

Relations between Greek states and between Greek and non-Greek states, 492-404BC

Part B : Greece in conflict 479–446 BC



B: Greece in conflict 479–446 BC

1. The consequences of victory for the Greek states, especially relations between Sparta and Athens
2. The growth of Athenian power in the Delian League
3. Sparta's concerns
4. The consequences for relations between Sparta and Athens and their respective allies of the earthquake and helot revolt 465–464 BC
5. The events of the First Peloponnesian War 461–446 BC that involved changing relationships between Greek states: Megara's defection from the Peloponnesian League
6. Corinth's relations with Megara, Sparta and Athens
7. The Battle of Tanagra
8. Continued conflict with the Persians followed by the cessation of hostilities in 449 BC
9. The Spartan invasion of Attica 446 BC.

Aristotle *Politics* 1284a38 (No. 84)

Diodorus 11.46–47 (No. 19); 11.50 (No. 28); 12.2.1–2 (No. 52); 12.4.4–6; (No. 53); 12.38.2 (No. 113)

Harpokration s.v. *Attikois grammasin* (No. 54)

Herodotus, *Histories* Book 7.151

Plutarch, *Aristeides* 23 (No. 10); 24.1–5 (No. 20)

Plutarch, *Cimon* 11–12.4 (No. 33); 13.4–5 (No. 51)

Plutarch, *Pericles* 23.1–2 (No. 71)

Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War* 1.89–118 (The 'Pentecontaetia'), 5.16

Chalkis Decree (No. 78)

TIMELINE: THUCYDIDES' PENTACONTAETIA: 479-446BC

		Sources and pages
479	Victory of Mycale. Leotychides and Peloponnesian fleet return home. Athenian-led forces capture Sestos.	(Herodotus 9.114-121)
478	Athens returns to rebuild city and bring back women and children. Themistocles' swift rebuilding of Athens' walls, against Spartan advice. Pausanias's success against Cyprus and Byzantium. Pausanias' recall.	Thuc. 1.89 ^{p.4} Thuc. 1.89-93 ^{p.4-6} (Plut. <i>Themistocles</i> 19) Thuc. 1.94-5 ^{p.7} Plut. <i>Aristides</i> 23 ^{p.22-3}
477	The Delian League is established. Aristides 'the Just' establishes annual payments for members of the Delian League at 460 talents. ^{560 talents Diodorus}	Thuc. 1.96-7 ^{p.8} Diodorus 11.46 ^{p.20} Plut. <i>Aristides</i> 24 ^{p.23}
476	Cimon leads the Delian League to victory over Persians at Eion .	Thuc. 1.98 ^{p.8}
475	Cimon captures the island of Scyros and takes back to Athens the bones of Theseus.	Thuc. 1. 98 ^{p.8}
472	Carystus (on Euboea) forced to join the Delian League Aeschylus' <i>Persians</i> performed (Pericles = <i>chorēgos</i>)	Thuc. 1. 98 ^{p.8}
c.471	Ostracism of Themistocles	
c.469	Revolt of Naxos crushed. (Thuc 1.99 on reasons for the revolt)	Thuc. 1. 98-9 ^{p.9}
469	Death of Pausanias (Pleistarchus rules as king) Death of Leotychidas (succeeded by Archidamus)	
c.468	Battle of Eurymedon: Delian League to victory over the Persians led by Cimon. 200 Phoenician triremes captured.	Thuc. 1.100 ^{p.9} Plut. Kimon ^{p.24}
c. 465	Revolt of Thasos from the Delian League (crushed in 462) Earthquake in the Peloponnese leads to a helot revolt against Sparta. This continues for several years (Thucydides says ten ^{1.103}) and leads to the foundation of Naupactus (c. 461?? ^{1.103}).	Thuc. 1.100-101 ^{p.10} Thuc. 1.101+103 ^{p.10-11}
463	Cimon prosecuted for corruption (Pericles is one of the prosecutors)	
462	Cimon's military expedition responding to Sparta's appeal for support over the Helot revolt is dismissed by Sparta.	Thucydides 1.102 ^{p.11}
c.461	Cimon (pro-Spartan) ostracised.	
462/1	Reforms of Ephialtes: powers of the Areopagus redefined as a court for homicide and GBH. Death of Ephialtes; Pericles becomes leader of democratic 'party'.	

c.460-446 The First Peloponnesian War		
c.460	Delian League sends a military expedition to Egypt to support anti-Persian rebellion Thuc 1.104 (ends in defeat six years later Thuc. 1.109-10)	Thuc. 1.104 ^{p.12}
c.460	Megara allies with Athens after dispute with Corinth ^{Thuc 1.103} Athens joins Megara to her southern port Nisaea with long walls and establishes a garrison; she uses Megara's other port Pegae to access Gulf of Corinth. Athenian and Corinthians (+ Epidaurians) fight at Halieis and in Saronic Gulf.	Thuc. 1.103 ^{p.12} Thuc. 1.105 ^{p.12}
c.458	Sea battle between Aegina and Athens (70 Aeginetan ships captured) Opportunistic attack on Megarid by Corinth . Corinthians humiliated by Athenian victory (old men and young); slaughter in ditched enclosure of 'quite a large section' of Corinth's army. Jury pay introduced by Pericles. Aeschylus' <i>Oresteia</i> . Two Long Walls are built connecting Athens to the Piraeus ^(3rd wall c.445) .	Thuc. 1.105 ^{p.13} Thuc. 1.106 ^{p.13} Thuc. 1.107 ^{p.14}
457	Battle of Tanagra : Sparta defeats Athens in Boeotia Battle of Oenophyta : Athens defeats Spartans and gain control of most of Boeotia (not Thebes). Aegina forced to join the Delian League.	Thuc. 1.107-8 ^{p.14} Thuc. 1.108 ^{p.15} Thuc. 1.108 ^{p.15}
c.454	Delian League's expedition to Egypt ends in failure and heavy losses	Thuc. 1.109-10 ^{p.15-16}
c.454	Athens and Boeotian allies attack Thessaly (but fail to reinstate Orestes)	Thuc. 1.111 ^{p.16}
	Athenians under Pericles sail attack Sicyon using Pegae as an Athenian base. Transfer of treasury of the Delian League from Delos to Acropolis in Athens	Thuc. 1.111 ^{p.16} Diodorus ^{p.27}
451	Pericles' citizenship law. <u>5-year truce between Athens and Peloponnesians</u> Expedition to Cyprus 200 ships led by Cimon (returned from exile); 140 besieging Citium; 60 to Egypt	 Thuc. 1.112 ^{p.16} Thuc. 1.112 ^{p.16}
c.450	Death of Cimon. Siege abandoned, but chance naval victories over Phoenicians, Cilicians etc. All ships return safe.	Thuc. 1.112 ^{p.16}
c.449 (or 468?)	Peace of Callias??	Diodorus, Harpokration, Herodotus VII.151 ^{p.25-6}
448	Spartan and Athenian attempt to control Delphi	Thuc. 1.112 ^{p.17}
447	Battle of Coronea in Boeotia (successful revolt against Athenian control)	Thuc. 1.113 ^{p.17}
446	Revolts of Euboea and Megara Spartan invasion of Attica led by Pleistoanax (son of Pausanias) stopped. Euboea subdued. ^{Thuc.1.114}	Thuc. 1.114 ^{p.17} Thuc.5.16 Plut. ^{p.27} Pericles 23.1-2 ^{p.27}
446/5	<u>30 Year Peace Treaty between Sparta and Athens.</u> Athens gave up Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen and Achaia. Pericles' building project on the Acropolis of Athens	Chalcis Decree ^{p.28-29} Thuc. 1.115 ^{p.17} Pericles 23.1-2 ^{p.27}
c.445	Athens' third wall to Piraeus built	
441	Revolt of Samos	Thuc. 1.115-117 ^{p.18-19}


Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*

Book 1.89-118 (Penguin Classics p.87-104) *THE PENTECONTAETIA* 479-435

Pentacontaetia Chapters 89-93: Stage 1: Persian defeat and Greek recovery 479-478BC

- 479BC Battle of Mycale, led by Leotychidas ^{1.89}
- 479-8BC Siege of Sestos led by Athenians ^{1.89}
- 479-8BC Athenians, guided by Themistocles, fortify their city and harbour. ^{1.89-93}

Thuc. I 89 The following is an account of how Athens came to be in the position to gain such strength. After the Persians had retreated from Europe, defeated by the Hellenes on sea and land, and after those of them who had fled by sea to **Mycale** had been destroyed, the Spartan king Leotychides, who had commanded the Hellenes at Mycale, returned home, taking with him the allies from the Peloponnese.



