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Competing for Leadership: Split or Détente in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1959-1961

DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union in the late 1950s over both foreign policy – China's bombardment of Jinmen in August 1958 and border clashes with India in 1959 – and domestic policy – the Great Leap Forward in 1958-60 and the People's Communes Movement in 1958 – provoked a more contentious ideological dispute: which party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), more accurately represented orthodox Marxism? which party pointed the international Communist movement in the right direction? and which party should lead the movement? After the Moscow Declaration of November 1957, by which the twelve parties in power in socialist countries endorsed the decisions of the twentieth congress of the CPSU, to demonstrate the unity of the socialist bloc,¹ the CCP moved to the left while the CPSU moved to the right.

After the twenty-first congress in February 1959, CPSU propaganda stressed the possibility of avoiding war, peaceful co-existence, and peaceful transition to socialism. Conversely, after beginning the Great Leap Forward, CCP propaganda stressed the inevitability of war, transition to socialism by violence, and the impossibility of peaceful co-existence with imperialism. Each party stressed the parts of the Moscow Declaration that suited it, and both claimed to wish to maintain the Communist bloc. But after a heated and emotional quarrel during the visit to Beijing of the first secretary of the CPSU (1953-64) and premier (1958-64), Nikita S. Khrushchev, in September and October 1959, each demanded that the other should admit its mistakes. On his way home, Khrushchev, in Vladivostok, warned the Chinese that 'it was unwise to long for war and to be prepared to fight like a bellicose rooster.'² The only question remaining

We thank Jerald Bernstein for helpful criticism.

¹ For the Moscow Conference of 1957, see Z. Shen, 'Mao Zedong, Heiluxiaofu yu 1957 nian Mosike huiyi', *Lishi yanjiu*, vi (2007), 82-109.

² L. M. Luthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton, 2008), pp. 146-50; D. Wang, 'The Quarrelling Brothers: New Chinese Archives and a Reappraisal of the Sino-Soviet

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was who would reveal the existence of the divergence, when, and by what means.

Dong Wang argues that the CCP central committee chairman, Mao Zedong, and the CCP, more rational than previously assumed, wished to avoid an open split.¹ While we agree that, until early 1961, the Chinese ‘intended to repair their relationship with the Soviet Union’,² Wang’s conclusion is problematic, owing to his uncritical reliance on the memoirs of Wu Lengxi, then editor-in-chief of *Renmin ribao*, the CCP’s mouth-piece, and on documents written mainly to be read by party members: they served primarily as propaganda justifying the CCP’s stance towards the Soviet Union. By contrast, Lorenz Luthi, drawing on Soviet and Eastern European as well as Chinese materials, argues that, as early as the autumn of 1959, both the CCP and the CPSU paid only lip service to a unity that required humiliating concessions from one of them. Luthi adds that Mao, having emerged ideologically radicalized from the clash with the defence minister, Peng Dehuai, over domestic policies at the CCP leadership meeting at Lushan in the summer of 1959, decided early in 1960 to advance China’s ideological agenda relentlessly: the U-2 incident in May 1960 merely gave him the opportunity.³ The compromise patched up in Moscow in November and December 1960 was attributable to the need for ‘the semblance of unity’ as Soviet-US relations deteriorated and China’s Great Leap Forward failed.⁴ Thus, whereas Luthi portrays 1960 as a year of conflict and 1961 as a year of truce, this article argues that 1960 was characterized by bids to preserve unity that led to a *détente*. The ideological compromise devised at Moscow in 1960, albeit limited, might have lasted longer had the CCP and the CPSU seized the opportunity, and had the CCP proved flexible rather than unyielding in the ideological struggle. Had Sino-Soviet party-to-party relations stabilized, the Soviet Union and China might have continued to be partners rather than become antagonists.

