



To the Brink of Nuclear War

International Relations c1945-1963

Miss A Galvin: amg@kes.net

Name:

Class:

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1.1 Seminar Reading: Introduction

A crucial element of your A level studies is wider reading. You should aim to complete six hours of wider reading a week, establishing a base of knowledge using textbooks before expanding on your understanding using academic texts.

During this academic year, you will be set further reading as part of your directed independent learning, which will be followed by a seminar-style lesson. These lessons will help you explore the ideas presented in the readings, allowing for discussion and debate, which will in turn inspire analysis, interpretation and critical thinking. Seminar learning is often integrated within humanities undergraduate degrees.



At the head of each reading list you will be given a **topic title** and a number of **enquiry questions**. These are designed to focus your reading and assist your note taking.

You will be expected to complete three tiers of reading:

- 1) **Core Reading:** This will be from a textbook aimed at A level students.
- 2) **Essential Reading:** This will be a chapter from an academic book or article.
- 3) **Further Reading:** You will then choose one piece of further reading. These lists will consist of journals, articles and book chapters.

You will need to provide evidence of your completed essential and further reading. There are a number of ways you can indicate you have engaged with the material including:

- Highlighting or making notes around your reading (if printed)
- Creating summary notes
- Creating a mind map of ideas

To assist you in accessing these texts, the vast majority will be available via the Moodle course*. You must therefore ensure you have a login and regularly access the course. There are also a number of books available in the school library.

You will be expected to contribute your ideas verbally during our lessons and on some occasions lead discussions with the presentation of your findings

1.2 The Origins of the Cold War

Questions to consider: Why did the Cold War emerge and by what date? What caused the Grand Alliance to collapse? How far were the origins linked to Soviet expansionism/ US dollar imperialism? How central were the issues concerning Poland and Germany in creating tensions? Was the US nuclear monopoly responsible for destabilising the balance of power?

CORE READING:

J Aldred, A Mamaux, S Waller (e.d.) *Oxford AQA History for A level: The Cold War c1945-1991* (Oxford, 2015) pp.1-15

OR

D Williamson, *Access to History: Europe and the Cold War 1945-1991* Third Edition (London, 2015) pp. 1-31

ESSENTIAL READING:

*David Engerman, 'Ideology and the origins of the Cold War' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume I Origins* (Cambridge, 2010) pp. 20-43

FURTHER READING (select one of the following):

- *Carole Fink, *Cold War: An International History* (Colorado, 2014) pp.27-48
- *Robert James Maddox, 'Truman, Poland and the Origins of the Cold War' *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 17(1) 1987 pp.27-41
- *Thomas G Paterson, 'The Abortive American Loan to Russia and the Origins of the Cold War' *The Journal of American History*, 56(1) 1969 pp.70-92
- *Thomas G Paterson, 'The Origins of the Cold War' *OAH Magazine of History*, 2(1) 1986 pp.5-9, 18
- *Arthur Schlesinger Jr., 'Origins of the Cold War' *Council on Foreign Affairs*, 46(1) 1967 pp.22-52
- *Martin Sherwin, 'The atomic bomb and the origins of the Cold War' in M P Leffler, David S. Painter (eds.) *Origins of the Cold War: an International History Second Edition* (New York and London, 2005) pp. 58-71

ADDITIONAL READING (optional):

- *George C Herring, 'Lend-Lease to Russia and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-1945' *The Journal of American History* 56(1) 1969 pp.93-114
- *Gary R Hess, 'The Iranian Crisis of 1945-46 and the Cold War' *Political Science Quarterly* 89(1) 1974 pp.117-146
- *M P Leffler, 'Adherence to Agreements: Yalta and the Experiences of the Early Cold War' *International Security* 11(1) 1986 pp.88-123
- *Jeremy K Ward, 'Winston Churchill and the "Iron Curtain" Speech' *The History Teacher* 1(2) 1968 pp.5-13, 57-63

DUE DATE:

1.3 Truman and Containment

Questions to consider: How did the role of the US in the world change after WWII? What is containment and how effective do you think this policy was? What did George Kennan argue in his X article? What is the Truman Doctrine and how did it change US policy towards the USSR? Why did the US government think it necessary to create the Marshall Plan? How far was Truman's foreign policy a break from what had come before?

CORE READING:

J Aldred, A Mamaux, S Waller (e.d.) *Oxford AQA History for A level: The Cold War c1945-1991* (Oxford, 2015) pp.16-25

OR

D Williamson, *Access to History: Europe and the Cold War 1945-1991* Third Edition (London, 2015) pp. 32-60

ESSENTIAL READING:

*M P Leffler, 'The emergence of an American Grand Strategy, 1945-1952' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume I Origins* (Cambridge, 2010) pp. 67-89

FURTHER READING (select one of the following):

- * Lee Edwards, 'Congress and the Origins of the Cold War: The Truman Doctrine' *World Affairs* 151(3) 1988-89 pp.131-141
- * John Lewis Gaddis, 'Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?' *Council on Foreign Affairs* 52(2) 1974 pp.386-402
- * Henry Kissinger, 'Reflections on Containment' *Council on Foreign Affairs* 73(3) 1994 pp.113-130
- *Wilson D Miscable, 'The Foreign Policy of the Truman Administration: A Post-Cold War Appraisal' *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 24(3) 1994 pp.479-494
- * Athan Theoharis, 'The Truman Presidency: Trial and Error' *The Wisconsin Magazine of History* 55(1) 1971 pp.49-58

DUE DATE:

1.4 Conflict over Germany: The Berlin Blockade and Airlift

Questions to consider: How did differences over Germany develop the Cold War? What caused Stalin to implement the blockade? How close did the situation come to a 'hot conflict'? What were the results of the blockade? Did the US or USSR come out looking stronger?

CORE READING:

J Aldred, A Mamaux, S Waller (e.d.) *Oxford AQA History for A level: The Cold War c1945-1991* (Oxford, 2015) pp.26-34

OR

D Williamson, *Access to History: Europe and the Cold War 1945-1991* Third Edition (London, 2015) pp. 61-83

ESSENTIAL READING:

*Hans-Peter Schwarz, 'The division of Germany, 1945-1949' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume I Origins* (Cambridge, 2010) pp. 133-153

FURTHER READING (select one of the following):

- *Daniel F. Harrington, 'The Berlin Blockade Revisited' *The International History Review* 6(1) 1984 pp.88-112
- *Wilson Miscamble, 'Harry S. Truman, the Berlin Blockade and the 1948 Election' *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 10(3) 1980 pp.306-316
- *Avi Shlaim, 'Britain, the Berlin Blockade and the Cold War' *Royal Institute of International Affairs* 60(1) 1983-4 pp.1-14
- * Robert Spencer, 'Berlin, the Blockade and the Cold War' *International Journal* 23(3) 1968 pp.383-407

DUE DATE:

1.5 The Korean War

Questions to consider: Why did the Korean War start? Why did the US decide to intervene? What was the impact of Chinese involvement in the Korean War? How did the war change Cold War policy? Was the Korean War evidence of successful containment by the U.S.?

CORE READING:

J Aldred, A Mamaux, S Waller (e.d.) *Oxford AQA History for A level: The Cold War c1945-1991* (Oxford, 2015) pp.43-50

OR

D Williamson, *Access to History: Europe and the Cold War 1945-1991* Third Edition (London, 2015) pp. 137-145

ESSENTIAL READING:

* William Stueck, 'The Korean War' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume I Origins* (Cambridge, 2010) pp. 266-287

FURTHER READING (select one of the following):

- * Roger Dingman, 'Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War' *International Security* 13(3) 1988-89 pp.50-91
- * Karunakar Gupta, 'How did the Korean War Begin?' *The China Quarterly* 52 1972 pp.699-7116
- * Robert Jervis, 'The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War' *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24(4) 1980 pp.563-592
- * David S McLellan, 'Dean Acheson and the Korean War' *Political Science Quarterly* 83(1) 1968 pp.16-39
- * Hong-Kyu Park, 'American Involvement in the Korean War' *The History Teacher* 16(2) 1983 pp.249-263
- * Kathryn Weathersby, 'Stalin and the Korean War' in M P Leffler, David S. Painter (eds.) *Origins of the Cold War: an International History Second Edition* (New York and London, 2005) pp. 265-282
- * O A Westad, *The Cold War: A World History* (New York, 2017) pp.91-103

ADDITIONAL READING (optional):

- * Barton J. Bernstein, 'New Light on the Korean War' *The International History Review* 3(2) 1981 pp.256-277
- * Donald W. Boose, 'Fighting while Talking: The Korean War Truce Talks' *OAH Magazine of History* 14(3) 2000 pp.25-29
- * Bruce Cumings, *The Korean War: A History* (New York, 2010)
- * Andrew Mulholland, *The Korean War: History in an Hour* (London, 2013)

DUE DATE:

1.6 Eisenhower and Dulles

Questions to consider: How did Eisenhower's strategy of containment differ from Truman's? Was Eisenhower's brinkmanship a successful policy? What impact did Secretary of State John Foster Dulles have on the Cold War? Did nuclear deterrence succeed? How did Eisenhower handle the Taiwan Crisis?

CORE READING:

J Aldred, A Mamaux, S Waller (e.d.) *Oxford AQA History for A level: The Cold War c1945-1991* (Oxford, 2015) pp.59-63

OR

D Williamson, *Access to History: Europe and the Cold War 1945-1991* Third Edition (London, 2015) pp. 84-92

ESSENTIAL READING:

* Robert J. McMahon, 'US National Security Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume I Origins* (Cambridge, 2010) pp. 288-305

FURTHER READING (select one of the following):

- * R. Gordon Hoxie, 'Eisenhower and Presidential Leadership' *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 13(4) 1983 pp.589-612
- * Richard H. Immerman, 'Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the Decisions?' *Political Psychology* 1(2) 1979 pp.21-38
- * Mary S. McAuliffe, 'Eisenhower, the President' *The Journal of American History* 68(3) 1981 pp.625-632
- * Bennet C. Rushkoff, 'Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis. 1954-1955' *Political Science Quarterly* 96(3) 1981 pp.465-480

ADDITIONAL READING (optional):

- * Michael Gordon Jackson, 'Beyond Brinkmanship: Eisenhower, Nuclear War Fighting and Korea 1953-1968' *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 35(1) 2005 pp.52-75
- * Jim Newton, *Eisenhower: The White House Years* (New York, 2011)

DUE DATE:

1.7 The Cuban Missile Crisis

Questions to consider: Why did the crisis break out? How successful was JFK's/Khrushchev's handling of the crisis? Was the crisis inevitable? Who's diplomacy held more weight in the outcomes of the crisis? What were the consequences of the crisis? Did the Cuban Missile Crisis aid to slow down a continuing arms race?

