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Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the Decisions?

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The overwhelming consensus among analysts of United States foreign policy during the Eisenhower administration is that it was dominated by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Regardless of their often differing assessments of the policies, these writers agree that Dulles' forceful personality, lengthy preparation, and keen intellect enabled him to control and even manipulate the congenial but bland and passive President Eisenhower. This conventional wisdom has been based on the public record, the period's journalistic accounts, and the appraisals of individuals who were largely outside the inner circles of both the White House and the State Department. Recently much primary source material has become available that calls into question this traditional interpretation of the Eisenhower-Dulles relationship. The Whitman File in the Eisenhower Library contains thousands of pages of transcripts of the president's daily phone conversations, minutes of formal and informal meetings, memoranda and other written communications, and Eisenhower's private diary. By using this new material in combination with the extant but often overlooked sources—Eisenhower's wartime papers, interviews with White House and State Department insiders available in both the Dulles Oral History Project and Columbia Oral History Collection, and studies of Eisenhower's pre-presidential career—the current scholar can determine that the standard view of Dwight Eisenhower on the leading strings of John Foster Dulles is highly problematic.

Studies of American foreign policy during the Eisenhower administration have produced several continuing controversies. Probably the most heated debate revolves around the influence of Eisenhower's secretary of state, John Foster Dulles. As the title of Ole R. Holsti's article, "Will the Real Dulles Please Stand Up," succinctly reminds us, assessments of Dulles' character and performance differ radically.[1]

Many analysts have concentrated on Dulles' theological inclinations. They depict him as a relentless crusader, whose fervent belief in his own moral rectitude and "strong, self-reliant personality" gave him the necessary confidence "to shoulder alone the momentous responsibilities of his office and to face alone the dreadful uncertainties of foreign policy."[2] While most students of Dulles agree that his moral instincts drove him to initiate forceful policies, they vehemently disagree in their assessments of those policies. Sympathizers emphasize that his crusading spirit was harnessed to a realistic perception of the world. They argue that the firmness of his convictions combined with his knowledge of diplomatic subtleties enabled him courageously to defend the interests of the United States in the face of a dangerous communist threat.[3] Detractors criticize him as a virtual fanatic who exaggerated the threat of communism and led the United States to the brink of war.[4] In both of these theological interpretations, the strength of Dulles' personality is a constant.

A smaller school portrays Dulles in more secular terms. These writers present him as a man of great ambition, a man who above all wanted to be secretary of state. Rather than acting out of conviction, he acted out of expediency. He was an oppor-

tunist whose desire to be America's international leader caused him to echo the dominant cold war ethos. Accordingly, these authors argue that Dulles' hard-line anticommunism was more the result of the legacy of Dean Acheson's China policy and the rampages of Joseph McCarthy than it was of any fear of international atheism. His primary concern was with his career and Eisenhower's remaining in office, thereby permitting him to continue to live his lifelong dream of international leadership.[5]

Somewhat surprisingly, these divergent opinions as to Dulles' character have had little effect on assessments of another fundamental issue concerning Eisenhower's foreign policy—"Who made it?" Some authors paint a portrait of Dulles as dominating his relations with Eisenhower, while others describe him as almost obsequious. Yet virtually all agree that Eisenhower's diplomacy from 1953-1959 was in fact designed by Dulles.[6] This consensus is based to a large extent on the traditional image of Eisenhower. How could the conventional Dwight D. Eisenhower, a naive farm boy whose only experience in world affairs was thought to have been narrowly military, have been anything but a figurehead in his dealings with a man who had been Wall Street's highest-paid lawyer, and had been garnering diplomatic experience since the age of 19? The answer seemed so obvious it hardly required careful examination.

But if Dulles were indeed so influenced by domestic pressures as some have postulated, it is not possible that he was also influenced by his president? And was Eisenhower so naive and so easily dominated? Since the late 1960s, journalists such as Murray Kempton and Garry Wills have asserted that his personality was much more complex than generally assumed,[7] and recent scholarly treatments have supported their assertions.[8] Questions such as these require students of the Eisenhower-Dulles relationship to look carefully at both men's personalities, and to analyze closely their relationship on the basis of a systematic examination of the primary source record, rather than continuing to assume Dulles' dominance based on the imputed personal characteristics of the two men.

This study is the beginning of such an examination. Using illustrative evidence gathered from recently released archives and older sources that have been available but largely overlooked, it will set forth the case for the necessity of reexamining the conventional wisdom. I argue that the personalities of neither Eisenhower nor Dulles have been adequately understood, nor has the manner in which they viewed their respective roles within the constellation of the executive office.[9] Citing representative examples from archival material, I will show that Eisenhower and Dulles interacted on various levels, calling into question the traditional assumptions concerning the nature of their relationship.

This study is interesting because it raises both a general issue and a concrete case for historical analysis. In general terms, it sheds light on the complex relationship between a president and a chief adviser. There have been altogether too few assessments of these types of interactions. Too little is known about the precise nature of the flow of influence in such relationships. Under what circumstances is the president the primary influence? Under what circumstances is it the adviser? When there is genuine collaboration, how does it occur? There are many such questions to consider, and these one-to-one relations have become so common that it is time they be meticulously examined, and eventually some comparisons drawn.

Specifically, reexamination of the Eisenhower-Dulles relationship will add another dimension to the growing revisionist literature on the Eisenhower administration, and on the president himself. Perhaps in no aspect of the conventional litera-

ture on Eisenhower is the Barber image of a passive/negative president so prevalent as it is in the standard interpretation of his relationship with Dulles.[10] Traditional assumptions as to their respective personalities could not help but to have reinforced the model of a president who placed full control of foreign policy in the hands of his secretary of state.

A noteworthy illustration of this standard treatment is Lloyd S. Etheredge's new work, *A World of Men: The Private Sources of American Foreign Policy.*[11] Etheredge, in attempting to rate quantitatively the personalities of various statesmen as to their general dominance over subordinates, cites the Eisenhower-Dulles relationship as an example. Using a 10-point scale derived from purported policy differences, he determined that Dulles' rating was 9.33 dominant, second only to Lyndon Johnson. Eisenhower, at 2.33, fell very near the bottom of the list. Hence Etheredge could conlude: "The traditional historian's judgments that . . . Eisenhower often took a back seat [to Dulles] is supported by . . . ratings as being of lower dominance."[12] Etheredge's study thus quantifies the conventional wisdom. But as in all cases of quantification, the numbers are only as valid as the data they enumerate. And Etheredge uses secondary sources and published memoirs which are themselves based on inferences of the sort previously summarized, not close analysis of the actors' behavior to whom he assigns scores.

SOURCES ON EISENHOWER AND DULLES

A major reason why interpretations of the Eisenhower-Dulles relationship have remained so static over the years is the unchanging nature of their sources. Etheredge, writing in 1978, documents as his primary evidence Sherman Adams' *Firsthand Report* and Emmet Hughes' *The Ordeal of Power,* which appeared in 1961 and 1963, respectively.[13] These are both works by White House insiders, but neither of the authors was able to observe consistently Eisenhower's dealings with or attitudes toward Dulles. Adams was almost exclusively involved with domestic concerns, and Hughes' position was that of a part-time speechwriter. Furthermore, coming so close to the end of the Eisenhower administration, they suffer from a lack of historical detachment.

