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BRITISH POLICY AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR

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Historians have found British records to be an invaluable source for understanding the origins of the Cold War. According to some scholars these records demonstrate that the Cold War was not a bipolar affair. They show that British officials shared the fears and concerns of Americans about the potential of a Soviet threat. Indeed some analysts believe that the British alerted and prodded the Americans to assume a bolder posture against Soviet/Communist expansionism. But at the same time the British were also aware that their interests did not always coincide with those of the United States and that it was important to try to maintain a degree of autonomy if they were to preserve their great power status.

British historians have done a wonderful job illuminating and debating the degree of continuity between the foreign policies of the Conservative government of Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden and those of the Labour Party headed by Clement Attlee and Ernest Bevin. Although tactics changed after Churchill lost the election in July 1945 and although parts of the empire won their independence, there probably was more continuity than one would have expected. But this is a complex problem because recent research has shown that notwithstanding Churchill's inveterate anti-Communism, he, too, pondered means of accommodating the Kremlin and working out a cooperative relationship. Of course, from his perspective, and from that of his successors, the cooperative relationship had to be on terms that comported with British conceptions of their own vital security interests. At what point this orientation dictated a break with the Kremlin is open to controversy. And so is the degree of Britain's own responsibility for bringing on the Cold War.

Rather than attributing blame or praise for the actions that led to the breakdown of the great wartime allied coalition, some historians are more interested in examining the motivations and goals of the various participants. In this provocative essay John Kent shows that British concerns with their strategic presence in the eastern Mediterranean and Bevin's hopes for maximizing the economic advantages of Britain's African possessions prompted the Foreign Office to take a defiant stand against concessions to the Kremlin.

Readers should compare British thinking about their security requirements with that of the Americans and the Soviets. What factors influenced British thinking? Were there divisions within the British government? If so, what caused them?

To what extent were they related to differences over assessments of Soviet intentions and capabilities? To what extent were they related to different views of British interests, British capabilities, and British economic and military requirements? To what extent were they prompted by hopes of retaining some autonomy vis-à-vis the United States? Why were the British so concerned about holding on to their possessions or maintaining their influence in Africa and the Middle East?

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Standard accounts of postwar foreign and colonial policy assume that Britain's imperial role had to be adapted to the increased international tensions resulting from the breakup of the wartime alliance. The failure of Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin's attempts to overcome Soviet intransigence and hostility allegedly produced the Brussels Treaty and the securing of an American military commitment to Western Europe. The Cold War therefore encouraged policies geared to the acceptance of a subordinate, if special, position in an American-dominated alliance.

In this essay the links between Britain's imperial policy and the Cold War will be interpreted rather differently. Rather than suggesting that the Cold War simply prompted new Foreign Office initiatives, it will be argued first that attempts to redefine Britain's global role were a prime cause of growing tension in 1945, and therefore an important element in the origins of the Cold War; and second that perceptions of Africa's imperial value influenced overall foreign policy objectives as Cold War tensions increased in 1947 and 1948.

It is first necessary to define the central aims, as opposed to the final results, of British foreign policy between 1944 and 1949; these aims are often mentioned in the historiography of the period but seldom given the emphasis they require if perceptions of British policymakers are to be accurately represented.[1] The overriding aim until 1949 was the reestablishment of Britain as a world power equal to and independent of both the United States and the Soviet Union[2]; an aspiration which reflected the Foreign Office view that British weakness was a temporary rather than a permanent phenomenon.[3] In order to achieve this it was believed that the preservation of imperial influence was vital in both economic and power-political terms; use of strategic bases and imperial resources would be supplemented by close political ties with the colonies and Dominions. But the Foreign Office also saw the need to enroll France and the lesser western European powers as "collaborators" with the British empire.[4]

This could obviously not be achieved overnight, and in the intervening period it was deemed necessary to avoid any weakening of Britain's imperial position. It was Bevin's and the Foreign Office's determination to prevent this that was to influence attitudes to Anglo-Soviet cooperation in 1945. These attitudes were based not on fears that cooperation with the Soviet Union would be difficult or impossible, but on fears that cooperation would compromise

Britain's position in the Middle East and Africa. As a result Anglo-Soviet cooperation was regarded, at least in the short term, as undesirable.

