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WHAT FOLLOWS THE ARMS RACE?

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Is the Cold War to end in a relatively even balance of power, respected by both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., and in a long period of peace? Is it to be ended by a preventive war launched by the U.S.S.R., fearful that its current arms superiority will be succeeded by hopeless inferiority? Is it to be closed by a war waged by the United States, from a position of superior armed strength, to liberate the Communist world?

These are the three likely alternatives and it is of vital importance that every responsible American citizen should begin to have some idea about the probable outcome. For the first time in the history of the United States we are engaged in a balance-of-power arms race, deliberately entered into with the announced purpose of containing a rival power and keeping the peace. Is this to be the result, or shall we get instead a war to the death between two giant powers, based on opposite sides of the earth and fighting with atomic missiles and gigantic V 2 rockets, in addition to all of the "conventional" weapons?

This is the outcome toward which we are headed, if the history of the past has any clear lessons.

Most students are familiar with the centuries-old success of Great Britain in juggling the European balance of power. The method was to remain relatively aloof until the balance of military forces on the continent was upset, then to throw Britain's decisive weight against the stronger side, always a dangerous "aggressor," and gain a new respite through victorious war.

This prescription worked, in its increasingly costly way, when applied to Philip II of Spain, Louis XIV of France, and the first Napoleon. It broke down when applied to the Germany of William II and Hitler. Britain was too weak to provide the decisive make-weight and she lost her position as a great power in the attempts.

In both cases the United States had to come in, belatedly and reluctantly, to redress the balance. In both cases, too, the all-out contribution of Russia was necessary to save the situation.

Now the great powers of yesterday are nearly all gone, destroyed or debilitated by balance-of-power conflicts among themselves. Only

the United States and the Soviet Union remain, and their efforts to fill vacuums and to hold strategic positions have eventuated in the most gigantic arms race ever run. Can the tremendous forces set in motion be controlled, or is the result to be what it has been in the past?

I

The arms race preceding World War I is our best example of the way the process works. For nearly twenty years Bismarck, the greatest of all jugglers of alliances, kept power balanced successfully, from his point of view, but in 1888 he had to go to the Reichstag with a demand for a new arms superiority. "God," he thundered, "has given us on our flank the French, who are the most warlike and turbulent nation that exists, and He has permitted the development in Russia of propensities which until lately did not manifest themselves to the same extent." Rejecting any thought of a preventive war, he demanded the addition of 700,000 men to his army reserves.¹

Bismarck's purpose was sincerely defensive, but his sabre-rattling, oral and otherwise, looked distinctly offensive to the French and Russians, who got together in an alliance (1892-94) to defend themselves. For ten years thereafter there was a balance of forces sufficiently even to cause both sides to act with moderation. When Britain joined the Franco-Russian side, in 1904 and 1907, the actual balance of arms and troops in being was still in favor of the German-led Triple Alliance, but the potential might was on the other side.

Now the arms race took on deadly earnestness, as each side strained to keep ahead, or catch up. When the German Reichstag voted an army increase the French Chamber was sure to react, both sincerely convinced that they were acting purely in defense, until in 1914 France used her last card in extending compulsory military service to three years.

Meanwhile, Admiral von Tirpitz had been playing a desperate game with Britain which is peculiarly apposite to our current arms race with Russia. Tirpitz aimed at a navy superior to Britain's, but he maintained that all he sought was a navy strong enough to make it risky for Britain to oppose Germany diplomatically. His famous

¹J. A. Spender, *Fifty Years of Europe, A Study of Pre-War Documents* (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1933), p. 112.

"risk theory" persuaded the reluctant German landsmen to vote him the money, in the famous laws of 1900-1902, which were to run to fruition in 1917.

Tirpitz knew well that there was another grave risk involved — that Britain might attack his growing fleet while it was still weaker — but he believed that Germany's cheaper labor costs and steadier nerves would carry him through the danger zone, until his fleet would be so strong that the British would not dare attack. His nerves were undoubtedly second to none, and he almost won through to superiority, though the war came a little too soon and his great fleet was eventually surrendered and scuttled in the Scottish harbor of Scapa Flow.

This does not mean that Britain made a preventive war on Germany in 1914. She did not. Nor can it be proved that the Triple Alliance started that war with malice aforethought. Yet it is clear that the Germans and Austrians thought in mid-1914 that the balance of forces was about to swing against them. On July 18, 1914 the German Foreign Secretary, von Jagow, wrote to his ambassador in London that "We shall not fail to hear some blustering in St. Petersburg, but fundamentally Russia is not ready," whereas in a few years she will "crush us by the number of her soldiers . . . her Baltic fleet and her strategic railways." Therefore, if the conflict should come now "we ought not to shirk it."² Four days later the Austro-Hungarian Minister to Sweden received a letter from his superiors in Vienna saying that if Russia remained neutral in the projected war with Serbia her influence in the Balkans would collapse, and if she decided to fight it would prove that she intended to do so anyway, "as soon as her important armaments were complete."³

This is the identical decision that the men in the Kremlin will have to make, over and over again, during the next two or three years. "Shall we accept war now, starting in whatever trouble spot is conveniently ripe, or shall we wait until the armaments of the Americans are complete?"

