



American Academy of Political and Social Science

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Source: *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 277, Report on China (Sep., 1951), pp. 167-176

Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. in association with the American Academy of Political and Social Science

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1030262>

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The Pattern of Sino-Soviet Treaties, 1945-1950

By WILLIAM B. BALLIS

A QUESTION which continuously presents itself in the forecasting of developments in the Korean war is the treaty relationship between the Chinese People's Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This relationship is based, according to the open record, on the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Aid, signed February 14, 1950,¹ in which the high contracting parties agree that they will "undertake jointly to adopt all necessary measures at their disposal for the purpose of preventing the resumption of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state that may collaborate with Japan directly or indirectly in acts of aggression." It further states that "in the event of one of the Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or any state allied with her and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal."²

¹ *The Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements* (pamphlet, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1950), pp. 6-8. Text of the Treaty and Agreements is also in *New York Times*, Feb. 15, 1950.

² It is interesting to note that the pattern employed by the Soviet Union in signing a treaty with China concerning "Japan or any state allied with her" as the common enemy bears resemblance to the pattern followed in the treaties of friendship, alliance and mutual aid signed by the U.S.S.R. with Rumania on February 4, 1948, and with Hungary on February 18, 1948. The treaty with Rumania, for instance, provides that the U.S.S.R. and Rumania "would jointly undertake all measures at their disposal to eliminate any threat of aggression on the part of Germany or any other state formerly allied to Germany or any other state uniting with Germany," and that in the event that either country became "in-

This treaty is to remain in force for thirty years, and thereafter for further periods of five years unless one of the parties declares its intention to denounce the agreement one year previous to the expiration of the agreement. When the Chinese Communist government announced the treaty, the official New Chinese News Agency asserted that "the pact was designed to prevent jointly the resurgence of Japanese imperialism and aggressive acts by other nations conspiring with Japan for renewed aggression."³

ANTI-AMERICAN ATTITUDE

On the occasion of the signing of the treaty, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky stated that the treaty "sealed the historic ties between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the Chinese peoples."⁴ Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai went much further and added that

the friendship, alliance and mutual assistance between China and the Soviet Union are sealed now with the signed treaty. The imperialist bloc headed by American imperialism resorted to all kinds of provocative methods attempting to frustrate the friendship between our Powers, but these ignominious attempts utterly failed.⁵

involved in hostilities with Germany or any other state directly or indirectly allied to Germany, the other country would immediately render all military and other assistance." The treaties further stated that the U.S.S.R., Rumania, and Hungary would consult each other "on all important international problems involving their common interests." *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Feb. 21-28, 1948, p. 9118.

³ *New York Times*, Feb. 15, 1950.

⁴ *U.S.S.R. Information Bulletin*, March 10, 1950, p. 138.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

The tenor of the Chinese Foreign Minister's remarks indicates that the treaty is in part directed against the United States. The leading editorial in *Pravda* on the first anniversary of the treaty gives further evidence of this view:

There is no need to demonstrate that the revival of Japanese militarism and the creation of a hotbed of imperialist aggression in Japan portends the gravest threat to peace in the Far East. Furthermore, it is a well-known fact that the American imperialists are seeking to achieve precisely this goal: they are reviving the Japanese army and Japanese war industry; they are supporting the Japanese irredentists; and they are devising a separate deal with Japanese reaction to disrupt the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan based on democratic foundations.⁶

An anti-American attitude is therefore implicit in *Pravda's* declaration that the "chief purpose" of the Sino-Soviet treaty "is to prevent the resurgence of aggression on the part of Japan or any other state directly or indirectly linked with Japan in acts of aggression."

TRANSFER OF TERRITORY AND PROPERTY

Accompanying the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Aid between the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union were several agreements relating to economic matters. The first of these dealt with the transfer of the Chinese Changchun Railway, Port Arthur, and Dairen to the Chinese Government. Its introductory paragraph takes into account

that since 1945, fundamental changes have occurred in the situation in the Far East, namely: imperialist Japan has suffered defeat; the reactionary Kuomintang Government has been overthrown; China has be-

⁶ *Soviet Press Translations*, April 15, 1951, p. 212.

come a People's Democratic Republic; a new People's Government has been established in China which has unified the whole of China. . . .⁷

Article 1 of the agreement provides that

both Contracting Parties agree that the Soviet Government transfer without compensation to the Government of the People's Republic of China all its rights to joint administration of the Chinese Changchun Railway with all the property belonging to the Railway. The transfer shall be effected immediately after the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, but not later than the end of 1952.