CORE READING:

J Aldred, A Mamaux, S Waller (e.d.) *Oxford AQA History for A level: The Cold War c1945-1991* (Oxford, 2015) pp.93-102

OR

D Williamson, *Access to History: Europe and the Cold War 1945-1991* Third Edition (London, 2015) pp. 115-120

ESSENTIAL READING:

* James G. Hershberg, 'The Cuban Missile Crisis' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume II Crises and Détente* (Cambridge, 2010) pp. 65

FURTHER READING (select one of the following):

- * Raymond L. Garthoff, 'Cuban Missile Crisis: The Soviet Story' *Foreign Policy* 72 1988 pp.61-80
- *Sergei Khrushchev (ed.) *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Volume III: Statesman 1953-1964* (Pennsylvania, 2007) pp. 315-358
- * William J. Medland, 'The Cuban Missile Crisis: Evolving Historical Perspectives' *The History Teacher* 23(4) pp.433-447
- * Marcus D. Pohlmann, 'Presidents at the Brink: The Cuban Missile Crisis' *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 19(2) 1989 pp.337-346
- * Robert A. Pollard, 'The Cuban Missile Crisis: Legacies and Lessons' *The Wilson Quarterly* 6(4) 1982 pp.148-158

ADDITIONAL READING (optional):

- * Mary S. McAuliffe (ed.) *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962* (Washington D.C., 1992)
- * Stephen G. Rabe, 'The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited' *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 3(3) 1991 pp.59-66
- * Len Scott and Steve Smith, 'Lessons of October: Historians, Political Scientists, Policy-Makers and the Cuban Missile Crisis' *International Affairs* 70(4) 1994 pp.659-684

DUE DATE:

1.8 Additional Reading Lists

Topics:

1. US containment in Asia and Mao's Communist Victory
 2. 1956: a year of crises
 3. Peaceful Coexistence?
 4. The Arms and Space Race
 5. The Berlin Crisis 1961
 6. The origins of the Vietnam War
 7. The Sino-Soviet Alliance
 8. Britain and the early Cold War
-

1) US containment in Asia and Mao's Communist Victory

- * Richard Crockatt, *The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1945-1991* (Oxon, 1995) pp.89-108
- * Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu, 'Japan, the United States and the Cold War 1945-1960' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume I Origins* (Cambridge, 2010) pp. 244-265
- * Chen Jian, 'Mao and Sino-American relations' in M P Leffler, David S. Painter (eds.) *Origins of the Cold War: an International History Second Edition* (New York and London, 2005) pp. 283--298
- * Niu Jun, 'The birth of the People's Republic of China and the road to the Korean War' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume I Origins* (Cambridge, 2010) pp. 221-243
- * O A Westad, *The Cold War: A World History* (New York, 2017) pp.75-90

2) 1956: a year of crises

- * Douglas Little, 'The Cold War in the Middle East: Suez Crisis to Camp David Accords' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume II Crises and Détente* (Cambridge, 2010) pp.305-312
- * Sergei Khrushchev (ed.) *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Volume III: Statesman 1953-1964* (Pennsylvania, 2007) pp. 644-673
- * Tony Kemp-Welch, 'Dethroning Stalin: Poland 1956 and its legacy' *Europe-Asia Studies*, 58(8) 2006 pp.1261-1284
- * Terry Cox, 'Hungary 1956' *History Ireland* 14(3) 2006 pp.38-43
- * G.C. Peden, 'Suez and Britain's Decline as a World Power' *The Historical Journal*, 55(4) 2012 pp.1073-1096
- * M.A. Fitzsimons, 'The Suez Crisis and the Containment Policy' *The Review of Politics*, 19(4) 1957 pp.419-445

3) Peaceful Coexistence?

- * Haig Babians, 'Khrushchev Calls a Turn' *Challenge* 9(3) 1960 pp.4-7
- * George F. Kennan, 'Peaceful Coexistence: A Western View' *Foreign Affairs* 38(2) pp.171-190
- * Nikita S. Khrushchev, 'On Peaceful Coexistence' *Foreign Affairs* 38(1) 1959 pp.1-18
- * O A Westad, *The Cold War: A World History* (New York, 2017) pp.59-74

4) The Arms and Space Race

- * Ron Cowen, 'Sputnik +50: Remembering the Dawn of the Space Age' *Science News* 172(14) 2007 pp.216-217, 221
- * Leon D. Epstein, 'Britain and the H-bomb, 1955-1958' *The Review of Politics* 21(3) 1959 pp.511-529
- * D.F. Fleming, 'What Follows the Arms Race?' *The Journal of Politics*, 14(2) 1953 pp.203-223
- * Michael S. Goodman, 'The Grandfather of the Hydrogen Bomb? Anglo-American intelligence and Klaus Fuchs' *Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences* 34(1) 2003 pp.1-22
- * David Holloway, 'Nuclear weapons and the escalation of the Cold War, 1945-1962' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume I Origins* (Cambridge, 2010) pp. 376-397
- * Bradley G. Shreve, 'The US, the USSR and Space Exploration, 1957-1963' *International Journal of World Peace*, 20(2) 2003 pp.67-83
- * Karsten Werth, 'A Surrogate for War – The U.S. Space Program in the 1960s' *American Studies* 49(4) 2004 pp.563-587

5) The Berlin Crisis 1961

- * Elisabeth Barker, 'The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962' *International Affairs*, 39(1) pp.59-73
- * Raymond L. Garthoff, 'Berlin 1961: The Record Corrected' *Foreign Policy*, 84, 1991, pp.142-156
- * Sergei Khrushchev (ed.) *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Volume III: Statesman 1953-1964* (Pennsylvania, 2007) pp. 293-314
- * Corey Ross, 'East Germans and the Berlin Wall: Popular Opinion and Social Change before and after the Border Closure of August 1961' *Journal of Contemporary History*, 39(1) 2004 pp.25-43

6) The origins of the Vietnam War

- * Fredrik Logevall, 'The Indochina Wars and the Cold War, 1945-1975' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume II Crises and Détente* (Cambridge, 2010) pp. 281-295
- * O A Westad, *The Cold War: A World History* (New York, 2017) pp.172-175
- * Mark N. Katz, 'The Origins of the Vietnam War 1945-1948' *The Review of Politics*, 42(2) 1980 pp. 131-151
- * Bernard B. Fall, 'The Second Indochina War' *International Affairs*, 41(1) 1965 pp.59-73
- * Edward Cuddy, 'Vietnam: Mr Johnson's War or Mr Eisenhower's?' *The Review of Politics*, 65(4) 2003 pp.351-374

7) The Sino-Soviet Alliance

- * William B. Ballis, 'The Pattern of Sino-Soviet Treaties, 1945-1950' *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 277 1951 pp.167-176
- * Sergei Khrushchev (ed.) *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Volume III: Statesman 1953-1964* (Pennsylvania, 2007) pp. 412-434
- Robert C. North, 'The Sino-Soviet Alliance' *The China Quarterly* (1) 1960 pp.51-60
- * O A Westad, *The Cold War: A World History* (New York, 2017) pp.130-143
- * Shu Guang Zhang 'The Sino-Soviet Alliance and the Cold War in Asia, 1954-1962' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume I Origins* (Cambridge, 2010) pp. 353-375

8) Britain and the early Cold War

- * Anne Deighton, 'Britain and the Cold War, 1945-1955' in M P Leffler, O A Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume I Origins* (Cambridge, 2010) pp. 112-132
- * Michael Hopkins, Michael D. Kandiah and Gillian Staerck (eds.) *Cold War Britain 1945-1964: New Perspectives* (Hampshire, 2003)
- * John Kent, 'British Policy and the Origins of the Cold War' in M P Leffler, David S. Painter (eds.) *Origins of the Cold War: an International History Second Edition* (New York and London, 2005) pp. 155-166
- * Ritchie Ovendale, 'Britain, the United States and the Cold War in South-East Asia, 1949-1950' *International Affairs*, 58(3) 1982 pp.447-464
- * William C. Cromwell, 'The Marshall Plan, Britain and the Cold War' *Review of International Studies*, 8(4) 1982 pp.233-249

2.1 Source Analysis: Introduction

The first component of your examination will test your ability to analyse **primary source material**. This section will take you through the exam board's expectations and advise you on the necessary techniques needed to be successful in your analyses.

What can you expect in the exam?

The first question on your Cold War paper (AQA Paper 2R: The Cold War c1945-1991) is compulsory and will ask you to **evaluate the value of three primary sources** to a historian studying a particular issue or development. In your assessments you are expected to evaluate the sources, considering for example, **provenance, style** and **emphasis** and the **content** of the sources.

You must provide evidence of your own knowledge and understanding of the historical context when making your assessments and, in doing so, avoid generalised comment about the value of sources without reference to context. Knowledge that does not relate to the sources receives no credit.

The question carries 30 marks (out of 80 for the entire paper) and you are advised to spend 60 minutes on your analyses. It is best to approach the question as though you are analysing the three sources as separate, but balanced, evaluations reaching a supported judgement. You should also dedicate 5-10 minutes of your allocated time reading the sources carefully and making any short hand annotations to effectively plan your answer.

The question will always be phrased as such:

“With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these three sources to an historian studying ... [30 marks]”

What are the common mistakes?

1. Writing large sections on context with no relation to the source or the question.
2. Forgetting one of the 'ingredients' – you **must** consider the provenance, content, tone/emphasis for every source evaluation.
3. Forgetting balance – you must be balanced not only in studying value and limitation but in examining all the 'ingredients.'
4. Copying out the provenance – it's simply not needed. In essence your wasting your own time writing out information the examiner already knew.
5. Missing information – there's a good reason your teachers have always encouraged you to plan examination answers.
6. 'Stereotypical limitations' – by this we mean simplistic statements that have little or no supporting evidence such as '*This source is limited because it's bias.*'
7. Tailing off – to reach the top marks your analysis must be consistently supported and focused throughout, which highlights the need to plan and time your answer adequately.
8. Time management – Often poor time management can lead to an underdeveloped answer, which usually impacts the final source evaluation preventing you from moving beyond a Level 3 (60%).

An example of a source:

Sources are labelled A, B and C. They are range between 5 and 15 lines long.

Provenance	Source A
	An extract from Hitler's Political Testament, which was prepared the day before his suicide in 1945:
Content	After the collapse of the German Reich, and until there is a rise in nationalism in Asia, Africa or Latin America, there will only be two powers in the world: the United States and Soviet Russia. Through the laws of history and geographical position these giants are destined to struggle with each other either through war, or through rivalry in economics and political ideas.

Provenance: Essentially the origins of the source, but you need to consider: Who wrote it? When was it written? What kind of source is it? Why was it written? Who is it directed at?

Content: What claims does the source make? What evidence does the source use? What claims does the source dismiss?

Language (tone/emphasis): How does the writer use language? What kind of impression is the writer trying to create? What does the source emphasise?

Context: How does the source relate to the events of the time?


Make a balanced argument about the source's value.

Reach a well substantiated judgement about the source's value

Structure:

1. No need for an introduction
2. No need for a conclusion
3. No need to compare, or cross reference the sources
4. Write in three sections, one dealing with each source
5. Balance each source evaluation, half looking at the source's value and the second half examining limitation, before reaching a supported judgement.

How to approach the question:



Technique checklist:

- ☐ Have you discussed provenance?
- ☐ Have you exemplified provenance with quotes from the Source?
- ☐ Have you linked provenance to your judgement?
- ☐ Have you discussed content?
- ☐ Have you exemplified content with quotes from the Source?
- ☐ Have you linked content to your judgement?
- ☐ Have you discussed tone?
- ☐ Have you exemplified tone with quotes from the Source?
- ☐ Have you linked tone to your judgement?
- ☐ Have you discussed context?
- ☐ Have you exemplified context with quotes from the Source?
- ☐ Have you linked context to your judgement?
- ☐ Have you used the language of explanation?
- ☐ Have you used the language of evaluation?
- ☐ Have you backed up your judgement?

How is the question marked?