As we consider the current power struggle, two things about the pre-1914 arms race should be kept in mind: (1) that both the economic burdens and the nervous tensions of the arms race became so

²Bernadotte E. Schmitt, *The Coming of the War, 1914* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1930), Vol. I, p. 321.

³Alfred von Wegerer, *A Refutation of the Versailles War Guilt Thesis*, trans. by Edwin H. Zeydel (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1930), p. 242.

nearly unbearable that many key people on both sides felt that anything was better than this; and (2) that when the assassination at Sarajevo led to a diplomatic showdown the military machines all started to move and swept the civilian governments along with them.

In Russia, Foreign Minister Sazanov tried to bring about partial mobilization against Austria alone, but his generals had, quite understandably, planned mobilization only against Austria *and* Germany. Plans to call up, arm, feed and move millions of men are unbelievably complex. They must be prepared in the greatest detail and they cannot be changed at the last minute, especially when everything depends upon speed. Meanwhile the German Chancellor von Hollweg tried to persuade the Austrians to "Halt in Belgrade," only to learn that the Austrian war plans did not call for a frontal assault on Serbia, across the Danube, but for a flank attack from Bosnia. Then when Kaiser Wilhelm thought that Britain would be neutral, if he did not attack France, he sought to "march, then, with all our forces only toward the East!" General von Moltke was overwhelmed by this order. It was "as though something had struck at my heart," until the proposal was rescinded and the great German war machine could move in the only direction it had planned to roll, across Belgium into France.

For similar reasons the control of our own destinies is daily shifting — let us hope in lesser degree — from the State Department and the White House into the Pentagon, where the men sit who dispense the scores of billions for defense and make the plans upon which the existence of the nation will depend, if the war comes. When we place in their hands the responsibility for the preparation, custody and handling of such huge quantities of lethal weapons we cannot easily deny them the diplomatic moves which they think essential to their task, such as bases in Franco Spain.

II

No move could be calculated to embitter the Russians more than our alliance with Franco, yet no one expects them to go to war over this incident or any other. We give them credit for being very "realistic" and cool-headed. Some fear that they will precipitate general war by some satellite incursion which we cannot permit, but the greater danger is a deliberate decision on Russia's part that she had better strike now, before time runs too strongly against her.

Will she make this decision? There are powerful reasons why she should. The American re-armament is on a stupendous scale. Our expenditures in the current fiscal year, the vast bulk of it for arms, are scheduled to reach 70 billions and to climb to 90 billions next year. These are world war scale expenditures. After that the annual bill for arms is expected to be about 40 billions, if war does not come.⁴

The economy of the United States is about four times as strong as that of the Soviet Union, though the latter can channel a greater percentage of its labor and materials into capital goods or arms than a democracy could. Given time, the gap could be considerably narrowed. On the other hand, the addition of the war-making strength of Germany and Japan to that of the United States, which we appear to be successfully accomplishing, would seem to put Russia hopelessly on the short end of both economic and military power, especially if clinched by the consolidation and arming of West Europe, including Britain. Thereafter Russia's permanent inferiority would make it necessary to yield to whatever demands the West might wish to make.

This is the kind of prospect which would cause a gambler like Hitler to make the final throw. Yet there are several reasons why the U.S.S.R. may decide not to do so. To begin with, Stalin is not a gambler. He is a patient man with a philosophy of history which tells him that the capitalist powers are all doomed to destroy themselves in boom-and-bust collapses and in "imperialist" wars. The latter may now be launched against the Soviet Union, but she has survived one major assault and her vast spaces, augmented now by East Europe and China, are still a very great protection.