The area initially most affected by the rival claims of British and Soviet imperialism was the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean. Russian expansion in the Balkans and the Turkish Straits had always threatened what was a predominantly British sphere of influence in the Mediterranean. But in 1944 the Foreign Office was committed to a policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union, although this commitment was to change by the summer of 1945. In the meantime its advocates were faced with two possible options: the negotiation of power-political agreements or the establishment of international arrangements, each of which could prevent Anglo-Soviet rivalries developing into hostile confrontations. But when it was realized that either option would compromise Britain's position in the eastern Mediterranean, and therefore its status as one of the Big Three powers, Anglo-Soviet cooperation was deemed undesirable.

The spheres-of-influence approach was epitomized by the infamous October 1944 percentages deal in which Stalin and Churchill agreed on a 50–50 division in Yugoslavia and a 90–10 arrangement in Britain's favor for Greece;[5] as Churchill explained, the latter was necessary because Britain "must be the leading Mediterranean power." Churchill, however, believed Britain had nothing to fear from the movement of a Russian fleet through the Straits because of Britain's greater naval strength, and told Stalin he was "in favour of Russia's having free access to the Mediterranean for her merchant ships and ships of war."[6] As he noted at the time, "it is like breeding pestilence to try to keep a nation like Russia from free access to the broad waters."[7] In 1945, the key "breeder of pestilence" who was determined to defend Britain's exclusive Mediterranean position was Ernest Bevin. His main opponent was the new Prime Minister, Clement Attlee.

In the summer of 1945, the Foreign Office thought Britain's position in the region was being increasingly challenged by the Soviet Union and this perception was crucial to the formulation of British ideas on future allied cooperation. In June, the Turks approached the Russians about a Turkish-Soviet treaty guaranteeing the joint frontier, and the Turkish ambassador mentioned granting bases in the Straits to the Soviets in certain wartime conditions.[8] Molotov responded by emphasizing the Soviet desire for bases, and explaining that the disputed frontier in the eastern provinces of Turkey could first require revision. In the week before the Potsdam Conference the British ambassador therefore reported that the "most disquieting feature of Soviet policy" was not their activities in eastern Europe, but their attitude to Greece and Turkey which suggested "a threat to our position in the Middle East."[9]

The underlying assumption among strategic planners was that the Soviet Union presented a potential threat to British interests and could not therefore be accepted as a friendly power.[10] This also became the prevalent attitude within the Foreign Office, not because of events in eastern Europe, but because



Map 4 The Mediterranean area, 1945–1946

of Soviet desires for greater influence in the eastern Mediterranean. In the summer of 1945, these attitudes produced a policy of no deals or concessions of any kind to the Soviet Union.

The first indication of a shift in Foreign Office thinking came in the spring of 1945 when Deputy Under-Secretary Sir Orme Sargent changed his views on the best means of dealing with the Soviets. Sargent, later to become Bevin's Permanent Under-Secretary, was not favorably disposed to the Russians.[11] In July, the Deputy Under-Secretary's position changed again when he explicitly called for a diplomatic offensive to challenge the Soviet Union in Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria; but in the two countries in southeastern Europe furthest away from the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East – Hungary and Romania – Sargent considered Britain might have to acquiesce in Russian domination.[12] "Our strategic position in Greece and the Middle East," stated the Foreign Office, "makes it particularly important to us that Bulgaria should not act simply as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy."[13] The fact that Russian domination in Hungary was acceptable to the Foreign Office if it prevented Soviet control over Bulgarian foreign policy, indicates the lack of importance attached to democratic principles in comparison with Britain's strategic interests.

