



American Academy of Political and Social Science

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Source: *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 489, International Affairs in Africa (Jan., 1987), pp. 123-132

Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. in association with the American Academy of Political and Social Science

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1045607>

Accessed: 06-08-2018 16:06 UTC

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The Eagle and the Bear in Angola

By GERALD J. BENDER

ABSTRACT: The United States and the Soviet Union have supported opposing sides in Angola for more than a quarter of a century. Both superpowers have been stymied by their lack of control over their respective Angolan allies and frustrated by their lack of impact on determining events. Each of the superpowers has also been an unreliable patron for their Angolan clients. One important result is that, not surprisingly, most Angolans—no matter what side they are on—are highly skeptical and cynical about both the United States and the Soviet Union. While superpower intervention is usually justified in ideological terms, few Angolans are fighting for, let alone familiar with, any ideology. The war in Angola is hopelessly stalemated; neither side can possibly defeat the other and there seems to be no prospect for a military solution. Thus it becomes increasingly clear that only a political solution can end the war, but neither superpower is posturing for peace or seriously pursuing political solutions.

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NOTE: An early version of this article was presented at the Third Joint American-Soviet Conference on Contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 29 May 1986.

THE United States and the Soviet Union have supported opposing sides in Angola for more than a quarter of a century. Generally throughout this period, both superpowers have been stymied not only by a lack of control over their respective Angolan allies but also by the minimal impact they have had on determining the desired outcomes of their support. Another critical aspect to U.S. and Soviet activity in Angola has been their unreliability as patrons for their respective Angolan clients. Not surprisingly, most Angolans—no matter which side they are on—are highly skeptical and cynical about both superpowers.

While global strategists in Washington and Moscow consult their scorecards and tabulate statements by Angolan leaders under categories of pro and con, the preferred course of action for most Angolan leaders is to follow a path that will not deeply offend either of the two powerful and dangerous giants. In today's world, such a policy can be extremely difficult, if not at times impossible, to carry out. Perhaps that is why inaction has so often been the *modus operandi* of Angolan decision makers.

With slogans such as "freedom fighters" and "internationalist solidarity" dominating the East-West dialogue, it often appears that no one realizes how precious few Angolans are fighting for, let alone are more than vaguely familiar with, any ideology. Too many in the East and West have forgotten, or never learned, Amílcar Cabral's adage about the unimportance of ideas and ideology in a revolutionary struggle. Cabral, founder of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde, the independence movement in Guinea-Bissau, told his cadres in a 1965

party directive, "Always bear in mind that the people are not fighting for ideas, for the things in anyone's head. They are fighting to win material benefits, to live better and in peace, to see their lives go forward, to guarantee the future of their children."¹

Too many have also forgotten or prefer to ignore other realities of the Angolan context in which an imposed East-West struggle continues to simmer. American polemicists, in addition to President Reagan and part of his cabinet, are fond of charging that the Soviets and/or Cubans have colonized Angola. Given the infinitesimally small impact that either the Soviets or the Cubans have had on Angolan culture or society, such a charge can only be considered ridiculous. One need only look at the record of the Portuguese after 500 years in Angola. In the early 1970s, for example, a highly sophisticated survey of rural Angolans, which included about 80 percent of the entire African population in the country, revealed that very few Angolans had any knowledge at all of the Portuguese language, history, leaders, or geography.²

PERCEPTIONS AND MISPERCEPTIONS

For centuries Angola was an enigmatic, unknown quantity on the African

1. Amílcar Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea: An African People's Struggle* (London: Stage 1, 1969), p. 70.

2. In 1970-71 only 6.5 percent of the rural heads of families named Salazar, Caetano, or Americo Tomas as the "Chief of the Portuguese Government" and less than 1 percent identified Lisbon as the capital of Portugal. Moreover, 85.0 percent could not answer the question, "What is Mozambique?" Only 0.6 percent identified Mozambique as a Portuguese territory. See Franz-Wilhelm Heimer, *Educação e sociedade nas áreas rurais de Angola* (Luanda, 1972), 1:347-58. See also Gerald

continent.³ Its history under Portuguese colonialism was learned by outsiders largely through the eyes of Lisbon, a vision basically taken at face value. Even in the mid-1950s, John Gunther observed that Angola was the least known big country in Africa, adding that scarcely a half dozen journalists had visited the territory during the previous two decades.⁴

With the outbreak of the war of national liberation in 1961, a number of journalists, scholars, and diplomats began to visit and write about Angola. Yet understanding still seemed to elude most of them, and diametrically opposed interpretations of Angola's colonial state were common. In addition, the fact that three major liberation movements evolved during the independence struggle—the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)—further served to confuse attempts to understand Angolan realities. Each movement naturally claimed preeminence over the others and produced outside experts who, after on-the-spot trips, supported their respective host's contention of controlling major portions of Angola.