* * * * *

AS LATE AS the spring of 1960, both the CCP and the CPSU treated the maintenance of the Sino-Soviet bloc as their foremost goal. But although each claimed to apply the principles of Marxism-Leninism, each insisted upon its own definition. In December 1959, a senior member of the secretariat of the CPSU’s central committee and well-known Marxist ideologue, Mikhail Suslov, reported to the committee’s plenary session:

Split, 1959-62’, C[old] W[ar] I[n]ternational] H[istory] P[roject], Working Paper xlix (2006), 20-6.

¹ Wang, ‘Quarrelling Brothers’, p. 4.

² Ibid., pp. 3-4.

³ Luthi, *Sino-Soviet Split*, pp. 146-93.

⁴ Ibid., p. 192.

While giving due credit to the ideology of the CCP, we should frankly express our opinion on the most important issues that are of vital importance to our common interests, but on which we differ. We should uphold the position we deem correct. We must make all efforts to overcome the difficulties in our relations on the condition of sticking to our principles. We deeply believe that [our] Chinese comrades would resolutely stand for unity and friendly relations with the Soviet Union.¹

The same month, the president of China and first vice-chairman of the CCP, Liu Shaoqi, told the CCP central committee: 'We should be serious and sincere in dealing with Sino-Soviet relations. We must be firm on principle, but flexible in tactics.'² Similarly, at the politburo's standing committee meeting at Hangzhou from 4 to 6 December, Mao noted that Khrushchev had two choices: 'The first is further deterioration in his overall policy orientation, and the second is changing for the better. But we should remain confident that his mistakes will eventually be rectified.'³ The following January, Mao told a meeting of an enlarged politburo: '[We should] strive for good Sino-Soviet relations and unity. I assume we could achieve unity. The relationship is mutual, not unilateral. [We should] win them over through our efforts. Influence is mutual. In the past, the October Revolution [1917] influenced us. Now we must influence him [Khrushchev]. Although Khrushchev has shortcomings, we should help him. We should win him over through our efforts.'⁴ As both the CCP and the CPSU claimed to hold the correct theoretical position, each expected the other to defer. Thus, China tried to lever the Soviet Union into shifting its ideological stance.

The first occasion arose from a disagreement over the Sino-Indian border war. On 19 January 1960, the premier, Zhou Enlai, at a meeting with the Soviet ambassador to China, Stepan Chervonenko, asked him to convey China's view that the Sino-Indian war had been instigated solely by India and that China had right on its side. He added that China wished Khrushchev, who was about to visit India, not to show any interest in mediating the Sino-Indian conflict. When the CPSU replied on 22 January that the Soviet Union would continue 'strictly observing neutrality',⁵ Zhou, taken by surprise, told Chervonenko that for one Communist country to

1 Z[hong]S[u] g[uanxi: *Eguo dang'an fuyinjian huibian*], ed. Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui (Shanghai, 2004), xiii. 3288-324.

2 China, Division of Central Documents and Manuscripts: L[iu] S[haqi nianpu, 1898-1969] (Beijing, 1996), ii. 474.

3 L. Wu, *Shinian lunzhan* (Beijing, 1999), pp. 98-9.

4 Lin Ke riji, Li [Danhui] collection; speech, Mao, to politburo, 17 Jan. 1960 [Fuzhou], F[ujian] P[rovincial] A[rchives], Q[uanzong], no. 101, cat[alogue] 12, file no. 117, p. 7.

5 Z[hou] E[nlai nianpu, 1949-76], ed P. Li et al. (Beijing, 1997), ii. 281.

remain neutral when another was bullied by a capitalist country, was not only a novelty, but also tantamount to being partial to India. When Chervonenko explained that he had misused the term 'neutrality' in conveying, verbally, the CPSU's instructions, Zhou replied that 'taking out the word' would not reassure China.¹ In the Chinese view, the declaration of neutrality, and expression of regret, over the Sino-Indian border dispute published in Tass (the CPSU's official organ) in September 1959 had revealed not only the Soviet stand but, for the first time, the existence of Sino-Soviet disagreement.² Given the rows between Mao and Khrushchev in Beijing in October 1959, the CCP expected the CPSU to placate it by standing by China in its dispute with India.

