternal Parties public in the face of the enemy, nor should they make use of the press and other propaganda media for open attacks on other fraternal Parties, and still less should they make use of congresses of one Party for this purpose. Clearly, if open attacks are directed against one fraternal Party today and another tomorrow, will there be any unity of the international communist movement to speak of? We hold that continuing to make attacks while talking about one's desire to halt them is not the attitude an honest communist should take.

| Value | | | |
|----------|---|---|---|
| | Provenance | Content | Tone |
| Source 1 | <p>21 August 1968 – The day following the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces in Operation Danube.</p> <p>Czechoslovak Communist Party Presidium – De facto ruling part of the government. It held the decision-making and policy-making responsibilities with the congress as little more than a rubber stamp. Therefore it is likely to have good information.</p> | <p>Occupation of Czechoslovakia - Seen as a hostile military invasion rather than restoration of stability – Backed up by point 5 which implies that the invasion is unjust.</p> <p>Violation of International Law – Calling for the support of the international community. This shows that Czechoslovakia doesn't see the Soviet sphere of influence as immune from Western interference.</p> | <p>Protesting the Occupation of Czechoslovakia – The statement is using language to show Czechoslovakia as an entirely innocent party – This can further be seen in language such as provoked or violation.</p> |
| Source 2 | <p>Delivered by Brezhnev – If any man is going to have the best information about pressures facing the USSR, it's going to be this guy.</p> <p>November 1968 – After the Prague spring has been quelled but before 'Normalisation' began with the removal of Dubček in April 1969.</p> | <p>Sovereignty...cannot be opposed to...socialism – Brezhnev is showing that a major pressure on the USSR in this period was rising nationalism in the Eastern Bloc threatening to undermine the Soviet Union's interests.</p> <p>Lenin demanded – Attempt for a return to old form of communism, showing Brezhnev's feelings that it is less stable now.</p> | <p>Subordinate the particular to the general interest – Brezhnev uses the common good as a stand in term for the good of the USSR. Although the message may be coded, it is relatively easy to see through.</p> <p>The tone is one of stern reassurance; therefore Brezhnev must be worried about the power and desires of the Eastern Bloc.</p> |
| Source 3 | <p>Chinese Communist Party – This source presents an entirely different threat to the other two sources, therefore showing a different pressure on the USSR.</p> <p>Official Newspaper –The Chinese government would have good information and intelligence about pressures on the USSR.</p> | <p>In different circumstances, the emergence of different views – This statement grants insight into why the Sino-Soviet split occurred, which was a major pressure on the USSR in this period.</p> | <p>The matter-of-fact tone shows the tight control of the CCP over its people's opinions and beliefs. Therefore, this shows that China could be a huge pressure on the USSR as they would have the support of the people behind them.</p> |

| Limitations | | | |
|-------------|---|--|--|
| | Provenance | Content | Tone |
| Source 1 | <p>To the People – The government’s public attitude to the crisis may not represent their true attitude.</p> <p>21 August 1968 – The day following the invasion so they are unlikely to have full information about the situation. Czechoslovak Communist Party Presidium – This government may doesn’t have insight in to the pressures facing the USSR.</p> | <p>Demand the Immediate Withdrawal – This is a reactionary piece so refuses to address the reasons for the invasion, especially in terms of how pressures on the Soviet Union impacted the decision. The source is largely devoid of useful information. It merely outlines Czechoslovakia’s response to an action caused by the pressures facing the USSR.</p> | <p>Statement Issued by the Czechoslovak Communist Party – The source is written in formal language and is therefore difficult to interpret any tone from.</p> <p>The statement has been translated into English, so any tone may have been distorted. Also, the tones may have been different between the Czech and Slovak versions of the statement.</p> |
| Source 2 | <p>To the Polish Party Congress – This is likely an attempt to reassure and quell panic in the Polish government. Brezhnev is going to want to make sure the Eastern Bloc takes Czechoslovakia as a warning, not a threat.</p> <p>This speech is public and is trying to put on a strong façade. It does not, therefore, outline the threats to and pressures on the USSR.</p> | <p>Largely a repetition of the same point for the Eastern Bloc to toe the line. It therefore has a long winded way of stating one single point.</p> | <p>Should have... However – Brezhnev trying to sugarcoat his message in order not to scare the Eastern Bloc nations. However, that simply hides the actual message that he is trying to convey.</p> |
| Source 3 | <p>January 1963 – The Sino-Soviet Split began to emerge as early as 1950, but was only made truly public with the formal ideological statements released in June 1963.</p> <p>Official Newspaper – Whilst the Chinese government would have good information and intelligence, they are unlikely to share that with the Chinese public.</p> | <p>Achieve unanimity through inter-party consultation – The message <i>People’s Daily</i> is putting across is very different to how they act a few months later. This hypocrisy is especially evident in the fact that the CCP was the first to publish its formal ideological statements in June 1963.</p> | <p>The tone presents its view in a very matter-of-fact way. The paper seems to see international communist unity as the only way forward but, again, is in direct conflict with their later actions.</p> |

2.5 Relations between China and the USA

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to a historian studying **the improved relations between the USA and China in the years 1971 and 1972.**

Read over the sources and the student response to Source A, then write **two further evaluations** for **Source B** and **Source C**. If possible, I would like you to complete the planning and writing of your evaluations in **no more than 40 minutes** (20 minutes per source).

Source A

From a speech on US foreign policy by the US President, Richard Nixon to Congress, 25 February 1971.

The twenty-two year hostility between ourselves and the PRC [People's Republic of China] is serious indeed; an international order cannot be secure if one of the major powers remains largely outside it and hostile towards it. In this decade, therefore, the most important challenge will be to draw the PRC into a constructive relationship with the world community. A factor determining contemporary Chinese foreign policy is the intense and dangerous conflict with the USSR. A clash between these two great powers is inconsistent with the kind of stable Asian structure we seek. We will do nothing to sharpen this conflict – nor to encourage it. We are prepared to establish a dialogue with Beijing. We cannot accept its ideological precepts or the notion that Communist China must exercise dominance over Asia. But neither do we wish to impose on China an international position that denies its legitimate national interests.

Source B

From a joint communiqué (a statement made by the US and China to the world's media), 27 February 1972.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agree that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides state that:

- both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict
- neither should seek dominance in the Asia-Pacific region
- neither is prepared to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world or any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

Source C

From a statement by President Brezhnev of the USSR which was published in the Soviet government-controlled newspaper, 'Pravda', 21 March 1972.

The participants in the Beijing meetings told their peoples and the world little about the content of their talks and the substance of the agreement reached by them. More than that, they said that it had been decided to keep it secret and not to discuss anything beyond what is in the published official communiqué. Therefore, facts and the subsequent actions of the United States and the PRC will reveal the true significance of the Beijing talks. The future will show how matters stand. It is impossible, however, to overlook some statements of the participants of the Beijing talks that make one think that the dialogue goes beyond the framework of the bilateral relations between the United States and China. For instance, how else can one assess the statement made at a banquet in Shanghai that 'today our two peoples hold in their hands the future of the whole world?'