Article 2 of the agreement states that

both Contracting Parties agree that Soviet troops be withdrawn from the jointly-utilized naval base Port Arthur, and that the installations in this area be handed over to the Government of the People's Republic of China immediately on the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, but not later than the end of 1952.⁸

The transfer of Dairen to the Soviet Union is the subject of Article 3 of the agreement, in which

both Contracting Parties agree that the question of Dairen harbor be further considered on the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. As regards the administration of Dairen, it is in the hands of the Government of the People's Republic of China. All the property in Dairen now temporarily administered by or leased to the Soviet Union, shall be taken over by the Government of the People's Republic of China.

⁷ *The Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements*, pp. 9-13.

⁸ A succeeding paragraph in the same article, however, enables the U.S.S.R. to make joint use of the naval base at Port Arthur (on China's proposal and in agreement with her) "for the purpose of conducting joint military operations against the aggressor" in the event that either party becomes a victim of attack on the part of Japan or any state collaborating with her.

The agreement further states that the measures transferring Dairen "shall be fully carried out in the course of 1950."

CREDITS TO CHINA

The second agreement which accompanied the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Aid, also dated February 14, 1950, covered the question of credits by the U.S.S.R. to the Chinese People's Republic.⁹ Article 1 of this agreement specifies that "the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic grants to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, a credit which in terms of American dollars, amounts of US\$300,000,000, taking 35 American dollars to one ounce of fine gold." The Soviet government agreed to grant this credit at an interest rate of only 1 per cent per annum. The credit is to be

granted over a period of five years starting January 1, 1950, in equal portions of one-fifth of the credit per year, to be used in payment for deliveries from the U.S.S.R. of equipment and materials including equipment for electric power stations, metallurgical and engineering plants, mining equipment for the extraction of coal and ores, railway and other transport equipment, rails and other materials for the restoration and development of the national economy of China.

The Chinese are to pay for the credits in the manner prescribed in Article 3 of the agreement: "The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China shall repay the credit mentioned in Article 1, together with the interest thereon, in deliveries of raw materials, tea, gold and American dollars." Amounts and prices of commodities are to be determined by special agreements and on the basis of prices on the world markets. Credits are to be repaid in ten equal install-

⁹ *The Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements*, pp. 15-17.

ments, the first made not later than December 31, 1954, and the last not later than December 31, 1964.

SECRET CODICILS REPORTED

On the day after the announcement of the signing of the treaty and agreements, it was reported that secret codicils to the treaty had been signed.¹⁰ These were purported to have put many new burdens on China in respect to giving over Chinese ports to the Soviets, allowing parts of the Chinese economy to be controlled by Soviet personnel, allocating sections of China as residential districts for Soviet immigrants, sending several million Chinese laborers to work in the Soviet Union, and other items. It is obviously impossible to authenticate these conditions exacted from the Chinese, but it is growing more apparent each day that the Soviets are exercising more influence and control over the internal as well as the foreign policies of the Chinese People's Republic.¹¹

JOINT STOCK COMPANIES AND TRADE AGREEMENTS

On March 27, 1950, additional economic agreements affecting Sinkiang province were signed by China and the Soviet Union. These provide for the establishment of two Chinese-Soviet joint stock companies¹² to exploit oil

¹⁰ *New York Times*, Feb. 16, 1950, p. 1.

¹¹ Occasionally the Soviet press refers to numerous Soviet advisers helping the Chinese Government in different technical problems. See Leonid Vysokoostrovsky, "Peking in September," *Ogonyok*, No. 40, Oct. 1940, in *Soviet Press Translations*, Dec. 15, 1950, p. 68. For a very revealing statement on the number of Soviet technical advisers in China over a year ago, see C. Y. W. Meng, "Sino-Soviet Relations," *China Weekly Review*, Vol. 117, No. 2 (March 11, 1950), p. 23.

¹² The pattern of the joint stock company with the U.S.S.R. as a holder of half of the stock developed in the postwar Sovietization of eastern Europe. Joint stock companies,

and nonferrous metals, respectively. The production, profits, and expenditures of the two enterprises are to be divided equally between China and the U.S.S.R.

Simultaneously, another agreement was signed for the setting up of a Chinese-Soviet joint stock company for civil aviation, providing "for the organization and exploitation of the following civil airlines: Peking-Chita, Peking-Irkutsk, Peking-Alma-Ata."¹³ This agreement—unlike the others, which are valid for thirty years—extends for only ten years.