As has been suggested earlier, the preservation of Britain's Middle Eastern position was deemed essential to the long-term goal of regaining equality with the United States and the Soviet Union. Another threat to this goal was Soviet-American cooperation, based on an assumption that Britain was now very much a junior partner in the alliance, and in July 1945 British representatives in both Moscow and Washington voiced their fears of this. An official of the North American Department reported some feeling in Washington that Britain and the empire were so weakened they could safely be overlooked by the Americans and Russians.[14] In Moscow, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr drew attention to an event which illustrated just such a policy – the bilateral discussions between Truman's emissary, Harry Hopkins, and Stalin on the Polish problem. "This renewed Soviet-American flirtation," he recorded, "of course means more than a mere attempt to break a temporary deadlock. The Americans and the Russians alike are probably hoping to establish a direct relationship with one another." If Britain was not careful, he warned, it would find itself playing a more modest role in allied exchanges.[15]

It was against this background that in July and August 1945 British discussions took place on Anglo-Soviet cooperation and the protection of British interests in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean. The new Prime Minister continued to advocate internationalist ideas as the best means of preserving world peace and maintaining Britain's global influence. Attlee believed that key strategic areas, particularly in the Middle East, should be placed under the control of the United Nations and that Britain should confront the Russians with the requirements of a world organization for peace and not with the defense needs of the British empire. Even before the discussions at Potsdam were over, Attlee believed there was a danger of getting

into a position where Britain and the Soviet Union would confront each other as rival Great Powers at a number of points of strategic importance.[16]

Bevin was determined to support the Foreign Office view rather than his Prime Minister's. In 1944, as a member of the coalition government, Bevin had expected the Balkans would probably demand British leadership.[17] At the Labour Party Conference of that year he had defended the government's Greek policy on the grounds that it was a necessary part of maintaining Britain's position in the Mediterranean.[18] These imperial instincts were reinforced by a deep dislike of Communism developed during his trade union days and by his private secretary, Pierson Dixon, who worked in the notoriously Russophobe Southern Department from 1941 to 1943. Bevin was keen to resist the extension of Soviet influence in the eastern Mediterranean, and in July 1945 believed that Britain's survival as a Great Power required the reinforcement of its military and economic role in the Middle East, from the Persian Gulf to Cyrenaica.[19]

As a basis for reconciling Anglo-Soviet imperialist ambitions this left some form of power-political agreement on the acceptance of Russian domination in certain areas in return for the assertion of exclusive British rights in others. As noted, these ideas were increasingly geared to keeping the Soviets away from the Turkish Straits and the eastern Mediterranean. One possible option for the British was to agree to Soviet bases in the Straits in return for an acceptance of British bases at Suez and the maintenance of Britain's predominant position in the eastern Mediterranean; another was to satisfy Soviet ambitions in eastern Europe in return for a guarantee of the Middle Eastern status quo. There were two specific difficulties in the way of such policies. In the former case, the British military were convinced of the serious consequences for Britain's strategic interests if such a course was followed. In the latter case the acquiescence of the Americans was unlikely to be secured.

The Foreign Office also considered more general difficulties arising from the need to prevent damage to Britain's imperial credibility. Counsellor Gladwyn Jebb considered the possibility of a deal with the Russians in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean. But he argued that for Britain "to yield to ANY Russian demand would clearly mean that we were not prepared to play the part of a Great Power."[20]

Here was the link between the maintenance of British imperial influence in the Middle East and the preservation of Britain's Great Power status. In both general and specific terms the future of the British empire depended on a policy of no concessions to the Soviet Union. Yet if Britain continued to reject Soviet demands for bases in the Straits its position in Suez was clearly illogical. British withdrawal from the Canal Zone appeared necessary unless the Americans were to side with the British and make it clear they were prepared to oppose Russian claims for bases in the Straits by force.[21] The defense of the British empire in its most vital yet vulnerable area required not only a policy of non-cooperation with the Russians, but an Anglo-

American anti-Soviet front until British postwar recovery was assured and the reattainment of a position of equality secured.