Soviet policy towards China's war with India was geared to preventing the United States from finding an excuse to intervene, and to ensure that the prime minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, a leading neutralist, should not veer towards the imperialist bloc. The Soviets assumed that the United States, the United Kingdom, and other imperialist countries would counter a Soviet declaration of support for China against India; according to their intelligence, the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration had already advised Nehru to show 'firmness', and asked him how much help he needed.³ The Soviets were also responding to requests from the Indian Communist Party for help in resolving the dispute peacefully, to avoid injuring the party, especially in Kerala, where it had held office for more than two years. Even if the dispute led to Nehru's overthrow, the general secretary of the Indian Communist Party, Ajoy Kumar Ghosh, had no chance of taking his place: reactionary capitalists would come to power, which would itself weaken the socialist bloc.⁴

The CCP's claim that the Soviet declaration of neutrality revealed the existence of Sino-Soviet disagreement was far-fetched. The statement in Tass may have been intended to mislead: an ally, for tactical reasons, often maintains the appearance of neutrality. When the Soviet Union remained neutral throughout the Korean War, Mao did not accuse Joseph Stalin of revealing the existence of disagreement.⁵ Thus, the issue for China was not

¹ ZE, ii, 280-1, 283-4.

² See B. T. Kulik, *Sovetsko-kitaiskii raskol: prichiny i posledstviia* (Moscow, 2000), p. 292; M. Kramer, 'The Soviet Foreign Ministry's Appraisal of Sino-Soviet Relations on the Eve of the Split', *CWIHP Bulletin* vi/vii (1995/6), 170-85. For Deng's view, see *China and the Soviet Union, 1949-84*, ed. P. Jones (London, 1985), pp. 21-2, and ZSG, xv, 3827-64.

³ Kulik, *Sovetsko-kitaiskii raskol*, p. 292; report, Kozlov to central com[mittee], 13 July 1960, ZSG, xiii, 3346.

⁴ Memo, anon., '[Some Issues the] Sino-Soviet Friendship [Association Delegation Felt during Its Visit to the Soviet Union]', 5 Feb. 1960, FPA, Q, no. 101, cat. 2, file no. 374, p. 172.

⁵ See Z. Shen, 'KangMei yuanChao zhanzheng juece zhong de Sulian yinsu', *Dangdai Zhongguoshi yanjiu*, i (2000), 28-39; idem, '1953 nian Chaoxian tingzhan - ZhongGu lingdaoren de zhengzhi kaolv', *Shijieshi*, ii (2001), 2-18.

the timing of the Soviet declaration of neutrality, not even the declaration itself, but the sign it gave that the CPSU objected to the CCP's stance towards India.

Several months later, China asked the Soviet Union to signal more obviously its alignment with China. On 8 January 1960, Khrushchev warned Mao that the Soviet Union planned in the next eighteen months to disarm, unilaterally, 1.2 million troops. The next day, Zhou minuted on a foreign ministry report: 'After Khrushchev makes his suggestion on disarmament by the parliaments of all countries at the fourth session of the Supreme Soviet on 14 January, the Chinese National People's Congress would pass a resolution supporting disarmament on the one hand, but also, [on the other] formally declaring that China would not bear any responsibility [for the outcome], as China had no involvement [in the decision].' But when, on Mao's instruction, the vice-director of the CCP's international liaison department, Wu Xiuquan, who was also a member of the central committee, asked Chervonenko to relay China's views to Khrushchev, he only mentioned the support for disarmament. He failed to mention the refusal to be responsible for the outcome. On 1 February, in a letter to Khrushchev agreeing to attend the conference of Warsaw Pact countries to be held at Moscow in February, Mao argued that the conference should try to diffuse international tension, expose the goals of the bellicose imperialists, and promote world-wide eagerness for peace. Mao did not disclose that China would agree to take responsibility for disarmament only if it had formally participated in the decisions.¹