On April 19, 1950, the Soviet Government announced the conclusion in Moscow of a Sino-Soviet trade agreement and an agreement on turnover of goods for 1950.¹⁴ These agreements apparently implemented the trade agreement of February 14, 1950. The most recently reported agreement in the economic area, signed at Peking on March 14, 1951, establishes through rail connections between China and the Soviet Union. This agreement unites China with the U.S.S.R. and with the Soviet European satellites in a common railway freight and passenger system with respect to tickets, bills of lading, contracts of carriage, and so forth.¹⁵ The agreement does not mention the conversion of gauges, which is the greatest technical stumbling block to a unified rail system of the Soviet world.

On June 15, 1951 an additional agreement was signed by China and the Soviet Union providing for an exchange of goods by both parties, which "will

with Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary each holding the other half interest, are important vehicles for the exercise of Soviet economic control. Furthermore, in Northern Korea joint stock companies for oil and transport were established in 1947.

¹³ U.S.S.R. *Information Bulletin*, April 14, 1950, pp. 202-3.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, April 28, 1950, pp. 239-40.

¹⁵ *Christian Science Monitor*, April 24, 1951.

greatly exceed that of last year." Simultaneously the two parties concluded a second agreement covering the supply of matériel and equipment by the U.S.S.R. to China for 1951 under the \$300,000,000 credit originally granted by Moscow to Peking February 14, 1950.^{15a}

HISTORICAL SETTING OF 1950 AND 1945 TREATIES COMPARED

The treaty between the Chinese Nationalist Government and the Soviet Union concluded on August 14, 1945¹⁶ differed considerably from the 1950 treaty. One of the differences was the historical setting. The 1945 treaty and its supplementary agreements had been preceded by preliminary negotiations between Stalin and Roosevelt at Yalta. China was not fully apprised of all the requests to be made of her. To be sure, Chiang Kai-shek had given his consent at Cairo (1943) to have Dairen made a free port, "provided there was no impairment of Chinese sovereignty."¹⁷ However, the other concessions which Russia was demanding of China were not taken up directly with China until they had first been discussed with President Roosevelt. These concessions—the independence of Outer Mongolia, the return of Port Arthur, and the recovery of the Manchurian railways—were, as far as the record reveals, omitted from any discussion with China.¹⁸

Another feature of the historical background of the 1945 treaty which was not

^{15a} *New York Times*, June 22, 1951.

¹⁶ Texts of this treaty and supplementary agreements are in *United States Relations with China*, Department of State Publication 3573, Far Eastern Series 30, Aug. 1949, pp. 585-96. See also A. K. Wu, *China and the Soviet Union*, London: Methuen, 1950.

¹⁷ *U. S. Relations with China*, p. 558.

¹⁸ See J. Patrick White, "New Light on Yalta," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. XIX, No. 11 (May 31, 1950), pp. 105-12.

present in 1950 was the difference in the internal political situation in China. Chiang was deeply concerned in 1945 over the Kuomintang's decline in the control of China and the corresponding rising strength of the Chinese Communists. Possibly Chiang thought that if he did not placate the U.S.S.R. there would probably be a military bond in addition to the ideological nexus between the Chinese Communists and the Soviets. Chiang indicated to Vice President Wallace that he "would go more than halfway in reaching an understanding with the U.S.S.R."¹⁹

The United States was committed to bringing the war with Japan to the quickest possible end with minimum losses. To do this, its military planners considered it necessary that China contribute as effectively as possible in the common war against Japan. This involved the United States in the policy of trying to bring together the Chinese and the Russians, which implied a rapprochement between the Chinese government and the Chinese Communists.²⁰ The work of United States officials in 1944 to bring the Soviet Union and China closer together was the prelude to the Yalta Agreements. The United States had been counting for some time on Soviet assistance in the war with Japan. As early as 1943, Stalin had said that the Soviet Union would join in the battle in the Far East.²¹ By the time of the Yalta Conference in February 1945, American plans for the Allied invasion of Japan were well advanced. The need for air bases from which United States planes could operate, and the necessity for containing the Japanese Kwantung army in Manchuria, were the military considerations

behind the Yalta Agreement. On the Chinese side, better relations with the Soviet Union were needed.