A Level 5 response:

Source A is a very valuable to a historian due to its provenance as it comes from a speech that Nixon gave to Congress meaning it has high authority. It also has value as in 1971 Henry Kissinger undertook a secret trip to China to further improve relations between the two sides in the hope that the Chinese would put pressure on North Vietnam to negotiate. Therefore the source holds value not only coming from Nixon but due to it being published at the beginning of improving Sino-US relations. Source A is also valuable in that it talks about 'not accepting ideological precepts.' Nixon and Kissinger were at that time engaged with the policy of realpolitik, which focused on diplomatic relations with other nations regardless of ideology. Therefore improving Sino-US relations was down to a change in US foreign policy, which came to overlook ideological differences and instead appreciate China's 'legitimate national interests.' The source also holds value as it recognises another reason the US were motivated to improve their relations with China: the continuing decline of Sino-Soviet relations. Reference to the 'inconsistent' relationship between China and the USSR is indeed accurate, with serious border tensions from 1968. This is supported by the source's claims of 'intense and dangerous conflict,' particularly significant considering China had the atomic bomb from 1964. Therefore the source is valuable in indicating the USA's desire to improve relations with China in a policy known as 'triangular diplomacy' whereby Nixon and Kissinger could exploit the Sino-Soviet rivalry to further progress the direction of Soviet-American détente.

However, in some ways, Source A is of limited value when studying improvements in Sino-US relations owing to its tone and provenance, as it is aimed to pacify members of Congress who were against Chinese diplomacy. The language is very certain of the negative implications of failing to improve relations with China in suggesting 'order cannot be secure.' Nixon, anti-Communist himself, needed to persuade politicians to agree that rapprochement with China was the right diplomatic move. This would have been challenging considering China's involvement in supporting North Vietnamese forces and prior to that, North Korea. There are also some limitations in Source A's contents, particularly the statement 'we will do nothing to sharpen this conflict-nor to encourage it.' The Soviet Union reacted strongly to the rapprochement, accusing China of "forming a bloc with ultrareactionaries" and "seeking to strengthen contacts with any political leaders in the West who display or may display willingness to cooperate with Maoists on the basis of anti-Sovietism." Thus, the source's claim that the US would not sharpen the conflict between China and the USSR seems highly implausible considering Nixon knew precisely that triangular diplomacy would be forcing the USSR's hand in improving their relations with the USA as it would otherwise prove a potential dangerous threat to Soviet interests.

Therefore, I believe that Source A is valuable as it outlines Nixon's reasons for wanting to improve relations with China and shows a clear change in policy in overlooking ideology with the hope of greater diplomatic ties.

2.6 Détente

This will be an in-class time essay practice. You are permitted to have with you annotated sources and a brief essay plan, but no more.

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to a historian studying **détente** [30 marks]

Source A:

From a speech by President Kennedy at the American University in Washington DC, June 1963

No government or social system is so evil that its people must be considered as lacking in virtue. As Americans, we find communism profoundly repugnant as a negation of personal freedom and dignity. But we can still hail the Russian people for their many achievements, in science and space, in economic and industrial growth, in culture and in acts of courage. Among the many traits the peoples of our two countries have in common, none is stronger than our mutual abhorrence of war. Almost unique, among the major world powers, we have never been at war with each other. And no nation in the history of battle ever suffered more than the Soviet Union suffered in the course of the Second World War. Today, should total war ever break out again, no matter how, our two countries would become the primary targets. It is an ironic but accurate fact that the two strongest powers are the two in most danger of devastation.

Source B:

From the transcript of President Johnson's briefing to ex-President Eisenhower on his talks with Alexei Kosygin at Glassboro, New Jersey, in June 1967

JOHNSON: I wanted to call you. I waited until he (Kosygin) got through with his press conference. He played the same old broken record in private that he did in public. We tried to get agreement on four or five points. We may have made a little progress on non-proliferation. On Vietnam he said we've got to stop our bombing. Send your troops home. Then things will work out. EISENHOWER: And then after that we will start talking? JOHNSON: Yup. He has an obsession about China and just said we'd better understand that they are very dangerous people and we'd better start talking about their exploding these nuclear weapons. EISENHOWER: This thing about China, did he make any specific suggestion? JOHNSON: No. He said we ought to have another conference on that. I said we're ready any time. I'd be glad to have one every year.

Source C:

From a confidential report to Moscow by Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, referring to his private talks with Henry Kissinger, July 1969

Kissinger said that the meeting was organised with the President's knowledge, so that my report could, if necessary, provide 'first-hand' knowledge of the President's point of view on various international questions and especially on Soviet-American relations. Kissinger said that President Nixon's main goal in this area is avoiding situations which could lead to direct confrontation between the USA and USSR. Nevertheless, went on Kissinger, this is only one side of the question. Nixon would like very much that during his Presidency (until 1972, or maybe even to 1976 in case he's re-elected) that Soviet-American relations would enter a constructive phase, different from those relations which existed during the 'Cold War'. Kissinger touched here on the question of China. Recalling Nixon's idea, which had been told to us before, that they were not going to interfere in the present-day Soviet-Chinese conflict in any way, Kissinger said that they, of course, don't mind improving relations with China and are ready to take 'reasonable steps' forward in this direction.

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2.7 Cuban intervention in Africa

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to a historian studying **the impact of Cuban intervention in Africa on Cold War relations.**

Read over the sources and the student response to Source A, then write **two further evaluations** for **Source A** and **Source C**. If possible, I would like you to complete the planning and writing of your evaluations in **no more than 40 minutes** (20 minutes per source).

Source A

In 1978, Peter Tarnoff, a senior US State Department official, visited Cuba and met with Castro. In one of their meetings Castro expressed his opinion of the negative shift in US-Cuban relations:

We feel it is deeply immoral to use the blockade [the US trade embargo against Cuba as a means of pressurising Cuba]. There should be no mistake: we cannot be pressure, impressed, bribed or bought. Perhaps because the US is a great power, it feels it can do what it wants and what is good for it. It seems to be saying here there are two laws, two sets of rules and two kinds of logic, one for the USA and one for other countries. Perhaps it is idealistic of me, but I never accepted the universal prerogatives of the US. I never accepted and never will accept the existence of a different law and different rules. I hope history will bear witness to the shame of the United States which for twenty years had not allowed sales of [American] medicines to save lives.

Source B

From Kissinger's memoirs of 1999, in which he offered an explanation of Cuba's involvement in Angola that was based on both Soviet records of an interview with former Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Korniyenko, and a secret briefing of US Secretary of State Alexander Haig in 1981:

Finally there was the wild card represented by Fidel Castro. At the time we thought he was operating as a Soviet surrogate. We could not imagine that he would act so provocatively, so far from home, unless he was pressured by Moscow to repay the Soviet Union for its military and economic support. Evidence now available suggests the opposite was the case. In 1975, Castro was on an ideological high. He seems to have interpreted the collapse of Indochina as ... an opportunity to establish himself as the ideological leader of a wave of the future... Castro ... sent an expeditionary corps to Angola initially largely on his own.

Source C

From a Defense Intelligence Agency Report in April 1984 titled 'Soviet Military and other activities in Sub-Saharan Africa':

Moscow continues its policy of taking an active and aggressive role in the affairs of Sub-Saharan Africa, but it has lost much of the political and psychological momentum it gained in the mid-to-late 1970s ... Angola and Ethiopia are the two countries in which Moscow is most heavily involved. In return for its military support, Moscow reaps the considerable benefits of continued use of naval and air facilities at Luanda.

Military sales and assistance programs remain the most visible and the most important means by which Moscow seeks to penetrate Sub-Saharan Africa. Moscow is the dominant arms supplier; trainer of indigenous military personnel abroad; with the exception of Cuba, supplier of military advisors to the region. The Soviets have entered into military sales or aid programs with nearly half of the states in this region. Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique are the USSR's most important clients in this regard, with Ethiopia accounting for over 60 percent of all Soviet military sales to Sub-Saharan Africa since 1977.