The Athenians, however, with the allies from Ionia and the Hellespont who had already revolted from the king of Persia, stayed behind and besieged the city of **Sestos**, which was occupied by the Persians. They spent the winter there and finally took the place after the Persians had evacuated it. They then sailed out of the Hellespont and dispersed to their own cities.

Athens restored

Meanwhile the Athenian people, as soon as their land was free from foreign occupation, began to bring back their children and wives and what property they had left from the places where they had hidden them away. They also started on the rebuilding of their city and their fortifications; for only small portions of their surrounding wall were still standing, and most of their houses were in ruins, the few remaining ones being those in which important Persian officers had had their quarters.


Thuc. I 90 When the Spartans heard of what was going on they sent an embassy to Athens. This was partly because they themselves did not like the idea of Athens or any other city being fortified, but chiefly because they were urged on by their allies, who were alarmed both by the sudden growth of Athenian sea-power and by the daring which the Athenians had shown in the war against the Persians.

The Spartans proposed that not only should Athens refrain from building her own fortifications, but that she should join them in pulling down all the fortifications which still existed in cities outside the Peloponnese. In making this suggestion to the Athenians they concealed their real meaning and their real fears; the idea was, they said, that if there was another Persian invasion, the Persians would have no strong base from which to operate, such as they had in Thebes; and that the Peloponnese was capable of serving the needs of everyone, both as a place of refuge and as a place from which to attack.


After this speech from the Spartans, the Athenians, on the advice of Themistocles, immediately sent them away with the reply they would send an embassy to discuss the points that had been raised. Themistocles then proposed that they should send him to Sparta at once, but should not for the time being send other delegates elected to go with him; instead they should they had built their

fortifications high enough to be able to be defended. Meanwhile the whole population of the city was to work at building the walls; no private house or public building which might be of any use to the work was to be spared, but must in every case be demolished.

So Themistocles set off, leaving these instructions behind him and indicating that he himself would arrange everything else that needed arranging in Sparta. When he arrived there he did not approach the Spartan government, but kept on putting things off on various excuses. If anyone in authority asked him why he did not come before the Assembly, he replied that he was waiting for his colleagues, that they had not been able to leave Athens because of urgent business, but that he expected them to come soon and was surprised that they had not arrived already.



Themistocles b.525
Accused of treason c.471BC
Died c.460BC (aged c.65)



Aristides the Just b.c.520
Ostracised c.485BC
Died c.468BC (aged c.52)




Cimon, son of Miltiades c.507
Ostracised c.461-451BC
Died c.450BC (aged c.57)

Thuc. I 91 The Spartans believed what Themistocles said because of the respect in which they held him; but as other people kept on arriving, all positively asserting that the fortifications were being built and had already reached a certain height, they did not see how they could reject such information. Themistocles, realizing this, told them that instead of being led astray by rumours they ought to send some reliable people of their own who could go and see for themselves and come back with a correct report. This the Spartans did, and Themistocles sent secretly to Athens, telling the Athenians to keep the Spartan envoys there, to avoid, if possible, putting them under open constraint, but not to let them go until he and his colleagues had got back. For his fellow delegates - Abronichus, the son of Lysicles, and Aristides ^{the Just}, the son of Lysimachus - had now arrived, and had told him that the fortifications were now sufficiently far advanced. Themistocles therefore was afraid that the Spartans might now refuse to let them go, once they received accurate information about what had happened.

The Athenians followed his instructions and detained the Spartan delegates. Themistocles approached the Spartan authorities and at last spoke to them openly. He said that Athens was now fortified, and fortified sufficiently well to be able to protect her people: that if the Spartans or their allies wanted to send embassies to Athens on any subject, they should in future go there prepared to recognize that the Athenians were capable of making up their own minds both about their own interests and about the interests of the rest of Hellas. He pointed out that when the Athenians decided to abandon their city and take to their ships, it was not in consultation with Sparta that they adopted that daring resolution, and that whenever they had joined in counsel with the Spartans it was clear that no one else had offered better advice. And now they thought it better that their city should be fortified; it was better for their own citizens and also would be an advantage to the whole alliance; for it was only on the basis of equal strength that equal and fair discussions on the common interest could be held. This meant either that no city in the alliance should be fortified or else that what the Athenians had done should be approved.

Thuc. I 92 After listening to this, the Spartans showed no open signs of dis-pleasure towards Athens. The fact was that their original embassy to the Athenian people had not stated any intention to prevent the action but had only appeared to offer advice. Also this was a time when Sparta as particularly friendly to Athens, because of the courage displayed by Athens against the Persians. All the same the Spartans had not got their own way and secretly they felt aggrieved because of it. The delegates from both states returned home with-out making any complaints.

Thuc. I 93 In this way the Athenians fortified their city in a very short time. Even today one can see that the building was done in a hurry. The foundations are made of different sorts of stone, sometimes not shaped so as to fit, but laid down just as each was brought up at the time; there are many pillars taken from tombs and fragments of sculpture mixed in with the rest. For the city boundaries were extended on all sides, and so in their haste they used everything that came to hand, sparing nothing.



Themistocles also persuaded them to complete the walls of Piraeus, which had been begun previously during his year of office as archon. He liked the position of the place, with its three natural harbours, and he considered that if the Athenians became a sea-faring people they would have every advantage in adding to their power.¹ Indeed it was he who first ventured to tell the Athenians that their future was on the sea. Thus he at once began to join in laying the foundations of their empire.

In breadth the wall was built according to his specifications, just as one can see it today around Piraeus. There was room for two wagons to pass each other with their stones for the building, and the space in between the outer surfaces was not filled in fitted with rubble or clay; instead large blocks of stone were cut and fitted together, with clamps of iron and lead on the outside. The height of the finished wall was about half what he planned. With these great and thick walls he intended to repulse all enemy attacks, and he considered that they could be perfectly well defended by a few troops of inferior quality, so that the rest would be able to serve in the navy. It was particularly on the navy that his thoughts were concentrated. He realized, I imagine, that it was easier for a Persian force to approach Athens by sea than by land, and in his view Piraeus was a more valuable place than the main city of Athens. Indeed, the advice that he constantly gave to the Athenians was that if ever they should be hard pressed on land they should go down to Piraeus, take to their ships, and defy all comers.

It was in this way, directly after the Persian withdrawal, that the Athenians fortified their city and generally strengthened their position.

¹ Earlier, the Greek practice was to beach their ships, so that the main Athenian 'harbour' was at Phalerum. It was only now that the great natural harbour of the Piraeus came to the fore.

Pentacontaetia Chapters 94-98: Stage 2: Formation of the Delian League 477-472BC

- After successes at Cyprus and Byzantium, Sparta recalls Pausanias and then Dorcis ^{1.94-5}
- Athens takes over leadership of the Delian League ^{1.96-97}
- First actions by the League under leadership of Cimon: attacks on Eion 476, Scyros 475 and Carystus 472 ^{1.98}

Thuc. I 94 Soon afterwards Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus, was sent out from Sparta in command of the Hellenic forces. He had with him twenty ships from the Peloponnese; the Athenians joined his force with thirty ships and there were a number more from the other allies. They went first to **Cyprus** and won over most of the island; later they went against **Byzantium**, which was in Persian occupation, and, still under the command of Pausanias, forced the place to surrender.


Thuc. I 95 But Pausanias had already begun to reveal the arrogance of his nature, and was becoming unpopular with the Hellenes, particularly so with the Ionians and those who had just recently been liberated from Persian domination. These states approached the Athenians, asking them, since they were their own kinsmen, to take them under their protection and, if Pausanias acted in a dictatorial manner, not to allow it. These approaches were welcomed by the Athenians, who made up their minds to put a check on Pausanias and to arrange matters generally in a way that would best suit their own interests.

Meanwhile the Spartans recalled Pausanias to face a court of inquiry in connection with various reports that they had received. Serious charges had been made against him by Hellenes arriving at Sparta: instead of acting as commander-in-chief, he appeared to be trying to set himself up as a dictator. It happened that he was recalled just at the time when, because of his unpopularity, the allies, apart from the soldiers from the Peloponnese, had gone over to the side of the Athenians.