Stalin well knew the fortune which had fallen to him in that both China and the United States wanted something from him. As former Secretary of State Byrnes wrote, "once Stalin knew our plans for invasion were under way, he knew also that we would want his armies and he could demand more for them. Mr. Stalin is not bashful about making demands."²²

CONCESSIONS AT YALTA

While Stalin's demands upon Outer Mongolia, Port Arthur, and the Manchurian railways were ultimately accepted by Chiang, the sad fact remains that they were granted without Chiang's participation in the preliminary discussions. This omission, necessary as it was for military considerations, contributed in part to the ultimate downfall of the Chinese Nationalist Government.

Former Secretary of State Stettinius later wrote that "President Roosevelt did not 'surrender' anything significant at Yalta which it was within his power to withhold."²³ Walter Lippmann has expressed a similar view: "The concessions which Roosevelt and Churchill made to Stalin in the Far East were less than the Soviet Union had the power to take by its own force. Nothing was in fact conceded to Stalin that Roosevelt and Churchill could, if they had been put to the test, have been able to hold."²⁴ George E. Taylor, however, replies to this argument as follows:

If there is any validity to the argument that we agreed to the restoration of the

¹⁹ *U. S. Relations with China*, p. 558.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 560.

²¹ E. R. Stettinius, Jr., *Roosevelt and the Russians* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1949), p. 91.

²² James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York: Harper, 1947), p. 43.

²³ Stettinius, *op cit.*, p. 306.

²⁴ Walter Lippmann, *The Cold War* (New York: Harper, 1947), p. 37.

Russian imperialist position of 1904 at Yalta because the Russians were in a position to take anything they wanted, then it was hardly necessary for us to seal the betrayal with a kiss. But if the Russians could take anything they wished, then it must have been assumed that they were going to enter the war; in which case they should have paid for it.²⁵

With respect to Outer Mongolia, the Yalta Agreement stated that "the status quo in Outer Mongolia (Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved."²⁶ The independence of Outer Mongolia was eventually recognized by China in the Sino-Soviet treaty of August 14, 1945, on the condition that the people of Outer Mongolia express their desire for independence in a plebiscite.²⁷ The Yalta Agreement provided that "the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored."²⁸ The corresponding Sino-Soviet agreement of 1945 went beyond the original meaning of safeguarding "pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union" by including the lease to Russia of "wharfs and warehouses" in an agreed apportionment.²⁹ With respect to Port Arthur, the agreement went further than the Yalta Agreement by extending "the boundary of that area farther than the United States expected, though not to the pre-1904 boundary which the U.S.S.R. would have preferred."³⁰

The Yalta Agreement on railways was as follows:

²⁵ George E. Taylor, "An Effective Approach in Asia," *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Winter 1950), p. 32.

²⁶ *U. S. Relations with China*, cited note 16 *supra*, p. 113.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 588.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 589.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchuria Railroad, which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company, it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria.³¹

This was a most important concession, not originally regarded as such by President Roosevelt, who "had in mind only transit traffic and not any general Russian interest in Manchuria."³² But Stalin apparently had in mind far-reaching implications, because the supplementary agreement to the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945, concerning the railway, stated that these interests included acquired lands and auxiliary railway lines.³³ The manner of stating what is to be included in the railway system "can only be characterized as a masterpiece of carefully concealed drafting."³⁴

For her part, China obtained in the treaty system of 1945 a pledge that "the Government of the U.S.S.R. agrees to render to China moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources, such support and aid to be entirely given to the National Government as the central government of China."³⁵ Furthermore, the Soviet Union promised to regard Manchuria as part of China and to respect China's sovereignty over Manchuria, as well as to recognize the territorial and administrative integrity of Manchuria.³⁶ The Soviet government also stated that it would not interfere in the internal af-

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 593.

³⁴ Raymond Dennett, "Sino-Soviet Treaty and Reparations," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. XV, No. 17 (Aug. 28, 1946), p. 258.

³⁵ *U. S. Relations with China*, cited note 16 *supra*, p. 587.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

fairs of China, including the developments in Sinkiang.

According to the material presented by the United States Department of State, the Chinese were satisfied with the results of the treaty.³⁷ It was natural for Chiang to think that Sino-Soviet relations had been stabilized and that Moscow would help to bring the Chinese Communists toward closer co-operation with the Nationalist government. This hopeful development did not come about. Instead, on October 1, 1949, a Chinese Communist government was proclaimed and subsequently recognized by the Soviet Union. This created a new basis for the treaty relationships between the two countries.