There is, moreover, no Russian tradition of beginning world wars. We sometimes charge Russia with aggressive expansion for the past 500 years, but when the earlier Russian wars are examined they turn out to be wars against Sweden, Poland, Lithuania, and Turkey, in which Russia was often fighting for access to the sea, and sometimes defensively. She has expanded greatly, but not more than we have when all methods of expansion are examined. Despite arguments about the effect of Russia's mobilization on Germany in 1914, it is clear that she did not want that war and that she waited to be attacked in 1941. There is no reason to question the judgment of George Kennan, expressed in October, 1949, that the Russian leaders

⁴*The New York Times*, September 30, October 2; *The Nashville Tennessean*, October 2, 1951.

do not have Hitler's mania to wage war for its own sake and that they do not "desire to launch a great sudden military onslaught on the West." Kennan did not believe that "a great, aggressive, open war is the way in which their aims are to be achieved."⁵

This is also the view of most observers outside of the United States. For years travellers coming to the United States, both foreign and American, have been astonished at the fever of apprehension here as compared to other countries. For example, Drew Pearson reported after a recent European tour that "nobody believed there was any danger of war." James Reston was sure that "the Europeans don't want guns, even at our expense, as much as they want butter," and Anne O'Hare McCormick, another leading writer for the *New York Times*, said of the Europeans that they do "not believe in the imminence of attack." Other *Times* writers currently reported that Nehru does not believe in Russian control of China or Asia and that in the Near East the struggle between the Western bloc and Soviet Russia "means nothing." They want only to be neutral.⁶

There are a number of weighty current factors which will incline the Kremlin to wait, among them notably the higher standards of living in the European lands they would overrun. Other world developments which the Soviets might believe to be working in their favor are: the rapid growth of military power in Russia's East European satellites; the consolidation of the power of the new Communist government of China; the stalemate in Korea; the continued inability of France to pacify Indo-China; the flaming nationalism which sweeps the entire Arab world, directed against the West; the reluctance of West Europe to arm and the strong probability that too much armament will lead to revolt there against our policy; the equally strong likelihood that our great arms boom may dislocate the economies of the entire Western world, first through inflation and then by a severe recession; the chance that a reunited, democratic Germany may turn to the East for markets and diplomatic help; and the near-certainty that Japan will have to make peace with her natural market in China.

These last two considerations may well be decisive in Soviet calculations, since they offer chances to keep Japan and Germany from swinging the balance irrevocably against Russia.

⁵*The Nashville Tennessean*, October 12, 1951.

⁶*The New York Times*, September 2, 23, 24, 30 and October 14, 1951; *The Nashville Tennessean*, August 24, 1951.

In addition, the Soviet peoples have had enough personal experience with war to last them a century. No other nation has seen with its own eyes and felt physically and emotionally as much distress and death, devastation and degradation due to war and invasion. Doubtless the Russians would fight heroically again to defend their country from invasion, even in East Europe, but to ask them to risk everything in a great war of conquest, or even a preventive war, is demanding more than any people can be expected to bear in one generation.

For these reasons there is much ground for believing that the U.S.S.R may choose to wait for the Cold War to run its course, even if it finally turns hot against them. What then of the Americans? What will they do with their giant military power when they get it?

III

To begin with we have no real common ground with the Europeans and Asiatics on the subject of world wars. We detested having to take part in the last two wars and we were glad indeed when they were over. In both cases, too, relatively few of us got a taste of the seamy side of war — the mud and rain, the blasting of bodies and wreckage of cities, the crying orphans and the ruined homes, the loss of loved ones and the sight of millions of mutilated ones surviving. Most Americans have seen the pictures of these horrors and heard them described, but aside from a relatively small number of casualties, they have never happened to us here at home. No people which has not suffered occupation and devastation can know what it is like. A people never defeated in war cannot begin to understand the humiliation and anguish of defeat. There are some potent memories in our South, but they are living memories only in a handful of centenarians.

We want no more war, and yet we have prospered phenomenally in the past two. We nearly doubled our production plant in World War I and more than did it again in World War II. The world had never seen such an outburst of productivity, of both guns *and* butter, with full employment, high wages for all and high farm prices — a few shortages, to be sure, but no real hardship and plenty of savings.

The contrast between this experience and that of China and Japan, Europe and Russia in the last war is abysmal. It is a gulf of experience so wide as to be practically unbridgeable. For us war has been

an unpleasant experiment with immensely valuable by-products. For the others it has been a disaster which left little recompense, even among the "victors." Our approaches toward another world war must therefore be very different indeed. The Russians and the Chinese have both experienced great outbursts of revolutionary energy as a result of the wars, but none of the others have much to show for their wounds. We are the one warring power which is undefeated and therefore exuberant and invincible, an economic colossus which will soon have military power to match.

IV

Like all great powers, from time immemorial, we are arming for *defense*, and also to be able to assert what we believe to be our rightful rôle in the world. The organization of Communist states in East Europe led to the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine, March 12, 1947, and elaboration of the doctrine of containment. We would save Greece and the Mediterranean from Soviet control. The Marshall Plan swiftly followed, to keep West Europe from going Communist or being an empty vacuum. The Soviets replied by organizing their satellites into the Cominform, October 5, 1947, and the Communist party of Czechoslovakia seized control of that key bastion of military power in February, 1948, shocking the West deeply and leading to rising demands that lines be drawn, demands which increased during the Berlin blockade of 1948 and early 1949 and led to drastic action after the Communist invasion of the South Korean Republic had opened up the prospect of our fighting a series of debilitating wars without the Soviet armies ever being engaged.