The Angolan civil war in 1975-76 resulted in a plethora of publications whose interpretations and facts were so contradictory that it was often hard to

believe they referred to the same country and the same war. Almost all writers were partisans who selected facts according to their political preferences. Common to most was the notion that the struggle was between good and evil, between villains and heroes, with the only difference being the party to which these appellations were given.

Part of the confusion and misunderstanding over the Angolan civil war resulted from the political and ideological diversity of the support the two sides attracted. The FNLA-UNITA alliance received assistance not only from the United States, France, and Britain, but also the People's Republic of China, Rumania, North Korea, and South Africa. Some, like Henry Kissinger, saw this alliance as pro-Western, while others called it pro-Chinese. The MPLA, on the other hand, secured support ranging from that of the Soviet Union and Cuba to Sweden, Denmark, Nigeria, and the former Katangese Gendarmes, once loyal to Moïse Tshombe. To many, this was the pro-Soviet side, while others considered it to be the non-aligned side.

Whereas the overwhelming tendency was to define and characterize the competing parties by the source of their external support, the diversity of that support, for both sides, was such as to preclude meaningful characterizations. In fact, none of the three movements could be legitimately or intelligently defined by the ideology of their outside patrons. Instead, each was more an expression of internal Angolan differences—for example, ethnolinguistic, regional, racial, and other domestic factors. Nevertheless, both internal and external perceptions of the competing parties have been based primarily on selective perceptions of external patrons. More-

J. Bender, *Angola under the Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 221-22.

3. This section draws from Gerald J. Bender, "Angola: The Continuing Crisis and Misunderstanding," *International Affairs Bulletin*, 7:5-6 (1983).

4. John Gunther, *Inside Africa* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), pp. 585-99.

over, this pattern, established during the civil war, has persisted until today. In it, the favored party is portrayed as enjoying broad ethnic and national support, while the other side is depicted as being a puppet of foreign powers—for example, the Soviet Union or Cuba, on the one hand, or the United States or South Africa, on the other.

These distorted perceptions have not only stymied a negotiated settlement of the civil war, but they have inhibited efforts toward national reconciliation since Angola's independence on 11 November 1975. The MPLA and its supporters view UNITA as a puppet or creature of South Africa and assume that it will wither away once its umbilical link to Pretoria is severed. UNITA and its supporters portray the MPLA as a Soviet or Cuban puppet that will collapse as soon as Havana's troops leave Angola. The truth is that neither would UNITA perish without South African support nor would the MPLA be overrun were Cuban troops to be withdrawn. No amount of propaganda on any side can alter these facts.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION: UNRELIABLE ALLIES

While the Soviet Union began to assist the MPLA almost five years before the United States began its support of the Union of Angolan Peoples, the predecessor of the FNLA, neither provided sufficient aid for its side to win. The support was extremely low level, both financially and technically. Once Portugal regained almost total control of the country in 1962, the amount of aid was further reduced on both sides. American support for the FNLA was severed altogether with the advent of

Richard Nixon's presidency.⁵

The United States was always torn between its support for national liberation in Angola and its assistance to Portugal, an ally in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This was already apparent in the Kennedy administration, when the policy of supporting anti-Portuguese resolutions at the United Nations and guerrilla fighters in Angola was severely attacked from within the administration. The detractors argued that the United States needed Portugal more than the liberation of Africans in Angola and that a choice must be made between the two. Under President Johnson the move to reduce support for the FNLA and raise military assistance for Portugal was clear; Kissinger and Nixon later made the choice definitive.⁶

Portuguese officers received training in the United States, while Washington supplied Portugal with airplanes, equipment that could serve either civilian or military purposes, over \$400 million in credits and loans, napalm, herbicides, and, most important, moral support. There were always sophisticated explanations of how each example of U.S. aid could be interpreted in two ways, but the sum total of American actions left no doubt about which side the United States actually supported in the war for independence. The United States placed its bets on the tenacity of the Salazar-Caetano regime and the white settlers—and lost.