Level	The answer will:	Marks
5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Show a very good understanding of content and provenance of all three sources • Present a balanced argument on the sources' value • Reach a well-substantiated judgement • Demonstrate a very good understanding of context 	25-30
4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Show a good understanding of content and provenance of all three sources • Provide a balanced argument on the sources' value • Reach judgements, which may be partially substantiated • Demonstrate a good understanding of context 	19-24
3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Show some understanding of content and provenance of all three sources • Attempt to consider the sources' value, but this may lack balance or may be unconvincing • Demonstrate an understanding of context 	13-18
2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Be partial • Provide some comment on the value of the sources, <i>either</i> without addressing all of the sources <i>or</i> without focusing on the question. • Demonstrate some understanding of context 	7-12
1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Offer some comment on the value of at least one source • Provide unsupported, inaccurate vague or • Generalised comments on source value • Demonstrate a limited understanding of context 	1-6

My marking codes:

- P+** Examination of the value of provenance
- P-** Examination of the limitation of provenance
- C+** Examination of the value of content
- C-** Examination of the limitation of content
- T+** Examination of the value of tone/language/emphasis
- T-** Examination of the limitation of tone/language/emphasis
- K** Incorporation of historical context (**Knowledge**)
- J** Judgement provided

A top-level response, when marked, will have each of these marking codes present for each of the source evaluations (not in any set order).

**Under timed conditions, you are aiming to write at least one A4 side for each source evaluation.
The majority of completed answers are between 3 - 3 ½ A4 sides.**

2.2 Soviet control over Eastern Europe

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to a historian studying **why the Soviet Union wanted to establish control over Eastern European states.**

Source A

Adapted from the speech given by Churchill in Fulton, Missouri in March 1946 to an audience that included President Truman; Churchill 'coined' the term 'Iron Curtain' in the speech:

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind the line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. The populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a high measure of control from Moscow. I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their powers and doctrines.

Value		
Provenance	Content	Tone
Churchill has been British PM 1940-1945 – respected, source of knowledge etc. Allows us to see how an ex-Western leader views the Soviets. With Truman as an audience member it is interesting to observe how the delivery is tailored to its audience. By 1946 the Grand Alliance was unravelling and the Red Army had occupied and influenced the governments of many Eastern European States.	Churchill's quote that Stalin 'desires' the 'fruits of war' is supported by the breakdown of the 'Declaration of Liberated Europe.' Use of the term 'Iron Curtain' refers to the boundary between Soviet occupied European States and those which it did not occupy. The assessment seems to fairly reflect that Soviet Russia does not desire war.	Indicates a tone of criticism and warning to the 'western' public. 'Indefinite expansion' paints the picture that the Soviet Union cannot be stopped in their tracks.

Limitations		
Provenance	Content	Tone
Aim is to strengthen the relationship between UK and US. Speaking in Truman's hometown and appealing to US audience. Churchill had lost office, which would impact his up-to-date knowledge on Soviet affairs. Is Churchill trying to retain his political standing on the international stage? It was his opportunity to draw attention to the new global realities.	Negative reference to the 'Soviet Sphere' seems a stark contrast to the approach taken at the 'Percentages Agreement' in Moscow, October 1944.	The speech was relatively unexpected for many American and British citizens and the tone presented suggested Churchill to be an alarmist and war-monger.

Using Source A, your own knowledge and the evaluating table as a **guide**, complete a source evaluation (1-1½ sides of A4). Remember to balance your examination of value and limitation, incorporate historical context and link to the **question** before reaching a supported judgement on the overall value of the source.

Having completed your evaluation of Source A, now complete an evaluation of Source B. Use the space to annotate around the source, linking to provenance, content and tone. Think about what your overall judgement might be. Once you have planned adequately, set yourself the challenge of writing the answer in 20 minutes. Again, your answer should not exceed the expected length.

Advice:

- Consider each source separately – you do not have to write an overall introduction or conclusion. However, you should come to a judgement at the end of your analysis for each source.
- Be clear about what the source is saying overall.
- Be clear about how the content of the source links to your contextual knowledge of the period.
- Comment on the provenance of the source.
- Comment on the tone of the source.
- Make a judgement about the value of the source for the purpose stated in the question.

You might find this grid helpful:

	Valuable	Less valuable
Content And argument (CAT): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overall argument • Content – linked to contextual knowledge 		
Provenance And Tone (PAT): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provenance – i.e. the origin of the source (Who wrote it? When? For what purpose?) • Tone – e.g. factual/informative/persuasive/angry/self-justifying 		
Judgement on value for purpose of Q		

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to a historian studying **why the Soviet Union wanted to establish control over Eastern European states.**

Source B

Adapted from an interview given by Stalin to Soviet journalists and published in the Soviet state newspaper *Pravda*, March 1946:

Mr Churchill now stands as a firebrand of war. He has friends not only in England but also in the United States of America. It may be that some quarters are trying to push into oblivion the sacrifices of the Soviet people, which ensured the liberation of Europe from the Hitlerite yoke. But the Soviet Union cannot forget them. One can ask therefore, what can be surprising in the fact that the Soviet Union, in a desire to ensure its security for the future, tries to achieve that these countries should have governments whose relations with the Soviet Union are loyal? How can one qualify these peaceful aspirations of the Soviet Union as 'expansionist tendencies' of our government?

DUE DATE:

2.3 The Marshall Plan

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to a historian studying **the Marshall Plan**.

Source A

Adapted from a speech by US Secretary of State, George Marshall, 5 June 1947, at Harvard University:

The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products – principally from America – are so much greater than Europe's ability to pay, that Europe must have substantial additional help or else face social, economic and political deterioration of a very grave character. The consequences to the economy of the United States should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation, I am sure, from the government of the United States. Any government that manoeuvres to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit from it politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.

A Level 5 response:

Source A is valuable to a historian studying the Marshall Plan because George Marshall explains the cause for his plan, saying, "Europe's requirements ... are so much greater than Europe's ability to pay." This is valuable because it shows how badly Europe was left following the Second World War ending in 1945. This information is made more valuable because Marshall had been sent to research the economic conditions of Europe in 1947, meaning what he revealed would have been fairly accurate. He devised the Plan and is therefore one of the most influential figures in justifying its coming about. This is of great value as it looks at the policy maker's own view directly and therefore gives a strong insight into US aims in implementing the policy. Source A is also valuable because Marshall explains where the money is to be directed, towards "hunger" and "poverty." This is valuable because when the Marshall Plan was put in use on 8th April 1948, money went towards food and fuel but in the later years towards reconstruction. The language used is also very revealing, as phrases such as "the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist" links to the idea that the U.S. were taking the role of 'world policemen'; America felt it had a conscious duty to help Europe and the world to become strongly democratic and economically stable.

However, Source A is not valuable to a historian studying the Marshall Plan because it does not explicitly mention the unofficial goal of the Marshall Plan, to limit the influence of communism and more specifically, the Soviet Union. Instead, Marshall says, "Our policy is not directed against any country or doctrine." It is common knowledge that the Marshall Plan was in part aimed at preventing the spread of communist influence in Europe because the US believed Communism often stemmed from great poverty within countries. In this way, Source A is not valuable as it seems to present its only goal as being to help Europe when in reality it had other aims in destabilising communist influences. Moreover, as the source is from George Marshall himself, the limitations of the Marshall Plan are not explored. For example, Henry Hazlitt, an American journalist and economist believed that cash subsidies wouldn't help Europe. The purpose of the speech, made to Harvard University, was to convince intellectual minds of the need to direct \$17 million towards war-torn Europe. Language such as the reasons for needing the aid being linked to "huge poverty, desperation and chaos" indicates Marshall's aim to appeal to American citizens to overlook that aid would be provided to nations in Europe that had previously considered the 'enemy' (i.e. Germany).

Overall, Source A is of the greatest value to a historian studying the Marshall Plan as it is adapted from a speech by the designer of the plan and discusses the aims and actions planned by the USA.

Having read through the student response to Source A, I would like you to write **two further evaluations** for **Source B** and **Source C**. You can spend however much time you feel you need in annotating the sources and planning, but you should complete the writing of your evaluations in **no more than 40 minutes** (20 minutes per source).

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to a historian studying **the Marshall Plan**.

Source B

From the diary notes of the French President Vincent Auriol at the Franco-British-Soviet conference in Paris, July 1947.

The truth is that, from the very first day, the Soviet Union was hostile to the Marshall Plan.

Conversations had been held at the Soviet Embassy with Communist party elected representatives from Eastern Europe, solely to explain the Soviet attitude. Poland, Czechoslovakia and some other small East European countries had agreed to the Marshall Plan and they counted on it to recover and to rebuild their ruined economies. But the Plan would have made it impossible for the Soviet Union to carry on exploiting the economies of small satellite countries in the way it had already begun to; besides, the Soviet Union fears Germany and is afraid of the external situation. It is obvious that the Soviet Union wishes to barricade itself in its corner with a belt of satellites around it and that is what determined its attitude. But it remains true that this terrible blow struck against peace and against people's hopes will be deeply resented.

Source C

From a speech by Andrei Vyshinsky, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1947.

It is becoming more and more clear to everyone that the implementation of the Marshall Plan will mean placing European countries under the economic and political control of the United States and will mean direct American interference in the internal affairs of those countries. Moreover, this plan is an attempt to split Europe into two camps and, with the help of Britain and France, to form a bloc of several European countries hostile to the interests of the democratic countries of Eastern Europe, most particularly to the Soviet Union. The intention is to make use of Western Germany and German heavy industry in the Ruhr as one of the most important bases for American expansion in Europe, in complete disregard of the national interests of those countries who have suffered most from German aggression. This policy of the United States, supported by Britain and France, is utterly incompatible with the principles of the United Nations.

DUE DATE:

2.4 The Berlin Airlift

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to a historian studying **the Berlin Blockade**.

Source A

Willy Brandt interviewed by Terence Prittle, 1974. Brandt first became well known outside Germany when he took the position of mayor of West Berlin, which he held from 1957 until 1966:

'It would not be fair to be over-critical, particularly when such a fine rescue operation for Berlin was mounted by the Western Powers. Maybe there were delays...I would prefer to stress the positive aspects of the Blockade. First, it was a heroic episode in which the Allied pilots and the Berliners played the main roles. Then it brought about a feeling of real co-operation between the Berliners and the Allies. Those were grey, grim days; but our people showed their steadfastness, their courage, their dry humour and their basic decency.'

A Level 5 response:

Source A is valuable to a historian studying the Berlin Airlift because it demonstrates its positive impacts in bringing West Berliners and the Western Powers together in an act of solidarity against Stalin's attempts to pressurise the Western Powers to leave Berlin. The tone of the source also holds value as it displays how Berliners felt indebted to the Allies through use of the words "fine" and "heroic." At the time of the airlift, Willy Brandt was beginning his political career with the Social Democratic Party in West Berlin. This would indicate value in the source's provenance, as Brandt would have been engaged in the political discussions emerging in West Berlin at the time and could accurately reflect the impact of the Blockade on West Berlin. Brandt explains the "rescue operation" in the form of the Berlin Airlift, which is valuable to a historian because it shows how the Allies reacted to Stalin's blockade of Berlin (24 June 1948 – 12 May 1949), which is painted as successful in his eyes. I know this to be true as during the Blockade which lasted 318 days, 275,000 planes transported 1.5 millions tons of supplies and an aircraft landed every 3 minutes at Berlin Tempelhof. He refers to the "real cooperation between Berliners and Allies" which could refer to when German volunteers were used to unloading aircrafts at Templehof Airport. Berliners also built Tegel Airport in three months, showing "real co-operation" and making Source A valuable as it confirms Brandt's positive comments. Brandt also refers to the context of the time with regards to the "grey, grim days" where he could be recalling the rationing of food, fuel and electricity as well as the shortages experienced and the emergence of a black market. This balance in studying the positives and negatives of the Airlift gives the source greater credibility, which may be enhanced by the fact the interview was given 25 years after the Blockade ended, allowing an opportunity to reflect on the events.