Others who have analyzed the Eisenhower-Dulles diplomatic record have relied heavily on two other kinds of sources. Journalists like Kempton and Wills used the public record to support inferentially their conclusions. The public record, of course, tells little about the decision-making process. Scholarly researchers have sought more primary material, and have therefore concentrated on the Dulles Papers and Oral History Project at Princeton. Unfortunately, Dulles' papers reveal very little of his relationship with Eisenhower, and few doubt that indiscriminate use of oral histories can lead to faulty generalizations. As I will explain, none of those who used the Dulles oral histories have subjected them to a close contextual analysis.

The acquisition by the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, of the massive Whitman file permits the current researcher to go beyond this "first-cut" evidence.[14] Named after the president's personal secretary Ann Whitman, the file is a bonanza, revealing more clearly what transpired behind the scenes of the Eisenhower presidency. Included are daily calendars and often detailed minutes of appointments and discussions, both formal and informal, and meetings, such as those of the cabinet, National Security Council, and legislative leaders. Perhaps even more enlightening are the numerous transcriptions of the many telephone conversations Eisenhower held each day,[15] the huge volume of memoranda which he sent and received, and the prolific correspondence which he conducted with individuals within and outside of

the administration. The communication between Eisenhower and Dulles, both written and verbal, is greater than that between the president and anyone else.

The Whitman File also contains an extensive array of the numerous drafts of Eisenhower's speeches. Prepared by official and unofficial speechwriters, normally with the significant input of department and agency chiefs, these drafts show that Eisenhower was intensely involved in and knowledgeable about virtually all aspects of the affairs of state, and in particular foreign policy. He never gave a major speech without his personal editions and additions. Nor, when time permitted, did one of his subordinates make a major address without his having had the opportunity to review it. Dulles showed virtually all his draft speeches to Eisenhower, and it is not uncommon to find the president's suggestions incorporated verbatim into the final text.[16]

A final component of the Whitman File which requires special attention is Eisenhower's personal diary. The president actually began to keep a diary in the 1930s while serving as Douglas MacArthur's aide in the Philippines, and although he kept it only sporadically, it contains many insights into his personal thinking and actions. He comments on his philosophy, his analysis of specific episodes, and most beneficially from the standpoint of this study, his views on leadership and relationships with individual subordinates. The diary is essential to any study of Eisenhower's personality.

The new assessment of Eisenhower's role in American foreign policy and his relationship with Dulles, which emerges from the Whitman File, encourages the researcher to reexamine previously available sources. The logical place to begin this review is the Dulles Oral History Project. Containing close to 300 interviews, this collection has been the basic instrument for those interested in understanding Dulles, both as a person and a secretary of state. Careful scholars and popular historians alike have used this project to support the thesis that Dulles dominated Eisenhower's diplomacy.[17]

A careful analysis of the Dulles Oral History Project reveals that virtually all interviewees who depict the Dulles-Eisenhower relationship traditionally were *outside* the inner circle of both the White House and the State Department. Those who *were within* one or both of these circles, who witnessed intimately how Eisenhower's foreign policy apparatus operated, almost unanimously support the hypothesis of an activist president who was the central figure in diplomatic decisions. These were the individuals closest to both Eisenhower and Dulles, who knew their personal habits, idiosyncracies, and modes of operation.

These views are substantiated by looking at the "other side of the coin." There are a large number of interviews on the Eisenhower administration in the Columbia Oral History Collection. These interviews have not been used by Dulles scholars when assessing his relationship with the president. Yet when Elmo Richardson used the Columbia Collection in conjunction with the Whitman File to study Eisenhower, he also concluded that the Eisenhower-Dulles relationship needs reexamination.[18]

One final note on the sources. A striking feature of any record on the Eisenhower presidency, whether it be from the Whitman File or the Oral Histories, is the constant reference to Eisenhower the General. There is no doubt that Eisenhower brought with him to the White House the legacies of his long military service. Consequently, in order to understand fully Ike's personality and the nature of his relationships, it is essential to review his career as supreme allied commander and chief of NATO.

Two often overlooked studies of the military Eisenhower are by Kenneth Davis

and Stephen Ambrose.[19] They both present an individual brimming with self-confidence and blessed with an almost uncanny ability to understand and take advantage of the personal characteristics of his subordinates. They also show a general very much involved with the political as well as the military aspects of international relations. These traits can also be found in Ike's wartime memoirs, *Crusade in Europe.*[20] Although this work creates the suspicions of any autobiographical account, his personal papers reinforce the view presented in the narrative. Once secluded in Abilene, and in other subdivisions of the National Archives, these papers are now being made readily available through the magnificently edited collection, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower.*[21]

SOME WHITMAN FILE EVIDENCE

Three representative selections from the Whitman material suggest the need to reexamine the nature of the relationship between Eisenhower and Dulles. Each illustrates a different manner by which the two men interacted. To show the type of give and take which indicates a mutual respect and confidence, I have chosen one of the numerous telephone conversations that took place between the two men practically every day. The incident under discussion was a relatively minor episode in the omnipresent cold war. In June 1954, a British airplane was shot down off Hainan, China. In attempting to locate survivors, two American search planes had themselves been shot down. Upon hearing the news, Dulles immediately informed Press Secretary James Hagerty, who told Eisenhower. The president called Dulles.

Eisenhower opened the conversation by asking Dulles how he suggested the matter be handled. Dulles replied that *if* the president approved, he would make "a protest against further barbarities in attempting to shoot down rescue-type planes." Eisenhower told Dulles that he had *already* spoken to the congressional leaders about lodging a protest, and they seemed to think it a good idea. But he had advised the leaders to keep the information secret until an official policy was decided upon. In addition, Eisenhower instructed Dulles that he should also send a message to British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden urging that England take as equally a hard line as the United States in condemning the Chinese action. Eisenhower was concerned that if the British position differed from the American one, friction might be created between the two countries. Dulles agreed. They concluded their exchange with the understanding that Dulles would immediately make a public statement, while the president would delay any comments.[22]

Clearly this was not a Dulles-dominated conversation. Eisenhower requested Dulles' advice, but in this case he had already arrived at the same judgments. Furthermore, it was Eisenhower who suggested the note to Eden, a note that was very much in keeping with his traditional concerns with Allied unity. Eisenhower was concerned with the overall strategy, and with the political ramifications. He would then have Dulles execute the decisions. The public would hear and see the secretary of state, not the president. The parallels to his former role as supreme allied commander are evident.

This telephone conversation is representative of the transcripts found in the Whitman File, and suggests the need for a new assessment of Eisenhower's interaction with Dulles. A more complete assessment will now be possible. Several days before the substance of this article was delivered as a paper,[23] the staff of the Eisenhower Library completed the review of the Eisenhower-Dulles telephone conversations located in the Dulles Papers at Abilene. This series of documents contains over a thousand pages of detailed transcripts of the many conversations between the

president and the secretary of state, whether or not Eisenhower was in the Oval Office when the conversations took place.[24] They concern literally every aspect of United States foreign policy and related matters, and will unquestionably enable scholars to reach more definitive conclusions.

