



Cold War Revision Guide

A World Divided: Superpower relations, 1944-90

Contents

This revision guide is intended to guide you to the key essentials necessary for answering questions on Unit 3. You shouldn't use it as a replacement for your class notes or your own revision notes, but as a way of supplementing them and ensuring you have a firm awareness of major events, individuals and ideas.

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Seeds of conflict

What were the characteristics of Cold War?

Ideologies : Communism v. capitalism

Capitalism: production of goods and distribution is dependent on private capital with a view to making profit; capitalist economies run by individuals rather than by state

Communism: hostile to capitalism, which exploits workers; ideally all property, businesses & industry should be state-owned, 'each gives according to their ability to those according to their need'

Economics: Marshall Plan (1947) – provision of fuel, raw materials, goods, loans, food, machinery advisers

US exploited its financial power to export Western values – dollar imperialism

1948-52, US Congress voted nearly \$13bn economic aid to Europe

Trade war with Communist countries, e.g. Cuba

Military tensions: Korean War (1950-3), Vietnam (early 1960s -1973); US military build-up, e.g. 1960 2.4 US military personnel around world; 1959, 1,500 military bases in 31 countries

Treaties: NATO (1949) – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation SEATO (1954)– South East Asia Treaty Organisation Warsaw Pact (1955)– military defensive pact amongst eastern European nations COMECON (1949)– Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

Propaganda: European Recovery Program – propaganda as much as economic exercise

Benefits of Marshall Plan advertised

Italy became a focus of economic rebuilding after WWII - 'Operation Bambi' used minstrels, puppet shows and film

Espionage: CIA (1947) – founded to co-ordinate information gathering on USSR and Allies. Activities included:

Support for anti-Communist political leaders, e.g. Christian Democrats, 1948 elections

'Regime change', e.g. overthrow of left-wing govt in Iran & Guatemala, Operation Executive Action (1961), collaborated with Mafia to overthrow Fidel Castro

Arms race: 1945 US tested and detonated 1st atomic bomb

1949 USSR carried out 1st successful nuclear test

1952 tested 1st H-bomb (2,500x more powerful)

1953, USSR produced H-bomb

1961 enough nuclear weapons to destroy world

1967 China produced H-bomb

1981, USA 8000 ICBMs, USSR 7,000

MAD – Mutually Assured Destruction

Space race: 1957, launch of Sputnik

1957, 1st animal in space

1961, Yuri Gagarin 1st man in space

21 July 1969 Apollo 11 mission successfully land 1st man on moon

Sport & culture: 1980, 'Miracle on Ice' – US hockey teams defeats USSR 'giants'

1980 Moscow Olympics, 1984 LA Olympics – boycotted by US & USSR

Ballet – defections to West, e.g. Nureyev

World Chess Championships– Bobby Fisher v. Boris Spassky (1972)

Ideology

- Communism capitalism - democracy (different interpretations)
- US assumptions - poverty, expansionism, oppressive (no choice – forced), evil

- Spy trials – threat internally – State Dept , McCarthyism
- Truman Doctrine perceived these as subjugation by armed minorities “free peoples”
- Marshall aid perceived as having ideological reasons – dollar imperialism
- Expansionism (Kennan – Russian nature was nationalistic) –proof seen in E Europe/Far East
- Guilt over appeasement
- Support for newly created UN
- Buffer zone/puppet state – different perceptions
- USSR commitment to world revolution
- Liberated peoples after 2ww or after colonial powers left want independence/self
 - determination & may choose communism

Personality (Leaders)

- Stalin paranoid – e.g. purges, fear of invasion – betrayed in 2ww by Hitler but also allies made him wait 2 yrs before opening eastern front; distrusts Truman as kept A bomb secret at Potsdam,
 - Truman – hard headed – ignorant of foreign affairs, persuaded by Riga Axiom & Kennan’s Long telegram rather than Wilsonian liberalism, no appeasement uphold Freedoms in UN charter
 - Change of leaders during 1945: Relations tricky, suspicion personal e.g. Potsdam relations – Molotov swore at Truman. Truman’s “I’m tired of babying the Soviets” and the “only language they understand is the language of force”
- USA attitudes (point of view)
 - Assumptions (poverty breeds communism, expansionist, evil, monolithic power, puppet states)
 - Fear of appeasement, must confront (little suffering in war)
 - Events of 1945-50 seemed to provide proof for each assumption so justified containment policy
 - Domestic pressure: US spy trials Fucks, Hiss, Rosenbergs 1949 & USSR a bomb, Berlin airlift symbolic support for democracy under threat by another dictator, China communist “soft on communism” – Truman found demands to be tough

USSR attitudes (point of view – perspective)

- History – fear of invasion: Russian past constant invasion, 1917 & civil war foreign intervention, – betrayed in 2ww by Hitler but also allies made him wait 2 yrs before opening eastern front; suffering huge 20 million, felt needed buffer as protection
- distrusts Truman as kept A bomb secret at Potsdam, despite being allies, thought bomb dropped in Japan as warning/threat
- Stalin had agreed with Churchill to have some influence in E Europe after war, not honoured by Truman as not a formalised agreement

National security:

- conflicting National interests – geopolitical – attitudes & assumptions drove need for security
 - Balance of power/spheres of influence - strategic advantage - containment v. Perceived as hegemony or expansion by other side
 - US perspective different from USSR – result of different histories and war time experiences
 - Conflict over E Europe – Yalta promises not fulfilled, conflict over Poland, Red Army in Europe, elections in France/Italy, no elections liberated states, opposition exiled, killed, imprisoned in E Europe, Greece – Truman Doc/Marshall Aid – buffer zone
 - Conflict over Germany- US rebuild, USSR reparations – Berlin division - airlift
 - Conflict over Far East – Japan (bulwark, defence perimeter)– China., Korea, Vietnam

Threats.. perceived to national security. World peace.. balance of power

- Actual danger – e.g., Berlin airlift Korean invasion

- Nuclear advantage: perceived danger of A bomb – arms race/NATO/Warsaw Pact
- 1949 turning pt China communist – Sino-Soviet Pact – spy trials at home – Berlin – NATO led to NSC 68 – followed by Korean invasion – led to 1st military action UN led invasion of Korea
- Korea militarised and globalised Cold War

Economic

- Economic containment by US: Marshall Aid, reconstruction of Japan, money to Korea, Vietnam
- Germany – US rebuild, join zones new currency: USSR reparations
- Comecon – join E bloc v. Marshall Aid countries , bound by command economy to Moscow

How did WWII make Cold War more likely?

- Conflicts of personality between Big Three
- Power vacuum in post-Nazi Germany & Europe
- Economic recovery
- Emergence of USA & USSR as superpowers
- Atomic bomb
- Red Army – 11 m troops occupied Europe
- Ideological differences – Wilsonian liberalism v Worldwide Revolution
- Distrust over conduct of WWII – Second Front

What were the attitudes of the main powers in Europe after WWII?

Stalin

- Rebuild & safeguard his country, which had lost 20 million citizens as a result of the war
- The leader wanted to strengthen the country and prevent the threat of future invasions.
- The occupation of as many Eastern European countries as possible to create a buffer zone around its borders
- The country had been invaded 3 times by the West, during WWI, the Civil War and WWII
- To spread Communism around the world, although this may not have been a primary aim immediately after WWII
- Gains after the war should be in proportion to the losses it had endured

Truman

- The leader wanted to confront his opponents head on, especially over human rights and democratic values
- His aims was influenced by the fact he was poorly informed on foreign policy matters and aware of the strength of anti-communist feeling in his own country
- His foreign policy was strongly influenced by George Kennan's deeply suspicious 'Long Telegram' (1946) and the policy of containment it inspired
- The leader adopted an 'Iron Fist' approach towards foreign policy, in contrast towards Chamberlain's Appeasement policy of the 1930s
- The government was keen to protect free trade in Europe to provide a market for US goods
- Arms industry were keen to keep tensions high, to avoid a downturn in demand after WWII
- Some within the country favoured a return to isolationism

Churchill

- Their leader saw the need for an agreement with Stalin
- Domestic policy and the setting up of the welfare state was the main consideration
- They wanted to their allies to stand firm over the threat of Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe

The Emergence of Cold War

Yalta & Potsdam Conferences

Yalta, Feb. 1945		Potsdam, July-Aug. 1945	
Agreement	Tension	Agreement	Tension
Military Russia agreed to enter war against Japan following German surrender In return Russia would receive territory in Manchuria & Sakhalin Island Germany Germany temporarily divided into four zones Berlin divided into four zones Eastern Europe 'Declaration of Liberated Europe' (to set up democracies in East Europe). Set up Polish Government of National Unity International organizations Setting up of UNO (to replace League of Nations), to which Russia was invited International War Tribunal to put Nazi war criminals on trial	Reparations Stalin wanted Germany to pay USSR reparations Stalin wanted payments in coal, US wanted coal to rebuild Europe, Russian demands ignored Poland USSR wanted to extend Polish border too far West for western allies Stalin disregarded calls for free elections and arrested non-communists Germany USSR forced Germans to sell food & raw materials to Soviet Union Some German factories dismantled & moved to USSR	Eastern European New boundaries agreed (Oder-Niesse rivers formed border between Germany & Poland) Germany Germany & Berlin divided into separate sectors and zones as agreed at Yalta Demilitarisation Democracy re-established – free press & freedom of speech International organizations Nazi Party was to be banned in Germany Legal trials at Nuremberg of 21 Nazi leaders for war crimes Allies agreed to participate fully in UNO	Military Stalin denied a naval base in Mediterranean Reparations Stalin demanded more in reparations than US or GB US didn't want to cripple Germany (as in WWI) Stalin suspicious about why West wanted to protect Germany & help it recover Poland Stalin set up Communist govt. in Poland GB preferred non-Communist Polish govt. which had lived in London US & USSR suspicious of Stalin's intentions in setting up Communist govt. in Lublin