Although Brandt was the Mayor of West Berlin at the time of interview, he did not hold this position during the airlift, that role was held by Ernst Reuter. This makes Source A less valuable because Brandt would have had limited access to the leading political leadership of the time but instead would have been reflecting on the view of the public he interacted with. Furthermore, as Mayor in 1974 Brandt would not want to say anything against the airlift. He had won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1971 (three years before the interview) partly for his work in trying to improve relations between East and West, so arguably he would not paint the Blockade or Airlift in a negative light – perhaps this is why he doesn't refer to the USSR at any point in the source. This can be seen in the tone of the source linking to Berliners "steadfastness", "courage" and "basic decency." This last point could also be seen as a limitation, as it seems to be a slight attack on the actions of the Soviet Union, which could be seen, at the time, to have gone against "basic decency." Additionally Brandt refers to a "heroic episode" but does not mention the confused response of the West when the Blockade first came into effect or elaborate on the many difficulties that were faced beyond "maybe there were delays".

Overall however, I would consider Source A very valuable to a historian. In presenting the attitudes of the people during the events and coming from a credible individual, the source highlights the importance of the Airlift to West Berliners.

Having read through the student response to Source A, I would like you to write **two further evaluations** for **Source B** and **Source C**. You can spend however much time you feel you need in annotating the sources and planning, but you should complete the writing of your evaluations in **no more than 40 minutes** (20 minutes per source).

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to a historian studying **the Berlin Blockade**.

Source B

From Truman's notes made in response to Clay's report on the Berlin Blockade in July 1948:

'Clay said the abandonment of Berlin would have a disastrous effect upon our plans for Western Germany. It would also slow down European recovery. The (West) Germans were concerned about the possibility of our leaving Berlin. We should go to any lengths to find a peaceful solution to the situation, but we had to remain in Berlin. He reported that the airlift was more than enough to meet the food requirements, but was inadequate to meet the necessary amounts of coal.'

Source C

Adapted from a note to British PM Clement Atlee, in July 1948, in which Bevan presented his analysis of the situation in Germany:

'The mere fact of our continuing presence has so far prevented and shall continue to hinder the setting up in Berlin of a Soviet-controlled German government. To retreat from Berlin, the last democratic island in the Soviet sphere, would immensely increase Soviet prestige, win over the doubtful masses in Germany to their side and depress our friends in each of the free countries in Europe. We must however be clear in our minds that to stay in Berlin is a means to an end rather than an end in itself.'

DUE DATE:

2.5 USA's attitude towards China 1949

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to a historian studying **the USA's attitude towards China in 1949**.

Source A

From an article written by Mao in August 1949, as the USA withdrew its diplomatic presents from China:

The war to turn China into a US colony, a war in which the United States supplies the money and guns, and Jiang Jieshi the men, to fight for the United States and slaughter the Chinese people, has been an important component of the US imperialist policy of worldwide aggression since the Second World War. The three main targets are Europe, Asia and the Americas. China, the centre of gravity in Asia, is a large country with a population of 475 million; by seizing China, the United States would possess all Asia. With its Asian front consolidated, US imperialism could concentrate its forces on attacking Europe.

A Level 5 response:

Source A was written by Mao Zedong, increasing its value to a historian studying US attitudes towards China in 1949, as Mao was a key political figure in China as leader of the CCP. Though this source was written two months prior to the establishment of the PRC (1 October 1949) by August 1949 the war had swayed greatly in favour of the CCP following their capture of Nanjing, the capital of the Nationalist government, in April 1949. Mao continued to lead the CCP to victory against the nationalist (and US supported) KMT, so he would have known considerable amounts in relation to US attitudes and efforts in the Civil War in seeking to destroy their cause. The source does somewhat mirror the ideas held by many Americans, that by "seizing" China (or having diplomatic influence) the United States would possess access to all Asia and be in an ideal position to prevent the further spread of communism. This, amongst other political ideas, was central in shaping US foreign policy, so this suggestion increases the value of the source. The source's content is of some value as it also gives specific examples of the type of involvement the USA had prior to and during 1949. It gives an idea about the level of military support the US was funding (approximately 14% of total expenditure). It also provides one perspective on the US's aims in China, even if US policy makers would not choose to express them in this way.

However, Mao as the spokesperson of the CCP weakens the value of Source A, as he would have been trying to demonise the US and their policies in order for his opposition to lose support. Furthermore, the source was written for public consumption, immediately following the withdrawal of the US from China, so Mao would have been using this article as propaganda now he had control of the media, in order to stamp out any potential opposition. Mao had to eradicate any chance of rebellion against his new rule and he adopted an extremely negative stance towards the US because of their involvement in aiding the KMT. This makes Mao's stance extremely subjective and less valuable in studying the USA's attitude towards China in 1949. Additionally, Mao's tone in this article supports the view that the source is of limited validity due to its aggressive references such as the "slaughter" of the "Chinese people." This source aims to paint the US as "imperialist" and comments of turning China into a "US colony" are exaggerated in an attempt to persuade the Chinese public of the US's evil intent. This impression is probably given by Mao in order to unite his party against the allusion of a still-strong common enemy. This weakens the credibility of the source as it is likely the personal opinion of Mao's aimed at the Chinese populace and thus of little use in studying the USA's attitude. Likewise, the source gives limited evidence to support Mao's claims, as the Civil War had been ongoing from 1927 but Mao chooses to focus on its developments from the end of the Second World War to support his anti-US rhetoric.

Conclusively, Source A is of some value to historians studying the USA's attitude towards China because the article was created by a significant figure at the time of the US's evolving policy towards China. However, much of the contents of the article are overshadowed by bias tone, calling into question the credibility of the document and revealing far more evidence of opinion and public propaganda. It isn't possible to pinpoint one exact American attitude towards China and so it is necessary to observe a spectrum of views in order to fully appreciate the USA's attitude towards China in 1949.

Having read through the student response to Source A, I would like you to write **two further evaluations** for **Source B** and **Source C**. You can spend however much time you feel you need in annotating the sources and planning, but you should complete the writing of your evaluations in **no more than 40 minutes** (20 minutes per source).

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to a historian studying **the USA's attitude towards China in 1949**.

Source B

From Dean G. Acheson's White Paper [a government report] on China, 30 July 1949:

The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by this country contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not. A decision was arrived at within China, if only a decision by default.

Source C

From the 'Report to the President by the National Security Council: NSC 48/2 The position of the United States with respect to Asia' Washington, 30 December 1949:

- f (1) The United States should continue to recognize the National Government of China until the situation is further clarified. The United States should avoid recognizing the Chinese Communist regime until it is clearly in the United States interest to do so. The United States should continue to express to friendly governments its own views concerning the dangers of hasty recognition of the Chinese Communist regime but should not take a stand which would engage the prestige of the United States in an attempt to prevent such recognition. In general, however, it should be realized that it would be inappropriate for the United States to adopt a posture more hostile or policies more harsh towards a Communist China than towards the USSR itself.
- (3) The United States should exploit, through appropriate political, psychological and economic means, any rifts between the Chinese Communists and the USSR and between the Stalinists and other elements in China, while scrupulously avoiding the appearance of intervention. Where appropriate, covert as well as overt means should be utilized to achieve these objectives.

DUE DATE:

2.6 The causes of the Korean War

This will be an in-class time essay practice. You are permitted to have with you annotated sources and a brief essay plan, but no more.

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to a historian studying **why the Korean War escalated in 1950 [30 marks]**

Source A

From an official statement by Mao, issued on 28 June 1950, in which he defined China's position regarding North Korea's invasion of the South:

The US invasion of Asia can only touch off (*suddenly initiate*) the broad resolute opposition of the Asian people. On 5 January, Truman said in an announcement that the United States would not intervene in Taiwan. Now his conduct proves what he said was false. The United States thus reveals its imperialist nature in its true colours. The United States is unable to justify in any way its intervention in the internal affairs of Korea.

Source B

From a speech delivered by President Truman to the US Congress, on 27 June 1950, in which he announced his plans to address the crisis in Korea:

The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has now passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations, and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. A return to the rule of force in international affairs would have far-reaching effects. The United States will continue to uphold the rule of law.

Source C

From a second resolution to North Korea issued by the United Nations on 27 June 1950:

The Security Council, having noted that the authorities of North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel, and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security, recommends that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and restore international peace and security in the area.

ESSAY DATE:

2.7 US Policy of Containment

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to a historian studying **the US policy of containment**

Source A

From Dwight D. Eisenhower's inaugural address as the incoming US president in 1953:

Knowing that only a United States that is strong and immensely productive can help defend freedom in our world, we view our nation's strength and security as a trust upon which rests the hope of free men everywhere. It is the firm duty of each of our free citizens and of every free citizen everywhere to place the cause of his country before the comfort, the convenience, of himself. Appreciating that economic need, military security, and political wisdom combine to suggest regional groupings of free peoples, we hope, within the framework of the United Nations, to help strengthen such special bonds the world over. The nature of these ties must vary with the different problems of different areas.

A Level 5 response:

Source A is especially valuable in relation to its provenance as at this point, Eisenhower was experienced in global politics, despite never having previously held public office, due to his position as Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces during World War Two. Therefore, one would expect him to be highly knowledgeable about foreign affairs increasing the reliability of his claims. The source is also useful in outlining what Eisenhower wanted the US public and rest of the world to believe about the aims for his presidency. It shows some of the continuity and possibly some of the changes between Eisenhower's presidency and approach to containment compared with his predecessor Truman. For instance, Eisenhower states that the US must "defend freedom in our world" suggesting that he aims to continue to try to contain communism like Truman had done and keep the USA as the 'world's policemen.' His mention of "free men" also links to the Truman Doctrine and the idea that all countries should have free elections and democratically elected governments. Additionally Eisenhower supports that "economic need, military security and political wisdom" are needed to defend "free people" suggesting that these three things are integral to the containment policy. Certainly, one could argue that this is the case, as the USA would employ financial (such as restructuring Japan's economy to discourage it from becoming Communist) and diplomatic means (such as the Geneva Conference to end the French-Indochina War in July 1954) as well as military might (such as during the Korean War) to prevent the further spread of Communism. This increases the value of Eisenhower's claims. The source is also useful as it indicates how the US adopted a different attitude to treating countries in similar regions as individuals rather than as collectives, "must vary with the different problems of different areas," where previously the US had looked at Asia and Western Europe as having similar conditions for supporting communism.

However, Source A has its limitations, firstly the word containment is not specifically mentioned and so it is unclear whether Eisenhower is talking about Kennan's interpretation, or whether he is discussing mutual atomic deterrence, which was a policy he and John Foster Dulles favoured throughout his administration. Furthermore, there is a lack of clarity on the specific areas of 'regional groupings' he is referring to and whether containment would be a viable policy across the Soviet sphere, or only in certain regions. This lack of explanation is due to the target audience being the American public, and so it must be both understandable and pleasing to his voters, which means a historian may find his vagueness limited if they were looking for details. Lastly, though it may have been his preferred policy later on, Eisenhower is unlikely to express his belief that the US should bolster its nuclear arsenal on his first day in office, especially considering his open criticism of Truman's hydrogen bomb construction. Moreover, the source being an inauguration speech means it contains persuasive arguments for the key campaign promises made during his election and the tone is designed to rouse the general public rather than explain his policies in-depth.