The second example shows Eisenhower soliciting Dulles' advice, but also using the secretary as a "sounding board" for his own ideas. Eisenhower would soon give a speech before the newspaper editors, and wanted Dulles' suggestions. His "personal and confidential" letter requesting the suggestions is revealing for two reasons. First, it indicates the respect the president had for Dulles' knowledge and judgments. Second, it calls into question the conventional assumption that since Eisenhower advocated conciliation and Dulles brinkmanship, the administration's hard-line anticommunism resulted from the secretary's dominating influence.[25] This is one of many illustration's of Eisenhower's personal hard-line thinking.

Eisenhower began the letter by outlining his overall objective, which was to reach "some reliable agreements with the Soviets that will make it possible, with confidence, to reduce armaments." But he continued by discussing the difficulties in reaching such agreements. His emphasis was not on conciliation but firmness. I will quote from the letter at length, advising the reader to keep in mind that these are Eisenhower's words, not Dulles':

> It is, of course, quite comforting to recite all of the international difficulties that have, over the five years, been either surmounted or ameliorated. I've personally recited these in a number of speeches.
>
> But these specific successes cannot blind us to the most potentially dangerous of all the situations now developing. This is the credence, even respect, that the world is beginning to give to the spurious Soviet protestations and pronouncements. As their propaganda promotes this world confusion, the tone of Soviet notes and statements grows more strident. The more the men in the Kremlin come to believe that their domestic propaganda is swallowed by their own people and by the populations of other countries, including some we have counted upon as allies, the greater the risk of American isolation. One great step we can take to counteract this trend is to make sure our own people are not deceived. . . .
>
> *I personally believe that one of the main objectives of our own efforts should be to encourage our entire people to see, with clear eyes, the changing character of our difficulties, and to convince them that we must be vigilant, energetic, imaginative and incapable of surrender through fatigue or lack of courage.* (emphasis added)[26]

The final selection illustrates Eisenhower *instructing* Dulles. I have chosen a document from the 1956 Suez crisis because it has been an episode frequently cited by historians as an example of *Dulles'* foreign policy. Not only was the Suez crisis a dramatic confrontation, but for many scholars it indicated the force of Dulles' personality and the short-sightedness of *his* diplomacy.

This tendency is especially true of his critics, like Herman Finer, who in his *Dulles Over Suez* traces the secretary of state's every move. For our purposes Finer's work, in spite of its bias against Dulles, provides a fascinating study. He begins by proffering the standard view that Eisenhower had chosen Dulles "so that he could leave in his hands almost all of the direct and daily responsibilities for guiding this nation in its multitudinous and complex dealings with other nations. Dulles alone was in the driver's seat."[27] He then goes on to recount Dulles' diplomacy, but his narrative continually illustrated Eisenhower's participation. Caught in a quandary, Finer eventually writes, "It must be added at this point, for unmistakable emphasis, that the President took a more active part in the Suez affair than in other diplomatic conflicts."[28]

The Whitman material illustrates that Finer is incorrect in asserting that Eisenhower played more of a role in Suez than in other similar events. Furthermore, he was unaware of the extent of Eisenhower's activity in this particular crisis. For example, Finer spends several pages criticizing Dulles for failing to present Nasser with the Eighteen Nations' Proposals which developed from the London Conference. Predictably he places the blame for this failure squarely on Dulles. What he did not know is that on August 20, the very day Dulles, according to Finer, independently decided against presenting the proposals, the secretary of state received a message from Eisenhower. I quote:

> By no means should you become involved in a long wearisome negotiation, especially with an anticipated probability of negative results in the end. . . . Our government has expressed the opinion that in this problem, the peaceful processes of negotiation should prove equal to the development of a satisfactory solution. We cannot afford to do less than our best to assure success, and yet I repeat that it would be worse than embarrassing if you should get tied into drawn-out conversations which would in the long run prove unsuccessful.[29]

A NEW LOOK AT EISENHOWER

This small sampling of Whitman material certainly does not prove conclusively that the conventional wisdom on the Dulles-Eisenhower relationship is inaccurate. It does, however, indicate that a careful examination is necessary. Any such examination must proceed in three stages. The first is a reappraisal of the president's personality and role.

As mentioned, the Barber image of a passive/negative Eisenhower, with a relatively bland and unassuming personality, has dominated the extant literature. Only a few mavericks have attempted to challenge this portrayal, but none of their analyses has gained wide acceptance within academic circles. When Kempton opened his 1967 article with Richard Nixon's famous comment, "He [Eisenhower] was a far more complex and devious man than most people realized, and in the best sense of those words,"[30] many perhaps intuitively questioned the validity of Kempton's approach.

President Eisenhower was thought to be the same as General Eisenhower, allegedly an excellent "chairman of the board" but severely limited as an innovator or strategist. For this reason his purported role as a leader was constantly described as one of keeping the peace among more dynamic personalities who were really responsible for the specific courses of action. During World War II there were Omar Bradley, Bernard Montgomery, and George Patton. Once president, there were George Humphrey, Sherman Adams, and of course John Foster Dulles. According to this standard view, Ike did not assume responsibility, he delegated it. "Congenial Ike" was well prepared to act as a moderator, but incapable of conceiving or directing policies of his own. Writers consistently intoned that any man who employed a Walter Bedell Smith or Sherman Adams supposedly to shield himself from irritating controversies could not possibly hold his own in the numerous confrontations characteristic of the cold war. Ike left the controversies to Dulles while he practiced putting on the White House lawn.

In revising this assessment, let us begin with the image of a passive, bland, and unassuming Eisenhower, the type of personality who would be a pushover for a dynamic and forceful chief subordinate. From his earliest childhood he had never exhibited these characteristics. As a boy in Abilene, although most diligent in performing his responsibilities, he much preferred the adventure of climbing to the precarious pinnacle of the barn roof, or testing his ability against others on the

athletic field. His prowess and determination earned him the respect of the entire neighborhood, including that of the boys from the "right" side of the tracks. Dwight Eisenhower would never give up, and he would never back down from anyone. The most illustrative instance of his indomitable will was his legendary, by Abilene standards, bout with Wesley Merrifield. Merrifield, the acknowledged champion of the more wealthy North Side of Abilene, was much stronger and quicker than young Ike. But challenged to defend his honor and that of his friends, Ike lunged to the attack. In spite of an initial beating that should have summarily ended the contest, he would not yield. Almost inconceivably the fight continued for more than two hours, with both boys suffering immeasurably. Finally Merrifield gasped, "Ike, I can't lick you," and wearily they decided on a draw. It took three days for Ike to return to school, but he had proven he could hold his own.[30]

Ike never lost this indomitable spirit. While at West Point he could not totally resign himself to the strict regimentation. This is not to say that he was inherently insubordinate, but rather that he had individual drives that needed to be expressed. He expressed this personality wherever he went. For West Point this personality was a little too activist. Over the four years he recevied 307 demerits, and out of a graduating class of 164 members, his rank in conduct was 125.[31]