5. Apparently Holden Roberto, the FNLA leader, continued to receive \$10,000 to \$20,000 a year during the Nixon administration for intelligence he provided. This is not the same, however, as aiding the FNLA itself.

6. See Richard D. Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); Witney Schneidman, "American Foreign Policy and the Fall of the Portuguese Empire" (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 1987).

Soviet support for African liberation in Angola was never compromised by a Lisbon or colonial connection. The Soviets were always on the morally correct side of all U.N. votes concerning Portuguese colonialism. Nevertheless, Soviet support for the MPLA did waver at times, as in 1962, 1968, and 1973-74—when it appeared that Moscow had lost confidence, if not all hope, in an MPLA victory.

The MPLA was a mass movement, not a disciplined party, and contained very few Marxists or strong ideologues of any persuasion. What united MPLA members was their opposition to Portuguese colonialism. The party was not easily controlled from within or without. The emergence of at least three distinct factions within the MPLA on the eve of the Portuguese coup underscored Agostinho Neto's inability to control the affairs of his party, as well as Moscow's impotency in influencing developments within the party. Certainly this must partially explain the Soviet Union's decision to cut off the MPLA altogether in March 1974, just one month before Caetano was overthrown. That assistance remained frozen for roughly six crucial months following the coup. When Moscow did resume its support, it was originally directed to one of Neto's principal rivals, Daniel Chipenda, who, when he failed in his attempt to take over the MPLA, joined the FNLA.⁷

Both superpowers paid lip service to the transitional government established in January 1975, but they actually helped to undermine that government with their exclusive support for one of the three partners.⁸ During the first half of 1975,

7. Chipenda visited Luanda in early 1986 and apparently plans to return home after living a number of years in Portugal.

8. See, for example, Gerald J. Bender,

the United States ignored UNITA altogether. Discovering it later in the year, the United States provided outmoded weapons, which offered little protection for the UNITA soldiers. For the United States, Angola was a no-win war in which UNITA was treated as little more than cannon fodder and useful cover for South African military forays into the country.⁹

Soviet support for the transitional government was much stronger than that of the United States, perhaps because Moscow was doubtful that the MPLA could prevail militarily over its two rivals. In fact, some top MPLA leaders remain bitter today about Soviet insistence on a coalition government as late as a week before independence. Clearly, the Soviet Union neither planned nor anticipated a scenario, even at that late date, which had Cuban troops playing the decisive role in projecting the MPLA exclusively into power.¹⁰

"Kissinger in Angola: Anatomy of Failure," in *American Policy in Southern Africa: The Stakes and the Stance*, 2nd ed., ed. Rene Lemarchand (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1978), pp. 65-143; idem, "Angola: A Story of Stupidity," *New York Review of Books*, 21 Dec. 1978, pp. 26-30.

9. John Stockwell, former Central Intelligence Agency head of the Angolan operation, discusses this in greater depth in his book, *In Search of Enemies* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), pp. 138-90.

10. The latest account to suggest that the idea for the large-scale Cuban operation in Angola originated in Havana, not Moscow, can be found in Arkady N. Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1985), pp. 362-65. Shevchenko was startled when he discovered this fact. He manifests a very hawkish, anti-Soviet attitude toward Moscow's Africa policy, which makes his revelation about the Havana role all the more credible. He clearly would have preferred to blame the Soviet Union exclusively for what happened in Angola in 1975.

Some of Moscow's moral credits for consistent opposition to Portuguese colonialism began to dissipate soon after independence. Soviet support for the bloody regimes of Amin in Uganda, Macias in Equatorial Guinea, and Bokassa in the Central African Empire, or Republic, raised doubts about whether Moscow was not just another opportunistic superpower. The *volte-face* in the Horn further exacerbated these concerns. But none of these actions compared in terms of negative impact to the support that the Soviet Union provided to President Neto's chief rival for power within the MPLA, Nito Alves.