Iron Curtain speech

- Delivered during a speech at Fulton, Missouri in March 1946
- "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia; all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and in some cases increasing measure of control from Moscow. "
- Speech given as a private individual – Churchill no longer PM
- Truman present, and agreed with 'Iron Fist' message
- Moscow branded Churchill 'warmonger'

Truman Doctrine

- Kennan's 'Long Telegram', recommending firm action against Soviet expansion (1946)
- Churchill's Iron Curtain speech (1946)
- Civil war between monarchists & communists
- GB govt unable to continue military & economic aid
- 'Iron Fist' & containment of spread of communism

Marshall Aid

- Need for economic recovery after WWII
- 'The most unselfish act in history' (Churchill)
- Market for US goods
- Avoid global recession
- Fear of Europe becoming 'breeding ground' for communism

Soviet reaction

- Dollar imperialism
- Eastern European countries pressurised to refuse
- Cominform (1947)
- Comecon (1949)

Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe

Country	Influence of Communism – steps taken to set up Communist regimes
Poland	Communists joined a coalition government after the war, becoming outright leaders in 1947, forcing non-communist leader into exile
Romania & Bulgaria	Romania: Communist elected PM, 1945 within a left-wing coalition. 1947, Communists also abolished the monarchy Bulgaria: left-wing coalition won elections, 1945. Communist members of coalition executed leaders of other parties
Yugoslavia	Marshal Tito led war-time resistance to the Nazis, elected President in 1945, determined to apply Communism in his own way & expelled from Cominform in 1948
Greece	Britain and USA supported Royalist side in a civil war, defeating Communist opposition
Hungary	Communists became second largest party in 1947 elections. Imprisoned opposition politicians, attacked Church leaders
Czechoslovakia	Left-wing coalition won elections in 1945. Communists became largest single party, but still in a coalition. In 1948, when their position was threatened, banned other parties and made Czechoslovakia a Communist, one-party state
Finland	Initially the WWII leader Marshal Mannerheim allowed to stay in power despite cooperating with Hitler, while only one Communist remained in power Stalin was keen to be moderate in his approach to demonstrate 'ideological détente'

Czech Crisis

- Communists mounted a coup d'état
- Police force taken over by communists
- Non-communist personnel removed
- Non-communists removed from govt
- Fear & coercion used to remove remaining opponents, e.g. Jan Masaryk defenestrated
- President Benes forced to resign & replaced by communist Gottwald

- Shocked West: - symptomatic of Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe & communist expansionism; last remaining democratic country in Eastern Europe; memories of WWII – failure of appeasement & Nazi expansionism

Berlin Blockade

Reasons Berlin so important: Capital of Germany - cause of two world wars; place where East met West, communism v. capitalism; focus of world events at Yalta & Potsdam (1945), Berlin Blockade (1948-9), Berlin Wall (1961, 1989)

Causes of Berlin Blockade: Divisions over future of Berlin dating back to Yalta & Potsdam; tensions of economic differences – West zones benefited from Marshall Aid; differences in living standards; failure of Council of Ministers; introduction of new currency – Deutsche Mark; merger of Western zones

Consequences: 1st major flashpoint of Cold War; 1949, Western allies estd. Federal Republic of West Germany; 1949, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) founded; end to US isolationism; divisions between East & West Germany became permanent

Why did Cold War extend to the Far East?

Trigger: Invasion of S Korea by North

UN decision to intervene – moral obligation as had temporary control over Korea after 2ww to set up

new Gov & run elections

NSC 68 dramatic reassessment of US foreign policy meant US supported UN intervention

National security

- **US perceived** that their national security under threat by Korean invasion
- Jan 1950 announced US defence perimeter – Pacific and Japan but not Taiwan and mainland, yet by June had changed and intervened on mainland.. why: NSC 68's analysis
- NSC 68 written in light of events in 1949/50 and earlier: 1946-8 E Europe taken over, Berlin Airlift, 1949 China communist, spy trials, USSR A bomb, Feb 1950 Sino-Soviet Pact= confirmed monolithic bloc, puppet state – expansionist assumptions & seen as threat
- US perceived invasion of south Korea by north as ultimately controlled by Moscow via China i.e. puppet state using a power vacuum as they had in Europe, same pattern, thus confrontation needed as in Berlin, since economic containment seemed insufficient in each region.
- NSC 68 recommended: no appeasement must confront authoritarian expansionist rule wherever it attempts to expand; massive rearmament needed; there is very likely to be a war with communism within 5 years. Truman reluctant to sign as would mean tax rise and mid term elections 1950
- Korean invasion in June seemed to confirm NSC 68's analysis – Truman thus agreed and supported action, even pushed UN into action. Domestic pressure (start of McCarthyism)

UN role

- UN at moment of votes on Korea lacked USSR (communist) representatives – boycotting UN as had voted not to give new communist gov of China a seat in UN but to allow Taiwan to keep the China seat
- US made vigorous campaign to get UN to vote for action, at times Truman's speeches about intervention made even before the vote taken in UN
- UN had moral obligation to oversee situation in Korea. At end of 2ww UNTOK oversaw setting up of new gov after Japanese defeated and left a power vacuum there. Agreement to divide nation temporarily until nationwide elections could be held 2 yrs later
- USSR had had a mandate in north after 2WW until elections could be held and she allowed Kim Il Sung to rule creating a communist area, with land reform and

- punishing landlords; UN could not guarantee fair elections there as UN officials too few and N Korea not eager to allow them in.
- UNTOK thus failed to organise nationwide elections in 1948 and had agreed to elections only in south where US had had a mandate.
- By agreeing to hold elections only in south UN had effectively created potential for a civil war
- So UN had a responsibility to protect south Korea and to resolve situation
- US had a disproportionate amount of influence in UN at this time given communist boycott

Japan/economic motives

- US had particular interest in the region as had a huge vested interest in protecting Japan
- Japan reconstructed after 2WW – huge amounts of money, economic containment – build a capitalist trade network in region to bind region to capitalist success (stop poverty v communism) and act as bulwark against communism
- Japan edge of defence perimeter and fears therefore of signs of communist expansion in region threatening Japan
- MacArthur, general in region in 2ww oversaw Japan, passionate Republican and anti communist. Very critical of Truman's policy "soft on communism" particularly when "abandoned" Taiwan Jan 1950 and "lost China". Rumoured to have made private trip to Taiwan and guarantees of protection and pushed for action in Korea, pressure on Truman great. Domestic pressure (election year) and heroic status meant he had influence (wrote letter to veterans criticising Truman and pushing for action)
- Truman began to give money to France at this time to support their war in Vietnam versus communists in north
- US saw a regional problem after Chinese communist revolution – spreading just as had in Europe so needs containment, just as had done in Berlin, perceived as puppet states controlled by China and ultimately Moscow
- Economic containment alone not sufficient in Europe (NATO now set up after Berlin confrontation), and not sufficient in Japan therefore in light of NSC 68 need military confrontation

USSR role

- Now appears Stalin very reluctant to become involved. Kim Il Sung visited Moscow and Stalin rebuffed his requests for help. Only a short time after Berlin humiliation. Stalin recognised that an invasion would cause US to react
- Ultimately Mao asked for some support for fellow communists.. Stalin gave a few MiG fighter jets only and even then charged Mao for lending them to his forces (Mao hugely resentful!)

China role

- Mao only just won civil war, not in a position to give much support as needed to consolidate own nation
- Mao however believed in supporting fellow communist so agreed to give members of PLA who had ethnic links with Korea
- Once MacArthur had crossed 38th parallel and moved quickly north to Yalu River appearing to threaten China, Mao sent diplomatic warnings to west which were not given much weight by west
- US jets bombed across Yalu River and Mao then sent his forces; i.e. only sent them in when perceived a direct threat and provocation. MacArthur continuously rejected the earlier intelligence reports of large numbers of Chinese forces
- Mao's forces did not go beyond 38th parallel when US withdrew south again – ceasefire line respected

Korea

Divided temporarily 1945 when Japan defeated and power vacuum left. UN to organise elections 2 yrs later to reunify country. USSR oversaw north. N Korea ruled by Kim Il Sung began communist land reforms. Elections not held in north as UN couldn't guarantee their fairness and US experts predicted Communists win. Both sides frequently made speeches about reunifying nation & often clashed on 38th parallel border.