Nor was Eisenhower passive in his later years, when he was supreme allied commander or president of the United States. There are numerous instances of his asserting himself in opposition to more cautious advice by deciding on an aggressive course of action. He was not reckless but he was firm. His decision to launch the D-Day invasion in spite of the problematic weather predictions and deeply divided advisers as well documented. A not so monumental but similar decision came in 1954 when, in spite of the objections of the assistant secretary of state and an estimated chance of success of only 20 percent, Eisenhower ordered that several planes be sent to Castillo Armas to help in the overthrow of Arbenz's government in Guatemala.[32] The president's 1956 letter to his long-time friend and confidante "Swede" Hazlett illustrates Eisenhower's activist nature. Referring to the frequent occasions when he awakened "annoyingly" early, he confided:

> Ever since the hectic days of the North African campaign, I find that when I have weighty matters on my mind I wake up extremely early, apparently because a rested mind *is anxious* to begin *grappling* with knotty questions. Incidentally, I never worry about what I did the day before. Likewise, I spend no time fretting about what enemies or critics have said about me. I have never indulged in useless regrets. Always I find, when I have come awake sufficiently to figure out what may be then engaging my attention, that I am pondering some question that is still unanswered.
>
> So I think it is fair to say that it is not worry about the past, but a *desire to attack* the future, that gets me into this annoying habit. [emphasis added][33]

There is one other manifestation of Eisenhower's personality that I should mention in this connection, for it relates directly to his relationship with Secretary Dulles. All of his associates were aware of his great temper. Although he constantly fought to keep it under control, when it erupted he resembled, in the words of Special Assistant Bryce Harlow, "a human Bessemer furnace."[35] It seems impossible that the conventional Eisenhower could have possessed such dynamism. Former head speech writer Arthur Larson recalls one incident in which an outburst of the Eisenhower anger clearly contradicts the interpretation of a president somewhat in awe of his secretary of state, perfectly happy to delegate all responsibility to him. Dulles was in doubt over the Girard case, which concerned a jurisdictional dispute between the United States and Japan. An American serviceman was accused of

shooting a Japanese citizen. According to Larson, once Eisenhower had finished discussing the matter with Dulles over the phone, he violently slammed down the receiver and exploded, "Goddammit, nobody can ever do anything around here without me doing it for them."[36] In this case it appears that Eisenhower wanted to delegate some responsibility, but found it impossible to do so.

But even if one accepts the notion that there were several dimensions to Eisenhower's personality, there remains the question as to his involvement in foreign policy. Did he *want* to shoulder the inherent responsibilities? The conventional characterization of Eisenhower is that he did not enjoy being president, and welcomed the opportunity to shift the burdens of his office to more capable subordinates. Supposedly, the secretary of state, full of self-confidence, willingly accepted the president's mandate. Did Eisenhower delegate all the responsibility for foreign policy to Dulles, responsibility that should properly have remained within the Oval Office? To answer this question we must look at Eisenhower the leader.

Long before entering the White House, Eisenhower had developed comprehensive theories of executive leadership. As might be expected, these theories were firmly rooted in his military experience. They were comprised of two essential components. The first has to do with the need for a systematically staffed administration. This applies to the general organizational structure of Eisenhower's presidency. The second, less well-recognized component was his view that any effective leader had to evaluate and make conscious use of the personalities of his chief subordinates. This latter aspect of his theory is central for understanding how Eisenhower related to John Foster Dulles.

Of these two components of executive leadership, Ike's use of a well-organized staff is the most discernible. Indeed, his reliance on his staff has often been used to evidence his excessive delegation of responsibility. What such critics have failed to consider is that Eisenhower's entire career *proved* to him the value of operating as a team. Many have remarked that much of Eisenhower's reputation prior to World War II resulted from his successes as a football coach. But as hackneyed as it may sound, his contact with football prepared him well for his more important assignments. His emphasis was always on coordinated effort as opposed to individual performances, and he preached that victory was the collective responsibility of all the participants.[37] The analogy between football and life has certainly been overstated, but in this case the parallels are often appropriate.

Of course a successful football coach will not necessarily be a successful chief of staff, supreme allied commander, or president of the United States. A coach's role is not nearly as complex, nor is his responsibility nearly as great. It was really Eisenhower's World War II experience, and in particular the influence of General George C. Marshall, that crystallized his thinking. According to Eisenhower, Marshall thought highly of him precisely because, as the chief of staff's subordinate, he was willing to assume responsibility. Marshall wanted Eisenhower, he *needed* Eisenhower, to make certain decisions himself and not constantly check for approval. As Eisenhower wrote in *Crusade for Europe:*

> Another thing that annoyed him [Marshall] was any effort to "pass the buck," especially to him. Often he remarked that he could get a thousand men to do detailed work but too many were useless in responsible posts because they left to him the necessity of making every decision. He insisted that his principal assistants act on their own conclusions in their own spheres of responsibility. . . . By the same token he had nothing but scorn for any man who attempted to "do everything himself."[38]

Eisenhower incorporated this reliance on staff administration into his overall team

concept. Delegation of responsibility was not the same as encouraging independent action. The subordinate who is making a decision must make that decision through the eyes of his commander. He must, in fact, almost cease to be his own man. He certainly may discuss various alternatives with his chief, and argue contrary positions, but once in the field his opinions are no longer his own. He is a member of a team, and a team can have only one captain. Again Eisenhower's words are precise:

> The teams and staffs through which the modern commander absorbs information and exercises his authority must be a beautifully interlocked, smooth-working mechanism. Ideally, the whole should be practically *a single mind.* [Eisenhower's emphasis][39]

The complexities of running a nation are certainly as great as those of running an army, and therefore President Eisenhower felt it important to develop a similarly well-organized staff network. Early in his first term he wrote his friend Amon Carter:

> . . . because of the way this government *must* be run, . . . I have to be guided largely by the opinions of those that I trust day in and day out . . . and who normally reach specific conclusions before they report to me.[40]

In writing that he would be "guided," Eisenhower assumed that his staff's opinions would be based on informed judgments in keeping with *his* overall policies. And every one of his close advisers who was charged with carrying out delegated responsibilities was aware of Eisenhower's theories and approved of them. *Both* the Dulles and Columbia Oral Histories support this contention. Eisenhower's presidential subordinates knew what he expected of them. All important matters were to be brought directly to the president's attention. Less consequential matters, however, were to be handled at the staff level, but always within the context of the president's general directives. The number of Eisenhower's assistants who have expressed this theme is too large to list here. For this reason I will only cite the words of one—General Andrew Goodpaster. Goodpaster, as a special staff assistant at SHAPE, and then staff secretary in the White House, had a long and intimate connection with Eisenhower. His appraisal is directly to the point:

> If you know the President, if you know General Eisenhower at all, you know that he's a man who (a) knows how to delegate, and (b) when he delegates, he expects the people to carry the responsibility he has delegated to them, while keeping the whole thing in a context of overall policy and direction.[41]

An understanding of Eisenhower's views on staff administration leads directly to the second component of his theory of executive leadership—an emphasis on personalities. Not all types of individuals are well-suited to such an administrative structure. Consequently, Eisenhower believed strongly that "the personalities of senior commanders and staff officers are of special importance."[42] Chief subordinates must have the confidence and ability to carry out responsibility, to make decisions on their own. If they cannot, they should be dismissed. Furthermore, if the entire operation suffers because a subordinate fails to live up to these standards, the failure is with the commander who has selected him in the first place.