According to a confidential MPLA report on the attempted coup of 27 May 1977, the plotters (*fraccionistas*) were encouraged and supported by "the Soviet Union, and two other Eastern European countries," which were never named. The expulsion of the Soviet ambassador following the coup attempt marked the nadir in relations between the Soviet Union and the MPLA.¹¹ This could have resulted in a major setback for the Soviet Union if the cold warriors in the Carter administration, led by Zbigniew Brzezinski, had not come to Moscow's rescue. In the spring of 1978, while the MPLA was still hurting from the attempted coup, which had eliminated one quarter of the party's central committee, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Council developed a plan for the United States to intervene in Angola on the side of UNITA.¹²

11. An extended discussion of this coup attempt can be found in Gerald J. Bender, "Angola, the Cubans and American Anxieties," *Foreign Policy*, no. 31, pp. 23-26 (Summer 1978).

12. At a seminar I presented to Columbia University's Research Institute on International Change on 25 March 1986, Zbigniew Brzezinski

Carter ultimately rejected the plan in May 1978, but the damage had been done. Despite the encouraging statements from top officials in the Carter administration about the desirability of improving relations with the MPLA government, the uncovered plot to support UNITA drove a number of MPLA officials, who were still angry over Moscow's support of Nito Alves, back to the Soviet bosom for protection. Relations were strained again the following year, however, when President Neto died on the operating table of a Moscow hospital. Some members of the Central Committee remain convinced that Neto did not die of natural causes.¹³

Despite these tensions between Moscow and Luanda since independence, the Soviets have not wavered in their commitment to support the MPLA against all external threats, especially from South Africa. Given the aggressive behavior of Pretoria against independent Angola, especially after 1980, it can be said that Soviet and Cuban support have been major factors in discouraging another South African attempt to overrun Angola. Undoubtedly, South Africa would have massively intervened in Angola to overthrow the MPLA government if it had not feared facing Cuban and Soviet soldiers on the battlefield. This effective deterrence against South Africa has engendered great

denied that the National Security Council had drawn up any plans to intervene in Angola on the side of UNITA while he was national security adviser. He was either unaware that his deputy, David Aaron, had helped to draw up such a plan or he did not see any of the newspaper articles on this issue, or he may simply have forgotten.

13. While I have always believed that Neto died of natural causes, I am aware of a report—never released—drafted by some top MPLA officials that accuses the Soviet Union of murdering Neto.

appreciation among a large segment of the MPLA leadership.

The United States, for its part, has been an even less consistent ally for its Angolan clients than has the Soviet Union. The Clark Amendment effectively precluded any meaningful support until its repeal in 1985. Even if the Clark Amendment had not been in place, however, it is not clear that the United States would have supported UNITA. American official attitudes about UNITA have covered the full spectrum in recent decades. Prior to 1974, the party was viewed almost as an enemy, since it opposed an ally in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. During most of the transition period, 1974-75, UNITA was essentially ignored. The spurt of military aid near the end of the civil war was given very cynically since the CIA knew that it could not reverse the military situation but could only raise the level of deaths on both sides.

The Carter administration adopted a policy toward UNITA of benign indifference. During Savimbi's visit to Washington in 1979, the highest member of the government to see him was the State Department desk officer for Angola—a marked contrast to the UNITA leader's triumphant visit to the United States in early 1986, when he saw the president, secretaries of state and defense, director of the CIA, and other top officials in Washington. During most of the Reagan administration, the attitude toward UNITA could be labeled schizophrenic. Chester Crocker, in an article he published just prior to assuming the job of assistant secretary of state for Africa, argued that the United States should admit publicly "the legitimacy of the UNITA struggle," but he cautioned that if the United States were to back UNITA outright "it is not obvious how this path would lead to reconciliation. . . . It could

produce an escalation of conflict, and it would probably rule out responding to frequent hints from the MPLA of a desire to reduce sharply its Soviet-Cuban ties."¹⁴

Some of Crocker's close advisers viewed UNITA as more of a nuisance factor—which could undermine the policy of linkage—than an ally. One even presciently confided in 1982 that UNITA could be the Achilles' heel of constructive engagement. By the mid-1980s, however, Crocker and the State Department had lost control over Angola policy. The congressional repeal of the Clark Amendment in July 1985 opened the floodgates for the right wing to seize the initiative on Angola. Their influence peaked during Savimbi's carefully orchestrated visit to Washington in January and February 1986 and the military aid that followed in the spring. Suddenly, the Reagan administration dropped all caveats and began to hail Jonas Savimbi in unrestrained superlatives as a modern hero. Once again, Washington stepped into the Angolan quagmire with all of the predictable results.