NSC-68, 1950

- Need to ...
- Improve defences against threat of all-out nuclear war
- Reassure general public
- Provide rapid US military response
- Respond to threat of espionage & internal sabotage
- Protect US economic interests
- Strengthen foreign anti-Soviet allies
- Undermine links between USSR and satellite states
- Raise public awareness of threat of Communism

Evidence of hardening of relations

- World politics interpreted in 'bi polar' terms
- Increased military spending
- Use of alarmism to promote fear of spread of Communism abroad or at home, e.g. 'McCarthyism'
- Move from containment to 'roll back' actively undermining 'relationships between Moscow and satellite countries'
- Widening terms of Truman doctrine to enlist support of foreign countries with US security

Historiography of Cold War – origins

Key schools of thought

- Historiography – study of historians views
- Traditional (orthodox) – conventional, western view, USSR to blame
- Revisionist – looking at history from different, 'revised' perspectives, the US must share the blame
- Post-revisionists – not who but what was to blame, e.g. break down of diplomacy, economic factors

US responsibility

- Change of policy from conciliation under Roosevelt to 'Iron Fist'
- Truman lacked Roosevelt's negotiating skills
- Truman felt less secure in his position, e.g. challenges from Dixiecrats over Civil Rights policies like Fair Deal
- His approach hardened divisions between East & West

BUT

- Truman was responding to hostility within US administration to USSR caused by communist expansion in Eastern Europe
- Key advisers, e.g. George Kennan, 'Long Telegram' (1946) spoke about 'steady advance of Russian nationalism'
- Previous administrations had been too soft on communism
- Soviet aggression gave Truman no other choice than to adopt an Iron Fist to avoid war
- Military-industrial complex encouraged conflict to secure capitalist markets and provide continued investment in military spending after WWII

Soviet responsibility

- Russian revolutionaries, e.g. Trotsky believed ideals of Communism would be under threat from capitalism
- Trotsky believed in 'Permanent Revolution' & Stalin 'Socialism in One Country'
- Comintern (aka Third International, 1919-43)

- Replaced by Cominform (1947)
- Soviet actions after WWII - power-vacuum exploited by Communists, e.g. Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe, Communist support for guerrillas in Greece, Communist coup in Czech. (1948)
- Soviet expansionism confirmed by Kennan in 'Long Telegram' and 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct'

BUT

- Protective zone around USSR (view supported by John Lewis Gaddis)
- Expansionism was the product of Soviet defence rather than aggression
- Need to appease or control hostile states, e.g. Poland
- Hardline US approach made imposition of Communist govts. A necessity

Schools of thought table

Schools of thought	Characteristics
Orthodox (traditional)	<p>Product of aggression & expansionist foreign policy of Stalin</p> <p>Characterised by George Kennan's deeply suspicious view of Soviet intentions in 'Long Telegram' (1946)</p> <p>Examples of supporters of this view: W.H. McNeil, 'America, Britain and Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict', H.Feis, 'Churchill, Roosevelt & Stalin', A.Schlesinger, 'Origins of Cold War' who spoke about 'The intransigence of Leninist ideology ... the madness of Stalin'</p> <p>Shaped by attitudes of West at start of Cold War and desire to support 'Iron Fist' approach to foreign policy</p>
Revisionist	<p>Considers provocative actions of US in political and economic expansionism & also the defensive aspects of Soviet foreign policy, e.g. need for buffer zone</p> <p>Supporters of this view include: William A Williams, 'The Tragedy of American Diplomacy' (1959). 'New left' rights influenced by failures in US foreign policy in Vietnam and more openly cynical view of US administration in 1960s</p>
Post-revisionist	<p>Move away from 'who' was to blame, to 'what'. Authors writing at end of Cold War & could adopt a more detached, objective response looking at complex 'factors' which led to break down in relations between two sides. Many still include blame for Stalin's part, e.g. V.Zubok & C.Pleshakov, 'Inside the Kremlin's Cold War'</p> <p>Factors which have been considered include: impact of WWII which made ideological aspirations harder to realise for the Soviets; European pressure put on US to take a more aggressive stance on USSR (e.g. Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' speech); internal pressures on the Soviet & US leadership led to a more hardline approach towards foreign policy</p> <p>Supporters of this view include: J.L. Gaddis 'We Now Know' (1997) & D.Yergin, 'Shattered Peace' (1980)</p> <p>Increased availability of Cold War documents has fuelled this approach as archives have opened up</p>
Soviet	<p>Soviet perspective sees the toughs stance of USSR necessary in the defence against capitalist advance</p> <p>Supporters of this view include: Molotov in 'Problems of Foreign Policy' (1946), Ponomaryov, 'Official History of USSR' sees Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid as smoke screen for US imperialism</p>

Russian writers since 1991	More open assessment of Russia's part in Cold War. Comintern actively promoted communism worldwide and Soviet great power status Supporters of this view include, Volkogonov, 'The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire' (1998) – Volkogonov was a senior member within Soviet army & has an insider's knowledge, albeit very sceptical one
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The Thaw & Peaceful co-existence

Reasons for Thaw

New leaders

- Stalin's death = opportunity for change
- Khrushchev – peaceful coexistence policy
- Need to regain prestige in USSR after humiliation of Berlin blockade & Stalin's aggressive policies so willing to talk and change direction
- Eisenhower, newly elected President – won as promised to end Korea = need to talk
- Rhetoric harsh – but also as a general knew that war a last resort esp nuclear war = willing to talk
- Eisenhower could talk from position of strength as a respected patriot

Economic needs

USA

- New Look: meant more nuclear less conventional forces “more bang for buck” but in fact expensive
- 12% of GDP on defence
- Korea globalised and militarized cold war e.g putting divisions in Europe nad supporting allies in NATO & SEATO so USA had more commitments around world = expensive therefore want to reduce them

USSR

- 1/3rd of economy devoted to defence
 - Commitments to Warsaw Pact & E Europe security e.g. Hungary costly
 - USSR lack of consumer goods, social pressure building up for change
Command economy under strain
- both economies had become very skewed towards defence - need cuts

Arms race

- MAD – both Khrushchev and Eisenhower feared nuclear war
- Both therefore set out to avoid nuclear war = negotiate, ease tension, reduce risk
- Almost parity attained by 1953 – both had H bomb within months of each other
- Both aware of technological race and race to achieve 1st strike meant war ever more likely e.g. sputnik, nasa therefore negotiate
- K aware that U2 planes would soon reveal USSR had fewer weapons than he boasted they had

Eisenhower aware that he was negotiating from position of strength – and more bang for the buck

Domestic pressure

- Fear – duck and cover, Gaither Report missile gap, Civil Defense Administration, education on massive retaliation; NASA set up, spending on science education up
- USSR – economically developing but need to focus on consumer goods

Achievements of the Thaw

- **Met at summits** : Geneva 1955; Geneva spirit seemed to emerge; cultural exchanges;
- Camp David 59 ; Paris & UN (New York) 60; summits made it clear both sides wished to reduce tension and risk of war
- **Visits**: Khrushchev goes to US and Europe; Nixon goes to USSR
- **Secret speech - destalinisation** from US & E Europe point of view positive (freeing political prisoners)
- **Media – image** – jolly, funny, getting on; US public happy to see USSR's human face – K during his visits; image of positive relations and hopeful for peace
- **Austrian State Treaty** – both sides withdrew soldiers so saved money
- **Finland** : gave back a port to Finland
- **Hungary**: US did not become involved in Hungary – reducing tension and not threatening use of nuclear bombs
- **Conventional reductions** e.g. red army out of Europe 600,000; no nuclear option when given; Limited war – no desire to fight China; ceasefire at end, accept division; Hungary 56 – USA not intervene nor in Poland/E Germany during uprising, acceptance of E bloc control
- **Germany**: Accept division of Germany FDR, DDR set up after blockade 1949
- NATO and Warsaw Pact accept division in Europe

Failures of the Thaw

- **Rhetoric** – hollow words – they didn't really mean a change in policy
- **USSR** – “*peaceful coexistence*”, secret speech yet 1959 “ *we will bury you*”, 1960 anger at UN ..”*missiles being churned out like sausages*” ; Warsaw Pact; still acted in the usual firm Soviet manner e.g. E Germany & Hungary suppression so not really coexisting with different regimes
- **USA** – “*massive retaliation*” “*roll back*”, *brinkmanship* –aggressive
- Announcing extending containment to Middle East also sounds aggressive
- Eisenhower “more bang for the buck” increased spending on new weapons
- Arms race continued; science education subsidies; U2 spy planes costly; SEATO – committed to helping around the world; METO - commitment to Middle East must mean expense
- **Personality**: Khrushchev – angry in US (not go to Disneyland as security unsure); angry at Summits: Paris summit & UN and gave ultimatum over Berlin - unpredictable, K's boasting raised tensions and increased pressure in US to rearm; difficult to deal with
- **Arms race** continued: both H bomb; Open skies policy failed – U2 shot down; no talks held on reducing arms; USSR - prestige gained as outdid USA in space race and rocket technology which boosted the appearance of their strategic strength (still had fewer weapons) i.e. still spending and not peaceful coexistence
- **Space race**: sputnik – space race; technological race continued – sputnik, phutnik, etc
- International crises: Berlin Wall... then Cuba
- **Domestic tensions**: splits in Politburo and intelligentsia (and with China) as K appeared to be selling out to capitalism and deviating from Marx's assertion that capitalism & communism inevitable conflict. K's increasing unpredictable behavior also unnerved some, culminating in his removal after Cuba

Was there a genuine Thaw in relations?