As such, this source is valuable to historians studying how the policy of containment was addressed to the public, but past 1953 is unable to reveal how the policy of containment would evolve.

Having read through the student response to Source A, I would like you to write **two further evaluations** for **Source B** and **Source C**. If possible, I would like you to complete the planning and writing of your evaluations in **no more than 40 minutes** (20 minutes per source).

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to a historian studying **the US policy of containment**

Source B

From an article by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, in the popular and influential *Life* magazine, early 1952. Dulles was a major opponent of Truman's containment policy:

If you think back over the last six years, you will see that our policies have largely involved emergency action to try to 'contain' Soviet communism by checking it here or blocking it there. We are not working, sacrificing and spending in order to be able to live without this peril – but to be able to live with it. Our present negative policies will never end the type of sustained offensive which Soviet communism is mounting. Liberation from the yoke of Moscow will not occur for a very long time unless the United States makes it publically known that it wants and expects liberation to occur.

Source C

From a comment by Eisenhower at a press conference early in 1954, where he mentioned the importance of Indochina and introduced another strand of containment called the domino theory:

You have the broader considerations that might follow what you could call the 'falling domino' principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences. It turns the so-called island defensive chain of Japan, Formosa (Taiwan), of the Philippines and to the southward; it moves in to threaten Australia and New Zealand. It takes away, in its economic aspects, that region that Japan must have as a trading area or Japan, in turn, will have only one place to go in the world – towards the communist areas in order to live.

DUE DATE:

2.8 The Berlin Wall

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to a historian studying **why the Berlin Wall was erected in 1961**.

Source A

From a diplomatic note sent by the US government, on 17 August 1961, to the Soviet government:

The United States government has never accepted that limitations can be imposed on freedom of movement within Berlin. The boundary between the Soviet Zone and the Western zones of Berlin is not a state frontier. The United States government considers that the measures which the East German authorities have taken are illegal. It reiterates that it does not accept the pretention that the Soviet Zone of Berlin forms a part of the so-called 'German Democratic Republic.' The measures that have just been taken are motivated by the fact that an ever-increasing number of inhabitants of East Germany wish to leave this territory. The reasons for this exodus are known.

A Level 5 response:

Firstly, Source A is valuable because it was written on the 17th August which was in the middle of the period of the Berlin wall construction (13th-22nd August) this showing how at the time, the reason for the Berlin Wall being erected was unfathomable to the Western Powers. It being a diplomatic note could enhance its value and the message would be well thought out and aim to communicate the stance of the US in a precise and assertive manner. Source A is also valuable to a historian studying why the Berlin Wall was erected because it implies that the US believed it was due to the "pretention that the Soviet Zone of Berlin forms a part of the so-called German Democratic Republic." This could refer to the Vienna Summit of June 1961 in which Khrushchev demanded that Germany should be united under communist terms, thus resulting in the GDR's independence. As well as the fact that the GDR's independence was stressed in this "diplomatic note," it seems that the West were concerned of it, as shown by the Hallstein Doctrine in which the Federal Republic of Germany refused to have diplomatic relations with any country that recognised the GDR. Thus, the source is valuable to a historian studying why the Berlin Wall was erected because it shows how the US believed it was part of an effort to forcibly achieve independence. Source A also states "The reasons for this exodus are known," referring to the travel of migrants from East Berlin to West Berlin, one that totalled 332,000 in 1953.

On the other hand, Source A can be argued to have less value in its provenance because the "diplomatic note" could not perhaps express the USA's full anger as Kennedy was conscious to avoid war so may have had to compose the note in a more passive tone. This is less valuable as it doesn't show further underlying reasons as to why the wall was built. The source also refers to the USA having "never accepted that limitations can be imposed on freedom of movement." Although the USA claim they can never accept this, it can be argued that as the wall was erected, the US did little to show their dissatisfaction. In fact, Kennedy refused to use US troops to pull the wall down in order to avoid war. British historian Frederick Taylor commented that the "Berlin Wall was more convenient to Western democracies than their rhetoric suggested." The tone of the source makes it clear that the US government is critical of the Berlin Wall, however, in reality Kennedy was content to allow the wall to remain in Berlin as it helped to avoid nuclear war and guarantee that there would be no military conflict between the USA and USSR in Germany. This combined with JFK's inaction to amend the conflict, shows a limitation in the source because "have never accepted" implies the USA were furious but their actions proved otherwise. The source doesn't demonstrate that the reason for the Berlin Wall being erected was partly helpful for the west. The tone is also scathing with reference to the "so-called 'German Democratic Republic'" a clear provocation of Soviet controlled East Berlin, linking to the USA's refusal to recognise the state.

Overall, Source A is valuable to a historian studying why the Berlin Wall was erected as it mentions both the Soviet aims of stopping the flood of skilled workers into West Berlin and of getting the USA to recognise the GDR. However, as it is an official US diplomatic document, it might not be totally reliable and might not show fully the reasons for the wall's construction, merely an initial US response.

Having read through the student response to Source A, I would like you to write **two further evaluations** for **Source B** and **Source C**. If possible, I would like you to complete the planning and writing of your evaluations in **no more than 40 minutes** (20 minutes per source).

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to a historian studying **why the Berlin Wall was erected in 1961**.

Source B

From a diplomatic note sent by the Soviet Union in response to the USA's protests, on 18 August 1961:

The actions of the German Democratic Republic established effective control on the border with West Berlin, in order to bar the way for subversive activity being carried out against the GDR and other countries of the socialist community. Any state establishes on its border with other states such regime as it deems necessary and responsive to its legitimate interests. West Berlin has been transformed into a centre of political and economic provocations against the GDR. West Berlin leaders have cynically called West Berlin the 'cheapest atom bomb put in the centre of a socialist state.'

Source C

From Khrushchev's memoirs, written after he resigned which his son Sergey smuggled out of the Soviet Union and published after his death:

The appearance of this strictly controlled border immediately brought order to East Germany and raised the level of labour discipline. Among other things the buying of cheaper East German food and consumer goods by "foreigners" [West Berliners] dropped off sharply. Ulbricht reported to us that the savings for East Germany added up to millions of marks. The purchasing power of the West German mark was considerably higher than the East German one; thus the East German mark kept losing value. That is, the West Germans were extracting big economic advantages from the situation as well as political ones. And all of this was a heavy load on the shoulders of the workers and peasants of East Germany. Now the situation had changed. Without the signing of a peace treaty East Germany had nevertheless asserted its sovereign rights.

DUE DATE:

2.9 Full Essay Practice Questions

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to an historian studying the **Soviet attitude to the future of Poland** [30 marks]

Source A

From a conversation between Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill. This occurred during the Yalta Conference, on 6 February 1945:

It is a question of security of the state not only because we are on Poland's frontier but also because throughout history Poland has always been in the corridor for attack on Russia. It is sufficient that during the last thirty years our German enemy has passed through this corridor twice. This is because Poland was weak. It is in the Russian interest as well as that of Poland that Poland be strong and powerful and in a position in her own, and in our interests to shut the corridor by her own forces. It is necessary that Poland be free, independent and powerful.

Source B

On 1 April 1945, Roosevelt wrote to Stalin and outlined his concerns about Stalin's interpretation of the Yalta declaration on Poland:

[The] part of our agreement which has aroused the greatest popular interest and is the most urgent related to the Polish Question. In the discussions that have taken place so far, your government appears to take the position that the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity which we agreed should be formed should be little more than a continuation of the present Warsaw Government.

Source C

Memorandum from William Leahy to Secretary of State Stettinius forwarding a statement from Stalin on the Provisional Polish Government, 11 May 1945:

As it seems to me you do not agree to regard the Provisional Polish Government as basis for the future government of national unity and do not agree that the Provisional Polish Government should occupy in this government a place which rightfully belongs to it. I must say that such a position does not give opportunity to reach a harmonious solution on the Polish question.

DUE DATE:

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to an historian studying the **Cold War tensions in the early 1950s** [30 marks]

Source A

From a speech delivered by McCarthy in Wheeling, West Virginia in February 1950. He later presented a modified version to the US Senate, on 20 February 1950:

At the war's end we were physically the strongest nation on earth. Ours could have been the honour of being a beacon in the desert of destruction. Unfortunately we have failed miserably to rise to the opportunity. We find ourselves in a position of impotency, not because our only potential enemy has sent men to invade our shores, but because of the traitorous actions of those who have been treated so well by this nation. This is glaringly true in the State Department. In my opinion the State Department, which is one of the most important government departments, is thoroughly infested with communists. We are dealing with a far more sinister type of activity because it permits the enemy to guide and shape our policy.

Source B

From a secret statement in NSC-68, April 1950. It offered an insight into the rapidly developing perception the USA had of its role as a global influence or a form of 'global policeman':

We advocate an immediate and large-scale build up in our military and general strength, and that of our allies, with the intention of righting the power balance, and in the hope that through means other than all-out war we could induce a change in the nature of the socialist system. The United States can strike out a bold and massive program of rebuilding the West's defensive potential. This means virtual abandonment by the United States of trying to distinguish between national and global security. Security must henceforth become a dominant element in the national budget.

Source C

Adapted from Dean G. Acheson's speech to the National Press Club in Washington DC, on January 12, 1950:

This defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyu Islands. These islands are essential parts of the defensive perimeter of the Pacific, and they must and will be held. The defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyu to the Philippine Islands. So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack.

DUE DATE:

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to an historian studying the **USA's attitude to Southeast Asia** [30 marks]

Source A

From Dulles' address to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, on 12 January 1954, where he explained the new strategy of 'massive retaliation':

It is not sound military strategy permanently to commit US land forces to Asia to a degree that leaves us no strategic reserves. It is not sound economics to support permanently other countries; nor is it good foreign policy, for in the long run, that creates as much ill will as good will. Also, it is not sound to become permanently committed to military expenditures so vast that they lead to what Lenin called 'practical bankruptcy.' If our policy was to remain the traditional one then we had to be ready to fight [anywhere]. Our basic decision was to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate instantly by means and at places of our choosing.

Source B

From a comment by Eisenhower at a press conference early in 1954, where he mentioned the importance of Indochina and introduced another strand of containment called the domino theory:

You have the broader considerations that might follow what you could call the 'falling domino' principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences. It turns the so-called island defensive chain of Japan, Formosa (Taiwan), of the Philippines and to the southward; it moves in to threaten Australia and New Zealand. It takes away, in its economic aspects, that region that Japan must have as a trading area or Japan, in turn, will have only one place to go in the world – towards the communist areas in order to live.

Source C

From a telegram from Dulles to Ngo Dinh Diem, on 10 July 1954, in which he pledged the USA's support of his regime in South Vietnam:

Your wisdom, strength and record of devotion to the cause of genuine independence are well known to us and we are confident that they will be put to service in Vietnam. We know that the struggle in Indochina is one for liberty against despotism and that you respect the spirit of resistance to a menace which threatens the entire free world. The US remains prepared to support countries everywhere seeking to maintain their freedom against a godless communist menace. We would lend our best efforts to assist the patriotic Vietnamese in building up strength in that part of Vietnam remaining outside communist occupation.

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to an historian studying **US-Soviet relations in 1956**
[30 marks]

Source A

An extract from Khrushchev's Secret Speech to the 10th Party Congress held in Moscow, 25 February 1956:

After Stalin's death the Central Committee of the Party began explaining that it was foreign to the spirit of Marxist-Leninism to elevate one person, and to transform him into a superman possessing supernatural characteristics akin to more of a God. Such a belief about Stalin was cultivated. Stalin originated the concept of enemy of the people. This made possible the usage of the most cruel repression against anyone who in any way disagreed with Stalin. When Stalin said that one or another should be arrested, it was necessary to accept on faith that he was an 'enemy of the people.'