At Sparta Pausanias was condemned for various acts of injustice against individuals, but he was acquitted on all the main counts: one of the most serious charges was that he was collaborating with the Persians, and there seemed to be very good evidence for this. Instead of sending him out again as commander-in-chief, they sent Dorcis and other officers with quite a small force. But by this time the allies were no longer willing to accept them as supreme commanders. Realizing this, the Spartans went back, and afterwards Sparta sent out no other commanders. They feared that when their officers went overseas they would become corrupted, as they had seen happen in the case of Pausanias, and at the same time they no longer wanted to be burdened with the war against Persia. They regarded the Athenians as being perfectly capable of exercising the command and as being also at that time friendly to themselves.



Pausanias leads the oath before the battle of Plataea.




Pausanias, King of Sparta c.510-465BC

Athens establishes the Delian League

Thuc. I 96 So Athens took over the leadership, and the allies, because of their dislike of Pausanias, were glad to see her do so. Next Athenians assessed the various contributions to be made for the war against Persia, and decided which states should furnish money and which states should send ships - the object being to compensate themselves for their losses by ravaging the territory of the King of Persia. At this time the officials known as 'Hellenic Treasurers' were first appointed by the Athenians. These officials received the tribute, which was the name given to the contributions in money. The original sum fixed for the tribute was 460 talents.² The treasury of the League was at Delos, and representative meetings were held in the temple there.

Thuc. I 97 The leadership of the Athenians began with allies who were originally independent states and reached their decision in general congress. I shall now describe the use they made of it, both in war and in their management of the League, during the period from the end of the Persian until the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. Some of these actions were against the Persians, some against their own allies when they revolted, some against the Peloponnesian Powers with whom on various occasions they became involved. **I am giving this account and making this digression from my main narrative because this is a period that has not been dealt with by previous writers, whose subjects have been either Hellenic history before the Persian Wars or else the Persian Wars themselves. The only one of them who has touched upon this period is Hellenicus, in his *Attic History*, but he has not given much space to the subject and he is inaccurate in his dates. At the same time the history of these years will show how the Athenian Empire came into being.**



c.476BC (*Eion was a Persian base. The Athenians sent colonists to re-populate it.*)

Thuc. I 98 The first action of the Athenians was the siege of Eion, a town on the Strymon occupied by the Persians.³ Under the command of Cimon, the son of Miltiades, they captured this place and made slaves of the inhabitants.

c.475BC

Then they turned to the island of Scyros in the Aegean, which was populated by Dolopians. They enslaved the inhabitants and colonized the island themselves.

c.472 *Carystus resisted the Persians in 490* ^{Her. 6.99}. *Defeated, it fought for Persia in 480* ^{Her. 8.66, 1; sacked by Greeks 8. 121}.

Next there was a war with the Carystians, who were not supported by the rest of Euboea. In the end Carystus surrendered on terms.

² 460 talents from tribute can be compared to Athenian revenue from internal sources at the same time: income from harbour dues, sales taxes, rental of state property, court fees and fines royalties on the silver mined in Attica etc. was approximately 400 talents. The cost of building the Parthenon was approximately 470 talents. (Appendix 2 p.612-3).

³ In 476-5BC.

Pentacontaetia Chapters 98-101: Stage 3: Revolts from the League 469-465BC.

- Revolt of Naxos 469 ^{1.99}
- Battle of Eurymedon c.468. Victory, led by Cimon, over the Persians by land and sea ^{1.100}
- Revolt of Thasos c.465 and appeal to Sparta to invade Attica. Helot revolt ^{1.100-101}

c.469BC

After this Naxos left the League and the Athenians made war on the place. After a siege Naxos was forced back to allegiance. **This was the first case when the original constitution of the League was broken and an allied city lost its independence, and the process was continued in the cases of the other allies as various circumstances arose.**

Thuc. I 99 **The chief reasons for these revolts** were failures to produce the right amount of tribute or the right numbers of ships, and sometimes a refusal to produce any ships at all. For the Athenians insisted on obligations being exactly met, and made themselves unpopular by bringing the severest pressure to bear on allies who were not used to making sacrifices and did not want to make them.

In other ways, too, the Athenians as rulers were no longer popular as they used to be: they bore more than their fair share of the actual fighting, but this made it all the easier for them to force back into the alliance any state that wanted to leave it. For this position it was the allies themselves who were to blame. Because of this reluctance of theirs to face military service, most of them, to avoid serving abroad, had assessments made by which, instead of producing ships, they were to pay a corresponding sum of money. The result was that the Athenian navy grew strong at their expense, and when they revolted they always found themselves inadequately armed and inexperienced in war.




c.468BC The Battle of Eurymedon

Thuc. I 100 Next came the battles of the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia, fought on land and on sea by the Athenians and their allies against the Persians. In both battles the Athenians won the victory on the same day under the command of Cimon, the son of Miltiades, and they captured or destroyed the entire Phoenician fleet of 200 triremes.



c.465BC The Revolt of Thasos and earthquake in the Peloponnese



Some time later occurred the revolt of Thasos.⁴ This was caused by a dispute over the markets on the mainland opposite in Thrace, and over the mine under the control of the Thasians. The Athenians sailed to Thasos with their fleet, won a naval engagement, and landed on the island.

About the same time they sent out to the river Strymon 10,000 colonists from their own citizens and from allied states to settle in the place then known as Nine Ways, but now called **Amphipolis**. They occupied Nine Ways, driving out the Edonians who held the place, but when they advanced farther into the interior of Thrace their force was cut to pieces at the Edonian town of Drabescus by a combined army of Thracians, who regarded the founding of a colony at Nine Ways as an act of hostility against themselves.



Thuc. I 101 Meanwhile the people of Thasos, who had been defeated in battle and were now besieged, appealed to Sparta and urged her to come to their help by invading Attica. The Spartans, without informing Athens of their intentions, promised to do so, and would have done so if they had not been prevented by the earthquake which happened then and by the simultaneous revolt and secession to Ithome of the helots and of some of the perioeci,⁵ the Thuriats and the Aethaeans. The helots were mostly descendants of the ancient Messenians, who had been enslaved in the famous war. Thus they all came to be called Messenians.



Mt Ithome

So Sparta had a war on her hands against the rebels in Ithome, and the Thasians, in the third year of the siege, had to accept the Athenian terms: their walls were demolished and their navy surrendered; they were ordered to pay an indemnity immediately and to pay tribute in future; they surrendered their rights on the mainland and also the mine there.

⁴ c.465BC

⁵ The helots were the servile population, first of Laconia and later also of Messenia, assigned to individual Spartans for work on the land and other services. The perioeci, in contrast, were free Greeks, living in their own Laconian communities, but subject to Spartan control in external affairs and obligated to provide military contingents to the Spartan armies.

Pentacontaetia Chapters 102-3: Stage 4: Relations worsen between Athens and Sparta 465-c.460

- Spartans request Athenian support against rebels on Ithome, then dismiss Cimon's force ^{1.102} Cimon was Pro-Spartan
- Athens forms an alliance with Sparta's enemy Argos and Thessaly ^{1.102}
- Some years* after the secession to Ithome a Helot colony is established at Naupactus with Athenian support ^{1.103} (*Thuc. says ten, but this is disputed)

Thuc. I 102 And now the Spartans, finding that their war in Ithome showed no signs of ending, appealed for help to their allies, including Athens, and the Athenians came to Sparta with a considerable force under the command of Cimon. The chief reason that they asked for Athenian help was that the Athenians had the reputation of being good at siege operations, and, after a long siege, it became clear to the Spartans that they themselves lacked experience in this department of warfare; for otherwise they would have succeeded in taking the place by assault.

This expedition was the occasion for the first open quarrel between Athens and Sparta. The Spartans, failing to capture Ithome by assault, **grew afraid of the enterprise and the unorthodoxy of the Athenians; they reflected, too, that they were of a different nationality** and feared that, if they stayed on in the Peloponnese, they might listen to the people in Ithome and become the sponsors of some revolutionary policy. So, while keeping the rest of their allies, they sent the Athenians home again, not saying openly what their suspicions were, but merely declaring that they had no further need of Athenian help.

The Athenians, however, realized that they were not being sent away for any such honourable reason as this, and saw that in fact they had become in some way suspect. They were deeply offended, considering that this was not the sort of treatment that they deserved from Sparta, and, as soon as they had returned, they denounced the original treaty of alliance which had been made against the Persians and allied themselves with Sparta's enemy, Argos. At the same time both Argos and Athens made an alliance on exactly the same terms with the Thessalians.