China sent an alternate member of the central committee's politburo, Kang Sheng; the ambassador at Moscow, Liu Xiao, who was a member of the central committee; and Wu Xiuquan to attend the conference as observers. On 4 February, in a speech along the lines previously approved by the central committee,² Kang told the conference that international tension had lessened 'because the east wind prevails over the west wind'. He continued:

The US ruling clique has been forced to express a certain degree of willingness for peace. Its so-called peaceful conquest tactics are to lull the world people's fighting will, to destroy the unity of the world peace force, to dismember the socialist bloc, and even to dream of the realization of the so-called 'peaceful transformation' of the socialist countries. The character of imperialism would not change [Kang emphatically stated]. China hopes to see an agreement on disarmament. The Chinese government would not hesitate to bear all the international responsibilities to

1 China, Division of Central Documents and Manuscripts: *J[ianguo] y[ilai] M[ao] Z[edong] w[engao]* (Beijing, 1996), ix, 8, 21-2; *ZE*, ii, 278.

2 'Sino-Soviet Friendship', 5 Feb. 1960', FPA, Q, no. 101, cat. 2, file no. 374, p. 172; X. Wu, *Huiyi yu huainian* (Beijing, 1991), pp. 333-4.

which it has agreed. But as the US imperialists, who are enemies of the Chinese people, adopt a policy of excluding our country from international affairs, the Chinese government has to declare to the world: all the international agreements on disarmament, and other agreements made without the formal participation of the People's Republic and endorsement by its delegates, would not be binding on China.¹

Thus Kang warned the Soviet Union, obliquely, not to agree on China's behalf to disarm.

Khrushchev's visit to the United States in September 1959 had been portrayed in the Soviet Union as 'a turning point in Soviet-American relations', and as 'open[ing] a new epoch in international affairs' and 'a new period in the evolution of world peace'. Keen to promote the CPSU's policy of détente, and frustrated by the CCP's refusal to co-operate,² Khrushchev, at the conference's closing banquet on 4 February, attacked Mao by innuendo, saying that if an old man is not wise, he is as useless as a pair of worn-out old galoshes discarded in a corner.³ The remark, which Mao treated as an insult, provoked swift and direct retaliation. On the 6th, *Renmin ribao* published the text of Kang's speech.⁴ In response, an alternate member of the CPSU presidium and a leading member of the CPSU central committee's secretariat, Peter Pospelov, made a statement on behalf of the central committee criticizing China's foreign and domestic policies, and attributing its dispute with India to its aggressive nationalism.⁵

The Soviets had not published Khrushchev's or Pospelov's remarks.⁶ Nor had the outside world learned the details of Kang's speech until it was published in *Renmin ribao*. Then, it not only attracted attention in the outside world, but also offended the Soviets for revealing the Sino-Soviet disagreement to the Western world.⁷

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¹ *Renmin ribao*, 6 Feb. 1960.

² 'Sino-Soviet Friendship', 5 Feb. 1960', FPA, Q, no. 101, cat. 2, file no. 374, p. 172.

³ Interview, Shen Zihua and Li Danhui with Yan Mingfu, March 1998. Yan was a Russian-language interpreter for the CCP central committee from 1957 to 1966; Wu, *Shinian lunzhan*, pp. 250-2.

⁴ The Chinese records on this subject are inaccurate. See, e.g., *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi*, 1957-69, ed. T. Wang et al. (Beijing, 1998), p. 233.

⁵ *Teshu er fuza de keti-Gongchanguoji, Sulian he Zhongguogongchandang guanxi biannianshi*, ed. W. Zhou and L. Chu (Wuhan, 1993), p. 520; *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi*, ed. Wang, p. 233. Taking into account the time difference between Beijing and Moscow, Pospelov's declaration was made in response to the publication of Kang's speech by the Chinese.