A Level 5 response:

Source B is valuable owing to its provenance, as Kissinger was Secretary of State until 1977 and was keen to counter Soviet expansionism and his foreign policy would certainly have contributed to the USA's involvement in Angola. Value can also be seen in the source's provenance as Kissinger in writing his memoirs, has access to sources from both a Soviet and US perspective. This makes the source highly credible because it would be possible for Kissinger to offer a more balanced reflection on the events of Cuba's involvement in Angola and its impact on Cold War relations. However, the provenance of Source B may be considered limited because the purpose of the source is to offer "an explanation of Cuba's involvement in Angola" which disregards the Ogaden War, for instance. Thus, the scope of the source is limited. The provenance is also limited because Kissinger's interpretation of Soviet records of the interview may not reflect how the Soviets would interpret the interview. The purpose of the source as a memoir also calls into question Kissinger's credibility, as it is highly likely he was aiming not only to document his experiences but also justify his insights and actions.

The tone of the source is valuable "evidence now available suggests the opposite was the case" portrays a reflective, pensive tone, meaning that Kissinger's thoughts would be well considered. However, the tone is limited because it doesn't reflect the heated discussions in the White House and over how much aid should be given to the FNLA, for example. The content of Source B is also valuable because Kissinger comments, "he could not imagine that [Cuba] would act so provocatively ... unless he was pressured by Moscow." This is valuable to a historian because it demonstrates that the USA now realise that Cuba should not be treated as a satellite state of the USSR, as shown through their intervention in Africa. Kissinger's comment on Cuba's actions is backed up by Anatoly Dobrynin, who stated in his memoirs that 'the Cubans sent their troops to Angola "on their own initiative and without consulting us."' This makes the source more valuable as the view Kissinger presents is not only accurate but indicates why the Cuban intervention in Africa had such an impact on Cold War relations; the USA could not then perceive that Cuba would act independently from the USSR. The content of Source C is limited, however, because Kissinger comments that Castro "seems to have interpreted the collapse of Indochina as ... an opportunity to establish himself." This is not completely accurate because it implies that Castro's motivation for involvement was the result of the Vietnam War. Yet Castro intervened in Angola because he opposed a minority white rule and, as he saw it, the victory of the U.S. and South African backed forces would have meant the victory of apartheid and the reinforcement of white domination over the black majority in southern Africa.

In all, Source B is valuable in reflecting on how the US perceived Cuban intervention in hindsight but its limiting provenance as a reflection on the events does impact the source's overall credibility.

2.8 Gorbachev's 'New Thinking'

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to a historian studying Gorbachev's 'New Thinking' [30 marks]

This will likely be an in-class time essay practice. You are permitted to have with you annotated sources and a brief essay plan, but no more.

Source A:

From Gorbachev's book entitled *Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World*, published in 1987, in which he sets out his rationale for change:

At some stage – this became particularly clear in the latter half of the seventies – something happened that was at first inexplicable. The country began to lose momentum. Economic failure became more frequent. Difficulties began to accumulate and deteriorate, and unresolved problems to multiply. Elements of what we call stagnation and other phenomena alien to socialism began to appear in the life of society... Analysing the situation we first discovered a slowing economic growth. In the last fifteen years the national income growth rates declined by more than half and by the beginning of the eighties had fallen to a level close to economic stagnation. A country that was once quickly closing on the world's advanced nations began to lose one position after another. Moreover, the gap in the efficiency of production, quality of products, scientific and technological development, the production of advanced technology and the use of advanced techniques began to widen, and not to our advantage.

Source B:

From Gorbachev's speech, given to the 27th Party Congress in February 1986, in which he presents his desire to change economic programming in the Soviet Union:

Every readjustment of the economic mechanism begins with a rejection of old stereotypes of thought and actions, with a clear understanding of the new tasks. This refers primarily to the activity of our economic personnel, to the functionaries of the central links of administration. Most of them have a clear idea of the Party's initiatives and seek to find the best way of carrying them out ... it is hard, however, to understand those who follow a 'wait and see' policy, or those who do not actually do anything or change anything. There will be no reconciliation with the stance taken by functionaries of that kind. All the more, we have to part ways with those who hope that everything will settle down and return to the old lines. That will not happen comrades!

Source C:

From an article in the **Guardian** in February 1988, which recounted the words of Gorbachev to Soviet poets, writers and journalists on the role of glasnost in Soviet society:

If we give up further development of the process of glasnost, criticism, self-criticism and democracy, it will be the end to our perestroika. We have resolutely taken the path of glasnost and we shall follow it unswervingly.

The main lesson from the past is that the people were excluded from the process of public life, from the process of decision-making. Now we must draw people into this process with the help of political democracy, the press, and public organisations. At the same time, we cannot permit the press to be turned into the domain of any one particular group.

Our stand point on this question must be absolutely clear. If someone is affected by critical material in the press, and is uncomfortable about it, he is going to have to swallow whatever the press says – if it is true. If it is true, we must turn to the people and ask what brought about this situation. On these conditions, our Party will remain alive.

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2.9 Full Essay Practice Questions

With reference to the sources and your own understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these three sources to an historian studying **US involvement in Southeast Asia from 1972 to 1979** [30 marks]

Source A:

From a speech delivered by President Nixon on 23 January 1973 that was broadcast around the USA, by all television networks, to announce the Paris Agreement:

Throughout the years of negotiations, we have insisted on peace with honour. In my addresses to the nation from this room, I set forth the goals that we considered essential for peace with honour. In the settlement that has now been agreed to, all the conditions that I laid down then have been met. A ceasefire, internationally supervised, will begin at 7.00pm this Saturday, January 27, Washington time. Within 60 days from this Saturday, all Americans held prisoner of war throughout Indochina will be released. There will be the fullest possible accounting to all of those who are missing in action.

During the same 60-day period, all American forces will be withdrawn from South Vietnam. The United States will continue to recognize the Government of the Republic of Vietnam as the sole legitimate government of South Vietnam. We shall continue to aid South Vietnam within the terms of the agreement, and we shall support efforts by the people of South Vietnam to settle their problems peacefully amongst themselves.

Source B:

A cable sent from Henry Kissinger to Ambassador Graham Martin via Martin Channel, 29 April 1975. Kissinger is cabling to Saigon on the President's evacuation decision:

1. The President has met with the National Security Council and has made the following decisions:
2. If the airport is open for fixed-wing operations today, you are to continue the evacuation of high risk Vietnamese by fixed-wing aircraft. You are also to evacuate by the end of the day all American personnel at Tan Son Nhut as well as all but bare minimum personnel from the embassy.
3. While you should not say so, this will be the last –repeat- least day of fixed-wing evacuation from Tan Son Nhut.
4. If the airport is unusable for fixed-wing aircraft or becomes so during the day as a result of enemy fire, you are immediately to resort to helicopter evacuation of all –repeat- all Americans, both from the DAO compound and from the embassy compound. Fighter and suppressive fire will be used as necessary in the event of helicopter evacuation.

Source C:

From Henry Kissinger’s memoir, *Diplomacy* published in 1994; he discusses the results of the Vietnam War for the American public:

In the Vietnam period, America was obliged to come to grips with its limits. America found itself involved in a war which became morally ambiguous, and in which America’s material superiority was largely irrelevant. America searched its soul and turned on itself. Surely no other society would have had comparable confidence in its ultimate cohesiveness to thus rip itself apart, certain that it could put itself together again. The experience of Vietnam remains deeply imprinted on the American psyche, while history has seemingly reserved for itself some of its most telling lessons. After its soul-searching, America recovered its self-confidence, and the Soviet Union, despite its monolithic appearance, paid a mortal penalty for moral, political and economic overreaching. The United States went into Vietnam in order to stop what it considered a centrally directed communist

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With reference to sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to a historian studying the **reasons for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan** [30 marks]

Source 1

A personal memorandum from Andropov to Brezhnev on 1 December 1979, regarding the situation in Afghanistan following Amin's coup:

After the coup and the murder of Taraki in September of this year, the situation in Afghanistan began to undertake an undesirable turn for us. The situation in the party, the army and the government apparatus has become more acute, as they were essentially destroyed as a result of the mass repressions carried out by Amin.