Thuc. I 103 Meanwhile the rebels in Ithome after **ten** years' fighting⁶ were unable to hold out longer, and came to terms with Sparta, the terms being that they should have a safe conduct to leave the Peloponnese and should never set foot in it again: if any of them was caught there in future, he should be the slave of whoever caught him. There was also an oracle from Delphi which the Spartans had and which instructed them to let go the suppliant of Zeus at Ithome. So they left the country with their wives and children, and the Athenians, because of the ill feeling against Sparta which had already developed, received the exiles and settled them in the town of Naupactus, which they had recently taken from the Ozolian Locrians.



⁶ This figure has been the cause of endless controversy. One plausible solution is to read 'four' for 'ten' in the manuscripts: the evidence that the revolt **did not last ten years** is firm.

Pentacontaetia Chapters 103-6: Stage 5: 'The First Peloponnesian War' c.460-446BC

Athens vs Corinth and Northern Peloponnese 460-458

- Megara forms an alliance with Athens and provides a military base for an Athenian garrison.^{1.103}
- An Athenian fleet on operations near Cyprus joins in an Egyptian rebellion against Persia.^{1.104} (Defeated 454BC 1.109)
- Clashes in Saronic Gulf (Athens/Argos/Megara vs. Corinth/Epidauros/Sicyon): Battles of Halieis (Athenians defeated by land) and Cercryphaleia (Athenian victory at sea).
- Aegina and Athens at war again
- Corinthians and Athens clash over Megara; Athens gains control of Mt Geraneia.



At this time Megara also joined the Athenian alliance, abandoning her alliance with Sparta because the Corinthians were attacking her in a war concerning the frontier boundaries. Thus the Athenians held Megara and Pegae, and built for the Megarians their long walls from the city to Nisaea, garrisoning them with Athenian troops. It was chiefly because of this that the Corinthians began to conceive such a bitter hatred for Athens.

The Egyptian Expedition

Thuc. I 104 About this time **Inaros**, the son of Psammetichus, a Libyan and the King of the Libyans bordering on Egypt, starting out from Marea, the town south of Pharos, **organized the revolt of nearly the whole of Egypt from the Persian King Artaxerxes**. After taking over power himself he called in the Athenians to help him. The Athenians happened to be engaged in a campaign against Cyprus with 200 ships of their own and of their allies; they abandoned this campaign, came to Egypt, and sailed from the sea up the Nile. They gained control of the river and of two-thirds of Memphis, and then attempted to subdue the remaining third, which was called the White Castle and inside which were the Persians and Medes who had escaped and those of the Egyptians who had not joined in the revolt.

Athenian interference in Saronic Gulf leads to war with Aegina




Thuc. I 105 At this time, too, the Athenians sent out a fleet and **made a landing at Haliae**^{= Halieis}. Here they were engaged by a force of Corinthians and Epidaurians, and the Corinthians were victorious. Later there was a sea battle of Cecryphalia between the Athenian and Peloponnesian fleets, and the Athenians were victorious.

Aegina vs Athens

After this war broke out between Athens and Aegina, and there was a big battle at sea off Aegina between the Athenians and the Aeginetans, with the support of allies on both sides. The battle was won by the Athenians, who captured seventy enemy ships. They then landed on Aegina and started to besiege the place, under the command of Leocrates, the son of Stroebus.

At this point the Peloponnesians, wishing to relieve Aegina, made a landing in the island with 300 hoplites who had previously been serving with the Corinthians and Epidaurians.



Athenians and Corinthians fight for Megara

At the same time **the Corinthians and their allies seized the heights of Geraneia** and moved down into the Megarid, believing that it would be impossible for the Athenians to come to the relief of Megara, since they had two large forces already serving abroad in Aegina and in Egypt; and, they thought, if Athens did manage to relieve Megara, she would have to withdraw her troops from Aegina. The Athenians, however, did no-thing of the kind.

They raised in the city a force out of the old men and the very young who had been left behind and marched to Megara under the command of Myronides. Here an indecisive battle was fought between them and the Corinthians, and when the battle was broken off, each side considered that it had had the advantage. However, after the Corinthians had withdrawn, the Athenians, who had in fact done best in the fighting, set up a trophy. About twelve days later the Corinthians, who had had to suffer the taunts of the older people in their own city, made their preparations, marched out, and put up a trophy of their own to prove that the victory had been theirs. The Athenians came out against them from Megara, overwhelmed the contingent that was setting up the trophy, and then engaged and defeated the rest of their enemy.

Corinthians slaughtered


^{Thuc. I 106} As the defeated Corinthians were retreating, quite a large section of their army, coming under severe pressure and being uncertain of its route, plunged into an enclosure on someone's estate which had a deep ditch all round it so that there was no way out. Seeing what had happened, the Athenians closed up the main entrance with their hoplites and, surrounding the rest of the enclosure with light-armed troops, stoned to death all who were inside. **This was a very severe blow to the Corinthians.** The main body of their army fell back on Corinth.

Pentacontaetia Chapters 107- : Stage 6: 'The First Peloponnesian War' (Sparta) c.460-446BC

Athens and Sparta clash in Northern Greece 457

- Athens builds her Long Walls, connecting the city to the Piraeus ^{1.107-8}
- The Spartans go North to the aid of an ally, but their return is cut off because of expansion of Athenian power.
- 457 Battle of Tanagra (Spartans return to Peloponnese)

Thuc. I 107 At about this time the Athenians began to build their two long walls down to the sea, one to Phalerum and one to Piraeus.



Spartans stranded in Boeotia: 457 Battle of Tanagra

And at the same time the Phocians started a campaign against Doris, the original homeland of the Spartans, containing the towns of Boeum, Cythium, and Erineum. When they had captured one of these places the Spartans came to the assistance of the Dorians with a force of 1,500 hoplites of their own and 10,000 of their allies. This force was commanded by Nicomedes, the son of Cleombrotus, acting as deputy for the Spartan King Pleistoanax, who was still under age.

The Spartans compelled the Phocians to come to terms and to give back the town which they had taken. **They then began to think of their return journey.** If they went by sea, across the Gulf of Crisa, the Athenians would be able to sail up with their fleet and stop them; nor did the route across Geraneia appear to be a safe one, since the Athenians held Megara and Pegae. The passes over Geraneia are difficult ones and were always guarded by the Athenians; moreover, on this occasion the Spartans had information that the Athenians had every intention of preventing them from taking this route. It seemed best, therefore, to stay in Boeotia and wait and see what the safest line of march would be. In this course they were also influenced by the fact that there was a party in Athens who were secretly negotiating with them even the hope of putting an end to democratic government and preventing the building of the Long Walls.

Thuc. I 108 The Athenians marched out against them with their whole army, supported by 1,000 troops from Argos and by contingents from their other allies, making up altogether a force of 14,000 men. They made this attack partly because they thought that the Spartans were in difficulties about their way back, and partly because they had some suspicions of the plot to overthrow the democracy.

The battle was fought at Tanagra in Boeotia, and, after great losses on both sides, the Spartans and their allies were victorious. The Spartans then marched down into the Megarid, and, after cutting down some of the plantations of trees, returned home through Geraneia and past the Isthmus.

Pentacontaetia Chapters 108-112 : Stage 7: 'The First Peloponnesian War': Athenian ambitions

Further Athenian triumphs and disasters:

- Two months after their defeat at Tanagra, the Athenians win a victory at Oenophyta over Boeotia.
- The Athenians complete the Long Walls and impose harsh terms on Aegina
- They pursue an aggressive policy, attacking Sparta's port, Gytheum, Corinth's Chalcis (Acarnania) and Sicyon.
- However, after initial successes in Egypt Athens and her allies suffer a heavy defeat and loss of ships.

457 Battle of Oenophyta: Athens controls Boeotia

The Athenians, on the sixty-second day after the battle, marched into Boeotia under the command of Myronides. They defeated the Boeotians in battle at Oenophyta and conquered the whole of Boeotia and Phocis. They pulled down the fortifications of Tanagra and took as hostages a hundred of the richest people among the Opuntian Locrians.

Meanwhile they finished the building of their own Long Walls.