⁶ *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi*, ed. Wang, p. 233.

⁷ Interview, Shen Zihua and Li Danhui with Yan Mingfu, March 1998; *Tokyo News*, 13 March 1960, *The Times*, 17 April 1960. Western media were abstracted in *Neibu cankao*, for confidential reviews of senior party officials from 1949 to 1964; Li Danhui obtained access to *Neibu cankao* at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.

THE DISAGREEMENT OVER foreign policy arose from China's suspicions of Khrushchev's partiality for Nehru. The anniversary of Lenin's birth on 22 April 1960 gave the CCP the opportunity to try to tempt Khrushchev back on to the correct ideological path. On 19 January, the day that Zhou reminded the Soviets that China had good grounds for its dispute with India, the CCP's central committee issued instructions on how the ninetyeth anniversary of Lenin's birth should be commemorated: who should give speeches and where, and the editorials to appear in *Renmin ribao* (the CCP's mouthpiece), *Hongqi* (the central committee's theoretical journal), and other newspapers on 'Lenin's theories on imperialism and proletarian revolution, the Chinese revolution, nationalist liberation movements in colonies and semi-colonies, class struggle and proletarian dictatorship in the transitional period, the two stages of socialism and Communism, and anti-revisionism'.

The circular specified that the articles should follow the central committee's instructions of 8 February 1959 not to criticize the actions, works, or films of other Communist parties, and should employ as a template Liu Shaoqi's article 'The Victory of Marxism-Leninism in China', written at the invitation of *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (a journal published in Prague from 1958 to 1991, in thirty-four languages, and distributed to 145 countries) and published in September 1959.¹ On 12 September, before the article was to be published, Liu sent it to Mao for approval, because it 'is full of hidden arrows at foreign comrades. Is it appropriate? Please check and ratify!' Mao replied: 'I have read it. It is very good!' The unidentified foreign comrades were the Soviets. Thus, the central committee's instructions, despite stipulating that newspapers and magazines should not criticize other socialist countries, were meant to launch a wave of criticism of Soviet policies in the hope of levering Khrushchev away from revisionism.

The article evaluated the socialist revolution in China since 1949 and the work of the PRC. It praised the Great Leap Forward: 'To criticize our Great Leap Forward is to criticize our party's general line on socialist construction ... [and] those who criticize our party's general line are opportunists of the right; they are the agents of capitalism.' It concluded: 'To a certain extent, China's experiences are of international significance.' Liu had written the article in response to the Soviets' criticism of the Great Leap Forward and the people's communes. The article was reprinted by *Renmin ribao* on 1 October.

After Mao, on 22 February, told the politburo's standing committee to

1 Circular, CCP central com., 'How to Commemorate the Ninetieth Anniversary of Lenin's Birth', [Huhehaote], A[rchives of the] M[ongolian] A[utonomous] R[egion], Q, no. 11, cat. 14, file no. 272, p. 14.

2 *Renmin ribao*, 1 Oct. 1959; *LS*, ii. 464; *JYMZW*, viii. 527.

counterattack Khrushchev, the politburo decided in early March to publish a series of articles that elaborated Lenin's views on war and peace, and proletarian revolution and dictatorship.¹ At four meetings in February, the central committee's secretariat had already discussed the contents of three articles: an editorial for *Hongqi* drafted by a leading CCP ideologue and deputy director of the central committee's propaganda department, Chen Boda; a report by the director of the CCP central committee's propaganda department and alternate member of the politburo, Lu Dingyi; and an editorial for *Renmin ribao* drafted by the director of China's information agency and vice-director of propaganda department, Hu Qiaomu. On 10 and 16 February, Mao read and revised the first.² Thus, the central committee used the commemoration of Lenin's birth as the opportunity for a counterattack in the media on the CPSU.