Source B

From an address by President Dwight D. Eisenhower to the US Congress on 31 October 1956, in which he made the USA's attitude towards the Hungarian Rising clear:

After the Second World War, the Soviet Union used military force to impose on the nations of Eastern Europe governments of Soviet choice – servants of Moscow. It has been consistent United States policy to end this situation and to fulfil the wartime pledge of the United Nations that these countries would once again know sovereignty and self-government. We could not, of course, carry out this policy by resorting to force. The United States has made clear its readiness to assist economically the new independent governments.

Source C

From Khrushchev's speech at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956:

We want to be friends with and cooperate with the United States in the effort for peace and security of the peoples. If good relations are not established between the Soviet Union and the United States, this will lead to an arms race on a still greater scale. The Leninist principle of the peaceful coexistence of state with different social systems remains the general line of our country's foreign policy. The principle of peaceful coexistence is gaining increasingly wider international recognition. And this is logical, since there is no other way out of the present situation. Indeed, there are only two ways, either peaceful coexistence or the most devastating war in history. There is no third alternative.

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to an historian studying **the origins of the Vietnam War** [30 marks]

Source A

From a Vietnam Workers' Party resolution, drawn up in January 1959 in Hanoi:

The entire people will unite and strive to struggle for national reunification on the basis of independence and democracy; to endeavour to consolidate the north and actively take it step by step towards socialism; to build a peaceful, unified, independent, prosperous and strong Vietnam; and to contribute to the safeguarding of peace in Southeast Asia and the world.

Source B

From the National Liberation Front's 10-point programme, published in December 1960:

1. Overthrow the camouflaged colonial regime and the American imperialist and the dictatorial power of Ngo Dinh Diem, servant of the Americans, and institute a government of national democratic union.
2. Institute a largely liberal and democratic regime.
3. Establish an independent and sovereign economy, and improve the living conditions of the people.
4. Reduce land rent and implement agrarian reform, with the aims of providing land to the tillers
- ...
8. Promote a foreign policy of peace and neutrality.
9. Re-establish normal relations between the two zones and prepare for the peaceful reunification of the country.

Source C

From a telegram from President Kennedy's national Security Adviser, McGeorge Bundy, to Lodge, dated 5 October 1963. It offers some insight into Kennedy's stance on a possible coup to replace Diem in South Vietnam:

President today approved recommendation that no initiative should now be taken to give any active covert encouragement to a coup. There should, however, be urgent covert effort with closest security under broad guidance of Ambassador to identify and build contacts with possible alternative leadership as and when it appears. Essential that this effort be totally secure and fully deniable, and separated entirely from normal political analysis and reporting. We repeat that this effort is not aimed at active promotion of a coup but only at surveillance and readiness.

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these sources to an historian studying **the Cuban Missile Crisis**
[30 marks]

Source A

From a comment by the Treasury Secretary, Douglass Dillon, at an early ExComm meeting in October 1962:

The Soviet Union has now deliberately initiated a public test of our intentions that can determine the future course of world events for many years to come. If we allow the offensive capabilities presently in Cuba to remain there, I am convinced that sooner or later we will lose all of Latin America to communism because all credibility of our willingness to effectively resist Soviet military power will have been removed.

Source B

Adapted from a speech by President Kennedy, broadcast on national television to the American people on 22 October 1962:

Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation. Should these offensive military preparations continue, thus increasing the threat to the hemisphere, further action will be justified. It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the western hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union. I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eventually to eliminate this clandestine, reckless and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations. I call upon him further to abandon this course of world domination, and to join in an historic effort to end the perilous arms race and to transform the history of man.

Source C

From a review of the Cuban Missile Crisis by Robert Komer of the US State Department on 29 October 1962:

The short-run effects would be very favourable to the US. Unquestionably the US will emerge from this confrontation with increased prestige. The Soviet action should demonstrate once again the offensive nature of Soviet motivations more clearly than anything we could say. It should also demonstrate that the Soviets are not prepared to risk a decisive military showdown with the US over issues involving the extension of Soviet power. We should be clear, however, that this is not to be confused with Soviet willingness to 'go to the mat' over an interest vital to Soviet security.

3.1 Essays: Introduction

What can you expect in the exam?

Section B of your paper will contain three essay questions of which you are required to answer two. Each essay is designed to test historical understanding in depth, by a focus on events, issues and developments and the interrelationships of various perspectives as they apply to the question.

Each question in this section carries 25 marks and it is advised that you spend **45 minutes on each** of the essay questions. The questions in Section B can be on any topic learned over the two year course and, in addition to targeting the generic qualities of organisation, analysis, evaluation and judgement, questions will also test your understanding of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance. Consistent with the nature of historical analysis, a single question may require you to demonstrate understanding of more than one of these concepts. The question will nearly always be phrased as a statement, followed by **“assess the validity of this view.” [25 marks]**

How is the question marked?

Level	The answer will:	Marks
5	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Show a very good understanding of the full demands of the question• Be well-organised and effectively delivered• Contain well-selected, specific and precise detail• Be fully analytical with a balanced argument• Reach a well-substantiated judgement.	21-25
4	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Show a good understanding of the demands of the question• Be well-organised and effectively communicated• Contain a range of clear and specific supporting information• Be analytical and direct in style, and well-balanced• Contain some judgement, which may, however, be only partially substantiated	16-20
3	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Show an understanding of the question• Be effectively organised and show adequate communication skills.• Supply a range of largely accurate and relevant information,• Comment on the question, with some balance• Contain some statements with inadequate support	11-15
2	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Be descriptive or partial• Show some organisation, and limited• Communication skills Contain some appropriate information• Be limited in range, and inaccurate• Contain mostly unsupported and generalist statements	6-10
1	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Be based on a misunderstanding of the question• Show limited organisational and communication• Skills Contain largely irrelevant material• Be very limited in range, and inaccurate• Contain unsupported, vague or generalist comment	1-5

How to approach the question:

Planning:

Step 1: Essay Question - *for example:* 'The tensions that existed within the Grand Alliance by the end of 1946 were the result of conflicting ideologies.' Assess the validity of this view

Step 2: What is the question asking? - Explain what you understand the question wants you to do.

Step 3: What is your answer to the question? - Summarise your view in one sentence, as this will help you introduce your judgement in your introduction to be supported throughout your essay

Step 4: Key points: Select 6 key points that will each form the basis of a developed paragraph. You need to have 3 key point that **support the statement** and 3 key points that **oppose the statement**.

Planning to write:

Step 5: Introduction: Use the statements you have created to state your arguments to the question. Make sure you use key terms in the question. You must at this point state your judgement on the question.

Step 6: Point 1 Opening Line- Keep it clearly focused on the question- remember to link directly to the question and explain how your point relates.

Step 7: Key Supporting Evidence- Be detailed- include specific facts and dates where possible.

Step 8: Mini judgement- Remember the importance of ending every key point with a clear link to the question - be prepared to engage the key word in the question.

Repeat steps 6-8 for the remaining key points

Step 9: Conclusion - summarise your arguments but make sure you link these back to the question. You must reiterate your overall judgement (which should not have changed from the one made in your introduction). This should not be a lengthy piece of writing, four to six lines should be sufficient.

In 45 minutes you can hope to write 2 to 3 A4 sides, so when completing practice essays you should not exceed this. Word-processed essays should never exceed 2 A4 sides.

3.2 Model answers

“It was the actions of the Soviet Union that had laid the foundations of the Cold War by March 1947” Assess the validity of this view [25 marks]

Although there were multiple actions that contributed to laying the foundations of the Cold War by March 1947, I disagree that the actions of the Soviet Union were predominantly responsible. Though it seems that Stalin's desperate desire to expand his control over Eastern Europe through use of 'salami tactics' and refusal to hold 'free elections' as agreed at the Yalta Conference (February 1945) was the cause the Cold War, the US's economic leverage and somewhat contradictory desire to influence the Western Hemisphere laid the foundations of the Cold War by March 1947.

One of the main reasons the Soviet Union can be seen as responsible for laying the foundations of the Cold War is owing to their control of the 'Satellite States' in Eastern Europe. By March 1947 Stalin had used his Red Army to gain influence over the Baltic States, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. In Romania, the Red Army was used to prevent any opposition to the communist government, while in Bulgaria the leader of the Agrarian Party, Nikola Petkov, was executed and a forced party merger led to a Communist dominated government. Even in divided nations such as Austria, the 1945 elections led to the communists gaining only 4 of 165 seats resulting in the arrest of Social Democrat Councillors in the Soviet zone. These actions clearly contradicted the "Declaration of Liberated Europe" signed by Stalin on 10th February 1945 which stated the Big Three would allow people 'to create democratic institutions of their own choice'. This caused high tensions in what had been the 'Grand Alliance' firmly laying the foundations of the Cold War.

Alternatively, Revisionist historians would point to the expansionist tendencies of the United States and its intention to extend economic influence throughout the world as a main cause of the Cold War. By March 1947 the Truman Doctrine emerged in which the U.S. Congress appropriated \$400 million to Greece and Turkey, over half of this in military aid in an attempt to combat communist expansion. The United States tried to solve certain political issues, such as the Soviet actions in Eastern Europe by using economic pressure. The power of words was also a heavy influence in laying the foundations of the Cold War and would support that the Soviet Union actions were not solely responsible. Kennan's Long Telegram in 1946 shaped the American foreign policy of Containment, suggesting that Stalin required a hostile international environment to consolidate his autocratic rule and set the stage for further political conflict. This coupled with Churchill's 'Iron Curtain Speech' in March 1946 clearly threatened the Soviet Union, providing evidence against the statement.

However, agreeing with Orthodox historians is evidence of the tactics of the Soviet Union, which laid the foundations of the Cold War due to their activities in Poland. After the Red Army crossed the Curzon Line, Stalin established a 'Provisional Government' in Lublin in August 1945. Despite agreeing to a more democratic Poland, Stalin went ahead with his own Government; from location it was clear they would enjoy the economic and political advantage over the London Poles. Following Stalin's actions in backing the Lublin Poles over the Government in exile, the Polish elections of January 1947 were rigged with over 200 potential candidates disqualified or killed. This laid the foundations of the Cold War owing to the centrality of the 'Polish Question', which was discussed in 6 of the 9 sessions of the Yalta Conference. For the Americans, Poland was a kind of acid test of the Soviet goodwill while for the British Polish independence and autonomy was hugely symbolic having entered World War Two following their invasion by Nazi Germany. In violating the agreements made at Yalta regarding Poland, the actions of the Soviet Union marked a turning point in East-West tensions, particularly after Stalin signed the 'Treaty of Friendship' on 21st April 1945 recognising Polish territorial gains. The hostility felt by the West can be evidenced in their refusal to admit Poland in the UN consultative meetings. This action from the USSR laid the foundations of the Cold War as already Poland, under Stalin's sphere of influence, were not involved in the Western vision for a peaceful post-war World.