RESULTS OF U.S. AID

What has Washington bought for \$15 million dollars of aid to UNITA?

1. It bought a major setback in the negotiations over Namibia when Luanda rejected a continued solo role for the United States as an intermediary in early March of 1986.

2. It bought into a perceived military alliance with South Africa, automatically

14. Chester Crocker with Mario Greznes and Robert Henderson, "A U.S. Policy for the '80s," *Africa Report*, 26(1):9-10 (Jan.-Feb. 1981). See also Chester Crocker, "African Policy for the 1980s," *Washington Quarterly*, pp. 72-86 (Summer 1982); *idem*, "South Africa: Strategy for Change," *Foreign Affairs*, 59(2):324-51 (Winter 1980/81).

associating the United States with Pretoria's destabilizing activities against neighboring states in southern Africa.

3. It bought the wrath of the membership of the Organization of African Unity, which strongly condemned U.S. support for UNITA, and many other nations around the world, including some allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

4. It bought another no-win military policy that will certainly lead to what the world will perceive as a defeat for the United States. Both the CIA and the State Department argue that success is not possible with the present program.¹⁵

5. It bought the responsibility for sabotaging the Namibia negotiations, which not only leaves South Africa squarely ensconced in Namibia, but leaves its Western allies in the Contact Group looking foolish for having trusted the Reagan administration to play the role of an honest, neutral broker over Namibia.

6. Finally, it also bought the responsibility for UNITA's and South Africa's conduct of the war. The mines laid by CIA operatives in the Managua harbor, which caused such a big scandal some time ago, are child's play compared to the activities that UNITA and South Africa carry out in Angola. UNITA has claimed to have downed three civilian aircraft and to have kidnapped hundreds of foreign missionaries, blew up a Trans-America plane killing an American crewman, and participated with South Africa in trying to attack Gulf oil installations in Cabinda in May 1985. No

15. It should be noted that while the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) does hold out some prospect for the success of this program, their fundamental premises are so flawed that their conclusion does not merit serious consideration. See David Ottaway and Patrick Tyler, "DIA Alone in Optimism for Savimbi," *Washington Post*, 7 Feb. 1986.

sooner had the Stinger missiles been shipped than UNITA kidnapped over 200 foreign nationals near the diamond mines and announced they were going to march them over 1000 kilometers to the Namibian border. Not surprisingly, the Reagan administration quietly persuaded UNITA in March 1986 to release the hostages in Zaire before an international campaign against American complicity in terrorism could be launched.

The Reagan administration, in fact, bought so many negative consequences for its paltry aid to UNITA that one wonders whether Moscow has a mole in the White House urging these policies. Would rational policymakers purposefully shoot themselves in the foot by joining in a tacit military alliance with South Africa on the Angolan battlefield in 1986? But policymaking in Washington is not always rational, so it is not necessary to resort to conspiratorial theories about moles to explain the Reagan Angola policy.

The vicissitudes and schizophrenic nature of American policy toward UNITA over the past two decades obviously have had an impact on Savimbi and other party leaders. He is distrustful of the United States, as he indicated in a 1985 speech at his headquarters in Jamba that was shown on Portuguese television:

I also don't want to leave without [correcting some errors]. The leaders of UNITA cannot create illusions. The West is not our ally. This is a lie. There are interests which coincide, but this is different. You know that it took a long time for the articles of UNITA to be published in the Western press. They are not our allies! And for this very reason [it must be clarified for those] who say that UNITA is pro-West. This is wrong! I am not pro-West. I am pro-Angola. I fight for Angola and we only love Angola.

We want to have good relations with America but who is it that doesn't want to have good relations with America. But it is necessary that America does not try to make Angola into another state of the United States.¹⁶

The present policy of the Reagan administration virtually guarantees another victory for the Soviet Union in Angola. If Angola represents a victory for the Soviet Union, some Soviets must wonder how many more such victories Moscow can endure; nevertheless it will be counted as a victory on the global scorecard.

CONCLUSION

The war in Angola is hopelessly stalemated; neither side can possibly defeat the other. Despite all of the attention and concern expressed about MPLA offenses, there is no prospect for a military solution of the war. From the MPLA point of view, the military situation has steadily deteriorated during the 1980s as UNITA has incrementally expanded its zones of operation and scale of attacks. Yet UNITA is not any closer to military victory.