At the same time, alarming information started to arrive about Amin's secret activities, forewarning of a possible political shift to the West. [These included:] Contacts with an American agent about issues which are kept secret from us. Promises to tribal leaders to shift away from USSR and to adopt a "policy of neutrality." Closed meetings in which attacks were made against Soviet policy and the activities of our specialists. The practical removal of our headquarters in Kabul, etc. The diplomatic circles in Kabul are widely talking of Amin's differences with Moscow and his possible anti-Soviet steps.

Source 2

From an interview by Brezhnev on 12 January 1980, in which he attempted to explain the Soviet Union's role in Afghanistan to the international community:

Imperialism together with its accomplices launched an undeclared war against revolutionary Afghanistan. The only task set to the Soviet contingents is to assist the Afghans in repulsing the aggression from outside. The unceasing armed intervention, the well advanced plot by external forces of reaction created a real threat that Afghanistan would lose its independence and be turned into an imperialist military bridgehead on our country's southern border. There has been no Soviet 'intervention' or 'aggression.' We are helping the new Afghanistan on the request of its government to defend the national independence, freedom and honour of its country from armed aggression. The sum total of the American administration's steps in connection with the events in Afghanistan shows that Washington again is trying to speak to us in the language of the Cold War.

Source 3

From President Carter's annual State of the Union address to the American people, delivered on 23 January 1980, in which he mentioned the Carter Doctrine

Now the Soviet Union has taken a radical and an aggressive new step. It's using its great military power against a relatively defenseless nation. The implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could pose the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War. The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance. It contains two thirds of the world's exportable oil. The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position therefore that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil. Let our position be absolutely clear. An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America. Such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these three sources to an historian studying the **Soviet-American summits of 1985 to 1988**
[30 marks]

Source A:

From the *Guardian*, 20 November 1985, reporting on 'the unexpected note of hope' at the end of the Geneva Summit:

The Geneva Summit has succeeded beyond all expectations. President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev agreed last night to hold a joint press conference this morning to deliver a much more unified report on their two days of talks than had been envisaged. The agreement between the two leaders was hammered out at the end of the formal dinner party given by Mr Reagan in Geneva last night. It is understood that the joint statement will include a mutual commitment to accelerate the arms control talks at Geneva around the 50 per cent scenario and will also envisage an almost joint rule for the two superpowers in the various regional crises. The agreement to deliver a joint report on their two days of talks testifies to the personal relationship the two men had established in the meetings, more than half of which had been taken up with private sessions with only interpreters. But until the small print of the joint statements appears it will not be clear whether this apparent agreement is cosmetic or reaches the fundamental divisions on the basic issue of arms control and geopolitical management which had bedevilled their relationships for so long.

Source B:

From Ronald Reagan's State of the Union address in January 1984, in which he showed his determination to pursue a new path in relations with the USSR:

Our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. We want more than deterrence; we must seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress for peace. Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies and philosophies but we should remember that we do have common interests. The foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. [We must] find ways to reduce the cast stockpiles of armaments in the world. Reducing the risk of war – and especially nuclear war – is priority number one. My dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the earth.

Source C:

From one of Gorbachev's most famous speeches, delivered on 6 July 1989, entitled, 'Europe is our Common Home.' In this speech he focused on what he hoped would be the future of relations between the USSR and the rest of Europe:

There are no 'bystanders', nor can there be any, in peace-building in Europe; all are equal partners here, and everyone, including neutral and non-aligned countries, bears his share of responsibility to his people and Europe. The philosophy of the concept of a common European home rules out the probability of an armed clash and the very possibility of the use or threat of force, above all military force, by an alliance against another alliance, inside alliances or wherever it may be... We are firmly opposed to the division of the Continent into military arsenals in Europe, against everything that is the source of the threat of war. In the spirit of new thinking we advanced the idea of 'the common European home' [with] the recognition of a certain integrated whole, although the states in question belong to different social systems and are members of opposing military-political blocs ranged against each other.

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these three sources to an historian studying the **collapse of communism in Eastern Europe**
[30 marks]

Source A:

From an article entitled, 'Walesa to meet with Jaruzelski and the Pope on path towards pluralism', which appeared in the Guardian, on 19 April 1989; it reports on the change in government status of Solidarity:

The leader of Poland's Solidarity trade union, Mr Lech Walesa, arrives in Warsaw today to savour one of the sweetest moments of his career – a meeting with the President, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, to discuss the implications of the union's victorious reinstatement by the courts. The judgement, given yesterday in Room 252 of the Warsaw Regional Court, represents the latest important milestone in the democratisation of Poland in the Gorbachev era.

It is all but a total defeat for General Jaruzelski, who is saved only by the fact that he has consistently campaigned for dialogue with the 'opposition'.

Mr Walesa, said to be nursing a cold at home in Gdansk, was not in court. He said by telephone before leaving for Warsaw, 'I am happy that Poland is returning to the road of pluralism and democracy ... Our effort, devotion and suffering have not been in vain.' He called on supporters to 'rebuild' the union's organisation 'skillfully and speedily'. Factory groups which had disbanded should reform.

Source B:

From a transcript in which East German press officer Gunter Schabowski tried to explain the change in East German travel laws, in press conference on 9 November 1989:

Schabowski: [...scratches his head] You see, comrades, I was informed today [puts on his glasses as he speaks further], that such an announcement had been [um] distressed earlier today. You should actually have it already. So, [reading very quickly from the paper] 1: 'Applications for travel abroad by private individuals can now be made without the previously existing requirement [of demonstrating a need to travel or proving familial relationships]. The travel authorisations will be issued within a short time. Ground for denial will only be applied in particular exceptional cases. The responsible departments of passport and registration control in the People's Police district offices in the GDR are instructed to issue visas for permanent exit without delays and without presentation of the existing requirements for permanent exit.'

...

Question: When does it come into effect?

Schabowski: [...looks through his papers] That comes into effect, according to my information, immediately, without delay [looking through his papers further].

Labs: [quietly]...without delay

Beil: [quietly] That has to be decided by the Council of Ministers

Source C:

From an article written by the political scientist George Schopflin, published in January 1990 in *International Affairs* in which Schopflin offered his assessment of the important events of 1989:

Human rights transcended the claims of Marxism-Leninism and provided the Central and Eastern European opposition with an intellectual basis from which to attack and thus erode the official systems. Its significance should not be underestimated.

At the same time, the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe pointed towards the redefinition of Europe as against the superpowers. As the 1990s began both the superpowers were weaker than they had been at any time since 1945, indeed without the weakening of the Soviet Union the transformation would not obviously have begun. By the same token, Europe was stronger than it had been at any time since the self-destruction started in 1914, and would unquestionably demand a much greater role for itself on the world scene. This was likely to be a dynamic process, implying that the power relations between Europe and superpowers would go on changing. Neither superpower was likely to take kindly to this.

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With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these three sources to an historian studying the **ending of the Cold War tensions and the collapse of the USSR** [30 marks]

Source A:

A note written by Eduard Shevardnadze to Viktor Chebrikov, a public official in the Soviet Union, in January 1989, which summarised the Politburo discussion regarding the impending completion of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan:

In the difficult situation characterising the state of affairs in Afghanistan, one can increasingly feel the inner tension stemming from the impending withdrawal of the remaining units of Soviet troops. The attention of the regime and the forces of the opposition are totally focused on 15 February, when, in accordance with the Geneva accords, the term of stay of our military contingent must end. Practically throughout the entire country, military engagements between the government forces and the opposition continue to take place, in the course of which the government has essentially been able to maintain its positions, although with the help of Soviet aviation. In the given situation there arise for us a number of difficult elements. On the one hand, the withdrawal of our forces on 15 February may cause us extremely undesirable complications in the international arena. On the other hand, there is no assurance that shortly after our departure there will not arise a very serious danger to the regime that, throughout the world, is associated with us.