Before Korea, however, our Government had firmly decided not to negotiate further with the Russians until we had equality, or superiority, in arms. A long series of foreign ministers conferences which always ended in deadlock had convinced our leaders that we could not deal with the Russians from a position of military inferiority. Up to 1949 we had counted on our monopoly of the atomic bomb to give us a decisive hand at the conference table, or in war if it should come. Our scientists had warned, as earnestly as men could, that the monopoly would be short, but the politicians and military men could not believe the Soviets to be capable of making in a short time the engineering effort required.

The Soviet achievement of an atomic explosion, announced September 23, 1949, accordingly produced a crisis in our policy making. Should renewed efforts be made to prevent a disastrous arms race, with atomic weapons added to all the others? Should a major effort be made to halt the Cold War itself? Our official General Advisory Committee, composed of leading scientists, proposed a compromise plan of atomic control. Chester I. Barnard, President of the Rockefeller Foundation, and one of the original authors of our atomic control plan, also counselled a change in our tactics.⁷

The chairmen of the two Senate Committees most concerned made devoted and courageous efforts to halt the deadly downward spiral. Senator Millard E. Tydings of the Armed Services Committee urged the calling of a world disarmament conference. He rejected the "monstrous defeatism" of the Acheson policy that we "must sit and sweat it out." He asked the State Department to remember that we are more vulnerable to atomic attack than Russia and to stop playing the deadly checker game with her, with the ultimate prospect of slaughtering more people than had been killed in all previous wars combined. He called for an end to the Cold War, saying that we could win it only "by strong, aggressive, imaginative diplomatic action."⁸

Senator Brien McMahon, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, also made a remarkable address on February 2, 1950, in which he described the two broad policies open to us. One was to wage the Cold War for a generation, knowing that against "such a policy in 5000 years of recorded history, which teaches again and again and again that armaments races lead to war — under today's conditions, hydrogen war!" The other policy involved "moving heaven and earth to stop the atomic arms race."⁹ The fifty billion development program to include Russia, which he proposed, won great applause from his colleagues, but no move to implement it.

The decision was for super-atomic power. On November 1, 1949, Senator Edwin C. Johnson, one of the chief watchdogs of atomic secrecy, announced in a television show that we were considering a super A-bomb. Nationwide debate resulted, though the outcome was never in doubt. On February 1, 1950, President Truman gave the order to proceed with the hydrogen bomb, evidencing the govern-

⁷*The New York Herald Tribune*, October 4, 31, December 2, 1949.

⁸*Congressional Record*, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 96, Part 2, p. 2276.

⁹*Congressional Record*, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 96, Part 1, p. 1338.

ment's decision to maintain our atomic supremacy and reject negotiations.

Justifying the decision on February 9, Secretary of State Acheson explained that the Soviet régime "is incompatible with the present achievement of a world situation which is based on peace and the maintenance of national independence and freedom." However, it could adjust itself to facts when it had to, and it was therefore our basic policy "to create strength instead of the weakness which exists in many quarters." This road would be "a very long and difficult one." It would take "continuity of purpose, perseverance, sacrifice" and "more than almost anything else, very steady nerves." The Soviet Union was like a river. You couldn't argue with it. We could only try "to extend the area of possible agreement with the Soviet Union by creating situations so strong that they can be recognized and out of them agreement can grow."

In other words, we would negotiate only when we had the military power to back up our point of view. Acheson recognized, as Tirpitz had, that we would have to pass through a danger zone on our way to supremacy, but he counted on superior nerves to see us through.

Walter Lippmann protested against this policy in some of the strongest articles of his long and distinguished career. There is, he said, "no way the American people can divest themselves of the duty to search for a decent and honorable alternative to a war of extermination. They cannot sit down, fold their hands across their stomachs, saying that their search has ended, that they have reached the limits of their wisdom, and that there is nothing more they can do except to make more and bigger bombs." That would mean the death of the American spirit.¹⁰

Other strong calls for negotiation had no effect upon the policy of "steady nerves" and "total diplomacy" which Acheson enunciated on March 9, and which apparently still means "no diplomacy with the Soviet Union." However, on March 16, Acheson did lay down seven points of difference with the Soviet Union which must be "sooner or later reconciled" if the two rival systems are to co-exist. The seven points included:

- (1) Agreement on peace settlements for Germany, Austria, and Japan that would not make them satellites of the Soviet Union;
- (2) withdrawal of Soviet military and police forces from the East-