1950 TREATY BUILT ON 1945 TREATY

In the exchange of notes between the Chinese and Soviet Foreign Ministers when the 1950 treaty and agreements were signed, it was stated that the "corresponding treaty and agreements concluded August 14, 1945, have become invalid."³⁸ Although many of the provisions of the 1945 treaty and agreements were superseded in 1950, yet the 1945 treaty served as a foundation on which the structure of Soviet expansion could be legitimately built. The 1950 agreements, for example, provide that both governments "affirm complete guarantee of the independent status of the Mongolian People's Republic as a result of the referendum of 1945 and the establishment with her of diplomatic relations by the Chinese People's Republic."³⁹ This is the most definitive statement on the independence of Outer

Mongolia, which is what the Soviets had been striving for since 1924.

On the question of Port Arthur, while the 1950 agreement states that the Soviets turn over to the Chinese their share of the installations and withdraw their troops, the Soviets retain the right of using the naval base of Port Arthur "for the purpose of conducting joint military operations against the aggressor."

With regard to Dairen, the 1950 agreement does not completely give up all Soviet control, for it provides that "the question of Dairen harbor be further considered on the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan." The Soviet government does, however, agree to turn over to China the property which is "now temporarily administered by or leased to the Soviet Union." This transfer is to be effected in 1950. How this ambiguity over "Dairen harbor" will be clarified remains to be seen.

The 1950 agreement on the Manchurian railways does indicate a marked change of Soviet policy on this question. The Soviet government agrees to "transfer without compensation to the Government of the People's Republic of China all its rights to joint administration of the Chinese Changchun Railway with all the property belonging to the Railway" by 1952.

The 1950 agreement to extend credits to China to the amount of \$300,000,000 over a five-year period covers a matter which was not in the 1945 agreements in such a specific form. The 1945 agreement did provide for giving to China "aid in military supplies and other material resources." The supplemental 1950 agreements on joint stock companies for oil and nonferrous metals in Sinkiang and for civil aviation represent a new development. In some respects the Chinese Changchun Railway which was to have been set up by one of the agreements of August 14, 1945,

³⁷ "On August 16, 1945, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek informed Ambassador Hurley that agreement had been reached with the Soviet Union and that he was generally satisfied with the treaty." *Ibid.*, p. 120.

³⁸ *New York Times*, Feb. 15, 1950.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

was a joint stock company, but it was not officially designated as such.

Perhaps the most significant difference between the 1950 treaty and the 1945 treaty is found in the nature of the military alliance between China and the U.S.S.R. The 1950 obligation is regarded as a very binding one by General George C. Marshall,⁴⁰ who said on May 10, 1951 that the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought that the Soviet Union would be called upon under the treaty to go to China's aid should the United States take military action on the Chinese mainland. The 1945 treaty was theoretically a military alliance, but it was not so clearly oriented toward the West as is the 1950 alliance. In both treaties, the proscription of "the resumption of aggression by Japan" is given as the basis for such an alliance, but in the 1950 treaty the addition of "or any other state that may collaborate in any way with Japan in acts of aggression"⁴¹ is an extension to cover other potential enemies which would have to be Western powers. *Izvestiya* and *Pravda*, in articles commemorating the first anniversary of the 1950 treaty, identified the United States specifically as the "other state."⁴²

Both the treaties have provisions in which the parties to them promise "not to conclude any alliance and not to take any part in any coalition against the other."⁴³ The inclusion of this in the

1950 treaty seems quite superfluous. A plausible explanation might be that the Soviets want to continue in the 1950 treaty as much of the language of the 1945 treaty as possible.

PATTERN OF TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS AS A WHOLE

Certain features of Russian imperialistic expansion⁴⁴ and Soviet communist ideological doctrine are present in the forces behind these treaties and agreements. There is no question that the idea of Russian national expansion was present in the mind of Stalin when he negotiated with President Roosevelt at Yalta. Shortly after the defeat of Japan, on September 2, 1945, the Soviet leader said, "for forty years we, the men of the older generation, have waited for this day."⁴⁵ Not only was the recovery of the position which Russia had in 1904 the goal behind the treaty and agreements made with China, but also the building of a power relationship with China which was to be used against Japan. The 1950 treaty equated the common enemy with any power which might unite with Japan. This was further strengthened by the new relationship with China and by the development of the cold war.