Khrushchev: new rhetoric “peaceful coexistence” seemed to signal a new approach after Stalin's death and the release of tension that resulted; needed to change policy to restore USSR prestige after humiliation e.g. over Berlin airlift; secret speech appeared to many in west to be undoing Stalin's work and again seemed a breath of fresh air, leaving behind the excessive repression, secrecy and tension of early Cold War; personality seemed outwardly “jolly” easy going, known to like his drink, a good joke, smiled and enjoyed his tours of Europe

and USA, happy to meet, greet and be filmed so doing – all seemed to announce a warmer friendlier approach towards the westerners

Eisenhower :elected in reaction to two apparently contradictory pressures – to be tough on communism after Truman accused of being too soft yet also elected to “get out of Korea” i.e. to reduce cold war tension and commitments, hence likely to want to talk to adversaries, and thus a thaw in relations; rhetoric by contrast to K seemed aggressive and similar or even harsher than that of Truman – massive retaliation, brinkmanship, roll back.. MAD yet the logical conclusion of this policy was nuclear Armageddon and as an experienced war time General E knew that if there was one thing he wanted to avoid that was war, hence his nuclear policy actually acted as a powerful driver for talks and negotiations with the Soviets and thus an apparent thaw in the State Dept’s approach in the early 1950s personality being regarded as a patriotic hero, could also afford to be seen negotiating with the Soviets from a position of strength as far as public opinion went, unlike Truman who might have been perceived as yet again being soft on communism had he so much as mooted face to face talks with Stalin – had Stalin ever indeed wanted to meet Truman which after Potsdam’s tense atmosphere seemed very unlikely. Thus Eisenhower might well have contributed towards the perception of a thaw with his acceptance that face to face talks were an acceptable policy move – his trip to Korea to take part in peace talks similarly gives us the initial impression of a thawing of international tension, all supported by excitable media coverage showing men shaking hands, smiling and documents being signed.

Summits: - gave appearance of good will and a new approach to international relations; Geneva, Camp David, Paris, UN (New York), K to USA, Nixon to USSR; K’s personality refreshingly jolly and apparently open when compared to Stalin’s paranoia and suspicious nature; K travelled to Peking, Delhi, Belgrade, London; Kitchen debate film clip seemed a fairly humorous good natured exchange of views; K commented that both sides now knew each other

International agreements: Korean Armistice; Geneva Summit – spirit of Geneva – exchange of cultural and scientific experts; USSR recognised W Germany officially seemed German question being resolved so there would be peace in Europe; Open skies discussed..no agreement, swept under carpet for moment; Austrian State Treaty; Red Army from Europe (600,000); Port returned to Finland

Acceptance of spheres of influence: a new stability in the bipolar world, apparently removing reasons for conflict: Korean armistice; secret speech appeared to be a fresh start and hope

USSR recognition of W Germany and removal of troops from Austria allowing her to be neutral appeared to bring stability to central Europe and as well as Asia; US did not intervene in Hungary 1956 i.e accept E Europe in USSR sphere of influence; SEATO/METO/NATO and Warsaw Pact seemed to define the spheres of influence

BUT

International crises: Hungary – Soviet repression for fear of Hungary leaving Warsaw Pact and opening a hole in their buffer state barrier; Germany remained unresolved cold war issue and potential flash point just as is had 1945-53 ultimatum 1958 to west to get out.. anniversary of Berlin blockade and exactly the same policy – leading to Wall by 1961 – Tension enormous – Kennedy flew there “Ich bin ein Berliner” symbolised the importance to US of a “free” Berlin but thus also raised the tension. Kennedy always thought there was a real danger of a USSR invasion of Berlin triggering a European war; Middle East – Eisenhower anxious about the tension arising from creation of Israel, the Suez crisis announced extension of containment to Middle East – Eisenhower Doctrine, backed up by military alliance – Baghdad Pact (Or CENTO or METO) to lie alongside NATO and SEATO seemed merely a continuation of previous policies containment ;Czech in USSR sphere of influence supplying Egypt with weapons v. Israel (whom US supporting) seemed both sides falling into same ways as their predecessors.
i.e. no change, no turning point, no thaw

Arms race & technology – i.e. no change, no turning point, no thaw ;1953 – both sides had H bomb & Eisenhower clear that he wanted “more bang for the buck” was on a mission to increase spending on technologically advanced weapons, After Sputnik, US fear that 1st strike lost and bomber strategy clearly useless so refocused on rockets ICBMS; USA; Korean War had also increased US commitments around the globe – NATO/ SEATO and bases world

wide also increasing military budgets – army divisions in Germany (figures needed); US had rejected USSR's Rapacki plan to have a nuclear free Europe and talks about a neutral Germany immediately ground to a halt – USA needed W Germany in her orbit, for NATO to work as a deterrent US had to be able to threaten to use the nuclear bomb. – US supported W Germany joining NATO (seemed a threat to USSR); Despite open skies suggestion by USA – refused by K and ultimately led to fury about U2 spy plane in 1960 ; U2 shot down 1960 over USSR: K stormed out of Paris summit very melodramatic but not turning back, neither side trusted the other – nothing had changed fundamentally since secret of A bomb not shared at Potsdam; Set up NASA (phutnik), grants for science education, Civil Defence Admin organised for nuclear attack; USSR continued developing her technology as well; Sputnik – another shock but this time to the US – anxiety that USSR further ahead technologically than US or her public had thought, admiration yet anxiety that this might be used for spying or even delivering nuclear bombs i.e first strike capability had potentially been lost; USSR also balanced NATO's alliance with the creation of the Warsaw Pact, which she protected with the harsh repression of the Hungarian uprising; While E might have known that USSR did not have as many weapons as she claimed thanks to U2 he was not going to tell the public that otherwise his tax revenues would have plummeted, but neither did K feel comfortable about U2s having such good intelligence about their capabilities – hence his fury and anxiety

Policies, paranoia – domestic attitudes same Little had changed, both sides suspicious; USA Duck and Cover – Federal Office of Civil Defence – public shelters; USSR similar fears of a first strike; Sputnik, admiration and fear mingled; Rhetoric similar on both sides as predecessors – massive retaliation, brinkmanship, roll back.. v we will bury you.. missiles being churned out like sausages; Policy containment and protection, spheres of influence, similar Berlin Wall, Korea ceasefire, Warsaw Pact, SEATO etc

The arms impact of the arms race

Growing tensions due to arms race

- Growth of international tensions – keeping ahead in the technology race helped safeguard the interests of the nation
- National pride – way of measuring the achievements of East or West
- Political insecurities of leaders – e.g. Eisenhower & Kennedy increased defence spending in reaction to public demands
- Insurance policy– use of nuclear weapons was so unimaginable war could be avoided
- Military-industrial complex – arms race provided jobs
- New technology – hydrogen, lithium, ICBM etc.

- The Americans secretly develop atomic bomb technology in New Mexico as part of the Manhattan Project, culminating in the dropping of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945.
- The UN tries to control the development of atomic weaponry through the Baruch Plan in 1946. Ultimately the plan fails due to distrust between the different sides.
- The Russians successfully test their own nuclear weapon on 29 August 1949
- 1 November 1952, the US successfully detonate the first hydrogen bomb
- 1953 the USSR develops its first lithium bomb – a more easily deployable bomb than the US hydrogen bomb
- 1954, the US detonates its first lithium bomb
- By 1955, the US had developed the first intercontinental bomber, the B52 Stratofortress
- The USSR develops its first intercontinental bomber, the TU20 Bear in 1956
- Intercontinental bombers were vulnerable and so ICBMs were developed, the first being the Soviet, 'SS-6 Sapwood' in Kazhakhstan in 1957
- 5 October 1957 the Soviets launched the first ever man-made satellite, 'Sputnik'
- Sputnik II in November 1957 carried the first live passenger, the dog Laika
- In 1961, the USSR launches the first man into space Yuri Gagarin
- The US develops U2 spy plane technology in the early 1960s
- July 1960 US develops first submarine-launched ballistic missile, Polaris
- By 1962, the US has 4,000 nuclear warheads compared to the USSR's 220

Reducing tensions

- Learnt lessons – hot line, Partial Test Ban Treaty – real fear of how close they came – new rules
- Gain concessions e.g. Treaties in detente or deals e.g. after Cuba take missiles out & US from Turkey.
- Both sides knew to their advantage to talk but both desired to be taken seriously so had to gain parity or even 1st strike so believed at negotiating table – though non intended using it. Mao of China similarly desperate to get nuclear bomb (1964) but also called it a paper tiger, knew it couldn't be used but couldn't sit at world table unless had it to force others to listen. Threat more than reality
- 1968 Non Proliferation Treaty so nuclear weapons not expand to other nations. SALT 1, 2 START, Helsinki Accords – both sides seriously talk & agree for own national security boundaries
- 1950s “peaceful coexistence” – both K and E knew of horror of war – made efforts to contain the threat – summits, start of reduction of tension Austrian State Treaty, exchange of experts, other summits and visits e.g. K to Camp David etc..
- Efforts to contain nuclear weapons in Europe e.g. Rapacki Plan 1954, European Security Area (failed) Plans to make Germany nuclear free area
- Suggested open skies policy, peaceful coexistence
- Both sides careful to limit any conflict that did happen e.g. Korea – USSR reluctant to become involved only sending MiG fighters to China and USA withdrew when war seemed likely to escalate & no nuclear weapons were deployed even though McArthur desired them
- Vietnam similarly – conventional war –and in Berlin crisis 1961 no mention of nuclear weapons
- Used to threaten, but the risk always present. They might be used.
The real question is – would any leader really have pressed the button? Presumably only if they could guarantee they had absolute first strike capability with no fear of MAD – but this unlikely, therefore in reality it is unlikely a nuclear war will ever take place unless by a rogue state with nothing to lose

Cuba – turning point or not?