Source B:

From the Soviet transcript of the opening plenary of the Malta Summit, in which George H.W. Bush expressed a change in the American view of perestroika:

Concerning our attitude towards perestroika. I would like to say in no uncertain terms that I agree completely with what you said in New York: the world will be better if perestroika ends as a success. Not long ago there were many people in the US who doubted this. At that time you said in New York that there were elements that did not wish for the success of perestroika. I cannot say that there are no such elements in the US, but I can say with full certainty that that serious-thinking people in the United States do not share these opinions.

These shifts in the public mood in the United States are affected by the changes in Eastern Europe, by the whole process of perestroika. Of course, among analysts and experts there are differing points of view, but you can be certain that you are dealing with an administration in the US and with a Congress that wish for the crowning success of your reforms.

Source C:

From Gorbachev's formal resignation as head of the USSR upon its dissolution, on 25 December 1991:

Due to the situation which has evolved as a result of the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, I hereby discontinue my activities at the post of president of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

I am making this decision on considerations of principle. I firmly came out in favour of the independence of nations and sovereignty for the republics. At the same time, I support the preservation of the union state and the integrity of this country.

The developments took a different course. The policy prevailed of dismembering this country and disuniting the state, which is something I cannot subscribe to.

After the Alma-Ata meeting and its decisions, my position did not change as far as this issue is concerned. Besides, it is my conviction that decisions of this calibre should have been made on the basis of popular will. However, I will do all I can to ensure that the agreements that were signed lead towards real concord in security and facilitate the exit out of this crisis and the process of reform.

3.1 Essays: Introduction

What can you expect in the exam?

Section B of your paper will contain three essay questions of which you are required to answer two. Each essay is designed to test historical understanding in depth, by a focus on events, issues and developments and the interrelationships of various perspectives as they apply to the question.

Each question in this section carries 25 marks and it is advised that you **45 minutes on each** of the essay questions. The questions in Section B can be on any topic learned over the two year course and, in addition to targeting the generic qualities of organisation, analysis, evaluation and judgement, questions will also test your understanding of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance. Consistent with the nature of historical analysis, a single question may require you to demonstrate understanding of more than one of these perspectives.

The question will always be phrased as a statement, followed by **“assess the validity of this view.”**

How is the question marked?

| Level | The answer will: | Marks |
|----------|---|--------------|
| 5 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Show a very good understanding of the full demands of the question • Be well-organised and effectively delivered • Contain well-selected, specific and precise detail • Be fully analytical with a balanced argument • Reach a well-substantiated judgement. | 21-25 |
| 4 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Show a good understanding of the demands of the question • Be well-organised and effectively communicated • Contain a range of clear and specific supporting information • Be analytical and direct in style, and well-balanced • Contain some judgement, which may, however, be only partially substantiated | 16-20 |
| 3 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Show an understanding of the question • Be effectively organised and show adequate communication skills. • Supply a range of largely accurate and relevant information, • Comment on the question, with some balance • Contain some statements with inadequate support | 11-15 |
| 2 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Be descriptive or partial • Show some organisation, and limited communication skills • Contain some appropriate information • Be limited in range, and inaccurate • Contain mostly unsupported and generalist statements | 6-10 |
| 1 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Be based on a misunderstanding of the question • Show limited organisational and communication skills • Contain largely irrelevant material • Be very limited in range, and inaccurate • Contain unsupported, vague or generalist comment | 1-5 |

How to approach the question:

Planning:

Step 1: Essay Question - *for example:* 'The tensions that existed within the Grand Alliance by the end of 1946 were the result of conflicting ideologies.' Assess the validity of this view

Step 2: What is the question asking? - Explain what you understand the question wants you to do.

Step 3: What is your answer to the question? - Summarise your view in one sentence, as this will help you introduce your judgement in your introduction to be supported throughout your essay

Step 4: Key points: Select 6 key points that will each form the basis of a developed paragraph. You need to have 3 key point that **support the statement** and 3 key points that **oppose the statement**.

Planning to write:

Step 5: Introduction: Use the statements you have created to state your arguments to the question. Make sure you use key terms in the question. You must at this point state your judgement on the question.

Step 6: Point 1 Opening Line- Keep it clearly focused on the question- remember to link directly to the question and explain how your point relates.

Step 7: Key Supporting Evidence- Be detailed- include specific facts and dates where possible.

Step 8: Mini judgement- Remember the importance of ending every key point with a clear link to the question - be prepared to engage the key word in the question.

Repeat steps 6-8 for the remaining key points

Step 9: Conclusion - summarise your arguments but make sure you link these back to the question. You must reiterate your overall judgement (which should not have changed from the one made in your introduction). This should not be a lengthy piece of writing, four to six lines should be sufficient.

In 45 minutes you can hope to write 2 to 3 A4 sides, so when completing practice essays you should not exceed this. Word-processed essays should not exceed 1½ A4 sides.

3.2 Model answers

All these student answers were awarded a Level 5; they could all be improved upon but hopefully they give you an idea of standard needed to achieve top marks.

How far was the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan responsible for the start of a 'Second Cold War?' [25 marks]

Although the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan was a major cause of the renewed Cold War hostilities of the 1980s, there were other factors that were to blame. Détente's failure was to blame as it led to the election of Ronald Reagan, a factor that substantially increased US-Soviet hostility. Whilst détente's failure is not directly responsible for the 'Second Cold War,' it was the main cause of the events that were, and is therefore the most significant factor responsible for the start of a 'Second Cold War.'

One such factor was the election of Ronald Reagan to the Presidency on 20th January 1980. Because his Democrat rival, the incumbent President Jimmy Carter, seemed weak following his failure to resolve the Iranian Embassy hostage crisis successfully, Reagan defeated him easily, winning 50.7% of the popular vote. In contrast to Carter's peaceful policy and championing of human rights, which seemed passé due to their aforementioned ability to negotiate the release of the American hostages in Iran, Reagan pursued a hard-line stance against potentially hostile power, including the USSR, and it was this that made him so popular. As soon as 8th March 1983, Reagan had already delivered a speech denouncing the USSR as an 'evil empire' that left no doubt that he disproved of the Soviet' actions and would oppose them as he saw fit; the fact that this speech was delivered to a right-wing American evangelical association, clearly demonstrates that Reagan was particularly concerned with winning support from right-wing voters in the USA, and since these voters mostly opposed the USSR for its liberation and atheism, Reagan would do the same to appease them. To this aim, he sent millions on the SDI program which, although completely unrealistic (Margaret Thatcher called it 'pie in the sky' and she was normally very supportive of Reagan) did much to antagonize the USSR (since they did not realize how implausible it was) to the extent that it led KGB leader Yuri Andropov to accuse Reagan of 'inventing new plans on how to unleash a nuclear war... with the hope of winning it.' As such, Reagan's election is undoubtedly partially to blame for the increased US-Soviet tensions of the early 1980s and the onset of a 'second Cold War.'