This policy was clearly evident within the Foreign Office even before the Potsdam summit was over. It was not conceived in response to oppressive Soviet actions in Europe nor to the difficulties over Poland and Germany. Perceptions of the importance of the empire to Britain's future global role and the preservation of Britain's Mediterranean position as a link between the mother country and the Dominions were much more important. This was to prove a key factor in the breakdown of the first Council of Foreign Ministers in London, which, under the terms of the Potsdam agreement, was to be primarily concerned with the Italian peace treaty. An important Italian issue was the disposal of Italy's colonies; and the future of Libya, divided into its eastern and western parts of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, had implications for Great Power rivalries in the Mediterranean. The Chiefs of Staff emphasized that in strategically important areas, notably Cyrenaica, Britain would require the use of military facilities, but there would be no objection to sharing these under the aegis of the United Nations provided they were controlled by Britain or a state on whose friendship the British could rely.[22]

At the London Council Byrnes proposed a ten-year allied trusteeship over the whole of Libya. Bevin's response was to support Byrnes's proposal on condition that certain modifications were made; Britain's priority was to prevent the Soviets getting a foothold in North Africa and then work for arrangements which would meet British needs in Cyrenaica. Molotov argued that Britain was trying to create a monopoly in the Mediterranean because of French and Italian weakness in the region. But if Russia was granted Tripolitania and Britain Cyrenaica, he felt the whole question of the Italian colonies could be settled very quickly. Bevin, true to the policy of no concessions, stood firm, and replied that the Soviet Union had not met him in anything and that Britain did not want an inch of territory.[23] In these circumstances the Conference of Foreign Ministers ended, apparently in deadlock over a procedural point. But, as Pierson Dixon noted in his diary, the real reason was "our refusal to meet Russian ambitions in the Mediterranean."[24]

This was not the policy of the Prime Minister who, unlike Bevin and the Chiefs of Staff, no longer believed in the strategic importance of the Mediterranean because of the advent of air power; and, unlike Bevin and the Foreign Office, Attlee had not ruled out a policy of compromise and cooperation with the Soviet Union.[25] In an attempt to defuse the growing Anglo-Soviet conflict, the Prime Minister suggested disengaging from the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East where there was a risk of clashing with the Soviet Union. As part of an attempt to reconcile the British empire with a commitment to internationalism, Attlee proposed a British withdrawal from Greece and Egypt in order to form a new line of defense across Africa from Lagos to Kenya.[26] The establishment of a neutral zone in the Middle East, subject to international supervision, where there would be no exclusive spheres of influence or bases could defuse the Anglo-Soviet conflict and provide an

unprovocative shield for Britain's African empire. This was the first indication that Africa was being drawn into the Cold War conflict being waged within the government; it was also the first indication of a British interest in the continent, an interest that was soon to grow and to result in colonial Africa assuming much greater importance in Bevin's overall global strategy.

Meanwhile the future of the Italian colonies was to continue to reveal the attitudes of the Foreign Secretary to Britain's imperial role in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. On May 10, the Russians made a significant concession and renounced all claims to any trusteeship of Tripolitania; the Soviet position was now that all the Italian colonies should be given in trust to Italy for ten years. Bevin's response was to increase British demands in order to secure an exclusive position in Cyrenaica,[27] a shift, as he acknowledged, made on his own responsibility and without cabinet approval. British communications through the Mediterranean, Bevin explained, were necessary for the defense of the Dominions. Cyrenaica was "vital from the point of view of the British Empire."[28]

This was a vital question in terms of the breakdown of allied cooperation and the origins of the Cold War; it was also relevant to the debate between the imperialists and the internationalists which was under way at the highest levels of the British government. Bevin's views on how best to safeguard the empire were directly opposed to Attlee's, who was convinced the empire could only be defended by its membership in the United Nations. Britain had therefore to try to make international arrangements effective and "not at the same time act on outworn conceptions" based on the need to preserve exclusive maritime control of imperial communications in the Mediterranean.[29]