As is well-known, Eisenhower was plagued in this regard by Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson. Wilson insisted on bringing virtually all problems to Eisenhower, and often ignored the expert advice of his staff. In another one of his revealing letters to Swede Hazlett, the president explained his position. His use of the military analogy is instructive:

> Personally, I think there is nothing complicated about the line of authority and responsibility. The President is Commander in Chief. He delegates to a Service Secretary a certain amount of his constitutional authority and that Secretary becomes the President's representative. . . . The Secretary's orders are presumed to be the orders of the Commander in

Chief. *If the Secretary is the type* who does not take the advice of his own military choices, or who is domineering and arbitrary in his decisions, then *it is the fault of the Commander in Chief for having selected such a person,* if things go wrong—as surely they would. [emphasis added][43]

Clearly, therefore, Eisenhower's assessments of individual personalities played a prominent role in his selection of subordinates. But he looked for more than just whether someone could assume responsibility, or could accept the advice of others. He sought to understand the strengths and weaknesses of all his associates, so that he could assure that they be used most effectively. Eisenhower was not callous, but his theory of executive leadership *called* for the use of subordinates.

To use World War II again as an example, Eisenhower constantly analyzed the personalities of his various associates in order to get the most out of their performances. One of his greatest challenges was George Patton. After the infamous incident when Patton struck a hospitalized soldier, Eisenhower admitted to Marshall, "George Patton continues to exhibit some of those unfortunate personal traits of which you and I have always known." Highest among these, according to Eisenhower's assessment, was "his habit of impulsive bawling out of subordinates." Nevertheless, Eisenhower continued, "he has qualities that we cannot afford to lose unless he ruins himself."[44] These were, as he later wrote, "his emotional tenseness and his impulsiveness . . . that made him, in open situations, such a remarkable leader of an army. In pursuit and exploitation there is need for a commander who sees nothing but the necessity for getting ahead."[45] Taking all this into consideration, General Eisenhower felt that he had to devise a means to minimize Patton's weaknesses and utilize his strengths. Patton's exploits at the end of the war attest to Eisenhower's success.

Bernard Montgomery also caused Eisenhower great difficulty. A tremendous egotist, he bitterly opposed playing a subordinate role to Eisenhower, or even an equal one to Bradley. As a result he threatened Ike's objective of promoting allied unity. But he had, in Eisenhower's opinion, "no superior in two most important characteristics." Specifically, Eisenhower mentioned Montgomery's ability to develop among his men "an intense devotion and admiration," and his "tactical ability in what might be called the 'prepared' battles."[46] Ike's strategy toward Montgomery was to be firm, yet flattering and conciliatory. In a long letter to the field marshall in 1944, Eisenhower repeatedly complimented Montgomery, and highlighted their points of agreement. But, at the same time, he consistently maintained, "for any one major task on the battlefield there must be a *single battlefield* commander."[47] Eisenhower left no doubt that this was to be himself. He was not cowed by Montgomery because, as he concluded to Marshall, he had "no lack of confidence in my ability to handle him."[48]

To say that Eisenhower "handled" Dulles is perhaps to overstate the case. Yet, as with Patton and Montgomery, the president sought to understand the personality of his secretary of state. This understanding was a crucial aspect of his relationship with Dulles, and exemplifies the mode by which he executed presidential leadership, and made Dulles function as an efficient member of the Eisenhower administration.

A NEW LOOK AT DULLES

This study is concerned with those aspects of Dulles' personality that affected his conduct as secretary of state, and more specifically, those that affected his relationship with President Eisenhower. For the present purposes it is not necessary to

attempt a detailed analysis of his religious and philosophical beliefs. Ole Holsti has already written an insightful article demonstrating the influence of Dulles' theological and intellectual perceptions on his postures and attitudes.[49] Although, as mentioned earlier, there are opposing views on the nature of his strident anticommunism and often uncompromising diplomacy, there can be little doubt that they rested on a firm theoretical foundation. A serious student of international relations, Soviet communism, and the Bible, John Foster Dulles was in many respects the consummate cold warrior.

The evidence I have gathered does not contradict this impression. But it does indicate that there were more secular facets of Dulles' personality as well. He was not the one-dimensional, one-directional secretary of state so prevalent in the conventional literature. He was much more "human" than that. He had feelings, ambitions, and fears. He had strengths and weaknesses. By looking at some of these other sides to his character, we can better understand his relationship with the president.

I will begin with the common image of Dulles the intellectual loner, a man so firm in his convictions that he "carried the state department around in his hat," seeing no need to seek advice." Dulles was quite confident in his abilities. Perhaps no modern secretary of state has entered office with a better background or preparation. He was the grandson of John Watson Foster, who had served as Benjamin Harrison's secretary of state, and the nephew of Robert Lansing, who had held the same post under Woodrow Wilson. Although he gave his class's valedictory address at Princeton, he had taken time off to attend the World Peace Conference at the Hague, and when only 30 he had advised President Wilson at Versailles. Through his position as senior partner of the Wall Street law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, and his chairmanship of the internationalist Federal Council of the Churches' Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace, Dulles had met many leading world figures. Later, his role as Thomas Dewey's chief foreign policy adviser in the 1944 and 1948 campaigns, his short stint as a senator, and the various activities which he performed for Dean Acheson, such as helping to organize the United Nations and negotiate the treaty with Japan, brought him recognition as an expert on international affairs. He even wrote two books on the subject.[50] Small wonder that he expected to be Eisenhower's selection as secretary of state, and was confident of his ability to do well.

But Dulles was not so confident, nor so stubborn, that he did not seek advice. As a matter of fact, his operation of the State Department was not unlike that of President Eisenhower's White House. The primary difference is that Dulles tended to consult a group of his favorites, a sort of "kitchen cabinet."[51] This group included both general advisers and experts in specific fields, such as Robert Bowie, John Hanes, Douglas MacArthur II, William Macomber, Livingston Merchant, Robert Murphy, Roderic O'Connor, and Herman Phleger. He held staff meetings each morning, during which time he would listen to the reports and the analyses of his subordinates. But he always reserved the final decision for himself.

It is true that Dulles normally approached his advisers with certain preconceived notions. But he did not want them merely to agree and complacently execute his policies. William Macomber states that he never saw Dulles make a decision without "talking it over with the elements in the Department that would have real experience and responsibility in that field." Herman Phleger concurs by adding, "I never met a person who was so interested in getting other people's views and . . . picking their brains for anything he could get out of them."[52] The secretary's relationship with the Department's Planning Board chief Robert Bowie is a case in point. Bowie and

Dulles disagreed on many fundamental issues. But Dulles invited, he demanded, that Bowie give his opinions on all major decisions. In this way, the secretary could guard against his overlooking alternative options, while at the same time forcing himself to think through his own position. As Bowie remarks, "He wanted somebody who would be forceful and direct in discussion. He didn't fear that."[53] Bowie's comments reveal a side to Dulles which has been deemphasized. He was not so confident that he felt he did not need advice and criticism, and he was confident enough to accept it.