Shortly afterwards **Aegina surrendered, and was forced to destroy her fortifications, to hand over her fleet, and to agree to pay tribute in the future.**

Then, too, the Athenians, under the command of Tolmides, the son of Tolmaeus, sailed round the Peloponnese, burnt the Spartan dockyards, captured the Corinthian city of Chalcis, and, after making a landing at Sicyon, defeated the Sicyonians in battle.



c.454: End of the Egyptian War 1.109-110

Thuc. I 109 Meanwhile the Athenian and allied force in Egypt was still engaged, and suffered all the chances and changes of war. At first the Athenians were masters of Egypt, and **the King of Persia sent to Sparta a Persian named Megabazus with money to bribe the Spartans to invade Attica and so force the Athenians to recall their fleet from Egypt. These negotiations, however, were unsuccessful**, and as the money was being spent without any results, Megabazus and what remained of it were recalled to Asia.

The King then sent out to Egypt another Persian, Megabazus, the son of Zopyrus, with a large army. He arrived by land, defeated the Egyptians and their allies in battle, and drove the Hellenes out of Memphis. In the end he penned them up on the island of Prosopitis and besieged them there for eighteen months. Finally he drained the channels round the island by diverting the water elsewhere. The ships were thus left high and dry; most of the island was connected with the mainland, and he captured it by marching across to it on foot.

Thuc. I 110 So, **after six years of war**, this great venture of the Hellenes came to nothing. Out of the whole great force a few managed to make their way through Libya and find safety in Cyrene, but nearly all were destroyed. Egypt once more passed into the control of the King of Persia, except that Amyrtaeus, the King in the marshes, still kept his independence. Because of the size of the marshes it was impossible to capture him: also the Egyptians who live in the marshes are the most warlike of their race. Inaros, the King of the Libyans, who had been the person responsible for the Egyptian revolt, was betrayed to the Persians and crucified.

Meanwhile fifty triremes from Athens and the rest of the League had sailed out to relieve the forces in Egypt. They put in at the Mendesian mouth of the Nile, having no idea of what had happened. Here they were under attack from the land by the Persian army and from the sea by the Phoenician fleet. Most of the ships were lost, though a few managed to escape. **This was the end of the great expedition against Egypt made by the Athenians and their allies.**

Inconclusive Athenian involvement in Thessaly c.454 BC

Thuc. I 111 Meanwhile Orestes, the son of the King of Thessaly Echekratides, was exiled from his country and persuaded the Athenians to restore him. The Athenians took with them a force of Boeotians and Phocians, who were now their allies, and marched to Pharsalus in Thessaly. Here they dominated the country - though without being able to go far from their camp, being prevented by the Thessalian cavalry - but they failed to capture the town or to secure any other of the objects of the expedition, and they returned home again with Orestes, not having achieved any results.




Further attacks in the Gulf of Corinth

Shortly afterwards a force of 1,000 Athenians embarked at Pegae (which was now in Athenian control) and sailed along the coast to Sicyon. This force was **under the command of Pericles**, the son of Xanthippus. They made a landing at Sicyon and defeated in battle the troops who opposed them. Immediately afterwards they took with them the Achaeans, sailed across the gulf, and made an attack on the Acarnanian town of Oeniadae. They besieged this place, but failed to capture it. They then returned home.

c.451 BC The Five Year Truce

Thuc. I 112 Three years later a five years' truce was made between Athens and the Peloponnese.



Athenian successes in Cyprus

Having no Hellenic war on their hands, the Athenians, under the command of Cimon, made an expedition against Cyprus with 200 ships of their own and of their allies. Sixty of these were detached to go to Egypt at the request of Amyrtaeus, the King in the marshes; with the rest they laid siege to Citium. **Cimon's death**, however, and also a shortage of provisions made them leave Citium. Then, when they were sailing off Salamis in Cyprus, they fought both by land and sea with an army and a fleet of Phoenicians, Cyprians, and Cilicians. **They were victorious in both battles, and then went home together with the sixty ships which had returned from Egypt.**

Pentacontaetia Chapters 112-115: Stage 8: 'The First Peloponnesian War' ends: Athenian set-backs

Opposition to Athenian control of Boeotia

After this the Spartans engaged in the campaign known as **the Sacred War**. They took over the temple at Delphi and give it back to the Delphians. As soon as they had retired, the Athenians marched out, took the temple again, and gave it back to the Phocians.

Thuc. I 113 Some time after this the exiled party among the Boeotians gained possession of Orchomenus, Chaeronea, and some other Boeotian towns. The Athenians, under the command of Tolmides, the son of Tolmaeus, marched against these enemy strongholds with a force of 1,000 of their own hoplites and contingents from their allies. They captured Chaeronea, made slaves of the inhabitants, and left a garrison in the town before retiring.

447 Battle of Coronea

On their way back they were attacked **at Coronea** by the Boeotian exiles from Orchomenus supported by Locrians, by exiles from Euboea, and by others who shared their political views. **This force defeated the Athenians, killing some of them and taking others alive. The Athenians then made a treaty by which they got back their prisoners at the price of evacuating the whole of Boeotia.** The exiled party among the Boeotians came back into power and the other states also regained their independence.



446BC Revolts of Euboea and Megara

Thuc. I 114 Not long after this, **Euboea revolted from Athens**. Pericles had already crossed over to the island with an Athenian army when he received the news that Megara had revolted, that the Peloponnesians were on the point of invading Attica, and that **the Megarians had destroyed the Athenian garrisons** except for a few who had managed to escape to Nisaea; in making this revolt Megara had called in the aid of Corinth, Sicyon, and Epidaurus. Pericles hurriedly brought the army back from Euboea, and soon afterwards **the Peloponnesians, under the command of the Spartan King Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias, invaded Attica, laying waste the country as far as Eleusis and Thria**. Then, without advancing any farther, they returned home.

The Athenians, under the command of Pericles, crossed over again into Euboea and subdued the whole island. Its future status was defined by the peace terms, except in the case of Hestiaea, where they drove out the inhabitants and occupied their land themselves.

446BC The Thirty Year Truce

Thuc. I 115 Soon after they had returned from Euboea **the Athenians made a thirty years' truce with Sparta and her allies: Athens gave up Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia - all places which they had seized from the Peloponnesians.**

Pentacontaetia Chapters 115-117 : Stage 9: Revolt of Samos



441BC Revolt of Samos

In the sixth year of the truce war broke out between Samos and Miletus over the question of Priene. After having had the worst of the fighting the Milesians came to Athens and lodged violent protests against the Samians. Their cause was supported by various private individuals from Samos itself who wished to set up there a different form of government. So the Athenians sailed to Samos with forty ships and established a democracy there. They took fifty boys and fifty men as hostages and kept them in Lemnos. Then, leaving a garrison behind in Samos, they returned home.


However, some of the Samians, instead of staying on the island, had fled to the mainland. These entered into communications with the leading oligarchs still in the city and also made an alliance with Pissuthnes, the son of Hystaspes, who at that time was the Persian Governor at Sardis. They raised a force of about 700 mercenaries, and passed over into Samos under cover of night. First they made an attack on the democratic party and imprisoned most of the leaders; then they rescued the hostages from Lemnos and declared themselves independent. They handed over to Pissuthnes the troops in the Athenian garrison and the Athenian officials who had been left in Santos, and at once made preparations for an attack on Miletus. At the same time Byzantium joined them in revolting from Athens.

Thuc. I 116 When the Athenians heard of this they sailed against Samos with a fleet of sixty ships. Sixteen of these were not brought into action: some had been sent to Caria to watch the movements of the Phoenician fleet; others had gone to Chios and Lesbos with orders to send reinforcements. The remaining forty-four, under the command of Pericles and nine other commanders, fought, off the

Diodorus

(LACTOR 1, *The Athenian Empire* 11.46-47, 11.50, 12.2.1-2 12 4.4-6; 12.38.2 (Nos. 19; 28; 52; 53; 113)

Diodorus wrote a *Universal History* in 40 books. He was a Sicilian who wrote during the period of the late Roman Republic (c.60-36BC). His work gives a year-by-year account of both Greek and Roman history. His chief source for Greek history seems to be Ephorus of Cyme (4th Century BC), who adopted a more thematic structure.



This is from the Preface to Book 12, which begins in 450BC.