By the end of 1946, the debate was influenced by perceptions of the increased importance of Africa for Britain's economic recovery. Bevin's interest in colonial development went back to 1929 and his work in the Colonial Development Advisory Committee established by the then Labour government. In 1946, Bevin was particularly interested in a trans-African trunk road which was rejected by an interdepartmental committee on grounds of cost.[30] But with attention being given to the economic and strategic importance of Africa, it could be argued that Britain's position in the Mediterranean and the Middle East was necessary for the defense of the continent. In other words a neutral zone in the Middle East would be infiltrated by the Russians who would then be in a position to threaten Africa. Pierson Dixon accepted that the Middle East was no longer vital for British communications, but believed a strong British presence was necessary to prevent the Russians taking over North and Black Africa; without it, he feared, the Soviets would become established on the Congo and at the Victoria Falls.[31]

At a meeting in January 1947 senior Russophobe officials concluded that any attempt to reach agreement with the Soviet Union was out of the question until Britain's weakness had been overcome; to ignore this "would be to

repeat on a larger scale the errors made at Munich" and enable the Russians to threaten South Africa. Then, once the Soviet Union was established on the shores of the Indian Ocean in East Africa, India would gravitate to the Soviet bloc.[32]

This African domino theory was designed to justify Britain's imperial position in the Middle East. But the continent was also important to the reattainment of Great Power status and to the regaining of economic independence from the Americans. The economic crises of 1947 increasingly convinced Bevin and other leading policymakers, notably Sir Stafford Cripps, that colonial development would provide the answer to Britain's dollar difficulties; what Europe was unable to deliver the colonial territories of Africa would eventually provide. Bevin explained his ideas to Attlee in September: "I am sure we must free ourselves of financial dependence on the United States as soon as possible. We shall never be able to pull our weight in foreign affairs until we do so."[33] Moreover, if the development of Africa's resources could be carried out in conjunction with the three other African colonial powers this would provide a means of enrolling western European nations as collaborators with the British empire. For Bevin maintained "it was essential that Western Europe should attain some measure of economic unity if it was to maintain its independence as against Russia and the United States."[34]

In the wake of the convertibility crisis of July and August 1947, Bevin and Cripps discussed the possibility of developing an area in western Europe and Africa which would allow Britain to become self-supporting, overcome the dollar problem, and thereby regain economic independence. Once Britain had examined the prospects of developing colonial resources, the French and Belgian colonies could be brought in to make a similar contribution to improving the dollar position. This formed an increasingly important element in the original 1945 plan of enrolling the western European nations as collaborators with the British empire; it was more attractive to imperialists like Bevin than a British imperial trading bloc, because of the perceived necessity to build strong economic links with Europe. France and Belgium would be the initial collaborators in Africa, although Bevin soon expected to involve both the Portuguese and the Italians.[35]

The French and British Colonial Offices were already involved in a low-profile scheme of technical cooperation in Africa; but in September 1947, Bevin and Bidault agreed this should be extended to economic and commercial matters and dealt with by ministers.[36] In December, an interdepartmental working party was set up to investigate colonial economic cooperation, and the breakdown of the Council of Foreign Ministers in the same month prompted Bevin to make public his ideas on a third world force led by Britain. Linked economically by what Bevin had earlier termed "vested interests," there would be no formal political ties, but a "spiritual union" in which, as leader of western Europe and the Commonwealth, Britain could develop its "own power and influence to equal that of the United States." Mobilizing the resources of Africa in support of West European Union would ensure that

the British-led grouping equalled the western hemisphere and Soviet blocs in terms of productive capacity and manpower.[37]