That is not to discount the importance of events in Afghanistan altogether. They were particularly important as they marked the first incidence of Soviet expansionism since the 1940s. Although Cuba and China had both 'turned communist,' they did so of their own volition, and as such had become completely independent from the USSR by 1980, to the extent that China was now more closely aligned with the USA than with its fellow communist superpower. However, in Afghanistan, the USSR sent in its troops with the intention of installing their own puppet communist leader, Babrak Karmal, who, although an existing member of the incumbent PDPA, was judged to be more loyal to the USSR than his predecessor, Hafizullah Amin, who they accused of 'insincerity and duplicity' in his dealing with them. Amin's brutal rule (he executed 27,000 political prisoners at the infamous Pul-e-Charki prison) and improvements to women's rights led to widespread rebellion, and his lenience towards the West was particularly problematic for the USSR since it shared 2,500km with his nation, so they came to view deposing Amin as essential to their continued security. Thus, the Soviet intervention was not merely an act of supporting an independent communist government, but of increasing Soviet territory, the first for over 20 years, which is why it provoked such a harsh reaction from the international community.

Said reaction is another major reason why the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is to blame for the 'Second Cold War.' Considering the dubious motives of the USSR and the sheer size of the force they used (their initial force consisted of 125,000 troops) it is no surprise that the response from the international community was similarly harsh. All NATO members condemned the invasion and attempted to enforce their own economic sanctions on the USSR, in addition to the existing trade embargo with the USA. The USA chose to boycott the Moscow Olympics in 1980 in protest to the invasion (leading to a retaliatory Soviet boycott of the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles) but even more significantly, they gave \$500,000 worth of non-lethal aid to the Mujahideen, as part of Operation Cyclone. This scheme also involved the USA purchasing all of Israel's Soviet made weapons and giving them to the Mujahideen, aiding the UK in supplying Blowpipe missiles to them and training over 100,000 militants. The US response became even harsher after 1986, when they began supplying the Mujahideen with Stinger missiles; the impact of this was immense, as it resulted in the destruction of 269 Soviet aircraft. The US response was accompanied by a Chinese response which, although less severe, was significant in that it was the largest Chinese anti-Soviet operation up until that point, with far more supplies being given to the Mujahideen than the FNLA in Angola (the last time China had aided an anti-Soviet force). This broad international response reaffirmed the Cold War as the basis of all international politics, and thus encouraged further diplomatic opposition between the USA and USSR, such as during their responses to the shooting-down of flight KAL 007 and Operation Able-Archer respectively.

This international response is indicative of a broader problem that increased Cold War tensions: The perceived failure of détente. Over the ten or so years it was practiced (it is normally considered to have begun with the first SALT talks in November 1969) détente had failed to bring about any substantial reduction in nuclear arms, with Carter's March 1977 proposed for the SALT II agreement being rejected by the USSR for placing too many restrictions on arms manufacture, and was thus unsuccessful in achieving its main objective. Furthermore, from an American perspective, it was too lenient towards the USSR since, because the agreements placed equal arms restrictions in both sides, even though they did not have equal numbers of arms, it allowed the USSR to achieve nuclear parity with the USA without breaking any international agreements, which was especially problematic as the USSR already had more convention arms and ground troops than the USA, making it the stronger military power. It also allowed the USSR to substantially improve its economy by reducing arms spending and let them extend their influence in Africa and the Middle East (as seen in events in Ethiopia and Angola in the 1970s). As such, by 1979, the USSR was as strong as, if not stronger than, the USA, which meant that it had no further use of détente. The USA too was unwilling to continue the policy due to the increase in Soviet power it had enabled, so by 1979, détente was, as Gaddis remarks, 'almost universally regarded as having failed,' so it was abandoned, making way for the 'Second Cold War' policies described above.

As such, it is apparent that, although the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a significant cause of the 'Second Cold War,' due to its scale, the scale of the international response and the fact that it was a morally reprehensible act of expansionism, the most important cause was the failure of détente, since this failure led partly to the invasion of Afghanistan and the election of Reagan.

'US intervention in Latin America indicates the US were the main aggressors of the Cold War in the years 1973 to 1983.' Assess the validity of this view [25 marks]

During the years 1973 to 1983 the Cold War extended to Latin America and Africa, with the US intervening in Chile, Nicaragua and Grenada. The US intervention in Latin America does not indicate the US were the main aggressors of the Cold War as both the Soviets and the US competed in Africa, raising Cold War tensions. In addition, the presidency of Ronald Reagan, the invasion of Afghanistan and the shooting down of KAL-007 were more significant threats to peace, indicating that US intervention in Latin America did not make the US the main aggressors of the Cold War in the years 1973 to 1983.

In many ways, US intervention in Latin American countries did make the US the main aggressors. In 1970, the socialist Salvador Allende was elected as president of Chile. Immediately Nixon cut \$70 million of US aid to Chile and asked the CIA to work to remove Allende's regime. This shows that the US intervention in Latin America made them the main aggressor, as Chile was not a communist regime or a significant threat to the US. Also, this was the first time a Marxist president had been democratically elected as president of Chile, which shows the US as the main aggressors as they were interfering in the domestic affairs of another state. As a result of Allende's collective farming and nationalization of the copper mined and telecommunications (which were owned by US companies) the Nixon administration gave funds to the 40 committee to undermine Allende's regime. While publically the US were praised for their restraint, they persuaded the World Bank not to lend Chile any money leading to inflation and a rise in unemployment which CIA agents spurred into anti-government attacks. This shows the US as the main aggressor as all their involvement was done in secret to prevent people finding out and publically denied involvement, which meant they did not face international condemnation for their action, especially as their actions were destroying Chile's economy. Eventually this led to a military coup d'état led by General Pinochet who was a ruthless dictator who purged Chile of thousands of Allende supporters. This shows how US interventions in Latin America to be the main form of aggression, as it lead to the creation of ruthless dictatorships.

US intervention in Grenada indicated the US were the main aggressor. In 1983, a coup led by the leftist Coard faction was successful and therefore the US feared that Grenada would be a communist base in the Caribbean. In October 1983, Reagan ordered the invasion of Grenada and 7000 men invaded the island toppling the Coard faction. This shows the US to be the main aggressors as although there were a handful of Cuban advisors, there was no evidence to suggest that Grenada was going to become a Soviet state, which meant the invasion had no basis, making it was illegal. The invasion of Grenada was met by international condemnation, with TASS calling it 'an act of international terrorism' which forced the US to use its veto in the Security Council. This shows that the US intervention in Grenada showed US aggression as many countries, including the USSR, condemned it.

However in many ways, US intervention in Latin America doesn't indicate that the USA was the main aggressor in the years 1973-1983, in many cases the USSR was. In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan due to the civil unrest in that country and installed Karmal as head of state. The invasion was met by condemnation across the world, especially from the US who cancelled their appearance in the 1980 Moscow Olympics and an embargo on grain to the Soviet Union. This shows that the USSR was the main aggressor during this period as the repercussions were severe and most countries condemned them. When Reagan won the election he started supplying \$3 billion of arms to the Mujahideen to fight the Soviets, which meant the Soviet Afghan war was dragged out much longer and caused more damage to the Soviet's stagnating economy. The US worked with many

countries, including Egypt and China, to provide aid to the Mujahideen which shows how much of a threat the Soviets were, as many countries were acting against them.

The USSR can also be seen as the main aggressor through the shooting down of KAL 007 on 1 September 1983, a South Korean airliner, which led to the deaths of 269 people including 61 Americans. This was met with condemnation by the world, with Reagan using this to show the Soviet Union as an 'evil empire' and showed the US how brutal the Soviet regime was, which would support the Soviets as being the main aggressors in the years 1973-83.