There is argument to be made however that national interests and a desire for security and spheres of influence motivated the Soviet leadership, suggesting that it was the reaction of the United States and not the actions of the Soviet Union that laid the foundations of the Cold War by March 1947. Prominent in this field of revisionist historiography, Walter La Feber notes “Stalin’s priority was not world revolution but, once again, Russian security and his own personal power”.¹ It is true that Russia had been invaded by Germany via Poland twice within the thirty years preceding the conference. The United States meanwhile opposed to the USSR’s sphere of interest in Europe while strengthening its own sphere in the Western Hemisphere.² Thus it was the United States’ contradictory policies and inability to appreciate the Soviet Union’s desire for stronger borders that laid the foundations of the Cold War.

Others may counter this by suggesting that Stalin’s certainty in his nations right to a sphere of influence was misplaced and expansionist. Stalin held on to the unofficial agreements made between Churchill and Stalin in the 1944 ‘Percentages Agreement’ in which the two leaders carved out their countries’ respective spheres of influence. Furthermore, Churchill and Roosevelt’s reluctant agreement to Soviet domination of most of Eastern Europe at the Yalta Conference was largely a result of Stalin’s difficult personality and inability to compromise, which made him challenging to negotiate with during the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. Thus Soviet actions certainly played a great role considering how Stalin took advantage of his position to economically and militarily pressurise Eastern European nations.

Finally, it could also be argued that the actions of the US laid the foundations of the Cold War because of the development and dropping of the atomic bomb. While the USSR had agreed to invade Japan at Potsdam providing they received naval bases at Port Arthur and gain territory of the South Sakhalin and Kurile Islands, Stalin was deprived his chance to support the Allies because of the atomic bomb forcing Japan’s surrender. Henry Stinson, US Secretary of War, had advised James Byrnes (Secretary of State) that drawing Stalin into a joint atomic partnership would lead to better relations and the opportunity to negotiate territory in Eastern Europe. However Byrnes ignored this advice and chose to flaunt the power of this weapon in the hope the USSR would become more flexible. Stalin was furious at being left in the dark about the decision to drop the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (6th and 9th August 1945) clearly indicating that the US holds great responsibility in laying the foundations of the Cold War by March 1947. In addition, by establishing the UN Atomic Energy Commission; the Americans further alienated Stalin as the commission meant other countries nuclear programmes would be under scrutiny (but not the US’s).

In conclusion, though the actions of the Soviet Union contributed to the tensions that led to the collapse of the Grand Alliance, the economic ‘imperialism’ and atomic power play of the United States was far more to blame for laying the foundations of the Cold War, thus reducing the validity of the statement.

AMG comments:

At 1200 words long, this is the upper limit for an ‘assess the validity of this view’ essay. If writing under non-timed conditions, you would need to keep under this word count to get used to the length expected in a timed exam. This is a strong Level 5 response, detailed and focused to the question. Note that in this case historiography has been incorporated to secure the top level **but is not expected in an exam** to reach top marks. The response is mostly balanced, with slight weight towards the opposing argument, which is presented in the introduction and supported throughout. To improve on this further I would expect more linking between points and further indication of the judgement throughout. There is referencing present in this copy, but in the exam **you do not need to reference**.

¹ Walter La Feber, *America, Russia and the Cold War 1945-1992* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1993) p.21

² La Feber, *America, Russia and the Cold War*, 22.

'Eisenhower's New Look Policy strategy marked a fundamental shift in US Cold War policy away from Truman's approach.' Assess the validity of this view [25 marks]

When Eisenhower succeeded Truman in 1953 his campaign and subsequent election speeches promised a much more aggressive policy toward communism than that of his predecessor. The 'New Look' policy signalled a move away from conventional forces and towards greater use of atomic weapons. Eisenhower also promised a more hard-line approach to communism, citing 'rollback' of communist influence over containment of it and adopting other aggressive policies such as Massive Retaliation and Brinkmanship. However, in practice we see Eisenhower as being a liberal president in terms of dealing with communist influence and with the benefit of hindsight, there was less difference between the two leadership styles than there appeared to be.

The New Look policy specifically addressed Eisenhower's plans to downsize military spending in the wake of Truman's NSC68 budget, which had pushed spending back up to WWII levels. Eisenhower believed that in order to ensure the Cold War was economically viable, the USA would have to downsize the conventional military and place more emphasis on the development and expansion of the American nuclear arsenal. He also began to view atomic weapons less as a last resort, telling congress that he would use them against the USSR 'if they start anything.' This gives the impression that Eisenhower was much more willing to use the Atomic Bomb than his predecessor who was so against its use that he sacked his top military commander, General MacArthur, for insisting on its employment against China during the Korean War. Thus Eisenhower's New Look Policy strategy did mark a fundamental shift in US policy away from Truman's approach.

However, there is an argument that Eisenhower was not more eager to use the bomb than Truman, but instead that he simply better recognised its significance in Cold War relations. He used it as a key bargaining tool at several points throughout his presidency to force the hand of communist countries. For example, the crisis in the Taiwan Straits in which China bombarded garrisoned KMT islands. Eisenhower threatened to use the atom bomb against the PRC in order to return the area to relative peace and protect nationalist territories. Eisenhower clearly had some appreciation for the theory of Mutually Assured Destruction, shown through his implementation of 'Brinkmanship.' He may have spoken about use of the atomic bomb but in reality, it seems clear that he had little intention of using it. After all, we cannot overlook the fact that Truman remains the only president in history to actually detonate an atomic bomb against another country. Thus while on the face of it Eisenhower's New Look policy appears to mark a fundamental shift, there were still continuities evident from Truman's presidency.

Other defining policies of Eisenhower's presidency marking a fundamental shift included 'Rollback.' This was a view to push back against communism, which would mark a decisive move away from the Truman Doctrine focused on Containment. Yet, there are very few examples of this policy in action. This is particularly exemplified through Eisenhower's dealing with the Hungarian Uprising in 1956. Following Eisenhower's speech outlining his plans to push back communism, the Hungarian people felt they could call on the west to help aid them in their fight against the Soviet forces, thinking the US would view it as an opportunity to 'reclaim' some influence in Eastern Europe. However, when the appeal came, Eisenhower made it clear to Khrushchev that he would not intervene. This was in line with the agreements made at Yalta and Potsdam in 1945 and fits firmly within Truman's policy of Containment.

Eisenhower evidently had little intention of violating the Soviet sphere of influence despite what he may have announced to the American people and the world. The two real examples of rollback seen in Guatemala and Iran, whilst both working against left leaning leaders, were hardly a

direct attack on communism but rather examples of preventative covert operations against socialist parties. Largely, Eisenhower was much less involved in Europe than his predecessor, instead choosing to implement Truman-like policies in Asia. The Eisenhower Doctrine, which was used to grant aid to vulnerable countries in Asia bore much resemblance to the Marshall Plan and was an obvious move to contain the spread of communism. Eisenhower also used treaty organisations such as SEATO and CENTO in order to galvanise the Middle East and Asia against the USSR. Whilst this was undoubtedly seen as an aggressive tactic by the USSR, it aligns itself better with containment than rollback. On balance, the policy of rollback appears to have been a clever political promise rather than a policy that Eisenhower particularly aligned himself with throughout his presidency. It appears few times between 1953 and 1961 with containment playing a much larger role in his practical approach to foreign policy, indicating there was not a fundamental shift in Eisenhower's foreign policy away from Truman.

Eisenhower's era further differed from Truman in the use of espionage. Eisenhower regarded covert operations as a routine instrument of foreign policy helped by his clever placing of men in power. John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower's Secretary of State, was the brother of Allen Dulles, the director of the CIA at the time; therefore the CIA and the government had many connections. Eisenhower put forward a policy of 'open skies' to the Soviets, which, unsurprisingly was rejected by the USSR as cover for American espionage. During the Eisenhower years, U2 spy plane flights operated over Soviet territory, this consistent use of espionage was something Truman did not utilise to the same extent.

In terms of assessing the difference in international policies of the two presidents, we cannot overlook their Soviet counterparts and the impact this would have. Truman's counterpart, Stalin was a notoriously difficult and confrontational communist leader. This would have made international relations harder for Truman than Eisenhower's interactions with Khrushchev, who actively promoted the idea of 'peaceful coexistence' and 'destalinisation' policies. This meant that Truman could not broadcast hard-line anti-Soviet policies as publicly without greater threat of retaliation by the Soviet Premier. However, in practice we yet again see a more cooperative relationship developing under Eisenhower. There were many direct meetings between Eisenhower and Khrushchev and the USA kept in close contact with both China and the USSR at ambassadorial levels throughout his presidency. The last meeting between the Truman and Stalin at any significant level occurred in 1948, 5 years before the end of his presidency. Thus it could be argued that this allowed for a fundamental shift in Eisenhower's foreign policy away from Truman.

In summary, Eisenhower's New Look policy marked very little in a practical move in foreign policy away from that of Truman. Although well publicised as defining features of his international policy, 'rollback' and 'massive retaliation' were only really spoken about and there is little evidence of their implementation. Any shift in foreign policy was not practical but rather ideological. Eisenhower's approach of bigger threats but softer practice differed from Truman, but in all there was less difference in the foreign policies of Truman and Eisenhower than historians may initially presume.

'The Korean War was caused by the detrimental efforts of Kim Il Sung to create a united communist Korea.' Assess the validity of this view [25 marks]

The outbreak of the Korean War is undoubtedly when North Korean troops crossed the 38th Parallel into South Korea on the 25th June 1950. Though it is a post-revisionist view that this invasion was spurred on by Stalin's expansionist aims, as well as an apparent lack of US interest in Korea, in my view they were merely facilitating factors and not instigators of the conflict. Therefore I agree to a reasonable extent with this view that the Korean War was caused by the determined efforts of Kim Il Sung to create a unified communist Korea, but Syngman Rhee did his part to encourage it.

Firstly, Kim Il Sung's stated aims regarding the reunification of Korea were to "liquidate feudalism and remove foreign dominance, US or Soviet." He was a determined nationalist who despised the 'colonialism' of Syngman Rhee's regime and since his assertion of power during 1948, had pushed to restore the self-respect of Korea after the forced division by the superpowers in 1945. From this it is clear that he was very interested in a united communist Korea, through any means.

In order to achieve this goal, Kim pushed for an invasion of the South in 1949. In March, he visited Stalin to ask for Soviet support regarding an assault on the South. He focused on four issues to persuade Stalin: that the victory would be decisive and rapid; that there was already 200,000 communist supporters in the South; guerilla forces were already operating in the South; and that the USA would not have time to intervene (due to withdrawal of the majority of military presence to Japan in 1949). The presence of organised guerilla forces in the South show that the North had been pushing for an armed conflict long before the start of the War. Furthermore (despite what some might say about the South provoking North Koreans) Syngman Rhee's claim in an interview with United Press, on 7th October 1949 - boasting that the South Korean army could take the North Korean capital of Pyongyang within three days - was merely an excuse for Kim to cross the 38th Parallel. It is clear that he was determined to take military action in order to achieve his goal due to his request for weapons and arms.

Moreover, Kim was determined to have the unlimited support of the communist world, as he appealed to not just Stalin, but also Mao Zedong, an action that risked undermining the support from both states, emphasising the determination of his efforts and his desire for immediate action. This was due to Stalin's initial reluctance to provide equipment to the North in 1949 and shows that Kim was pushing for invasion. Harry Truman's message on 27th June 1950 made it evident that the US assumed these visits indicated Moscow directing the North Korean invasion. However, the belief that Stalin was behind the war has been proved ultimately wrong by the release of Soviet documents in 1991; according to Khrushchev's Memoirs in 1971, Kim was responsible for the war, although Stalin had his blessing. In addition, Peter Lowe concluded in his book *The Origins of the Korean War* that "on balance, it is unlikely that the Russians manipulated the North Koreans in June 1950." Lastly, Mao's immediate priorities were the consolidation of Chinese territory and regaining control of Taiwan and he did not want to take any action that would inflame the US, only entering the war due to US actions later on. Therefore, it was Kim Il Sung, not Stalin or Mao, who pushed for the invasion of the South.