In 1948, the Foreign Secretary was not seeking a special position in an American-dominated Atlantic Alliance created to defend Western civilization; his goal was a special role for the British empire, in conjunction with western Europe, which would enable it to gain economic independence from the United States and achieve equality of status and influence within a tripartite world order. As late as March 1948, the Cabinet was still being told "we should use US aid to gain time, but our ultimate aim should be to attain a position in which the countries of western Europe would be independent both of the US and the Soviet Union." Bevin was hoping "to organize the middle of the planet – W. Europe, the Middle East, the Commonwealth," and if Britain "only pushed on and developed Africa, we could have US dependent on us and eating out of our hand in four or five years . . . US is very barren of essential minerals and in Africa we have them all."[38]

Between 1945 and 1947, Bevin and his officials aimed to preserve and strengthen British influence in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East; they then sought to develop European and African resources in an attempt to regain Britain's economic independence and reestablish a position of global power and influence equal to that of the Americans and Russians. Historians who interpret Bevin's policy in terms of the contemporary issues of the Soviet threat, western European defense and the Atlantic Alliance fail to reflect Bevin's Churchillian imperialism and the fact that his policy in terms of its own stated aims was a failure. What was central to Bevin's policy was the role of the empire and its relation to western Europe and the middle of the planet; his aim was to create a third world force independent of the United States and the Soviet Union, not to provide a link between the United States and western Europe. The Atlantic Alliance was not therefore Bevin's overriding aim in 1945 nor indeed in 1948.

In the short term, American backing for British schemes was deemed necessary in order to support the empire during Britain's period of recovery, and also to support Britain's commitment to western Europe when the latter appeared threatened by Communist coups. The fact that American backing for the empire was sought in the summer of 1945 before the Conference at Potsdam is crucial to an understanding of British policy toward the Russians; it was perceptions of Britain's imperial role, together with a refusal to accept the Soviet Union as a friendly power, which produced a Foreign Office view that any cooperation with the Soviets was undesirable.

Central to this view was the determination to preserve Britain's exclusive position in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, and it was the Mediterranean issue which produced the first formal breakdown of allied cooperation. Attlee's internationalism and Molotov's power-political bargaining both proved irreconcilable with Bevin's and the Foreign Office's ideas on the future of the British empire. This is not to affirm that British actions were

solely responsible for the breakdown of allied cooperation, or that they were a major influence on American policy; but a study of Bevin's imperialism does suggest that his policies could only lead to Cold War confrontation and were therefore more a cause of allied disagreements than a response to them.