The Athenians were renowned through practically the whole inhabited world as remarkable for bravery and glory. For they had increased their hegemony to such an extent that on their own, without the Spartans and the Peloponnesians, they had defeated the great Persian forces in contests by both land and sea, and they so humbled the famous Persian hegemony as to compel them to make an agreement to free all the cities of Asia. But of these things we have given a quite precise and detailed account in two books, this and the preceding. i.e. Book 12 and Book 11.

Diodorus, *Universal History* 12.2.1-2 12 LACTOR 1 52

The formation of the Delian League and the part played by Aristides.

Aristeides' conduct as General was compared [to the notorious conduct of Pausanias] among the allies, and because of the way he got on with his subordinates and his other virtues, he made them all incline, as it were with one accord, towards the Athenians. So they no longer took any notice of leaders sent from Sparta, but as a result of their admiration for Aristeides they enthusiastically submitted to him in every matter, and so enabled him to take over the supreme command by sea without having to face any danger. Immediately, therefore, Aristeides advised all the allies, who were holding a general meeting, to choose **Delos as their common Treasury**, to deposit there all the money they collected, and to impose a levy on all the cities according to their means for the war which they suspected would come from Persia. **The total collected as a result was 560 talents.** Aristeides was put in charge of the tribute assessment, and he shared out the amount so precisely and fairly that all the cities were well pleased. Since he seemed to have accomplished something impossible, Aristeides got the greatest reputation for justice, and because he was so excessively just he was known as '**Aristeides the Just**'.

Diodorus, *Universal History* 11.46.4-47.2 LACTOR 1 19



Delos



Aristides the Just

This story is preserved only in Diodorus. Scholars are divided as to whether it is reliable. If it is, it is the only unequivocal evidence that the Spartan Gerousia deliberated over policy as well as being a judicial body. The dating of 475BC may not be reliable.

In this year ^{475BC} the Spartans showed their resentment that they had lost command of the sea for no good reason. They were ill-disposed towards the Greeks who had revolted from them and threatened to impose an appropriate punishment upon them. When the Gerousia ^{Spartan Council of Elders} met, the Spartans debated over whether to go to war with the Athenians over command by sea. Similarly when the popular Assembly met, the younger men and many of the others, were ambitious to get the command back, in the belief that, if they got it, they would enjoy much revenue, would make Sparta in every respect greater and more powerful, and the households of individuals would be made prosperous. They reminded themselves of the old oracle in which the gods had ordered them to beware the lame leadership, and they interpreted the oracle as having a bearing on the present situation. For they said that their rule would indeed be lame if when there were two commands (on land and sea), they were to lose one of them.

Practically all the citizens supported this interpretation, and when the Gerousia met to discuss these matters, no one expected that anyone would dare to give contrary advice.



The Gerousia consisted of 30 members in total, of whom twenty-eight had to be over the age of sixty, and the remaining two members were the two Spartan kings, regardless of their age. Other than the kings, the members of the Gerousia (gerontes) were elected, and served for life. Gerontes were elected by acclamation, and a group of men in a separate building would judge which shout had been the loudest.

The Gerousia had two major roles. It debated motions which were to be put before the citizen assembly, with the power to prevent any motion from being passed on, and functioned as a Supreme Court, with the right to try any Spartan, up to and including the kings.



The Spartan Gerousia

But one member of the Gerousia, whose name was Hetoimaridas, who traced his ancestry back to Heracles, and who enjoyed favour among the citizens for his excellence, made an attempt at advising that the Athenians be allowed to keep the command. **He said that Sparta should not dispute command at sea, supplied a wealth of fitting arguments to this unlikely claim, and contrary to expectation succeeded in persuading the Gerousia and the people.** In the end the Spartans judged that Hetoimaridas gave the right advice and they turned away from their intention of making war on the Athenians.

The Athenians at first expected to face a major war against the Spartans over the command at sea, and because of this built more triremes and accumulated a large amount of money. But when they learned what the Spartans had decided, they were relieved of their anxiety about war and lost no time seeing to increasing the power of their city.

Diodorus, *Universal History* 475BC 11.50 LACTOR 1 28

Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*



Aristides the Just

Plutarch (1st C. AD (pre- AD50-post-AD120)) was a philosopher and biographer from Chaeronea in Boeotia and priest at Delphi. Twenty-three pairs of his *Parallel Lives* survive; His *Parallel Lives* compare notable Greeks and Romans. Aristides is paired with Cato the Elder; Cimon with Lucullus; Pericles with Fabius Maximus. (Alcibiades is paired with Coriolanus and Nicias with Crassus). Plutarch was extremely well-read and made use of Thucydides (e.g. in No.10 his account derives from Thuc. VII.1.95); he also uses Theopompus of Chios, the 4th Century historian who admired Philip II. He is not consistently critical of his sources and his interest is in character and ethics rather than history and analysis of events. Circumstantial details cannot always be traced back to a source so it is hard to judge whether there is a fictitious element or some anecdotes; there are occasional anachronisms.

Plutarch, *Aristeides* 23 + 24.1–5 (LACTOR 1, *The Athenian Empire* Nos. 10 + 20)

Pausanias' recall

Chios, Samos and Lesbos were the islands that continued for the longest time to meet their obligations to the Delian League by contributing ships rather than money.

When Aristides was sent out along with Kimon as general for the war, he saw Pausanias and the other Spartiate (i.e. Spartan citizen) commanders proving harsh and tiresome for the allies. He himself mingled with them in a kindly and considerate way and made sure that Kimon was accommodating and even-handed to all the contingents. In this way he took over the leadership without the Spartans noticing, not by force of infantry, navy or cavalry but by kindness and diplomacy.

Pausanias' greed and harshness were particularly important in making the Athenians desirable, the Athenians being agreeable to the Greeks because Aristides was fair and Kimon noble. Pausanias always met the allied commanders with a short temper and rough treatment, and he punished the troops with beatings and making them stand holding an iron anchor all day. No one was allowed to fetch bedding or fodder or approach a spring to get water before the Spartans did, servants with whips driving away anyone who tried. When Aristides once tried to make known the complaints on their behalf, Pausanias scowled, said he had no time and did not hear him out.

As a result of this the various naval and military commanders, and particularly the Khians, Samians and Lesbians, went along to Aristides and tried to persuade him to accept the leadership and to take command of the allies who had long wanted to be rid of the Spartiates and to transfer their allegiance to the Athenians.

Aristides replied that he saw that their arguments were compelling and fair, but that he needed a pledge in the form of an action which, once taken, would not allow the troops to transfer their allegiance back again. As a result, the friends of Ouliades the Samian and Antagoras the Khian, who had hatched the plot at Byzantion, launched an attack on Pausanias' trireme when it was sailing out in the middle of the fleet.

When Pausanias saw this, he rose up and angrily threatened that in a short time he would show that they had not attacked his ship but their own homelands. They told him to go away and think himself lucky to have had a share of their glory at Plataia; for they thought that it was because the Greeks still felt embarrassed over that that they had never exacted proper justice from him.

Finally they revolted and went over to the Athenians. It was here that Sparta's wisdom revealed itself as remarkable. For when they became conscious that their commanders were being corrupted by the amount of power they were exercising, they willingly gave up the leadership and stopped sending generals to the war; they chose to have citizens who were self-controlled and continued to behave according to traditional values rather than to rule the whole of Greece.

Plutarch, *Aristeides* 23 LACTOR 1 10

Aristides the Just

The tribute figures themselves seem to bear out the view here that Aristeides took into account the resources of cities as well as population and total area. The contrast between Aristeides' poverty and the sums he collected as tribute becomes a popular theme, especially for a biographer with an ethical agenda like Plutarch.

Even while the Spartans were leading them, the Greeks made contributions towards the war. Wanting the burden on each city to be moderate, they asked the Athenians for Aristeides' help, and instructed him to consider the land and income of each city and to fix the contributions according to the resources of each.

When he acquired such powers and Greece had, in a way, put all her affairs in his sole charge, he went out to the job poor and returned poorer, and he assessed the contributions not only justly but in a way that was kind and fitting for everyone.



A peasant who could not write walked up to Aristides, who was looking on, and asked him to mark the name "Aristides" on his ostrakon.

Aristides looked at the man in surprise.

"Why," he said. "Has Aristides done you any harm?"

"Nay," answered the peasant, who had no idea who he was talking to. "Nor do I know the fellow – I am merely tired of always hearing him called 'the Just'."

Without a word Aristides wrote his own name on the piece of pottery, and handed it back to the man.