However, both the US and USSR pursued aggressive policies in Africa in the 1970s and so both could be seen as aggressive. The US became involved in the Yom Kippur War in 1973 by supplying weapons to the Israelis. The US's aggressive policies in Africa show that they were the main aggressive power as they manipulated Sadat and the Israelis to gain new allies and according to Gaddis, Kissinger rejected proposals from Brezhnev for a joint ceasefire, showing them to be aggressive as they cut the USSR out of war spoils. The Soviets were heavily involved in the Ogaden War of 1977/78 between Ethiopia and Somalia as they supplied armaments to both sides, showing them to be the more aggressive power. However, the US can be seen to be aggressive in their policies in this war as they too supplied arms to the Somalis and gained military bases on the Horn of Africa, an important geostrategic position. Finally, the US can be seen as the main aggressors in the Cold War but due to their actions in the Angolan Civil War. The US supported the FNLA and UNITA against the MPLA and supporting the South Africans in their invasion of Cuba, showing the US to be an aggressive power as they encouraged foreign intervention.

To conclude, I believe that the US's intervention in Latin America did not make them the most aggressive power between 1973 and 1983 due to the invasion of Afghanistan which was a direct intervention by the USSR acting against international law. It also partly led to the Reagan Doctrine, which led to further US intervention in communist countries to contribute in toppling pro-Soviet regimes. Also, the shooting of KAL-007 shows that the USSR were the major aggressors and caused tensions to rise between the two sides while superpower intervention in Africa indicates that both sides were aggressive when it came to gaining allies in the Third World.

“Weak leadership in the USSR was the most significant reason for the increase in Cold War tension between 1982 and 1985” Assess the validity of this view [25 marks]

Overall, I disagree with this statement. By the early 1980s tensions between the two camps had definitely pilled the world out of the brief state of détente experiences during the preceding decade. However, I believe this was a reflection of both nations’ actions and to blame it entirely on the USSR’s weak leadership during this time would be an unwarranted overstatement. Certainly, Russia’s continued conservative attitude in matters concerning foreign affairs was far from helpful in easing tensions in this time, but I would argue it was equalled and mirrored by American antagonism.

Despite this, I am by no means arguing that the period after Brezhnev’s fatal heart attack wasn’t a period of weakness in Soviet leadership. Andropov, despite being an ardent economic reformer and an excellent force for good in terms of disrupting the internal corruption within the Soviet Politburo, was fairly conservative with his actions abroad. Andropov used the same tactics as with Hungary in 1957, firmly pushing back against any form of protest or dissent. With Soviet policy in Afghanistan persisting, Andropov openly gave the USA reason to shut down all of Russia’s attempts at reopening détente negotiations. It was clear that withdrawal from Afghanistan would immediately ease tensions, yet both Chernenko and Andropov lacked the insight required to realise that peace with America was more necessary for the preservation of the USSR than the political message given out by continuing the Afghanistan campaign. The weak gerontocratic leadership of the USSR led to a massive upscaling of the conflict under Chernenko, in a bid to make a name for himself. This was a significant reason for the increase in Cold War tensions in the years 1982-85.

In addition, the Lebanon War was also an example of weak leadership, which led to an increase in tensions. Against the advice of Gromyko, Andropov gave SAM-5s to Syria to help them fight Israel in the Lebanese War. This was the first time the USA had sent air-to-ground weapons to a country outside the Soviet bloc. This is an example of weak leadership because Andropov ignored the advice of his government. It has been said that Assad and Andropov got on well on a personal level, so Andropov was perhaps misguided by this. Coupled with Andropov’s refusal to take any blame for the KAL007 incident and keeping in their possession the black box from the airline, it is clear that weak leadership was the main reason for increased tensions in the period 1982-85.

Chernenko’s weak leadership was a major factor for increasing tension. He took the Brezhnev Doctrine to heart, pushing away China, accusing Germany of Nazism and banning all western cultural influences in Russia, undoing all of Andropov’s positive actions taken towards easing tensions with the US. However, Andropov’s reaction to Solidarity was equally unhelpful – his pressure on the Polish government to implement martial law whilst simultaneously mobilising Warsaw Pact troops on the Polish border showed a total disregard for the agreements of détente. The clear principles of the Helsinki Accords of 1975 and the Moscow Summit in 1977 dictating that Russia stay involved with the internal affairs of foreign states were left unconsidered, inspiring a continued antagonisation from the west, boosting tensions.

However, in spite of these examples, I still feel America contributed its fair share to increase tensions in the period 1982-85. Reagan was a confrontational and aggressive leader. His “evil empire” speech coupled with his “star wars” Strategic Defence Initiative both in March 1983 sent out a clear message to the world that Cold War tensions were back at an all-time high. Despite Andropov’s attempts for a more civilian focus, Reagan continued to close of the Soviets and committed itself to regaining the technological advantage over the Russians. Reagan’s dismissal of the principles of MAD was a significant reason for rising Cold War tensions.

Furthermore, with the deployment of Pershing II missiles, the increase of NATO's military budget and "Able Archer" (November 1983) it is understandable why the USSR became so paranoid during the year 1982-5 during what could be seen as an impending US onslaught. According to KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky, the Soviets were certain that nuclear war was imminent as a result of Able Archer. It was this tension that Reagan's actions had evoked in the Soviet government that led to the mistaken shooting down of KAL007. Andropov claimed at the time that "sophisticated provocation [had been] masterminded by the U.S. special services" and indeed from 1981 the U.S. military had embarked on an active programme of testing Soviet reactions to different types of interactions. US missions would fly close to the border of Warsaw Pact countries and towards the Soviet Union's Pacific coast, all with the aim of remaining undetected. So, although the poor leadership of those involved in authorising the shooting down of the commercial airliner was certainly partly to blame, the act itself was also a testament to how far the USA's actions had increased Cold War tensions.

American involvement in Latin America was also a large contributing factor to increasing tensions during the 1980s Reagan's involvement in Grenada was even questioned by Thatcher at the time Operation Urgent Fury was supposedly undertaken to protect the 1,000 or so US nationals living there, however it quickly escalated into a far more aggressive insurgency, leading to the coup d'état of Bishop, Grenada's Marxist Prime Minister. Once a Marxist revolutionary military council had taken control during the power vacuum, Reagan began to commit extensive military aid to the Caribbean island, believing the Soviet Union to be trying to use Grenada as a vector for spreading Marxism throughout Latin America. This was an assumption made under the pretence that Cuba was operating in Grenada under Soviet influence. Cuba was, however, completely separate from Moscow and so similarly was also a significant factor in increasing Cold War tensions.

In conclusion, weakness in Soviet leadership, namely during Chernenko's time as General Secretary certainly had a significant effect on rising Cold War tensions in the early 1980s. However, this was not the most significant factor. I feel that it was a constant state of rising paranoia, perpetuated by actions taken by either side. The rise in tension was a reactionary cascade, initiated by weaknesses stemming from the détente talks and brought to fruition by the clash between Reagan and the various conservative leaders of the USSR between the years 1982 and 1985.

It was Ronald Reagan who bought the Cold War to an end.” Assess the validity of this view for the years 1983-1991 [25 marks]

Following the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR in 1979, the US began building up arms again, starting what is known as the ‘Second Cold War.’ Over the 1980s, the Soviet Union had to keep up with the new arms race whilst increasing standards of living in a decade they were fighting in Afghanistan, all of which drained the economy and led to the beginning of the collapse of the USSR. I believe Ronald Reagan was the man responsible for this because of his aggressive policies, such as the Reagan Doctrine and Strategic Defence Initiative but also his bargaining in the four conferences of the late 1980s (Geneva, Washington, Moscow and Reykjavik), which decisively ended the Cold War.

One of the first ways in which Reagan bought about the end of the Cold War was through the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). In March 1983, Reagan directed the military to find a way of destroying ICBMs and therefore end the theory of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). While many people in the US did not believe it would work and cynically referred to it as ‘Star Wars,’ the Soviet leadership feared the technology. This made Soviet leaders spend more money on defence at a time where money was desperately needed to rescue the Soviet’s stagnating economy. While it was concluded that the technologies needed for SDI were decades away from being ready to use, it caused the Soviets to spend more money at a point oil prices were dropping to \$9 a barrel and the rate of inflation in satellite states was becoming alarming. The financial pressure placed on the USSR through Reagan’s SDI therefore contributed to a swifter end to the Cold War.