Notes

1 See especially Alan Bullock, *Ernest Bevin*: *Foreign Secretary*, *1945–1951* (New York, 1983); R. Ovendale, *The English-Speaking Alliance* (London, 1985); David Dilks, *Retreat From Power* (London, 1981).
2 This idea was frequently expounded by both Bevin and his Permanent Under-Secretary from early 1946, Sir Orme Sargent. See, for example, Sargent memo, July 11, 1945, Foreign Office [hereafter FO] 371/50912; Bevin to Attlee, September 16, 1947, FO 800/444; Cabinet papers [hereafter CAB] 129/23 C.P.(48)6, January 4, 1948, CAB 129/23; CAB/128 C.M.(48)2, January 8, 1948, CAB 128; Public Record Office [hereafter PRO], London.
3 A. Adamthwaite, "Britain and the World 1945–49," *International Affairs,* 61(2) (1985): 223–35.
4 Sargent memo, "Stocktaking after VE Day," July 11, 1945, FO 371/50912, PRO.
5 The initial agreement was Russian influence in Romania 90 percent; British influence in Greece 90 percent; Russian influence in Bulgaria 75 percent; British and Russian influence in Hungary and Yugoslavia 50 percent each.
6 Folios 227–35. Record of meeting at the Kremlin, October 9, 1944, FO 800/302, PRO; cited by M. Gilbert, *Road to Victory: Winston S. Churchill 1941–1945* (London, 1986), 993.
7 Churchill Papers 20/153 Prime Minister's Personal Minute M(Tol) 6/4, October 12, 1944; cited by Gilbert*, Road to Victory*, 1003.
8 FO to Washington, July 5, 1945 (copy of telegram to Istanbul), CAB 119/126, PRO.
9 *Documents on British Policy Overseas* [hereafter *DBPO*], Series I, Vol. I, 1945, Clark Kerr to Eden, July 10, 1945.
10 P.H.P(45)9(0) Final, March 30, 1945, JP(45)170(Final), July 11, 1945, CAB 119/126, PRO.
11 For Sargent's views in the interwar years see J. Haslam, *The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe 1933–39* (London, 1984), 99, 228.
12 Sargent memo, "Stocktaking after VE Day," July 11, 1945, FO 371/50912, PRO.
13 *DBPO*, Series I, Vol. II: 699.
14 *DBPO*, Series I, Vol. I: 793–5.
15 ibid., 145–6.
16 *DBPO*, Series I, Vol. I: 364.
17 Bevin Papers 3/1, Bevin to Cranborne, February 1, 1944; cited in V. Rothwell, *Britain and the Cold War, 1941–1947* (London, 1982), 224.
18 43rd Annual Conference Report of December 11–15, 1944; cited in P. Addison, *The Road to 1945* (London, 1975), 254.
19 K. Morgan*, Labour in Power*, *1945–1951* (Oxford, 1984), 193.
20 *DBPO*, Series I, Vol. I: 992–4; original emphasis.
21 ibid.
22 Comments by the Chiefs of Staff, January 1, 1945, FO 371/50787, PRO.
23 Note of conversation between Bevin and Molotov, October 1, 1945, FO 371/50920, PRO. Bevin's last point was of course incorrect and was not what he was preparing to tell the Americans, because Britain wanted Cyrenaica.
24 Rothwell, *Britain and the Cold War*, 239, citing Pierson Dixon's diary.
25 For an analysis of Attlee's and Bevin's disagreements: R. Smith and J. Zametica, "The Cold Warrior: Clement Attlee Reconsidered, 1945–1947," *International Affairs*, 61(2) (1985): 237–52.

26 K. Harris, *Attlee* (London, 1982), 299.
27 Ironically this tactic of increasing one's demands when others made concessions was precisely what Bevin ascribed to Communist negotiators. See Dalton Diary, September 10, 1946; cited in Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston, MA, 1977), 258.
28 Record of 3rd informal meeting of Foreign Ministers, Paris, May 10, 1946, FO 371/57278, PRO.
29 *DBPO*, Series I, Vol. II, Memo by Attlee, "Future of the Italian Colonies," September 1, 1945.
30 DO(46) Minutes of 10th Meeting of the Defence Committee, April 5, 1946, CAB 131/1, PRO; P. S. Gupta, "Imperialism and the Labour Government," in J. Winter (ed.), *The Working Class in Modern British History* (Cambridge, 1983), 101.
31 Dixon memo, December 9, 1946, FO 800/475, PRO.
32 Foreign Secretary minute for PM, January 9, 1947, FO 800/476, PRO.
33 Bevin to Attlee, September 16, 1947, FO 800/444, PRO.
34 Record of Meeting of Cabinet Economic Policy Committee, November 7, 1947, FO 371/62740, PRO; cited in W. Lipgens, *A History of European Integration: The Formation of the European Unity Movement 1945–47* (Oxford, 1982), 557.
35 Note of a conversation between Bevin and J. Chauvel, October 20, 1947, FO 800/465, PRO; Troutbeck minute, October 20, 1947, FO 371/67673, PRO.
36 ibid. Note of discussions between Bevin, Bidault, Creech Jones, Chauvel, Couve de Murville, Harvey and Dixon, October 19–22, 1947.
37 CP(48), January 4, 1948, CAB 129/23, PRO; CM(48), January 28, 1948, CAB 128/12, PRO.
38 B. Pimlott (ed.), *The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton, 1918–1940* (London, 1986), 443.