On 16 April, *Hongqi* published Chen's disguised attack on Khrushchev in an editorial that accused the Yugoslav leader Josip B. Tito of revisionism. It refuted Tito's theory of the 'new era' in which the core issue was neither war nor peace (war no longer being inevitable), but economic competition or co-operation, a theory proposed by Khrushchev and the Soviet premier, Nikolai Bulganin, at the twentieth congress in February 1956. The editorial accused the revisionists of treating Marxist-Leninist theories of class analysis and class struggle as outdated: 'For the interests of all the people of the world, [we must] disprove the modern revisionist thesis on violence, war, and peaceful coexistence, and uphold the Marxist-Leninist viewpoints ... [against] the deathbed struggle of the imperialists.'³

In response to the editorial, the Soviet leadership at first decided, in the words of the director-general of the foreign ministry's bureau of Far East affairs, Mikhail Kapitsa, 'Don't be harried! They want us to get involved in debate. Be patient! Don't respond to their action!'⁴ The CPSU's mouthpiece, *Pravda*, reprinted a new biography of Lenin with a commentary explaining how Lenin's theories fitted with the CPSU's new programme. Next, on 17 and 18 April, *Pravda* published articles in praise of the CPSU's contribution to 'peaceful transition'.⁵ The magnanimity was short-lived, however, as Khrushchev lost patience. On the 21st, the CPSU central committee issued a news bulletin to all Communist and workers' parties that criticized the CCP.⁶ The next day, Lenin's birthday, the CCP

¹ *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi*, ed. Wang, pp. 232-3; Wu, *Shinian lunzhan*, pp. 251-3.

² S. Yang, *Y[ang] S[hangkun] r[iji]* (Beijing, 2001), pp. 483-95; *JYMZW*, ix, 139-42.

³ *Renmin ribao*, 20 April 1960.

⁴ M. S. Kapitsa, [*Na raznykh paralleliakh*], *z[apiski] d[iplomata]* (Moscow, 1996), p. 71.

⁵ Jacobson to sec[retary of] state, tel., 16 June 1960, College Park, MD, U[nited] S[tates] N[ational] A[rchives], R[ecord] G[rup] 59, C[entral] D[ecimal] F[ile] 1960-3, box 1367, folder: 661.93/6-1660; *Renmin ribao*, 19 April 1960.

⁶ Kapitsa, *ZD*, p. 71.

and the CPSU, at their separate commemorations, publicized their competing theories and refuted the other's views without naming it. Being further to the east, the Chinese struck first.

On the morning of the 22nd, *Renmin ribao* published an editorial – 'To March along the Great Leninist Road!' – that stated: 'China could surely march at a leap-forward speed ... [as] the series of policies that China has adopted in constructing socialism is the product of combining the general principles of Leninism with the Chinese reality.' The article cited Lenin's prediction that 'our European mediocre people never even dream that the revolution in populous nations with complicated social conditions in the Far East would be more colourful than the Russian revolution.' It declared that 'Lenin's theory that imperialism is the origin of modern war ... would never be "outdated",' and listed a string of so-called US bellicose words and acts, before asking, 'Is this the "peace in freedom" of Eisenhower?'¹ Despite a nod to the need to strengthen the solidarity of the socialist countries, the article's object was to refute Khrushchev's attack on China's domestic policy. It rebutted the Soviet theory of socialist construction and model of development, and challenged the claim Khrushchev had made at the CPSU's twenty-first congress that the realization of socialism's economic plans in Europe and Asia 'would create the possibility of eliminating war, and make war irrelevant to resolving international conflicts'.²

In the afternoon, the CCP central committee invited ten thousand people to commemorate Lenin's birth. The vice-chairmen, Zhu De and Lin Biao, and the party's general secretary, Deng Xiaoping, were present, as was Chervonenko. Lu Dingyi gave a long speech, entitled 'Unite under Lenin's Revolutionary Banner', that echoed the editorials and was published in *Renmin ribao* the next day. It mocked 'modern revisionists who are scared shitless by imperialist nuclear blackmail'. It accused them of 'the smearing of Marxism-Leninism as "dogmatism" ... the dirty tricks of traitors to the working class [trying] to corrupt the revolutionary spirits of Marxism-Leninism.' The speech stressed Mao's personal role in sustaining and developing the revolutionary spirit of Marxism-Leninism.³