An Athenian silver drachma, 454-404 BC, weighing 4.3 grams. A talent was equal to 6,000 drachmae - 25.80 kilograms of silver. During the Peloponnesian War, a trireme crew of 200 rowers was paid a talent for a month's worth of work, one drachma, or 4.3 grams of silver per rower per day.

As the men of old praised the age of Kronus i.e. the 'Golden Age' so the allies sang the praises of Aristeides' assessment as a stroke of good fortune for Greece, and particularly when not long afterwards tribute was doubled and then tripled. To explain, Aristeides' assessment was **460 talents**; Perikles added practically a third to this, for Thucydides says that at the beginning of the war ^{431BC} **600 talents** were coming in to the Athenians from their allies; after Perikles' death, the demagogues increased it little by little until they brought the total to **1,300 talents**. They did this not so much because of the length and fortunes of the war, but because they enticed the people into distributions of money, payments for public shows (theorika – the Theoric fund), and constructing cult statues and temples.

Plutarch, *Aristeides* 24.1–5 LACTOR 1 20

c.477BC	c.431BC	c.415BC?
460 talents	600 talents	1,300 talents
Cimon	Pericles	Demagogues



Athens' changing relations with her allies

The allies continued paying tribute but failed to provide men and ships according to their assessment, and were already refusing to go on campaign and did not man ships or send men, on the grounds that there was no need for warfare and that they wanted to live quietly and farm, since the barbarians had been removed and were not causing trouble. The other Athenian generals applied compulsion to make them do this, put those who failed on trial and by their punishments made the Athenian rule grievous and hard to bear.

But when Kimon was General he went in the opposite direction and did not apply force to any Greek; he accepted money from those who were not willing to campaign, and empty ships, and he let them be enticed by leisure and spend time on their own affairs, turning themselves from warriors into money-makers and farmers not fit for war through luxury and folly. He put many Athenians on the ships in turn and made them labour on the campaigns, and in a short time used the money and pay from the allies to make the Athenians masters of those who paid. As a result of their own shyness of war, the allies became accustomed to fearing and flattering the men who were maintained and trained, and were always sailing and handling arms; they failed to realise that they were turning themselves into subjects and slaves.


No one did more to humble the Great King and abase his pride than Kimon. He did not let him go when he departed from Greece, but following hard on the Persians' heels and not letting them pause for breath, as it were, he ravaged and destroyed some territories and made others revolt and come over to the Greeks, so that he completely cleared Asia of Persian arms from Ionia to Pamphylia. When he learned that the King's generals were lying in wait in Pamphylia with a large army and many ships, he set out from Knidos and the Triopion peninsula with 300 ships, with the intention of inducing such fear as to make the sea this side of the Khelidonian islands an area they would not sail into or trespass upon. These ships had been made by Themistocles to be very fast and manoeuvrable, and on that occasion Kimon made them broader, and gave them a gangway on the decks so that they would carry large numbers of hoplites and so be more effective at fighting the enemy.



He sailed to the city of **Phaselis, whose inhabitants were Greek, but they did not receive the fleet or wish to revolt from the King**, and so he began to ravage their territory and attack their walls. The Khians, who were part of his fleet, and had long enjoyed friendly relations with Phaselis, induced Kimon to be more gentle and shot pamphlets and arrows over the walls with messages to the people of Phaselis. In the end this brought reconciliation on condition that Phaselis pay ten talents, join the League, and take part in the campaign against Persia.

Plutarch, *Kimón* 11–12.4 LACTOR 1 33

449BC The 'Peace of Callias' ??



When Artaxerxes the Persian King learnt about the defeats around Cyprus, he took counsel with his friends about the war, and decided that it was in his interests to make peace with the Greeks. In consequence, he wrote to the generals in Cyprus and to the satraps ^{provincial governors} laying down the conditions on which they could end the quarrel with the Greeks. So those with Artabazos and Megabyzos sent ambassadors to Athens to discuss a settlement. The Athenians heard what they proposed favourably and sent ambassadors with full powers under Kallias, son of Hipponikos. An agreement was made between the Athenians and their allies and the Persians about peace, whose central clauses were: that all the Greek cities in Asia be autonomous; that the Persian satraps should not come closer than three-days' journey to the coast and no long ship sail inside ^{i.e. West} of Phaselis and the Kyanean Rocks; that if the King and his generals observed these terms, the Athenians should not invade the land that the King ruled. Once the treaty had been concluded, the Athenians withdrew their forces from Cyprus after having achieved a brilliant victory and a most famous peace. It happened that Kimon died ^{c. 450BC} from illness while on Cyprus.

Diodorus, *Universal History* 4.4–6 ^{LACTOR 1 53}

Conditions imposed upon the Persians by Kallias (i.e. the 'Peace of Callias')

This deed ^{Kimon's victory at Eurymedon} so humbled the King's pride that he made that famous peace, in which he promised that he would always keep a horse's journey from the Greek Sea and not sail inside ^{i.e. a warship} ^{West of} the Kyanean and Khelidonian islands with a long and bronze-beaked ship.

Yet Kallisthenes ^{Late 4th century historian (see below)} denies that the Persians made a made a treaty on these conditions, but says that because of the fear inspired by the defeat they acted as if such a peace was in force and kept so far away from Greece that Perikles with fifty ships and Ephialtes with just thirty could sail beyond the Khelidonians without any barbarian fleet meeting them.

But Krateros in his collection of decrees ^{made in the early 3rd century BC} includes a copy of the treaty as one that was made. And they say that the Athenians put up an altar of peace because of this treaty, and gave special honour to the ambassador Kallias.

Plutarch, *Kimon* 13.4–5 ^{LACTOR 1 51}

Osborne: 'This extract shows Plutarch at his best, carefully recording variant traditions and the reasons given by various authors for their actions. Whether Athens had made a Peace with Persia on advantageous terms became a big political issue in the fourth century BC, first because Sparta brought about a rather degrading Persian-guaranteed peace treaty in 386BC which compared unfavourably with Athenian exclusion of Persians not just from mainland Greece but also from the Ionian seaboard, and then because Alexander and the Macedonians liked to think they were taking revenge for the Persian Wars and did not like to think that their actions had been anticipated. Kallisthenes was the official historian of Alexander until he showed too little respect for the extraordinary nature of Alexander's achievements and died in suspicious circumstances.'

Harpokration s.v. *Attikois grammasin* (LACTOR 1, *The Athenian Empire*, No. 54)

Disputed authenticity of the 'Peace of Callias'. The point of this claim is that Athens officially changed from using the Attic alphabet to the Ionic for public inscriptions in 403/2. The Attic did not use eta and omega. Theopompus of Chios was a fourth century historian who wrote with admiration about Philip II of Macedon, conquerer Athens in the fourth century and father of Alexander the Great. He is often critical of the Athenians and here he discredits them for exaggerating their successes against Persia.

Theopompus in Book 25 of his History of Philip says that the treaty with the Persians is a fake, being written up not in the Attic, but in the Ionic alphabet.

Harpokration



Themistocles and Artaxerxes (King of Persia 465-424BC) Thuc. 1.137

Callias and Artaxerxes. Relations between Argos and Persia

[Xerxes has sent messengers to Argos claiming common descent with the Persians through Perseus (son of Andromeda); he suggests that Argos would be rewarded for staying neutral; there is a story that Argos engineered staying out of the war by claiming a share in the leadership of the Greek army, knowing Sparta would refuse.]

Her.VII 151 There are people in Greece who say that this account is borne out by a remark made long afterwards by Artaxerxes. **Callias son of Hipponicus and a number of other Athenians were in Susa, the city of Memnon, on different business,**⁷ and it so happened that their visit coincided with that of some representatives from Argos, who had been sent to ask Xerxes' son Artaxerxes if the friendly relations, which the Argives had established with his father, still held good, or if they were now considered by Persia as enemies. 'They do indeed hold good,' Artaxerxes is said to have replied; **'there is no city which I believe to be a better friend to me than Argos.'**

Her.VII 152 For my own part I cannot positively state that Xerxes either did, or did not, send the messenger to Argos; nor can I guarantee the story of the Argives going to Susa and asking Artaxerxes about their relationship with Persia. I express no opinion on this matter other than that of the Argives themselves. One thing, however, I am very sure of: and that is, that if all mankind agreed to meet, and everyone brought his own sufferings along with him for the purpose of exchanging them for somebody else's, there is not a man who, after taking a good look at his neighbour's sufferings, would not be only too happy to return home with his own. So the Argives were not the worst offenders.