Although not very large, the group of people who worked closely with Dulles, along with others who knew him intimately, belie another generalization regarding his personality. Dulles was not the unapproachable, dour statesman who always seemed to have one foot on an airplane. Clearly he was less personable and less sensitive than Eisenhower, and enjoyed the spartan life of his Duck Island retreat. But both the Dulles and Eisenhower Oral History collections show that his associates and acquaintances saw him as warm, possessing a good sense of humor, and a pleasant companion. He not only inspired respect, but he inspired genuine affection.

Many have referred to his devotion to his wife Janet, how he took her everywhere with him, and how he appeared almost lost without her. His devotion to those outside his immediate family is less known. He was far from an extrovert, but once he became familiar with an associate, they frequently developed an intimate relationship. He teased and joked with his secretarial staff, and displayed an almost fatherly concern for his junior subordinates. Douglas MacArthur II remembers that after Dulles learned that MacArthur's wife resented the amount of time he was spending at work away from her, the secretary literally ordered him home, explaining that the young man's "home front was crumbling."[54] On another occasion, Dulles took time off from his incredibly hectic schedule in order to make arrangements that the tropical fish which were kept in his cold State Department office found a warm home while he was away.[55] Like Eisenhower, there was a public and a private Dulles. The words of MacArthur represent this general consensus:

> He was a fellow of great human warmth. He thought about people. He thought about family relationships. He didn't hesitate to work one very hard indeed, but at the same time he was somebody that one could joke with. And this aspect of him really didn't come out publicly. . . . I think Livy Merchant, Bob Bowie, and others of us that were privileged to work with him—all of us—we've had hilarious times with Dulles, traveling to and from conferences, when the work was over. He was a warm human being for whom I have a deep affection.[56]

The preceding discussion is not meant to debunk completely the conventional image of a bellicose, seemingly belligerent secretary of state. Dulles' gruff exterior is a matter of public record, and numerous observers have commented on such incidents as his refusal to shake the hand of Chou En-lai at the 1954 Geneva Conference. As will be shown, Eisenhower was well aware of this aspect of Dulles' personality. What is also important to note is that Dulles himself was aware of it. This was one of the major reasons why he maintained Carl McCardle as his press secretary for such a long time in spite of advice to the contrary from so many others. (The other major reason is that he *liked* McCardle.)

A great intellect and forceful advocate, Dulles loved to coin a phrase. He always wrote his own speeches and statements. Unfortunately, he was often incapable of predicting how his words would affect the press, the public, or his opponents. He knew that McCardle, although obviously not infallible, had an uncanny ability to make such predictions. He was not a very knowledgeable journalist, and was extremely inarticulate, but he would force Dulles to listen to his opinions. I say "force"

because McCardle could rarely explain why he felt as he did, which would frustrate and even anger a man who had spent much of his life as an attorney. Dulles realized, however, that McCardle possessed an ability which he did not, and by heeding McCardle's advice, Dulles was able to minimize his propensity to say the wrong thing to the wrong people at the wrong time.[57]

Dulles' conduct during the McCarthy period raises another point about his character. Few studies of the secretary of state have not mentioned his early speech demanding "positive loyalty" from his desk officers and foreign servicemen, his hiring of Scott McLeod[58] to conduct security investigations, and his general failure to protect the State Department from demoralizing witch hunts. There is debate as to Dulles' motives. Some analysts feel that he was forced into this passive position by Eisenhower's reluctance to confront McCarthy.[59] Dulles, they theorize, was not sufficiently strong politically to take on McCarthy independently from the president. Others imply that to some extent Dulles sympathized with McCarthy, or at least agreed that security in the State Department had been lax and there was the possibility of communist infiltration. Another viewpoint, shared by, among others, Dulles' sister Eleanor, is that Dulles was too concerned with the political climates of the period, and felt it necessary to go along with McCarthy in order to assuage the right wing of the Republican party.

Dulles was probably influenced, in varying degrees, by all these considerations. However, another factor was also involved. Dulles was not so sure of himself, was not so contemptuously intractable, as many believe. Few have thought it possible that a man with the theological and intellectual convictions of John Foster Dulles could have been frightened by a man as crassly opportunistic as Joseph McCarthy. But he was, for Dulles, too, had his Achilles heel—Alger Hiss.

Dulles, of course, had worked with Hiss in organizing the UN, and had recommended him for the presidency of the Carnegie Foundation. His deep concern that his past connection would make him vulnerable to McCarthyite charges is illustrated by an interview with Edward Corsi. Corsi was the State Department's specialist in migration and refugee problems, and was attacked by McCarthy's staunch ally, Congressman Francis Walter, chairman of the House Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee. At first, Corsi could not understand his isolation. The only help he was getting from the Department was an open-ended offer to become an ambassador to an unspecified Latin American country. Finally, he went directly to Dulles. Corsi's account of this encounter shows a side of Dulles very different from that of the indomitable titan:

> Finally I couldn't take this. I had to have a showdown with John Foster Dulles himself. And I called Mr. Dulles. I made an appointment. . . . He sat there. He looked like a beaten man. It seemed that the tragedy was more his than mine. . . . And then he went off into a spiel about what these same elements had done to him on the Hiss case. And he said, "Don't you know that I went through this kind of thing with all these people? You can't pacify these people. There's no reasoning with these people." . . . and he kept pleading with me. I never saw a man plead . . . I never saw a man so scared of this situation as he was.[60]

This story is not intended to portray Dulles as a cowering weakling. It is meant rather to illustrate that there was more to him than vitriolic rhetoric, seemingly inexhaustible energy, and stoical self-denial. He had a multifaceted personality. Similarly, he had a multifaceted relationship with President Eisenhower.

THE EISENHOWER-DULLES RELATIONSHIP

It is too simplistic to assert that the respective personalities of two individuals wholly determine the manner in which they relate to each other. Environmental and situational factors all play a part. However, concentrating on the personality factor, I

have argued thus far that neither Eisenhower nor Dulles conform to the conventional historical image. While these new assessments of their personalities do not necessitate a new interpretation of their relationship, they do necessitate that their relationship be reexamined.

Perhaps the most crucial component in any relationship is how the involved personalities perceive one another. Eisenhower, most have believed, felt innately inferior to Dulles. He deferred to his secretary of state's knowledge, intelligence, and power of advocacy. One Dulles biographer wrote, Ike "admired Foster and was a little frightened of him, sometimes referring to him as an Old Testament prophet."[61] In relation to the other members of the cabinet, Eisenhower viewed Dulles, according to the journalist Roscoe Drummond, as "a peer among peers," and gave him his unwavering and unequivocal support.[62]

According to this traditional interpretation, Dulles perceived Eisenhower as his client. In almost every Dulles biography or study there is the analogy to a lawyer and his client. Theoretically in such a relationship the lawyer advises and counsels, and the client listens. But the lawyer should not overstep his mandate. For this reason Dulles, many think, kept Eisenhower informed as to his every action. He never forgot how his uncle, Robert Lansing, had lost Wilson's confidence by pursuing too independent a course at Versailles. Dulles therefore nourished his relationship with extreme care, giving Eisenhower "advance notice of upcoming problems in need of decision, laying out his own analysis, and listening carefully to the President's comments."[63] In fact, one gets the impression that the secretary was so attentive and held such a monopoly with Eisenhower concerning international affairs that there was little if any other input. As a result, in the words of another Dulles biographer, "Eisenhower came to see the world through Dulles' own spectacles."[64]

On one score these generalizations concerning the manner in which Eisenhower and Dulles perceived each other are right on the mark. The president did greatly admire his secretary of state. As he wrote in 1954 to Edgar, his older brother and often critic, in his estimation Dulles was "the best informed man on international affairs that I believe lives in the world today."[65] In addition, Eisenhower respected Dulles for being a "dedicated and tireless individual," as a patriot who "passionately believes in the United States, in the dignity of man, and in moral values."[66] What responsible leader would not seek out and often accept the advice of an adviser whom he regarded so highly?