This new relationship with China was not primarily based on the treaty structure, but on Soviet communist ideology. While both treaties mention respect for the sovereignty and integrity of China, Sino-Soviet relations have been given a

⁴⁰ *Military Situation in the Far East. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Second Congress, First Session, Part 1* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 480.

⁴¹ Preamble to the treaty (author's italics).

⁴² See *Izvestiya* and *Pravda*, Feb. 14, 1951.

⁴³ *U. S. Relations with China*, cited note 16 *supra*, p. 586. In the 1950 treaty, the text reads, "Each Contracting Party undertakes not to conclude any alliance directed against the other Contracting Party and not to take part in any coalition or in any actions or

measures directed against the other Contracting Party" (Article 3).

⁴⁴ See Robert C. North, "The Sino-Soviet Agreements of 1950," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. XIX, No. 13 (July 12, 1950), pp. 125-30; N. Wing Mah, "Sino-Soviet Relations in Retrospect," *The Russian Review*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Oct. 1950), pp. 267-74.

⁴⁵ Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Information Bulletin, Sept. 6, 1945, p. 2.

different orientation by the new concept of China as a sister republic to the U.S.S.R., with a parallel Communist Party and with a somewhat similar governmental structure which is inextricably interwoven with that party. Important as is the parallelism in party structure between the Soviet Communist Party and the Chinese Communist Party, the most significant binding force is the ideology which directs the foreign policies of the two states. "Marxism-Leninism forms their basically identical foreign policies into a monolith resting on mutual friendship and common interest."⁴⁶

With China being transformed into a People's Republic, which according to Communist theory is a transitional stage before the socialist stage, in which the Soviet Union is the only one at present, the obligation of China is to join her foreign policy to that of the Soviet Union. This involves accepting the primacy of the Soviet Union. Over a decade ago Mao Tse-tung wrote in *China's New Democracy* that the Chinese people would maintain the policy of "taking the hand of friendship offered by the socialist country, the Soviet Union, and the international proletariat."⁴⁷

The nature of this new relationship was stated by Molotov shortly after the signing of the treaty of February 14, 1950 in the following remarks to an election audience in Moscow:

After the October Revolution in our country, the victory of the people's liberation movement in China is another tremendous blow against the whole system of world imperialism and all present day plans

for imperialist aggression. It is understandable that close friendly relations have been established between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic. The Treaty of Fraternal Alliance between the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China, concluded in February, transformed Soviet-Chinese friendship into a great and mighty force for consolidating universal peace such as has no equal and has never had an equal in human history.⁴⁸

SOVIET INFLUENCE ON CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

While it is difficult to document the degree of actual Soviet control of Chinese Communist foreign policy, it is self-evident that the Soviets are occupying key positions as advisers not only to the Chinese Communist army, but also to the party and the government, and are thereby exercising a strong directing role in the determination of that policy. This places the structure of formal treaties and agreements in a degree of importance incidental to the "higher" norms of Communist ideology. To the Politburo in Moscow and to the Politburo in Peking, questions of diplomatic relations covered by formal treaties are only superficial accouterments of international relations in the transitional period leading to world communism. They are resorted to in order to serve the Soviet Union in facilitating that goal which according to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine will inevitably be reached.

One of Stalin's favorite quotations from Lenin is very indicative of this concept of the relations between states:

We are living not merely in a state but in a system of states and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable.

⁴⁸ Quoted in Max Beloff, "Soviet Policy in China," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XXIII, No. 2 (June 1950), p. 136.

⁴⁶ H. Arthur Steiner, "Mainsprings of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Jan. 1950), p. 85.

⁴⁷ Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report on "The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism," *Supplement III, Country Studies C. Communism in China*, 1948, p. 29.

able. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable.⁴⁹

The Soviet Union regards itself as the center of control of world revolution, and therefore each country in the process of socialist revolution has to follow the pattern prescribed by the Soviet Union. Communist doctrine does not preclude treaties and agreements between the Communist states, but merely

puts them in a different perspective from those between Communist and non-Communist states. What applies to the Communist satellites in eastern Europe can be said to cover in some respects the international relations between the U.S.S.R. and China. "From the Soviet point of view there should be no 'international relations' in the traditional meaning of the words between the U.S.S.R. and the satellite countries. They are to be replaced by relations of a 'new' or 'special' or 'higher' type."⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Quoted in J. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1940), p. 156.

⁵⁰ Samuel L. Sharp, "Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XXVI, No. 16 (Jan. 1, 1951), p. 182.

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