Nor can the MPLA hold realistic hopes for victory through winning the hearts and minds of the peasants in the countryside. There are many explanations for the state of the Angolan economy, with the fault divided between government inefficiency and incompetence and factors beyond the government's control, such as the destruction of the colonial distribution system, droughts, floods, and South African and UNITA attacks. But the end result is that the Luanda government has basically failed to deliver even minimal essentials to the countryside. With the

expansion of the war into the rich food-producing central highlands and the dramatic drop in the price of petroleum, it appears impossible for the government to improve significantly on its delivery of goods and services to the interior.

Thus, as the struggle continues, it becomes increasingly clear that only a political solution can end the war. But a political solution requires courage and sacrifice on all sides. There are clearly domestic Angolan constraints on the prospects for reconciliation, but this will require another article to discuss. Therefore, the focus in this conclusion is on the possible constraints to reconciliation presented by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Political reconciliation for the MPLA requires a fundamental trust in the intentions of South Africa and the United States. Pretoria's violations of the Nkomati and Lusaka accords of 1984 and of the understandings with Washington not to attack its neighbors without justifiable provocation do not inspire trust in any quarter. In fact, there may even be more cynicism and skepticism in Washington today than in Luanda about South Africa's intentions vis-à-vis Angola.

Developments in the United States do not inspire trust in Luanda. The right wing's usurpation of Crocker's Angola policy in 1985-86 raises serious questions about future American intentions. Will those in the administration and Congress who support military assistance to Savimbi accept political reconciliation or will they seek an outright military victory? If Nicaragua is any indicator, many of Savimbi's American supporters will not be content until the MPLA is overthrown. Will they be the ones guiding American policy in the future?

The most vociferous attacks on constructive engagement have come, ironi-

16. Bracketed phrases are the author's paraphrasing of portions on the recording that were not clear enough for a literal translation.

cally, from the Right, not the Left. The Right opposes linkage because it precludes a military victory in Angola that, they argue, could not only drive the Cubans out but prevent the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the main Namibian nationalist party, from ever replacing South Africa in Namibia.

One of the most outspoken advocates of this position has been Patrick Buchanan, President Reagan's influential director of communications. He wrote that he opposes linkage and favors backing UNITA to a military victory because "a Savimbi victory in Angola would mean a reversal for the Soviet empire on the scale of Mr. Sadat's expulsion of the Russians from Egypt." He also argued that a UNITA "victory would leave the Marxist guerrillas of SWAPO . . . without a base camp, without a strategic rear. SWAPO would die on a severed vine."¹⁷

Savimbi, likewise, has strong reasons to be distrustful of the United States and South Africa. Pretoria says that it will never abandon him, but the South African government has abandoned other allies in the past and would not hesitate to drop UNITA as well, if that served its purpose. Moreover, he cannot count on the present government in Pretoria to run that country indefinitely. The surprise agreement between Angola and Zaire in 1978, which resulted in President Mobutu sending tens of thousands of former FNLA supporters back to Angola, is a sufficient reminder of how fleeting alliances are in this part of

the world. The fickleness of the United States toward UNITA is not only legendary, but a new chapter will be written if the Democrats gain the presidency in 1988.

And what about Soviet intentions and goals in Angola? The prospects of Namibian independence and reconciliation in Angola cannot be seen in Moscow as necessarily desirable outcomes. They would certainly result in a marked decline of Soviet influence in the region and may even call into question the *raison d'état* for anything more than a normal presence. Soviet models and recommendations in the economic and military fields in Angola have basically failed, at least in the eyes of the overwhelming majority of the Angolan people. "Socialism has failed, let's try something else" is a phrase heard with increasing frequency.

There will never be peace in Angola if Moscow continues to place all bets on illusory military solutions that have failed in the past and will fail again in the future. Nor can there ever be peace with the United States' introducing sophisticated weapons on the battlefield. Neither of the two superpowers is posturing for peace. On the contrary, both are presently pursuing policies that will prolong the war. There is little incentive for either to change since it is a relatively cheap war for both, and those maimed and killed on the battlefields are not Americans or Soviets, but Angolans. So it appears that Moscow and Washington will continue to send messages to each other via the Angolan battlefield. It would be so much better if they spoke directly to each other about ways for bringing about peace in Angola, rather than continuing the bloodshed.

17. Patrick Buchanan, "Selling Savimbi down the River," *Washington Times*, 29 Feb. 1984.