But to admire someone, to respect his outstanding abilities, is not the same as to be awed. Eisenhower had spent most of his life dealing with many of the most able and forceful individuals in the twentieth century. Being secure in himself he was not reluctant to bestow praise on others. Yet he was also not reluctant to find fault with them. We have seen how during World War II he analyzed both the strengths and weaknesses of chief subordinates like Patton and Montgomery so as to use their potential to the utmost. He did the same in the White House. A 1953 entry in his personal diary bears a remarkable resemblance to his previously cited letter to Marshall a decade earlier. Similar to his assessment of the chief officers under his command during World War II, Eisenhower as president reviewed his cabinet secretaries and White House staff.

He opened his discussion of Dulles by extolling the secretary of state's virtues. His second paragraph, however, illustrates the type of critical analysis necessary for his theories on effective leadership. Eisenhower understood that Dulles had faults as well as virtues, and as the leader he would have to be conscious of both. Consequently, he concluded his appraisal by writing:

He is not particularly persuasive in presentation and, at times, seems to have a curious lack

of understanding as to how his words and manner may affect another personality. Personally, I like and admire him; my only doubts concerning him lie in the general field of *personality,* not in his capacity as a student of foreign affairs. [Eisenhower's emphasis][67]

Perhaps some day the availability of additional documents will permit the researcher to uncover the spectrum of Eisenhower's views on Dulles. For the time being, however, it is enough to note that he was not so overwhelmed by Dulles that he was oblivious to his shortcomings. He perceived Dulles in the same ways he perceived Patton or Montgomery, based on all his feelings and his judgments. Eisenhower's mode of leadership required multifaceted approaches, and it required cooperation. When there is a mutuality of purpose, there must be a mutuality of understanding.

Interestingly, Eisenhower's reservations regarding Dulles' manner of presenting the United States position stemmed in part from the secretary's legalistic inclinations. Although most observers, including many within the administration, perceived the Eisenhower-Dulles relationship as that of a client to his lawyer, the president at times disapproved of the attorney-like approach. For example, in 1958, after dictating an insert to Dulles' draft note to the Soviet Union, Eisenhower commented to Andrew Goodpaster, "I sense a difference with Foster Dulles [in the approach to the Soviets]. His is a lawyer's mind." The difference, he explained, was that whereas Dulles methodically prosecuted the Soviets for their actions, he neglected to emphasize sufficiently the constructive aspects of United States policy. Eisenhower appreciated Dulles' power of advocacy, but preferred that the American position be presented more positively. As he told Goodpaster, "Of course we have got to have a concern and respect for fact and reiteration of official position, but we are likewise trying to 'seek friends and influence people.' "[68]

By the same token, Dulles' perception of his role as Eisenhower's secretary of state was not merely that of a lawyer to client. He did believe that his background in international relations, and his assignment as chief of the State Department, dictated that he be the administration's key foreign policy advisor. He jealously guarded this position. This is the reason he felt he was selected in the first place. He knew that Eisenhower wanted his advice and counsel, that Eisenhower expected him, as he expected any subordinate, to carry out his responsibilities as fully and as aggressively as he could. He was confident in himself. But he was also confident in Eisenhower.

Perhaps no aspect of the Eisenhower-Dulles relationship has been less appreciated than this confidence which Dulles had in his president. Dulles did not confer so frequently with Eisenhower simply because he wanted to avoid the fate of his uncle, Robert Lansing. He conferred with him because he respected Eisenhower's opinions. He knew that the president's experience in the international arena and familiarity with many of the world leaders gave him a valuable perspective on the conduct of foreign policy. He also knew that Eisenhower possessed the type of political sensitivity and awareness that he himself was lacking.

Dulles acquired this respect for Eisenhower at the beginning of their association. Illustrative is an incident recounted by Dulles' long-time assistant Roderic O'Connor. During the Hotel Commodore period, while Eisenhower was organizing his administration prior to taking office, he received a long telegram from Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran, asking for the administration's support. The president-elect understandably sent the wire to Dulles for a draft reply. As time passed and Eisenhower did not hear anything from the secretary of state–designate, he dictated a two-page reply to Ann Whitman, who brought it personally to Dulles for his comments. Dulles changed two words and then said to O'Connor, "You

know, I don't know why General Eisenhower needs a Secretary of State."[69]

The purpose of this study was not to prove that Eisenhower did not need a secretary of state, or even that he dominated foreign policy. The purpose was to show that there is reason to scrutinize the conventional wisdom on the relationship of Eisenhower and Dulles. Evidence indicates that the standard views of both men's personalities are problematic, as are the views of their interaction within the decision-making process. Any further conclusions will require more extensive research and analysis of the recently released archival material.