Not a turning point

Continuity of policy and action before and after 1962

e.g.

- Détente – in fact despite the talking the countries still armed and still engaged in confrontation e.g. Germany, and 3rd World beginning, the ideological battle continued – Germany remained flashpoint
- US continued rearming, Kennedy ordered 41 new nuclear subs and new ICBMs
- 1980s US put Pershing 2 missiles in Europe within range of Moscow – causing increasing tension. NATO had 108 MRBMs within range of Moscow.. had lessons been learnt?
- 1983 USSR believed USA & NATO about to attack.. in fact an exercise but USSR believed it until last minute
- More stable relations with each other but still a 2nd cold war began in 1970s – lessons not learnt as a new arms race began as USA began to believe a new missile gap opening up and uncomfortable at expansion of communism in 3rd world.

Turning point because

Differences in policy and action after 1962

e.g.

- Nuclear war can be managed – there can be brinkmanship but it can lead to bargaining with nuclear weapons
- Wise and careful leaders can defend and deter, they can manipulate crisis to their advantage JFK wonderful wise leader (Schlesinger)
- Revisionists condemn JFK as reckless as bluff could have been called and chain reaction leading to nuclear holocaust unleashed

- Soviets learnt that – USA might act like this again so prepare for it, reinforced their rearmament programme and conventional forces and fleet as well as their spheres of influence esp in 3rd world & remove leader who put them in such a dangerous position
- Détente – countries inspired to talk to each other.. to limit arms SALT, to halt testing Partial Test ban treaty and to talk – hotline – Give details
- Some wanted to get rid of nuclear weapons completely even Robert Kennedy and even Nixon later
- Fear: Nuclear wars must never be fought again – we must never pass this way again – Bundy etc. and they did not. USA did not continue to dispute Cuba – it remains communist today & Castro intervened in communists movements in 3rd world, Africa, s America, USSR withdrew its missiles from Cuba. Cuba remains peaceful & any conflict is dealt with via diplomacy e.g. 1970s dispute over nuclear subs there could have resulted in conflict instead dealt with via diplomats
- Marked an end of a dangerous phase in cold war – in fact a dangerous phase in Khrushchev's policy – increasingly irascible and unpredictable, even USSR Politburo concerned – Berlin and Cuba seen by some as putting USSR in unnecessarily dangerous confrontation with USA

Consequences of Cuba

- Gave Kennedy a foreign-policy success – removal of Soviet weapons from USA's 'backyard'
- Kennedy assured USSR he wouldn't remove Castro from Cuba
- Removal of US weapons from Turkey
- Use of 'flexible approach' – brinkmanship & diplomacy
- 'Hot line' telephone link
- Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963)
- Threat of nuclear retaliation led to 'tacit cooperation among bitter antagonists' (Gaddis)
- Alternative military strategies developed, 'limited war', e.g. Korea & Vietnam
- Brinkmanship & threat of massive retaliation
- MAD
- Continuing need for conventional weapons & military superiority
- Technological advances, e.g. computer technologies
- Economic costs – civilian sector held back

Sino-Soviet relations

Sino-Soviet Treaty (1950)

- Formal alliance
- Economic aid - \$300m; technical assistance
- Soviet military assistance
- Soviet promise to restore Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria

Fragile Alliance

- Mao treated as an instrument of Soviet power
- Sino-Soviet Treaty (1950) heavily favourable to USSR
- 1920s-1949, USSR supported Chinese nationalists and defended its own interests in Manchuria
- Mao needed Soviet support against USA & in constructing communist society in China
- Terms of Sino-Soviet treaty (1950), e.g. Mongolia part of USSR sphere of influence, no support over Taiwan, no revolutionary strategy for East Asia

Why was there a split in Sino-Soviet relations?

Ideological clashes	<p>Stalin felt that Mao's interpretation of Marxism using peasants as basis for revolution & small scale industry not genuinely revolutionary as Marx focussed on proletariat & urban class war. "from infancy of CCP Mao's contact with Moscow was neither pleasant nor gratifying" Hsu</p> <p>Both men competed for the "true" interpretation of Marxism and & fell out over destalinisation & peaceful coexistence (implying that global revolution could happen without armed struggle – heresy as far as Mao concerned esp when Austrian State Treaty and Geneva Summit had K visit and compromise with capitalists), secret speech (critical of Stalin) Hungary (failure to curb reactionaries), as a result denounced K as a "revisionist" with wealthy elites in USSR; Cuba (giving into capitalism), Albania (abandoning a revolutionary ally) - launched cultural revolution to cleanse China of revisionists possibly influenced by USSR</p> <p>Ideological struggle also meant competed for spheres of influence in developing world eg Int conf 1957 – Mao condemned K as revisionist and revolution would not happen if worked alongside capitalists – well argued at Conf and showed strong leadership of communism for emerging nations. Chinese attacks on ideology of USSR continued in 1958 visit & accused USSR of sending spies</p> <p>K accused Mao of Trotskyist deviation when threatening Quemoy 58, pursuing revolution whatever the cost – fanaticism</p> <p>Great Leap Forward – accused Mao of "unorthodox" & erroneous approach – undermined Mao in communist world</p> <p>Cuba – Mao presented as poorly handled by K and evidence of lack of revolutionary zeal – openly placing missiles foolish, & gave in</p>
Territorial disputes (sphere of influence) National security	<p>Mao annoyed at USSR lack of support for fellow comm. nation: civil war – during this Mao had helped GMD rather than CCP as wanted strong Chinese gov v Japan and Stalin not convinced Mao win & though USSR would get more border recognition from GMD than CCP – Mao resented this for evermore. <u>Treaty of Alliance 1950</u> "Moscow making puppets out of China" US description – mutual – in fact USSR charged loans from China for the aid, but during talks Chinese felt snubbed but aid did come & military & technological aid even if had to pay for it. <u>Korean War</u> – USSR encouraged China to take part & provided aid but then asked for repayment for the aid \$1.35 million (Hsu) <u>Taiwan, Quemoy 54 & 58</u>, USSR did not support Mao's actions, <u>Sino Indian War 1962</u> USSR supplied Mao's enemy with MIGs & allowed U2 to overfly China to find A bomb so no support! <u>A bomb programme</u> help agreed 1955 after Quemoy but withdrawn 1959 after Quemoy bombed. & furious 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty felt betrayed by USSR. USSR would not allow China to develop independent weapon, Mao furious. Did it anyway by 1964 (even called 1st bomb 59/6 after year and month USSR aid withdrawn)</p> <p>Territorial disputes: Mongolia – USSR refused to leave area & clashes along mutual border 15 divisions there 1967, 30 by 1970. Damansky Is disputed border region – Mao claimed USSR Tsarist and going back on word to restore territory</p> <p>Self interest presented as ideological: Peaceful coexistence – a form of detente designed to isolate China from west?</p> <p>Albania – Mao used this as a way to attack USSR when USSR criticised Albania for Stalinist methods, China came to support it – seems ideological but actually for self interest and aggrandisement led to ending of diplomatic relations USSR and China 1961</p> <p>potential ally India and USSR had aided the enemy in the war.</p> <p>Brezhnev Doctrine 1968 – USSR could invade client states appearing to undermine socialism – China condemned as really feared it could be used against her so appears ideological in fact self interest.</p> <p>FINAL STRAW 1969 Damansky is. Clash – appears ideological as China accused USSR of imperialism as had not returned territory from Tsarist times – escalated aligned missiles and tanks. Fear of nuclear war – nadir in relations.</p> <p>Vietnam: China gave moral and diplomatic support to North but little else. But struggle between USSR and China to win Vietcong to their side in ideological split – appears ideological but self interest. USSR sent most aid to N and signed friendship treaty. So China turned to Cambodia. 1978 Vietnam invaded Cambodia therefore now Viet + USSR v Cambo + China thus 1979 China invaded Viet from north. War ended same year but very nasty.</p>
Strategic strength money, economy A	<p>Treaty of Mutual Alliance 1950 – later on Mao angry that had to repay with interest – i.e imbalance in relationship from start – accepted by Mao as needed aid and assumed fellow communists be treated well. Soon clear not an equal partnership & USSR in position of strength at start so Mao had to accept – later on he breaks away from what Mao sees as an unfair partnership</p>