On the other hand, some would argue that the causation of the Korean War was down to the indirect actions of the United States. Under the Moscow agreement of December 1945, it had been decided by Britain, the USA and the USSR that after its liberation from Japanese rule, Korea would become a unified, independent, democratic state. In violation of this agreement, the government of the USA took advantage of the provisional military occupation by the victorious powers to set up a regime in South Korea. This caused the USSR to do the same in the North and tensions rose when they drew the 38th Parallel and installed Rhee, a man who had spent 30 years living in the US, to head the puppet government. This was heavily criticised by Kim since Rhee had abolished the press and liquidated political opposition with brutal violence. The US also showed a lack of will to defend Korea, leaving it open for Kim to attack the South. Between 1945 and 1949, American military presence in the South was a deterring factor for Stalin when it came to getting involved. However, by 28th June 1949, the US had withdrawn the last of their forces stationed there, bar 500 as a training/advisory force for the new South Korean military. Also, Secretary of State, Dean Acheson's public statement in January 1950 had excluded Korea from the 'defensive perimeter,' and finally Moscow were

well aware of the cut to US defences by Truman and Louis Johnson's false economy. Unintentionally, the US had made its position on Korea unclear enough that Kim was able to persuade Stalin to support a rapid war.

Furthermore, it is arguable that Stalin was determined to cause a war in Korea in order to boost communist morale. In 1948, the failure of the Berlin Blockade had humiliated the communist bloc and was a perceived victory for the Western Powers, demonstrating their resilience. A victory in Korea would not only prove the strength of the communist world, but it would also give the USSR a close ally in South Asia, since Kim was considered a disciple of Stalin. It can also be seen as his way of testing the US resolve since Korea had been excluded from the defensive perimeter, and the communist victory in China allowed him to take a more forceful approach to foreign policy. This approach was supported by the new found atomic strength after the USSR detonated its first nuclear bomb in August 1948, ending the US atomic monopoly a lot sooner than the CIA had anticipated. There is physical evidence for this through the provision of 1600 piece of artillery, 178 military aircraft and 258 T-34 tanks to the North. These factors are evidence that it was Stalin's determined efforts that caused the Korean War, however document released at the dissolution of the Soviet Union show that in reality Stalin was reluctant to enter a conflict.

Lastly, South Korea can be seen as instigating the Korean War, Syngman Rhee encouraged border incursions aimed at enticing North Korean troops to cross into conflict. He also boasted of his ability to seize Pyongyang, justifying a war with the North due to the apparent lack of morale in their army in comparison with the South's. He concluded to Ambassador John Muccio and Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall in a meeting on 8th February 1949, that there was 'nothing [to be] gained in waiting,' and on the 1st November, the New York Herald Tribune reported that Syn Sung Mo, the South Korean War Minister had declared that his army was ready and waiting to push into North Korea. Rhee continuously expressed his concern for South Korea's defence and the need for US troops to remain there. Bruce Cumings, head of the history department at the University of Chicago, claims that Rhee, with help from his American sponsors, initiated a series of attacks that well preceded the North Korean offensive of 1950. From 1945-1948, American forces aided Rhee in a killing spree that claimed tens of thousands of victims: the counterinsurgency campaign took a high toll in Kwangju, and on the island of Cheju-do – where as many as 60,000 people were murdered by Rhee's US-backed forces. Yet, Kim Il Sung had adopted the same attitude, travelling to both the USSR and China in order to gain support.

In conclusion, although Stalin may have seen benefit from the war, official documents show that he was in no way determined to cause it and neither was Mao. The US also had no intention of causing conflict and only responded to it. Finally, though Syngman Rhee contributed to tensions and enticed war, Sung's policy from the beginning was always to push for a united Korea, shown by his efforts to gain support from the united communist bloc, and so I agree with the view that the Korean War was caused by Kim Il Sung's determined efforts to create a united communist Korea.

AMG comments:

This is a high Level 5 response. What I particularly liked about it was how detailed it was – the student clearly went away and did a great deal of reading before coming to write their response. There is also the right balance and a strongly substantiated judgement throughout. It is a long response, owing to it being completed as a homework piece with no time restrictions, however it gives you an idea as to how to construct a consistently focused and supported argument.

'The outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis was a triumph for the diplomacy of Nikita Khrushchev.'

Assess the validity of this view [25 marks]

Although Khrushchev was portrayed as the peacemaker, retained Cuba as a communist country and had the Jupiter Missiles on Turkey removed, the outcomes of the Cuban Missile Crisis was not a diplomatic triumph for Khrushchev. Sino-Soviet relations broke down, his international image was tainted and he was removed from power two years later as a result of the outcomes of the crisis.

It can be argued that the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis was a triumph for the diplomacy of Khrushchev because Cuba remained a Soviet satellite in 'Uncle Sam's backyard', which was one of Khrushchev's main goals, alongside protecting Cuba from US invasion. In fact, according to Walton, Khrushchev only put missiles in Cuba because of the US attempt to overthrow Castro in the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. As a result, the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis was a triumph for the diplomacy of Khrushchev because one of his main objectives was achieved, to maintain communism in Cuba, a country neighbouring the United States.

It was also a triumph for the diplomacy of Khrushchev because another of his objectives was achieved, to have the Jupiter Missiles stationed in Turkey in close proximity to Russia, removed. This meant that the two superpowers would be closer to nuclear parity. Some argue that this was Khrushchev's primary objective: to gain concessions. Thus the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis was a triumph for the diplomacy of Khrushchev because he gained concessions to his advantage. What is more, Khrushchev agreed to keep the Jupiter missile removal a secret, despite the effect it would have on his image. As well as this, he in a public statement suggested actions towards disarmament on both sides that would lead to the 1963 Test Ban Treaty and later the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Finally, the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis was a triumph for the diplomacy of Khrushchev because he was seen as the peacemaker. He had instigated the removal of missiles from Cuba so was the first to make a compromise. This was made evident on the 26th October 1962 when Khrushchev wrote to Kennedy offering the removal of the missiles in exchange for lifting of the quarantine and a pledge that the US would not invade Cuba. On the 27th Khrushchev sent a follow up telegram adding the removal of the Jupiter Missiles to the terms. Kennedy failed in his diplomacy at this point as he waited to reply and did so only to the first letter, a somewhat dangerous and risky action considering how volatile the situation was (with a U2 plane having been shot down over Cuba and US hawks wanting immediate retaliation). Thus, it can be argued that Khrushchev sacrificed his reputation for the sake of world peace. In contrast, as stated by David Horowitz, Kennedy "seized the opportunity to show US nuclear superiority." For this reason the outcomes of the Cuban Missile Crisis was a triumph for the diplomacy of Khrushchev because he was the instigator in preventing a nuclear war.

On the other hand, the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis was not a triumph for the diplomacy of Khrushchev because Sino-Soviet relations broke down. Mao Zedong criticised Khrushchev for backing down, saying "Khrushchev has moved from adventurism to capitalism." Khrushchev responded by declaring that Mao's policies would lead to nuclear war. To add insult to injury, at the same time, the USSR sided with India against China in the Sino-Indian War. Moreover, Mao became convinced that an outcome of the crisis, the limited Test Ban Treaty, was an attempt to slow China's advancement as a superpower. Thus, the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis was not a triumph for the diplomacy of Khrushchev because of the impact it had in contributing to the Sino-Soviet split. I would also disagree with the statement as the outcome of the crisis angered Fidel Castro, who felt vulnerable with the USA just 50km away and the Bay of Pigs incident a recent memory. Despite securing a non-invasion pledge from the US and continued Soviet economic

assistance to Cuba, Castro still expressed the feeling that Khrushchev had backed down to the Americans and had deserted them by withdrawing the missiles.

Moreover, the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis was not a triumph for the diplomacy of Khrushchev because inside the Soviet Union, hard-liners were appalled at Khrushchev's withdrawal of the missiles, agreed on 27th October. As a result Brezhnev and Kosygin worked to remove Khrushchev from power in 1964 and proceeded to lead the Soviet Union on a massive military build up. Therefore, the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis was not a triumph for the diplomacy of Khrushchev because he was removed from power as a result.

In addition, Kennedy came out of the crisis with a better international reputation. His demeanour and method of conveying his message made him look very good at dealing with hostile situations. Khrushchev however, came across as giving in to the Americans. Some have argued that Khrushchev sending multiple telegrams with differing demands contributed to the confusion and it was Kennedy's careful replies to these demands that helped bring about a peaceful resolution. Due to the fact that public perception is so crucial in politics, the outcomes of the Cuban Missile Crisis was not a triumph for the diplomacy of Khrushchev because his public image suffered so badly, as emphasised by his removal from power.

Overall, I would disagree with the statement that the outcome of the Cuban Missiles Crisis was a success for the diplomacy of Khrushchev because Sino-Soviet relations were destroyed and two years later Khrushchev was removed from power due to the outcomes of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

3.3 Practice essay questions

'The tensions that existed within the Grand Alliance by the end of 1946 were the result of conflicting ideologies.' Assess the validity of this view [25 marks]	Due:
'The Cold War developed by 1949 because of Stalin's intention to dominate post-war Europe.' Assess the validity of this view [25 marks]	Due:
'The Marshall Plan marked the beginning of the Cold War.' Assess the validity of this view, with reference to the years 1945 to 1947 [25 marks]	Due:
'Differences over Germany were the main reason for the development of the Cold War by 1949.' Assess the validity of this view [25 marks]	Due:
'McCarthyism was responsible for moving US foreign policy towards a global rather than regional focus during the years 1950 to 1954.' Assess the validity of this view [25 marks]	Due:
'The main reason why the United States entered the Korean War was in order to defend South Korea.' Assess the validity of this view [25 marks]	Due:
'The Western powers had considerable success in limiting the spread of Communism in Asia in the years 1949 to 1960.' Assess the validity of this view [25 marks]	Due:
'Throughout the years 1949 to 1961, the question of Berlin caused East-West tensions.' Assess the validity of this view [25 marks]	Due:
'Khrushchev's policies in the years 1955-61 ensured that there was no Cold War confrontation in Europe.' Assess the validity of this view [25 marks]	Due:
'Actual confrontation between the USA and the USSR was only a remote possibility in the years 1956 to 1961.' Assess the validity of this view [25 marks]	Due:
'Peaceful coexistence failed by 1961 because neither the East nor the West was fully committed to it.' Assess the validity of this view [25 marks]	Due:
'The conclusion of the missile crisis was proof that the USA's strategy of containment had failed.' Assess the validity of this view [25 marks]	Due:

Be prepared for timed essays in class time where the exact title will not be revealed until the lesson it is scheduled for.

Useful links and further support



Specification:

<https://filestore.aqa.org.uk/resources/history/specifications/AQA-7041-7042-SP-2015.PDF>

Assessment Resources: <https://www.aqa.org.uk/subjects/history/as-and-a-level/history-7041-7042/assessment-resources>



<http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/search/results?q=cold+war>

The Wilson Center

<https://www.wilsoncenter.org/program/cold-war-international-history-project>

Yale: Avalon Project

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/coldwar.asp

CNN: Cold War

<https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL8hNHC9nbLlzb4miGp5pZPYCk9Zw0dGke>