¹⁰*The Nashville Tennessean*, February 12, 14, 1950.

ern European satellite countries and the holding of elections there in which the "true will" of the people could be expressed; (3) abandonment of the Soviet policy of obstruction in the United Nations; (4) agreement on "realistic and effective" arrangements for control of atomic weapons (5) desisting from the use of the Communist apparatus to undermine and overthrow established governments; (6) co-operation in assuring the "proper treatment" of diplomatic representatives; and (7) stopping the distortion of motives of others through false propaganda that speaks of a "capitalist encirclement" and of the United States "crafty and systematically plotting another world war."¹¹

This address was the result of long and careful preparation in the State Department. All of the top political officials contributed to it.¹² It accordingly represents the demands which the State Department may be expected to make when it has arms superiority behind it.

Of the seven points the second is obviously crucial, the evacuation of Eastern Europe and the holding of free elections, presumably to be supervised by us. Everything would probably depend on who controlled the elections.

It is possible that a majority of the workers and peasants in this region might vote for continued affiliation with the Soviet Union, inconceivable as this has now become to us, but could the Kremlin take that chance?

A demand for Soviet-Communist evacuation from East Europe would present the Soviet Government with the ultimate decision. Acceptance would mean that the chief political result of World War II, the orientation of East Europe toward the East, would be reversed. It would mean that the principal result of the Munich surrender of the British and French Governments of 1938 would be reversed. They had intended to turn East Europe over to Hitler, instead of Stalin. It would mean that the invasion gates into the Soviet Union would be open again, perhaps to a third invasion spearheaded by Germany and backed by the entire might of the Western world. Also the end of world communism would appear to be strongly indicated.

It is difficult to believe that the Soviet Government could accept the loss of East Europe without a world war, any more than we could accept the loss of West Europe without fighting.

¹¹Brookings Institution, *Current Developments in United States Foreign Policy*, Vol. III, No. 8, March, 1950, p. 1.

¹²*The New York Times*, March 19, 1950.

Yet in the interval since March 1950 we have travelled very far toward a liberation crusade, not only for East Europe but one aimed at the Soviet Union itself.

V

Consider some recent straws in the wind. On July 24, 1951, Secretary Acheson warned that the world had "never known a more ruthless or more powerful challenge to the independence of nations and the freedom of men." He advocated neither war nor weakness but "a middle course which seeks to block Soviet expansion without war by building an effective system of collective security and making it strong." That, he said, is the course we are following. But is there any middle way to meet such a ruthless challenge? Do great campaigns ever stop at mid-point?

Acheson went on to say that "the greater the effort now, the more rapidly we will pass through the present period of maximum danger." Tirpitz was never able to get through his danger zone because the British would not stand still. They out-armed him. But Acheson is confident that our immensely greater resources will carry us through.¹³

On September 17 President Truman declared that "The Soviet citizens live in fear. Their society is a jungle, through which the naked power of the Government prowls like a beast of prey, making all men afraid." This, said the *New York Times* editorially the next day, is "the literal truth." If so, can the President object if his people demand the extirpation of this beast, after he has declared Russia's tyranny to be the worst in all history?

In the same address the President also interpolated that "A Bolshevik agreement is not worth the paper it is written on. It's only a scrap of paper." This statement led columnist David Lawrence to demand the breaking of diplomatic and all other relations with Russia and her satellites, "to isolate the Communist regimes and await the day when emancipated governments, truly representative of the people, would take over the power."¹⁴

The demand was logical, and so is the conclusion that nothing can ever be settled with the Soviets by negotiation.

¹³*The New York Times*, July 25, 1951.

¹⁴*The New York Herald Tribune*, September 19, 1951.

At Wake Forest, on October 15, Mr. Truman stated firmly that "our basic objective — our only objective — is peace." We "do not think war is inevitable." He propounded again the theory that "As our defences improve, the chance of negotiating successfully with the Soviet Union will increase." We are always ready "to sit down with the Soviet Union." But when and on what terms? When Mr. Truman has the right amount of guns and bombs behind him, what will his aroused and embittered countrymen in every city in the United States demand?

It may well be that when the mountains of weapons are ready other men will decide what to do with them. On August 31, Governor Thomas E. Dewey returned from a trip to the Orient which many thought might be intended to prepare him to serve as Secretary of State. In an address on August 30 he denounced "the most evil conspiracy that ever launched itself on this earth to enslave all of the human beings in the world" and declared that "our job is to beat it wherever it sticks its head up under every circumstance." He urged that we "develop the resistance within China with all possible means" and declared that "We have to use every instrumentality at our command because in world politics things move — they never stand still." Either we would continue to lose parts of the free world "or the Iron Curtain will begin moving back."¹⁵

Can there be any serious doubt about what Dewey, who made his reputation as a gang buster, would demand and do, if backed by the armed power we are building up?