bomb, relative strength and power compared US China)	<p>Korea – limited help from USSR & bill sent for aid after (MiGs)</p> <p>A bomb promised to China but withdrawn 1958 and advisers then purged by Mao in 1966 cultural revolution</p> <p>Economic inequality – Mao desperate to catch up</p> <p>A bomb – agreed to share technology but firstly Partial Test Ban treaty 1963 agreed USSR and USA would mean China could not have A bomb so refused to sign, annoying USSR, USSR decided 1958 not to share A bomb -& USSR experts withdrawn after cultural rev and</p>
Leaders/personalities clash	<p>Stalin feared Mao as a leader of revolutionary world; Mao meanwhile convinced that Stalin wanted a divided and weak China so USSR would be dominant in Asia therefore resented Stalin. Mao suspicious that Stalin deliberately delayed ending Korean war to exhaust China – thus 1953 death brought brief honeymoon period with better terms in treaties/loans etc. But Mao's suspicions of Khrushchev grew & now Mao stronger position domestically so could make a clearer stand away from K. Mao furious at secret speech 1956, took as personal insult from K on his style of leadership given his criticism of Stalin's cult of personality.</p> <p>Mao treated K "as a superficial upstart, neglecting no opportunity to confound him with petty humiliations.. K could never be sure what Mao meant" Gaddis e.g. the visit to Beijing, Mao received him in swimming pool (tight shorts rubber ring) & no air con. 1958</p> <p>1961 after Albanian dispute K called Mao "Asian Hitler" and a "living corpse", even racist talking of inborn deviousness and selfishness while Mao called K a "redundant old boot" & after Cuba "a coward"</p>
Relations with US	<p>Three way relations – as relations with US and China improved so need for USSR to be friendlier with USA grew as feared they would be left out in cold. But as each became friendlier with US, relations between USSR and China worsened.</p> <p>Taiwan – unresolved situation & enemy; Mao tested US resolve deterred in 1954 & tried again in 58 without giving Soviets advance warning. Troop manoeuvres near Quemoy, US also prepared for war – K furious and said would not help but also accused Mao of being Trotskyist, pursuing revolution whatever the cost. – consequences grave as K removed all Soviet advisers & cancelled contracts to build nuclear technology given in 55 after last Taiwan threat.</p> <p>Brezhnev & Mao died. Deng Xiaoping adopted more tolerant line. – Rapprochement with USSR and west.</p> <p>1972 Nixon visit China – USSR furious</p>
Domestic issues	<p>Domestic problems Great Leap forward 1958 disastrous, 14-30 mill dead, backyard furnaces created, new agric techniques = famine, Mao purged "rightists" who criticised it but then stepped down 59 realising he would be held responsible. Soviets criticised it as faulty in design and erroneous in practice" Mao furious as undermined in communist international community. Soviet criticism continued during Cultural Revolution (Brezhnev) which sought to eliminate "revisionists" ie USSR & China descended into chaos so criticised China for her illegal opium trade, illegal support for apartheid regime etc. Ideological criticism served self interest</p>

Why did Sino-US relations improve?

US Motives: "improved Sino-American relations became a key to the Nixon administration's Soviet strategy" Kissinger

- Vietnam: linkage pressure on Ho. & Public support /pressure in US for more constructive efforts to end war
- US wanted to reduce commitments in Asia (1972 Communique)& but still have bases therefore needed to ensure stability in region
- Pressure on USSR to discuss arms limits "scope for Soviet intransigence narrow even evaporate" Kissinger, fearful of a US-China alliance against them
- Nixon personally wanted to make history Kissinger "restore fluidity"
- China now had ICBMs dangerous to leave her isolated
- Economic savings
- Sino-Soviet split showed US global communism, not monolithic "deal with countries on basis of their actions not ideological formulas" Nixon
- UN membership changing, ex colonies & votes might change, US wd not be able to control vote much longer

China's motives:

- Geopolitical – threats to Chinese security – tension on all sides (Vietnam, Taiwan, S Korea, Japan, India & clashes on border with USSR)

- Sino-Soviet split so did not want 2 enemies, reduce tension with US therefore essential – real fear of Soviet attack; knew US would not want this as feared USSR expansion
- US seemed a declining power (Vietnam) = do deals
- Rapprochement would mean China could gain much e.g. UN, Taiwan, US out of Vietnam, even region
- China worried about Japan wanted its power limited
- Personal: Mao just stepped back into power so it was to relaunch himself
- Ideological: critical of reactionary Soviet revisionism seemed greater threat than US; desire to lead comm...
- 3rd world countries would see China as less fanatical if she talked to west & so China wd be respected more
- China argued detente temporary legitimate to play enemies off against each other so that in long run defeat them (Mao)
- *“Sino –American rapprochement enormously enhanced Washington’s strategic position in its global competition with the USSR” Jian*

How far did Sino-Soviet relations influence US policy?

1. Both China and USSR fearful of having 2 enemies, therefore they both attempted to improve relations with US, which meant that the US could gain concessions from them
2. US needed to solve Vietnam so they could use the SS Split to their advantage to solve US needs (think what other needs US had at the time)

Détente

Causes of Détente

Fear of War

- Cuban Missile Crisis had drawn attention to the threat of nuclear conflict
- More sophisticated weapons & delivery systems adding to tensions
- By 1969 USSR and USA evenly matched – each could destroy the other country using nuclear weapons

Needs of USSR

- Brezhnev continued with policy of Peaceful Coexistence started by Khrushchev, compromising ideological beliefs for sake of national security
- USA perceived to be weaker during Vietnam War
- USSR was reaching parity with US in terms of numbers of weapons and could negotiate from a position of strength
- USSR fearful of USA starting a new technology race
- Need to stabilise the situation Eastern Bloc & gain acceptance it was part of Soviet sphere of influence
- Sino-Soviet split
- Improve domestic economy & standards of living
- Access to new technologies, e.g. micro computers

Needs of USA

- Failures in Vietnam War led to re-evaluation of foreign policy
- Domestic costs – high inflation & budget deficit
- Western criticism of US foreign policy, e.g. 1966 DeGaulle withdrew France from NATO
- Right-wing Republican politics on the decline, dented by failures in Vietnam allowing Détente to prevail
- Growing social unrest, e.g. 1968 riots, drew attention to need to divert funds from military to social reforms
- European powers catching up on US in commerce & financial services

European needs

- Political instability, e.g. Prague Spring, student riots in Paris (1968)
- Billy Brandt, West German Chancellor forged new links with East, known as ‘Ostpolitik’, e.g. between East & West Germany

- Growing perception that there was more to be gained economically & politically from negotiation rather than conflict

Successes of Détente

- SALT I: Nixon's visit to China (1972) helped to accelerate the talks
- Agreement reached on anti-ballistic missile systems – 2 systems each, 1 for their capital cities and 1 for their main nuclear site
- Limits placed on no. of ICBMs & SLBMs (Submarine-launched ballistic missiles) of 1054 and 740 respectively
- offensive nuclear weapons
- Code of conduct :USA pledged to 'do their utmost to avoid military confrontations' & 'to exercise restraint'
- Trade was to be encouraged
- Consideration given to US lead in the arms race, i.e. Soviets could have more weapons as their delivery systems and spying equipment was inferior to US
- SALT II :set equal limits for missile launchers & strategic bombers
- Dialogue channels remained open between incoming President Carter and increasingly weak Soviet premier Brezhnev
- HELSINKI ACCORDS: attended by 33 states from NATO and Warsaw Pact; agreement reached over European borders of Warsaw Pact in return for 3 baskets: Basket one: acceptance of European borders (including East Germany); Basket two: trade & technology exchanges (similar to Geneva Summit, 1955); Basket three: respect for human rights, e.g. freedom of speech & movement; organisations set up to monitor governments & actions

Failures of Detente

- SALT I: talks were delayed by Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia
- Difficulty in agreeing over which weapons systems should be included as both sides had different types of weapons; tendency to focus on setting limits for existing systems, ignoring the possibility of newer more powerful technologies, e.g. didn't include MIRVs (multiple independent re-entry vehicles); old obsolete missiles could be replaced with new ones; code of Conduct was very open-ended and little more than a statement of intent
- SALT II: Left out cruise missiles – where the USA had a significant lead
- Right saw SALT II as too much of a concession to USSR and allowed them to catch up with the US, obliging Jimmy Carter to renegotiate the treaty when he took over from Ford as President in 1977; Treaty was highly technical & detailed & 'not understood by the average senator'; SALT II rejected by Congress in 1980 and treaty was never ratified
- HELSINKI: Little substantive detail; no references to arms reductions

Why did Détente fail?

1. Trigger for failure of detente and 2nd Cold War beginning = 1979 invasion of Afghanistan

– last straw – distrust of USSR: Widespread condemnation by west – expansionism
After invasion

Carter's language much harsher

Withdrew from SALT 2, cut off trade, boycotted Olympics in Moscow 1980

Increased arms spending and nuclear weapons, limitation over

Thatcher supported this more strident approach

1980 Presidential election centred on foreign policy – Afghanistan etc. Reagan hostile to USSR his election symbolized disillusionment with détente. Reagan increased defence spending by 13% in 1982 and by 8% in each of the next 2 yrs.

But Détente already in difficulties before this, during Carter's administration 1976 on problems appeared

2. Successes of detente mixed – Little achieved in real terms

did not always achieve the reduction in tension desired & sometimes agreements even ignored

Human rights still an area of dispute, USSR continued to violate Helsinki

Carter tried linkage here, linking economic aid, trade to human rights e.g. to allow Jews to emigrate to Israel. Deeply resented by USSR and many in US saw USSR as still trying to evade these rules therefore why still negotiate with them

e.g. other limited successes....