My business is to record what people say, but I am by no means bound to believe it – and that may be taken to apply to this book as a whole. There is yet another story about the Argives: it was they, according to some, who invited the Persians to invade Greece because their war with Sparta was going badly and they felt that anything would be better than their present plight.


⁷ Callias was in Susa, it is thought, in order to negotiate a formal peace between Athens and Persia in 449. The 'Peace of Callias' is an endlessly debated topic in Greek history, but it belongs to Greco-Persian relations after the period treated in Herodotus' history. See Sealey 278-282.

Transfer of the Treasury from Delos to Athens, dated by Diodorus to 454/3.

Accusations against Pericles of peculation (refuted by Pericles Thuc II.60.5 and Thucydides II.65.8).

The Athenians, keeping tight hold on their naval hegemony, transferred to Athens the moneys collected on Delos for common use, some 8,000 talents, and handed it over to Perikles to look after. Perikles was outstanding among the citizens for nobility, reputation and skill in speaking. But after a time he had privately spent no small part of these moneys, and when asked to render an account he fell ill, unable to give an account of the money entrusted to him.

Diodorus, *Universal History* 12.38.2 LACTOR 1 113



Plutarch, *Perikles* 23.1–2 (LACTOR 1, *The Athenian Empire* Nos. 71)

c.446 Pericles' ten talents See Thuc. 1.114

When Perikles included an entry of ten talents 'as was needed' in his account of expenditures from his generalship ^{446/5} the people did not quibble with this or look further into the secret. But some, including the philosopher Theophrastus, have stated that Perikles had ten talents sent annually to Sparta and that by looking after the authorities in Sparta in this way he deferred the war, not purchasing peace but time during which he could make preparations quietly and ensure that the Athenians fought better.

Thephrastus of Eresos (c.371–287) succeeded Aristotle as head of the Lyceum in Athens. Some extracts from his work *On Laws* survive from later writers.

Plutarch, *Perikles* 23.1–2 LACTOR 1 71

The Spartan King Pleistoanax accused of accepting bribes not to invade Attica

Thuc. V 16 As for Pleistoanax, he was being attacked by his enemies in connection with his restoration; whenever anything went wrong, they invariably brought his name forward in an attempt to convince the Spartans that what had happened was due to this illegal restoration of his. The charge made against him was that he and his brother Aristocles had bribed the priestess at Delphi to give oracles to the Spartan delegations which had come on various official visits, commanding them to bring home from abroad the seed of the demigod son of Zeus, or else they would have to plough with a ploughshare of silver. **He was exiled** ^{just after 446BC?} **because he was supposed to have been bribed to retreat from Attica**, and, because of his fear of the Spartans, he had built half of his house inside the grounds of the temple of Zeus. So in the end, according to his accusers, he had induced the Spartans **in the nineteenth year of his exile** ^{c.427BC?} to Lycaenum to bring him back with the same dances and sacrifices as they had used originally in the institution of their kings at the time of the foundation of Sparta.

Thucydides 5.16 (see textbook p.32)

446/5BC Chalkis Decree (LACTOR 1, *The Athenian Empire* No. 78)

There is no firm date provided by evidence internal to the decree, although Dracontides is quite likely to be the man known to be active in the 430s as an opponent of Pericles and as one of the Generals (stratēgoi) on the second Athenian expedition to Corcyra. The content of the decree presupposes a major disturbance in relations between the Athenians and Chalcis and Eretria and this can only be that of 446-5BC.

Two features of the decree deserve special comment: that the oaths involve only the Athenian people, and not the allies; and that (compulsory?) reference to Athens is required in cases involving ex-magistrates. This provision was designed to prevent Athenians supporters being arraigned by enemies at home on trumped-up charges and then excluded from politics by the severity of the penalty imposed. The phrase used near the end '*in accordance with the people's decree*' (line 76) may imply that this rule was being enforced on all allies.

Part of the Athenian decree setting out the oath to be sworn at Eretria survives, and the surviving clauses are exactly parallel to those of the Chalcidian oath.

The Council ^{boulē} and People ^{dēmos} decided. The tribe Antiokhis were prytaneis ^(i.e. the presiding Tribe for the period). Drakontides was President ^{epistatēs}. Diognetos made the proposal.

The Athenian Council and dikasts ^{dikasts} are to swear an oath on the following terms:

'I will not expel Khalkidians ^{= Chalcidians} from Khalkis ^{= Chalcis}, nor will I uproot their city; I will deprive no individual of civic rights nor punish any with exile nor take any prisoner, nor execute, nor confiscate the money of anyone not condemned in court unless that is the decision of the Athenian people;

Whenever I am prytanis, I will not put anything prejudicial to the interests of an individual or the community to the vote without due notice, and any embassy that is sent I will bring before the Council and People within ten days, as far as I can; I will maintain this while the Khalkidians obey the Athenian people.'

An embassy is to come from Khalkis with the commissioners for oaths and administer the oath to the Athenians and list the names of those who have sworn; the generals having responsibility to see that all take the oath.

The Khalkidians are to swear an oath on the following terms:

'I will not revolt from the people of Athens by any means or device whatsoever, neither in word or deed, nor will I obey anyone who does revolt, and if anyone revolts I will denounce him to the Athenians, and I will pay to the Athenians whatever tribute I persuade them to agree, and I will be the best and fairest ally I am able to be and will help and defend the Athenian people, in the event of anyone wronging the Athenian people, and I will obey the Athenian people.'

All the Khalkidians of military age and above are to swear. If anyone does not swear, he is to be deprived of his civic rights and his property is to be confiscated and a tithe ^{1/10th} of it is to be dedicated to Olympian Zeus. An embassy is to go from Athens to Khalkis with the commissioners for oaths and administer the oath in Khalkis and list those of the Khalkidians who have sworn.

Antikles made a proposal.

In the name of good fortune for the Athenians: the Athenians and Khalkidians should make the oath just as the Athenian People voted for the people of Eretria and the Generals ^{stratēgoi} should have responsibility to see that that happens as quickly as possible. The people as soon as possible should choose five men to go to Khalkis to exact the oaths.

And on the matter of hostages, they should reply to the Khalkidians that for the moment the Athenians have decided to leave the matter as decreed. But whenever they decide, they will deliberate and draw up an agreement (or 'exchange') on conditions which seem suitable for the Athenians and Khalkidians.

The foreigners who live in Khalkis and do not pay taxes to Athens, even if they have been given tax exemption by the Athenian people, should pay taxes in Khalkis along with the rest, just like the other Khalkidians.

The Secretary of the Council is to write up this oath and decree at Athens on a stone stele and set it up on the Akropolis at the expense of the Khalkidians, and let the Council of the Khalkidians write it up and deposit it in the sanctuary of Zeus Olympios at Khalkis.

This is the decree about the Khalkidians.

Three men, chosen by the Council from among their own number, should go with Hierokles as quickly as possible to make the holy sacrifices demanded by the oracle about Euboia. So that this happens as quickly as possible, the Generals ^{stratēgoi} should take responsibility and provide money for it.

Arkhestratos made a proposal. In other respects I agree with Antikles, but the Khalkidians should themselves subject their officials to scrutiny on Khalkis, just as the Athenians at Athens, except in cases involving exile, execution or loss of civic rights. On these matters there should be reference to Athens to the court of the Thesmothetae in accordance with the people's decree. As to guarding Euboia, the Generals ^{stratēgoi} are to take responsibility for doing that as best they can in the interests of the Athenians.

Oath.



Aristotle (384-322BC) *Politics* 1284a38 (LACTOR 1, *The Athenian Empire*, No. 84)

Aristotle was a philosopher who lived in the Fourth Century BC and became tutor to Alexander the Great. His *Politics* seems to derive from lectures he gave in the 330s. In making generalised claims about political behaviour it alludes to many specific political incidents, as here:

The nature of Athenian Empire:

- **Revolt of Samos 441-439BC** Thuc 1.115-117
- **Lesbos 428-427BC** Thuc 3
- **Chios 413-411BC** Thuc 8

Those in positions of political power do the same (*i.e. weaken their rivals*) with regard to cities and nations, as for example the Athenians with regard to Samos, Chios and Lesbos: for as soon as they had a firm hold over their empire, they humbled these islands contrary to agreements.

Aristotle, *Politics* 1284a38 LACTOR 1 84