Immediately after announcing his candidacy for President, Senator Robert H. Taft said that he would hope that communism could be pushed back within the borders of Russia, and that this could be done without war.¹⁶ If the Russians should decide to stand firm, what then?

If Senator Taft should be elected President would his native caution control the great military machine? The understanding between him and General MacArthur appears to be very close, so intimate that Taft could hardly deny MacArthur the post of Defense Secretary if elected. In that event would the imperious General be controlled by a mere civilian head? Taft does not want a world war, *but would he prevent it?*

¹⁵*The New York Times*, August 31, 1951.

¹⁶Thomas L. Stokes, *The Nashville Tennessean*, October 18, 1951.

General Eisenhower was a great diplomat during World War II. I do not doubt that both President Truman and Eisenhower believe that their fundamental mission is peace. But will either resist successfully the increasing drift toward "a showdown"? In a recent interview published in a French weekly Eisenhower predicted that the armed Atlantic powers would "have to take the risk of a showdown" at the end of 1952. It would be a "delicate moment" and "a stormy one." The implication was that some kind of ultimatum would be presented to Moscow. The risk was "worth taking."¹⁷

On October 19, 1951 the *New York Times* indicated that no responsible official in the Western world could talk agreement with the Soviets on the basis of recognizing "all the Soviet conquests made thus far, and therefore abandonment of all the nations and peoples already under Soviet domination."

The implication that all the people of the West are ready to fight to liberate the East is much too sweeping. But is there an American Presidential candidate in sight who can be depended upon to control firmly the great military apparatus now being created, and who will stand for adjustment, compromise, and the essential minimum of toleration between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.?

In the climate of opinion already created the Crusade for Freedom, which is currently gathering funds on a nation-wide basis, has added importance in preparing the minds of millions of Americans for the liberation of Eastern Europe.

The ultimate end of this crusade is clearly indicated by the revelation in the *New York Times* on November 4, 1951, that Representative Charles J. Kersten, Wisconsin Republican, had sponsored a \$100,000,000 appropriation in the Mutual Security Act for the purpose of aiding "underground liberation movements in the communist countries" and that this sum is now available for that purpose, though it is not specifically stated in the act.

In other words, we are about to embark on subversive war in countries with which we are not at war officially — if a proposed UN code of offenses against the peace and security of mankind does not intervene by outlawing all such activities. Lest the United Nations raise its voice against subversive warfare, however instigated and financed, twenty-six Republican members of the House of Representatives, led by Walter H. Judd of Minnesota, cabled Secretary

¹⁷"The General Talks," *The Nation*, November 10, 1951, p. 389.

Acheson on November 11 to oppose the proposed code on the ground that it would bind only us, while "the tyrannies" would ignore it, even if they signed.¹⁸

While Judd and his colleagues were fighting to prevent the outlawry of subversive war, House Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin, Republican, of Massachusetts, was in Taipeh, Formosa telling Chiang Kai-shek that "nobody can stop the United States from arming and equipping free China and bolstering her hopes of recovering the mainland." To emphasize that we are going to liberate China, as well as East Europe, Martin brought a message from General MacArthur to Chiang "that American sympathy is increasing all the time" and assured him "that China's anti-Communist war will end in final victory."¹⁹

This drive of the American Asia-Firsters makes our liberation crusade truly global. And the espousal of subversive war takes us far toward the adoption of all the methods of totalitarianism, in the name of "liberation." The ultimate end of this road is a fascist dictatorship dedicated to the suppression of world communism. We may not go that far, but the "fighting fire with fire" argument can rapidly merge into acceptance of the communist dogma that the end ("liberation") justifies any means.

The liberation crusade reached a new high point on October 27, 1951, when two of our great-circulation magazines gave it tremendous boosts. On that day the *Saturday Evening Post* published an article by British Major General J. F. C. Fuller urging us to be "astute enough to wage a war of disintegration within the U.S.S.R. and its satellite countries, not only after the outbreak of war but from this very moment." This war of disintegration must be "ultra offensive." We must train the refugees "and form them into the nuclei of national armies, around which the enslaved peoples can build up their fighting forces on or after the outbreak of war." We must "make ready on a vast scale all the requirements of guerrilla warfare: the provision of arms, ammunition, explosives, medical stores, rations, radios, as well as earmark the aircraft needed to carry them," ready for the moment "when the flag falls."

On the same day *Collier's* published an entire issue devoted to "Russia's Defeat and Occupation, 1952-1960." In this "Preview of

¹⁸*The Nashville Tennessean*, November 12, 1951.