3. Impact on arms race minimal

Some in US objected already saying the arms talks benefitted the Soviets – USSR catching up

Even becoming superior in ICBMs

- SALT 2 agreed 1979 but Senate refused to accept it

4. tension not reduced in some parts of world

Actions in 3rd world seemed to indicate USSR expanding influence upsetting many in west – increasing distrust of USSR

- US adviser Brzezinski – hardline anti Soviet (Polish) “detente was buried in the sands of Ogaden” Somalia
- 3rd World Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia, Soviet activity in supporting civil wars here fed neo-conservative demands for tough action, Carter sent weapons e.g. to El Salvador and Nicaragua v. communists – Detente died in the deserts of the horn of Africa
- In Yom Kippur war when Egypt invaded Israel, USA suspected that USSR had supported Egypt and known in advance despite an agreement they had signed to inform each other of any conflict which might threaten world peace

5. Domestic mood in US – election of Reagan and rise of Republican right – ideological continuity

Conflicting advice to Carter – Weinberger v. Brzezinski

US recovered from humiliation of Vietnam (now a couple of years away from events, less raw) & want to restore prestige in world. Detente seen as weak and giving up on principles and ideology so long fought for

Iranian hostage = humiliating for that prestige and must restore it. Carter had initially refused to negotiate to get US families out, finally released 1981, US seemed weak therefore more demands from US right to act tough.

A Return to containment and past “glories” and firm posturing, defense of ideals of democracy and freedom, hence rhetoric of Reagan and determinist approach – US preordained to fight communism good v evil

Reagan Doctrine – money to those around the world fighting communism, defence spending up – return to old policies

“human rights as soul of foreign policy” seen as “soft on communism” much as Truman had been accused of and Carter the butt of jokes.

This mirrored by view that detente and Carter had actually allowed the Soviets to make gains both territorially and strategically (arms) and that this might ultimately harm US national security – similarly critical of Ostpolitik for reaching an accommodation with Eastern block rather than maintain rigidly to policy aiming to reunify Germany and fight communism.

6. USSR also some elements opposed détente

Unease over Helsinki Accord criticism from west

Soviet military wanted to increase weapons to support policy in 3rd world

- Brezhnev very ill, Soviet decision making slow, negotiations slow, therefore easier to be hard line in talks
- USSR always has divisions between reformers and hard liners – gerontocracy ruled so hard line approach, maintaining attitudes from 2nd WW, meant little change and an acceptance of the older ways of doing things. Khrushchev had lost his position because of his attempts to formulate a new type of policy but one which had become increasingly unpredictable and caused danger to the USSR. Fearful therefore of “new policies”

By end of 1970s “the complexities and contradictions of détente had become explosive”
Fitzgerald The Cold War and beyond.

détente failed because there was ultimately no “paradigm” shift in the way the two sides viewed each other i.e. ideologically and in terms of national security

End of Cold War

Reagan responsible for ending Cold War

1. Increasing nuclear arms : to regain military supremacy; to push USSR to economic brink as she probably wouldn't be able to match US thereby get concessions from USSR from a position of strength; military spending up (Congress agreed i.e public support, post Vietnam and after humiliation of US = Iran, & USSR aggression: Afghanistan, SS20s put in E Europe) 1982 defence spending increased by 13%, and over =8% in the following 2 yrs: unprecedented; New delivery systems: Stealth bombers, Trident submarines, SDI (star wars)

2. Reagan Doctrine: halt growth of Soviet influence in 3rd World; weaken the USSR “at the edges” (see map of world according to Reagan's republicans); put Soviet economy under strain by forcing them to give more support to 3rd world; prove to USSR once again that USA would take forceful action v. communist expansion; send aid to anti-communist insurgents & governments

- Nicaragua: arms to the Contras in Nicaragua, v. Sandanistas (the Communist Gov)
- El Salvador: US supported an unpopular gov facing a popular revolt by left
- Grenada 1983: US deposed the left wing gov
- Afghanistan: stinger anti aircraft missiles to mujahedeen
- Europe: Voice of America broadcasts to encourage E bloc to revolt
- Poland: US loans and bank credits cut and tariffs on polish goods when Solidarity banned

Advantage to US: led to few instances of US troops being involved unlike Vietnam, instead massive use of CIA operations; dDisadvantages to US: actions not always popular in wider world – US interfering in internal politics and a threat to the liberty of the people of those nations – critics in west and also in developing nations often with left wing govts. United in this view; supporting regimes which were anti-communist eg. Marcos in the Philippines criticized as had poor human rights record

3. Summits: Second Term in office from 1984 Reagan CHANGED approach and was supportive of the new USSR leader Gorbachev, less confrontational. Both men agreed on their desire to reduce or even eliminate nuclear weapons. Supporting Gorbachev build a reputation as a world statesman making it easier for him to impose change at home. 1988 Reagan went to Moscow, asked about the “evil empire” he replied “that was a different time, a different era”; Thatcher met Gorbachev and reported back that “he was a man she could do business with”; 1985 Geneva Summit: Reagan agreed to meet him– a strong personal friendship resulted; 1986 Reykjavik Summit followed – Gorbachev produced suggestions for a)reduction of Intermediate Nuclear Forces drastically in Europe : eliminated Intermediate range ballistic missiles in Europe and also limit total number in world;b) get rid of nuclear weapons in 10 yrs if SDI cancelled. – Reagan would not agree to the later; 1987 Washington Summit: agreed to the INF Treaty as suggested at Reykjavik; 1988: Geneva Accords agreed to withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; 2 more summits held before Reagan left office in 1989

4.Strong relationship and respect for Gorbachev , popular with media and therefore Presidents; Image – good relations continued under Bush Sr next President.

How important was Reagan?

- US certainly seen as tough but morally questionable
- Reagan more effective because had a right wing GB PM – Thatcher to support him – similar view of “evil empire” - “the iron lady” see ppt of pics on special relations
- Thatcher agreed to have nuclear bases in UK – vital in increasing pressure & threat to USSR

- Unintentionally, it was Gorbachev's changes which helped USSR collapse. Ironically in trying to save the USSR Gorbachev destroyed it & Reagan's support for him on the world stage was vital
- Economically – put pressure on, little evidence that USSR had the ability to react but did put pressure on Gorby to find new policies to deal with pressure i.e. perestroika and glasnost.

“Triumphalist” US historians or “Reagan Victory school” claim Cold War ended because of the pressure, especially economic pressure Reagan put on USSR and his “evil empire” rhetoric gave them no where to hide anymore from the fact that they could not compete with the economic might of USA. Republican right thrilled that detente ended, USSR could no longer “catch up” and a tough stance was again taken against an expansionist and ideological threat.

However other factors to remember a) Reagan changed his approach in 2nd term b) Gorbachev had to be in place & his new ideas had to attain some support at home before change could really happen c) Politburo discussions seem to show that ec pressure was not so great as they did not entirely believe in SDI as a possibility d) as a command economy they could still have put more resources towards arms, the Russian people were used to deprivation e) voices in E Europe calling for change already (Poland) so it not Reagan alone.

Gorbachev responsible for end of Cold War

Gorbachev – new leader of USSR facilitated change 1985 – New Political Thinking

Committed communist so had support from Party.

New Politburo members with similar mind sets – Shevardnadze as Foreign Minister

Confrontation with west now seen as unproductive as a) arms race b) increased insecurity

Gorbachev had to solve serious problems

- Enormous military spending – need arms limitation talks with USA in order not to leave USSR undefended; Afghanistan shown huge cost, 15000 Red Army killed, \$8 billion per annum, and no decisive result supporting 3rd world – Cuba, Vietnam even Africa approx \$40 billion
- Economic & political stagnation in USSR's system

New policies

1. **Glasnost** – openness, new ideas esp after catastrophe of Chernobyl nuclear power station which seemed to prove in his first year all the failings of the Soviet system a) technology unreliable & not maintained b) secretive system – information on disaster not even given clearly to Gorbachev until after neighbouring countries contacted USSR c) reluctance from those in positions of power to change anything – vested interests would lose their privileges and fear of punishment given previous history of USSR = Gorbachev had to introduce more openness in Soviet society in order to allow economic reform to happen, otherwise kept getting blocked by those in power. His first attempts at perestroika were blocked, hence he introduced glasnost and limited democratisation

2. **Democratisation** – only way to get perestroika to work was to change Party officials blocking it so stimulate political change to get economic change.