NOTES

1. Ole R. Holsti, "Will the real Dulles Please stand up," *International Journal*, vol. 30 (Winter 1974-75), 34-44.
2. Hans Morgenthau, "John Foster Dulles (1953-1959)," in Normal Graebner, ed., *An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century* (New York, Toronto, London, 1961), 291-292.
3. Numerous books and articles sympathize with Dulles' efforts to construct a realistic foreign policy. The most scholarly representation of this view is Michael Guhin, *John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times* (New York, 1972). Other frequently consulted works with this interpretation are John Robinson Beal, *John Foster Dulles: A Biography* (New York, 1957); Mildred H. Comfort, *John Foster Dulles, Peacemaker* (Minneapolis, 1960); and Eleanor Lansing Dulles, *John Foster Dulles: The Last Year* (New York, 1963). Chalmers M. Roberts, *First Rough Draft: A Journalist's Journal of Our Times* (New York, Washington, London, 1973) and Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, *Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles' Command of American Power* (Garden City, New York, 1960) are journalistic accounts which at times stress Dulles' realism but are also often critical of his diplomacy.
4. Among the multiplicity of works criticizing Dulles, the most comprehensive is Townshend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (Boston and Toronto, 1973). Other critical volumes appear elsewhere in the notes.
5. Examples of this interpretation are Leonard Mosley, *Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen and John Foster Dulles and their Family Network* (New York, 1978) and Herman Finer, *Dulles Over Suez: The Theory and Practice of His Diplomacy* (Chicago, 1964). Mosley's book is not scholarly, and Finer's suffers from his subjective perspective.
6. The only major work to challenge this conventional interpretation is Louis L. Gerson's volume in the *American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy* series, *John Foster Dulles* (New York, 1967). While concentrating on Dulles, Gerson acknowledges President Eisenhower's substantial contribution.
7. Murray Kempton, "The Underestimation of Dwight D. Eisenhower," *Esquire* (September 1967), 108+; Garry Wills, *Nixon Agonistes: The Crisis of a Self-Made Man* (Boston, 1970).
8. The best examples are Fred I. Greenstein, "Presidential Activism Eisenhower-Style: A Reassessment Based on Archival Evidence," *Political Science Quarterly* (forthcoming). Elmo Richardson, *The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower* (Lawrence, Kansas, 1979). Earlier articles include Richard Rhodes, "Ike: An Artist in Iron," *Harper's Magazine*, vol. 201 (July 1970), 70-77 and Vincent DeSantis, "Eisenhower Revisionism," *Review of Politics*, vol. 38 (April 1976), 190-207.
9. The concept of an executive role constellation is examined in Richard C. Hodgson, Daniel S. Levinson, and Abraham Zalcznik, *The Executive Role Constellation: An Analysis of Personality and Role Relations in Management* (Boston, 1965).
10. James David Barber, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1972), 156-172.
11. Lloyd S. Etheredge, *A World of Men: The Private Sources of American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1978).
12. Etheredge, *World of Men*, 82-83, 92.
13. Sherman Adams, *Firsthand Report: The Story of The Eisenhower Administration* (New York, 1961); Emmet J. Hughes, *The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years* (New York, 1963).
14. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Papers as President of the United States, 1953-1961 (Whitman File), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. In this paper I will refer only to the Eisenhower Diary Series, abbreviated as WDDE, and the Whitman Diary, abbreviated as WD.
15. Illustrating his unawareness of certain aspects of the Eisenhower administration, Sherman Adams told my colleague Fred Greenstein that the president rarely used the telephone.
16. Greenstein, "Presidential Activism," 17-18.
17. Eleanor Lansing Dulles, in assessing Mosley's lack of scholarship, scathingly criticizes his abuse of the Dulles Oral History Project. She also discusses the inherent problems in over-reliance on oral interviews. Dulles, "The Historian as Gossip," *The American Spectator* (June/July 1978).
18. Richardson, *Eisenhower*. Dr. Richardson told me over the telephone that although he has never been a scholar of American foreign policy, his research on Eisenhower led to the inescapable conclusion that the president was intimately involved in all phases of diplomacy.

19. Stephen E. Ambrose, *The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower* (Garden City, NY, 1970); Kenneth S. Davis, *Soldier of Democracy: A Biography of Dwight Eisenhower* (Garden City, NY, 1945).
20. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (Garden City, NY, 1948).
21. Louis Galambos, et al., eds., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, vols. I-IX (Baltimore, 1970-79).
22. Telephone conversation, 1 July 1954, WDDE, "Phone Calls, June–December 1954."
23. Immerman, "Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the Decisions?" paper delivered at the meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, 24 May 1979.
24. As a rule Ann Whitman was only privy to those conversations Eisenhower held while in the Oval Office.
25. Scholars often cite Adams, *Firsthand Report*, 87, to document how Dulles influenced Eisenhower to take more strident anticommunist positions.
26. Eisenhower to Foster, 26 March 1958, WDDE, "March 1958 dictation."
27. Finer, *Dulles Over Suez*, 11.
28. Finer, *Dulles Over Suez*, 90-92.
29. Memorandum for State Department Secretariat, 20 August 1956, WDDE, "August 1956 (1)."
30. Richard M. Nixon, *Six Crises* (New York, 1962, 1968), 172.
31. Davis, *Soldier of Democracy*, 67-78. Milton Eisenhower told me of the veracity of Davis' account.
32. Academic record of Dwight David Eisenhower while a cadet at the United States Military Academy.
33. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953-1956* (New York, 1963), 425-426. For more on Eisenhower and Guatemala, see Immerman, *The United States and Guatemala, 1954: A Cold War Strategy for the Americas* (unpublished dissertation, Boston College, 1978).
34. Eisenhower to Captain E.E. ("Swede") Hazlett, 23 January 1956, WDDE, "1956 Misc. (2)."
35. Transcript of a recorded interview with Bryce N. Harlow. The John Foster Dulles Oral History Project, Princeton University Library, Princeton, NJ (hereafter referred to as DOH).
36. Arthur Larson, *Eisenhower: The President Nobody Knew* (New York, 1964), 75-76.
37. Ambrose, *Supreme Commander*, 55.
38. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 35.
39. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 75.
40. Eisenhower to Amon Carter, 25 December 1954, WDDE, "December 1954."
41. Transcript of a recorded interview with General Andrew J. Goodpaster, DOH.
42. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 75.
43. Eisenhower to Hazlett, 15 August 1955, WDDE, "August 1955."
44. Galambos, et al., *Papers*, II, 1353.
45. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 181.
46. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 211.
47. Galambos, et al., *Papers*, IV, 2221-2225.
48. Galambos, et al., *Papers*, II, 1354.
49. Ole R. Holsti, "The 'Operational Code' Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles' Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, vol. III, no. 1 (March 1970), 123-157.
50. Dulles, *War or Peace* (New York, 1950); *War, Peace and Change* (New York, 1939).
51. Transcript of a recorded interview with Livingston T. Merchant, DOH.
52. Transcripts of recorded interviews with William Macomber, Jr., and Herman Phleger, DOH.
53. Transcript of a recorded interview with Robert Bowie, DOH.
54. Transcript of a recorded interview with Douglas MacArthur II, DOH.
55. Several of Dulles' associates recount this story.
56. MacArthur interview, DOH.
57. Transcript of a recorded interview with John W. Hanes, Jr., DOH.
58. Formerly a member of the FBI and the staff of Vermont's right-wing Senator Styles Bridges, McLeod was believed well qualified to head up security in the State Department. According to Donald Lourie, undersecretary of state for administrative affairs and the individual responsible for hiring McLeod, McCarthy was not consulted concerning McLeod's appointment.
59. New evidence indicates that Eisenhower played a much more active role in combating McCarthy than has been traditionally assumed. For a revised assessment of Eisenhower's strategy toward McCarthy, see Greenstein, "Presidential Activism," and Allen Yarnell, "Eisenhower and McCarthy: An Appraisal of Presidential Strategy," paper delivered at the Meeting of the Organization of American Historians, 9 April 1976.
60. Transcript of a recorded interview with Edward Corsi, DOH.
61. Mosley, *Dulles*, 342.
62. Drummond and Coblentz, *Duel at the Brink*, 34-36.
63. Hoopes, *Devil and Dulles*, 139.
64. Richard Goold-Adams, *John Foster Dulles: A Reappraisal* (New York, 1962), 61.
65. Eisenhower to Edgar, 27 January 1954, WDDE, "January 1954."
66. Eisenhower diary entry, 14 May 1953, WDDE, "Personal Diary."
67. Eisenhower diary entry, 14 May 1953, WDDE, "Personal Diary."
68. Diary, 24 January 1958, WD, "January, 1958 (1)."
69. Transcript of a recorded interview with Roderic O'Connor, DOH.