¹⁹*The Nashville Tennessean*, November 19, 1951.

the War We Do Not Want" thirty-four famous authors collaborated, all operating from a 60,000 word blueprint which was prepared in consultation with "high level Washington officials." The Russians began the war with an attack on Marshal Tito's life. After some months they A-bombed Detroit, New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Washington, but it was only after they had dropped atomic bombs on some of the cities a second time, months later, that we A-bombed Moscow. The war was a frightful ordeal for us, but we stuck to the policy of destroying Russian industries, instead of people. A terrible plague raged through Russia, but the Russians were well supplied with food, there being "plenty of horses and oxen" and the peasants "somehow remembered their handicraft patterns."

Afterwards, there was "a huge, excited demand for anything foreign and western," the newsstands were "loaded down" with our magazines printed in Russian, only the black market in high-heeled shoes survived and the women of Moscow crowded the Moscow stadium to see an American fashion show. There is a picture of this scene under the caption "Fashion-starved Moscow women jammed huge Dynamo Stadium for their first style show — even though only a handful could see stage clearly." Other photographs picture our "Guys and Dolls" being produced in a Moscow Theater, and the cover shows an American M. P. dominating a map of the Soviet Union with his bayonet.

One of the stated aims of the issue was "to warn the evil masters of the Russian people that *their* vast conspiracy to enslave humanity is the dark downhill road to World War III." The leading editorial put everything up to the men in the Kremlin. They "must make the choice. They can roll up the Iron Curtain. Or they can start a war and have it shot down." This "either or" antithesis was driven home in succeeding paragraphs.

The issue demonstrated clearly that the Soviet régime is so completely vicious that it must end. The various authors ended the Soviet Union with finality in the year 1955 and devoted many pages to treating it as a thing of the past.

Collier's doubtless intended to deter the Soviet Union from striking while we are passing through the danger zone, but what would we think if a Soviet magazine devoted an entire issue to depicting a Russian conquest and sovietization of the United States? Would we think that the Russians were determined to avoid war with us?

The character of *Collier's* authors also indicates that it is later than we thought. With one or two exceptions, none of the powerful group of speakers and writers who have for years been steadily preparing us for war with Russia is included. On the contrary, the magazine is filled with articles by people of moderate, liberal, humane reputations, not hitherto associated with war with the Soviets.

Collier's great effort to describe the liberation of all the Soviet-ruled peoples led William R. Mathews, the editor and publisher of the *Arizona Daily Star*, to write a remarkable letter which appears in the *New York Times* of October 31, 1951, in which he warned that "we are being shouted into a catastrophic war by the opinion makers of our country." But instead of a glorious ending, with the Soviet peoples gladly welcoming us, and our ways and products, he predicted that such a war of "liberation" would be "as such a war for unlimited and unattainable objectives," and that "it would almost certainly end as a stalemate of exhaustion," with much of Europe devastated and most Europeans bitterly resenting the bloodshed and destruction of being liberated.

VI

This brings us to the crux of our present situation, and it introduces a new factor which may prevent the final destruction of Western civilization. On past experience the student of balance of power arms races would have to conclude that we have already passed the point of no return, that the ideological preparation for war, plus the momentum of the arms race, makes the result "inevitable." This is the more likely since this is the first time that the American people have ever really entered the game of power politics. We are a people which plays all its games, from athletics to world wars, not to create a condition of stalemate acceptable to both sides, but to win. The Russians have alarmed and frustrated us and we believe we have the power to end their disturbance to our lives. We have already worked ourselves into what Thomas L. Stokes recently called "a muddled, immature emotional state" in which our Government "can't move in the direction of negotiation."²⁰ We are rapidly moving toward a decision that the world cannot exist "half slave and half free" and that the Iron Curtain must come down.

²⁰*The Nashville Tennessean*, October 31, 1951.

Yet the new factor may prevent this arms race from rolling through to its logical conclusion. That new factor is the inability of the two great antagonists to get at each other decisively. One is a great sea and air power, the other a great land and air power. One is protected by oceans and polar wastes, the other by nearly limitless land spaces and buffer zones. Each can hurt the other terribly, but in the end neither is likely to be able to carry through a conquest and occupation that would be conclusive, though either may bankrupt and destroy itself in the effort.

This new factor also works with powerful impact in Europe. The Soviet Union cannot attack Western Europe without running the gravest risk of losing Eastern Europe, for after our great bombers had done their work it is unlikely that she would be able to maintain her power up to the Elbe, or the Oder.

Conversely, the United States cannot drive the Communists out of Eastern Europe without destroying Western Europe. The clouds of Russian bombers are too close to the small industrial district which is the heart of West Europe, and to the pinpoint on the map which is urbanized Britain. Our atomic stockpile may be far superior to Russia's, but they must be presumed to have enough A-bombs, or H-bombs, to destroy every great city in West Europe. In the early stages they would probably not wish to destroy cities they expected to occupy, a consideration which is small comfort to the West Europeans.