Another way in which Reagan bought about the end of the Cold War was by increasing defence spending. He revived the B-1 bomber program and began funding the MX Peacekeeper missile, the B-1 being a supersonic stealth bomber and the Peacekeeper being a missile that could deliver 50 missiles when it re-entered the atmosphere. These new technologies weren’t cheap, which is why the defence budget went from \$330 billion in 1983 to \$456 billion at its peak in 1987. All this defence spending again cause the Soviets to invest more into defence, weakening their economy and contributing to the dissolution of the USSR. There were also increases in the US Navy from 230 ships to 591 in 1989, which was a huge increase in expenditure. Reagan was pushing the Soviets to spend more on defence until a point where it was no longer possible for this to occur, which contributed to the end of the Cold War.

The Reagan Doctrine was also responsible for the end of the Cold War as through it, the US aimed to tackle communism across the world, ending Soviet influence whilst placing immense pressure on the Soviet Union to continue funding communist governments across the world. Reagan believed in the idea of ‘rollback’ and so the CIA financed groups all across the world. In 1983 the US invaded Grenada in order to overthrow the pro-left Coard faction who received aid from Moscow and Cuba, which deprived Moscow of another ally. By 1983, the US was indirectly funding the Contras in Nicaragua by the sale of arms to Iran. In El Salvador, the US supported the Khmer People’s Liberation Front against the Vietnamese government. This forced the Soviet Union to fund multiple groups to uphold their status as defender of Marxist-Leninism, further draining the Soviet economy. A more direct hit on the Soviet Union was the decision to give Singer surface-to-air missiles to the Mujahedeen, which allowed them to bring down Hind gunships, which cost \$12 million each. Not only was the economic loss mounting, but the Soviet people were becoming increasingly more angry that there was not progress in the war and casualty rates were increasing. This meant that by 1989 the Soviet Union was in economic and military crisis by 1989 and therefore the Reagan Doctrine led to the end of the Cold War as it placed huge financial pressures on the USSR.

A final way in which Reagan was able to end the Cold War was through diplomacy. In 1984 Reagan's speech on Soviet-US relations he called for an attempt at peace by trying to reduce the funding of conflicts across the world and decreasing nuclear weapons stockpiles. He then went on to discuss the idea of cooperation explained through the hypothetical couples Jim and Sally (American) and Ivan and Anya (Russian) seeking to reduce the ideological barriers to US-Soviet détente. This eventually led to the Geneva Summit in 1985, which limited medium range missiles and banned chemical weapons. However, the main way in which the Geneva Summit led to the end of the Cold War was by paving the way for both leaders to have future summits. In Washington in 1987 the INF (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces) treaty was signed which banned the use of cruise missiles and intermediate range ballistic missiles and both sides were allowed to verify this. This shows how Reagan used diplomacy to end the Cold War as by signing the INF it was bringing the arms race to a close, which was significant in bringing an end to the Cold War.

However, in many ways, Reagan was not responsible for the end of the Cold War. In 1985 Gorbachev became the leader of the USSR. Very quickly he realised what the failures in the USSR were and aimed to fix them, starting with alcohol consumption resolved through heavy pricing and restrictions to improve economic growth. In 1986 Gorbachev announced Glasnost and Perestroika. This was successful as following the realisation of Andrei Sakharov, European relations with the Soviet Union warmed as it seemed they were obeying the Helsinki Accords and promoting improved East-West relations. Following Perestroika and Gorbachev's 'New Thinking' speech, the Law on Joint Ventures was passed and in 1988 the Law on State Enterprises was passed which aimed to move the economy to a free market economy. This is significant as not only did it lead to an end in ideological differences between the US and USSR, it revealed the need to withdraw financial support from satellite states thus triggering the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War.

Gorbachev also ended the war in Afghanistan, which was significant as it had been a drain on the Soviet economy and strained diplomatic relations with other nations. Gorbachev was also able to work effectively with Bush at the Malta Summit where they discussed the limits of military equipment each state could have. This helped end the Cold War as it showed that both leaders were able to negotiate well with one another and prevented Bush saying anything inflammatory, preventing Soviet hardliners attempting a coup.

One final way in which Gorbachev was able to end the Cold War was through allowing free elections to take place in Europe. This led to the communist party being removed from power and leader like Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia and Lech Wałęsa in Poland taking control who wanted independence from the USSR. Another change in Eastern Europe was the replacement of Eric Honecker with Egon Krenz in East Germany, which led to the Berlin Wall coming down peacefully and reunification talks were delayed until it came down. The crucial change in Eastern Europe was when Gorbachev refused to allow the fence between Austria and Hungary to be renewed as it meant people could flee the Eastern Bloc, which led to the end of the Cold War.

To conclude, I believe that Reagan brought the Cold War to an end due to his aggressive defence spending which caused the Soviet Union to increase arms spending with a stagnating economy whilst continuing to support communist groups. Reagan's diplomacy and negotiation was also essential in ending the arms race through the signing of the UNF in 1987 and through his ability to work with Gorbachev. These factors combined were key to ending the Cold War in a relatively peaceful way.

3.3 Practice essay questions

| | |
|--|-------------------|
| 'By 1968, war in Vietnam had proven that military containment was no longer possible as the basis for the USA's Cold War strategy.' Assess the validity of this view [25 marks] | Due: |
| 'The Tet Offensive of 1968 was a turning point in America's conduct of the Vietnam War in the years 1965 to 1970.' Assess the validity of this view [25 marks] | Due: |
| 'Nixon's policies towards Vietnam in the years 1969 to 1972 were confused and ineffective.' Assess the validity of this view [25 marks] | Due: |
| To what extent did the nuclear agreements between 1963 and 1968 reduce the threat of nuclear war? [25 marks] | Due: |
| To what extent did Soviet policies towards other members of the communist Eastern Bloc change after 1962? [25 marks] | Due: |
| 'America's relationship with China undermined the policy détente with the Soviet Union.' Assess the validity of this view [25 marks] | Due: |
| 'Cuba's interventions in Angola and Ethiopia ensured the failure of détente by 1979' Assess the validity of this view [25 marks] | Due: |
| To what extent is it fair to describe President Reagan as a peacemaker, in the years 1985 to 1989? [25 marks] | Due: |
| To what extent were economic problems the cause of the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe? [25 marks] | Due: |
| 'The end of the Cold War was caused primarily by economic, rather than political, problems.' Assess the validity of this view [25 marks] | Due: |
| 'The collapse of Soviet control in Eastern Europe was due to the misguided policies of Mikhail Gorbachev.' Assess the validity of this view [25 marks] | Due: |
| 'The reason why the Cold War ended peacefully was the statesmanship of Mikhail Gorbachev.' Assess the validity of this view with reference to the years 1985 to 1991. [25 marks] | Due: |

Be prepared for timed essays in class time where the exact title will not be revealed until the lesson it is scheduled for.

Useful links and further support



Specification:

<https://filestore.aqa.org.uk/resources/history/specifications/AQA-7041-7042-SP-2015.PDF>

Assessment Resources: <https://www.aqa.org.uk/subjects/history/as-and-a-level/history-7041-7042/assessment-resources>



<http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/search/results?q=cold+war>

The Wilson Center

<https://www.wilsoncenter.org/program/cold-war-international-history-project>

Yale: Avalon Project

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/coldwar.asp

CNN: Cold War

<https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL8hNHC9nbLlzb4miGp5pZPYCk9Zw0dGke>