- Jan 1987 Central Committee mtg G announced members of local Soviets would now be elected by people not Party and there would be a choice of candidates
- Direct elections also for several important Soviet posts G trying to bring in reformers
- 1988 – changes to Gov of Soviet Union –
- Supreme Soviet wd now consist of 400 members chosen from Congress of People's Deputies.
- Congress would have 2/3 of its members elected by universal suffrage & 1/3 from “people's” organisations including the Communist Party
- Supreme Soviet would now meet as a Parliament
- 1988 Elections held for Congress – they were “semi free” as non Party candidates allowed
- 88% of successful candidates from Communist Party but prominent dissidents e.g. Sakharov were elected
- Beginning of loss of grip on power by Communist Party – seen by satellite states in Europe

Supreme Soviet (Parliament) televised sessions, exciting viewing when reformers clashed with conservatives

even leading to elections in March 1989

More criticism of communism – encouraged push for more reform.. influenced E Europe

3. Perestroika – restructure economy – liberalise so some private enterprise

- Law on State Enterprises (88) meant 60% of state enterprises moved away from state control & remaining 40% followed in 1989 – factories and businesses could now trade with each other and set own prices. A quota of goods produced still went to state but it was possible to sell the remainder at a profit. Small private businesses and worker's cooperatives were set up
- Problem – still how to set prices and measure demand – led to shortages and severe ec problems as ec dislocation during reform process – led to unrest. Cultural shift too, more aware of western goods & fashion, demands for jeans and gum. July 89 miners in Kuzbass region on strike when got no soap – strike spread to 500,000 miners, adn 160,00 from other industries. Better working conditions wanted AND a trade union and greater political freedom (similar to Solidarity in Poland in early 1980s)
- Ec reform failed: Afghanistan etc still costly & even fewer goods in shops by 1990 than in 1985
- Incomes rose but output fell and shortages worse – basics e.g soap, salt, matches gone
- Quality fell, queues even longer, black market flourished,
- By 1990 25% of pop living below poverty line
- No smooth transition to democracy so the political instability led to economic slow down (prod fell by 4% in 1990 and by 15% in 1991)

4. Ended the Brezhnev Doctrine 1985 Gorbachev made it clear he would not support socialist governments in E Europe if there was unrest against them. He encouraged the “**Sinatra Doctrine**” do it my (or your own) way

1989 – Gorbachev visits E Germany – after the various unrest in Poland etc clear that USSR was no longer intervening according to the Brezhnev Doctrine (brought in to crush “Prague Spring” in Czech 1968)

USSR less eager to interfere in E Europe because

- a) Afghanistan indecisive & costly – disillusionment in USSR about such activities
- b) Cost – Polish uprising in 1981 Andropov had thought very costly to invade
- c) Gorbachev genuinely thought some liberalization necessary and he was doing so at home in the spirit of glasnost and democratisation.
- d) Gorbachev even considered armed intervention morally wrong
- e) with Cold war tension ending, no need for cold war reasons to maintain such control over E Europe

Instead Gorbachev focused on universal human rights to promote interests of people around world

5. Withdrew from Afghanistan – saved money, and proved to US that no longer expansionist

6. Proposed discussions to US on reduction of nuclear weapons, even with a view to their elimination which led to a series of summit meetings with Reagan who willingly supported Gorbachev enabling his reforms to take hold and for Gorbachev personally to gain prestige

1. Geneva Summit 1985 Reagan and Gorbachev met.. friendly, but little of substance – laid foundations
 2. Reykjavik 1986: Gorbachev introduced idea of phasing out medium range nuclear weapons but wanted SDI stopped. Surprised Americans but no agreement reached.
 3. Washington Summit 1987: **Intermediate Forces Treaty** signed, leading to scrapping of medium range missiles – 1st agreement to reduce rather than control. Also spoke in New York at UN
 4. Moscow summit 1988: Signed even more details of INF treaty and also went on to meet in New York and agree more reductions.
 5. Malta Summit 1989: Gorbachev met new leader Bush Sr. again good relations but no agreements. Announced they had ended cold war.
- .
- 1990 huge economic problems in USSR, led to unrest. Hardliners thought USSR lost power and prestige. Critical situation but G refused to declare state of emergency in 1991
 - Coup – G on holiday in Crimea – hard line old guard took over in Moscow and put him & family under house arrest. Boris Yeltsin (President of Russian Soviet Republic) became

hero of hour, demanded return of G and arrest of old guard. Protests in Moscow but on massive scale. Army decided not to act, key

How important was Gorbachev?

Gorby returned and little seemed to change

- But he found Communist Party had lost its authority
- Yeltsin hero of the hour (who tore up his Party card & even banned Russian Communist Party after coup)
- 25 Aug 1991 Gorbachev resigned as Gen Sec of CPSU
- Dec 1991 USSR had ceased to exist Ukraine, Russia, Belarus formed the Commonwealth of Independent States
- Nationalism was unleashed by Gorbachev's reforms – no longer a black and white cold war of communism v capitalism
- **Historians** – Gorbachev as an individual credited with ending Cold War for bringing in new policies – being a of a new generation
- But his role inextricably linked with economic weakness of USSR under Brezhnev and command economy system And also the “bankruptcy of socialism” as an ideology as more and more esp in E Europe criticised the system
- So Gorbachev + economic system + end of ideological system + E Europe all combine but all ultimately need the new generation of Gorbachev to come about with the new ideas before change could really happen.

Failures of Communism responsible for end of Cold War

1. E. Europe: Economic problems

- Prosperity less than W Europe
- Inefficient state controlled industry – quality and quantity
- Heavy industry prioritized over consumer – restless people, clothing, housing in short supply
- Privileged groups in society – managers, party members etc – resentment
- Little innovation no incentives
- Oil prices increase in 1973 head meant difficult to get credit for foreign exchange and investment
- Technology increasingly out of date – slow to get computers, robots etc
- Growth rates declining, almost stagnant by 1980s – bureaucracy seemed a brake on development
- TV stations received in E Europe – showed the western prosperity, western music, cinema and fashion being taken note of in east – mass consumer society in sharp contrast to drab misery of east. Capitalism seemed attractive
- Prices rises eg. Poland 1976 60%, 1988 av rise 48%, debt to west \$25 mill 1980, loans made dependent on reform. All led to protests by workers

2. Harsh repressive rule led to increasing demands for political reform

a) **Leadership often hardliners, older generation**, many convinced communists. But they were an older generation, of 2ww mentality. Their reluctance to change annoyed younger generation in a different context

- Bulgaria: Zhivkov, who had heroically resisted Hitler & brought in communism. No longer appropriate Hungary: been in power since 1956
- Czech leader since 1968, Jakes (Stalinist) took over 1987 Husak
- E Germany : Honecker – increasingly out of touch, even Gorbachev noted that during his visit Oct 1989, crowd shouted Gorby i.e. preferred his way to Honecker's. Honecker's intransigence to change led to frequent public protests e.g. the Monday protests in Leipzig. He wanted to use force against them which led to pressure on him to resign and then the fiasco of the opening of the Berlin Wall Nov 9th 1989.
- Roumania Ceausescu, authoritarian, dictatorial & harsh rule, primitive economy

b) Secret police hated–

- E Germany, “Stasi” (secret police) v. efficient, files on all the people and informers. Honecker not liked, nor respected by people. His regime relatively secure as people merely accepted it but hated oppression of Stasi
- Romania – “Securitate” crushing opposition. Censorship, registration of all typewriters annually Ceausescu – paranoid, entrenched – one of most

repressive. Harsh policies, including demolition of villages etc. by 1985 he had alienated virtually all pop. And many were also going hungry.

d) Martial law (military rule) imposed by some in desperation to keep control:

Poland 1981 – discontent threatened to get out of hand – economic problems

Illegal Trade Union set up Solidarity by Lech Walesa (a devout Catholic) encouraged by visit of Pope John Paul II in June 1979

General Jaruzelski new leader declared martial law 1981 and used army to quell unrest – did so as feared USSR might invade otherwise

Solidarity abolished but continued underground (USA withdrew all bank loans, and credits in protest)

e) local campaigns for reform

- Poland – Solidarity – mainly arose for ec reasons onto which political added
- Czechoslovakia – protesting for free speech since 1968 Prague Spring. During 1970s many political campaign groups e.g. Charter 77, VONS & pop groups e.g. Plastic People of the Universe, John Lennon Peace Group, intellectuals like playwright Havel. Strong tradition of wanting pol freedom, inspired by Gorb and finally fall of Berlin Wall, led to Velvet Revolution, Husak resigned and Havel became new leader.
- E Germans many protest groups & could watch TV banned in other E European countries – esp during Gorby's time so aware of changes.
- Also environmental issues strong in E. Germany – pollution a serious issue – inefficient machinery – 4x as much sulphur dioxide as in W Germany & focus for protestors esp after Chernobyl in 1986 e.g. Gov irritate by posters put up by protestors "Ride a bike, don't drive a car" – Lutheran Church also joined protestors

3. Some E European Gov led political change, new leaders, new generation willing to encourage change, possibly inspired by Gorbachev

- **Hungary** – 1989 Hungary adopted a multi party system – non communist gov elected leader did not repair barbed wire between Hungary and Austria, allowed many in E Europe to cross into Western Europe, particularly E Berliners who took advantage of this in 1989. Gorbachev congratulated election winners!
- **Czech:** Velvet Revolution – gov simply resigned in face of enormous public protest after fall of wall.
- **Poland**
 - United front, workers, intelligentsia, students
 - Reform movement been around even if suppressed since late 1970s ie a decade
- **Czechoslovakia**
 - Workers took a long time to convince, well looked after by state, many critical of VONS & Charter 77.
 - Nov 1989 – late on workers joined demands for reform
- **E Germany**
 - Dissent stopped by Stasi
 - Hungary and Austria border opened, movement of refugees began chain reaction that led to protests in E Germany which gov could no longer control
 - Visit of Gorbi demonstrated to E German gov that it was alone i.e. external influence stronger here than in Poland or Czech.

Other individuals – Pope John Paul II

Polish himself gave him influence over predominantly catholic pop

1979 visit to Poland & speeches gave encouragement to those living under communism to stand up for human rights Yet role of church can be overstated, Catholics strong in Poland but elsewhere other religions and most opposition groups actually had no religious affiliation.

Historians & commentators: Jonathon Kwitny, (biographer of Pope) *Man of the Century: Life & Times of Pope John Paul II*

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