With one or two small exceptions these peoples have all suffered the agonies of occupation recently, and few of them believe they could survive another, particularly a Russian occupation. They have all endured the terrors of liberation and they cannot face that prospect again. As Anthony Eden put it in Chicago recently, continental Europe "has no interest in being liberated," because the "scourge" of another occupation "would have swept all away long before a liberating soldier could land upon the foreshore."²¹

This is the voice of conservative England, but many Europeans go much further. Lord Strabolgi asserted at the recent Labour Party conference that the United States is as guilty as the Soviet Union for the tension in the world today, and Raymond Daniell reported that

²¹*The New York Times*, August 21, 1951.

similar speeches made at that conference reflected a belief that "is held not only throughout the Labor party but in Britain generally."²²

We can arm West Europe up to a point, but we cannot lead her in a crusade to liberate East Europe. The West Europeans know that the last two wars have toppled them from world rule to weakness and dependence. They know they cannot stand another.

On November 1, after a two weeks trip through Britain and France, Edward R. Murrow of the Columbia Broadcasting System made a broadcast from Paris which is deeply arresting. He found in both Britain and France "great and perhaps growing apprehension about the development of our future policy . . . a real and abiding fear" about "what we will do with our tremendous military might when we get it." Every reckless and irresponsible utterance in the United States increases this fear that we will precipitate a conflict which "would destroy utterly these two countries regardless of the outcome." Our allies are straining their economies to the breaking point to rearm, but "they know and feel that they could not survive another war."

About our intention to negotiate only when we get into a dominant and superior position, a French leader had said to Murrow: "Dominant and superior nations never negotiate! They don't have to!"

Everywhere he found fear that we will drive "the Russians to make the final desperate gamble." He had "talked with no one in public or private life who does not share this apprehension." Finding it so general was "one of the most profoundly disturbing things this reporter has ever encountered." Many people in Europe have "come to believe that we are a greater threat to peace than the Soviet Union." We have "failed to convince our friends that we will use our power with wisdom and discretion."

VII

Murrow's report reveals clearly the abyss before which we stand, and also the imponderable which works against another great war. The Europeans know that "dominant and superior nations never negotiate." They don't have to, they dictate. But the Europeans cannot permit us to use the full weight of our coming arms superiority, lest they themselves be destroyed. They must strive to prevent the

²²*The New York Times*, October 4, 1951.

final deluge, even if they should be constrained to deny us the use of their European and African air bases.

This balance of power conflict cannot be played through to its logical conclusion without destroying the very thing we seek to preserve. In our conflict with world communism we must therefore avoid the use of that most revolutionary of all weapons — world war — and leave something to time and evolution. In the last two global wars we got communism from Berlin to Shanghai, a thing which never could have happened without the disrupting, explosive effects of those wars. This time we must summon all the wisdom and discretion of which we are capable to conserve what is left of the Western world, and to see that it is not further diminished in the desolation of another world war.

It will not be enough to trust to the desperately war weary people of West Europe to keep the two giant powers from a final death grapple. They can and will try, but the decisive restraining influence must come from the place where the dominant power lies — in the American people. The average American citizen feels helpless to halt the course of events. Yet he must recognize that the coming “show-down” is the ultimate crisis for democracy itself and do what he can. It is even more vital that the many thousands of lesser American leaders should live up to their responsibilities, during the two or three years of decision that are left to us.

The urgency of the issue was brought out sharply in an article by Demaree Bess in the *Saturday Evening Post* on November 24, 1951 under the heading “How Close is War With Russia?” He reported that in Washington “the target year,” the “year in which the United States will be in a position to fight an all-out war with Russia,” has been moved recently from 1953 to 1954. However, there is little reassurance in this advance of the time table, because “a fatalistic feeling has pervaded both major political parties” that we can solve the world’s problems only by destroying the Soviet empire in another war. Bess warned that the same men who are now running our affairs lately carried us through a “smash-bang” world war which did not have the results they expected, and he urged that we demand of them a careful study of the only alternative to another global war, the striking of “some kind of balance, however uneasy it may be,” between the Soviet Union and the United States.²³

²³Pages 107-8.

Can the greatest of democracies do what has never been done before, prevent the internal dynamics of a balance of power arms race from grinding all the way to disaster — this time the catastrophe of atomic war and world-wide chaos?

This fateful issue is formidable enough, but it must be grappled with, because it is inescapable and because all of our hopes for living decent lives and enjoying the fruits of our labor depend on the way it is met.