The same day in the Soviet Union, an editorial in *Pravda* praised the CPSU's contribution to the development of Marxism-Leninism and claimed that only the Soviets applied Lenin's theories.⁴ In the evening, the CPSU central committee invited ten thousand people to celebrate the birthday. Averkys Aristov, Kliment Voroshilov, Frol Kozlov, Anastas

¹ *Renmin ribao*, 22 April 1960.

² *Teshu er fuza de keti*, ed. Zhou and Chu, p. 516.

³ *Renmin ribao*, 23 April 1960.

⁴ M. Iu. Prozumenshchikov, 'Zhongguo lingdaoren yanzhong de 1960 nian', trans. Wen Yi, *Zhonggong dangshi ziliao*, lxv (1998), 205.

Mikoyan, and many others were present; Lenin's brother-in-arms and a member of the presidium and the secretariat, Otto Kuusinen, delivered a speech on 'the new contribution of the twentieth and twenty-first party congresses to Marxism'.¹ Kuusinen stated that Lenin, long before Khrushchev, had argued for peaceful coexistence: 'In order to be true to Marxism, it is not enough only to repeat the old truth of the aggressive nature of imperialism ... [We] must notice the emergence of powerful forces prohibiting war. [We] can't ignore the fact that the time when imperialists dominated around the world will never return.' He quoted Lenin's statement that 'one day in the future, because the destructive power of war is so great ... war becomes impossible,' to argue that the CPSU's policy of peaceful coexistence 'is the only correct policy with great vitality'.² The speech rebutted the three editorials published in *Hongqi* and *Renmin ribao* for its 'dogmatic' habit of continuously 'repeating old truth', unlike the Soviet practice of 'upholding principle while leaving leeway for compromise'.³

The Chinese did not circulate Kuusinen's speech, nor did the Soviets circulate the three Chinese articles. Neither the CCP nor the CPSU wished either to intensify the dispute, or to provide a vehicle for the other to promote its theory; neither had yet mentioned the other by name. Nonetheless, the Sino-Soviet split, of which the Western world already had inklings, in becoming more noticeable, obliged the Soviets to take steps to buttress their control over the member states of the Warsaw Pact.⁴ The Chinese articles, which directly or indirectly criticized the CPSU's application of the theory and tactics of Leninism, were translated into foreign languages, and circulated in Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and even capitalist countries. 'We can see', explained a member of the CPSU presidium, Frol Kozlov, on 13 July 1960, 'that the Chinese comrades want to become the mentor and guide of the international Communist movement, by attempting to prove that the Chinese viewpoint is the only [true] view of Marxism-Leninism'.⁵ Whereas the CCP and the CPSU appeared to disagree about which properly applied Marxism-Leninism,

¹ *Renmin ribao*, 24 April 1960.

² Jacobson to sec. state, 16 June 1960, USNA, RG 59, CDF, box 1367, folder: 661.93/6-1660; *Neibu cankao* (1960), no. 3041, p. 20, no. 3044, pp. 29-30.

³ *Neibu cankao*, no. 3041, p. 21.

⁴ *Neibu cankao* contains abstracts of articles from *Agence France-Presse*, *Le Globe* (Paris), *Guardian*, *New York Times*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *Kurier* (Austria), *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Switzerland). See *Neibu cankao* (1960), nos. 3040, 3041, 3042, 3043, 3044, 3046, 3059, 3062. For the first time, ordinary people in the Soviet Union learned of the disagreement. See also, A. Dolinin, 'Kak nashi raketchiki kitaitsev obuchali', *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 13 May 1995.

⁵ Report, Kozlov to central com., 13 July 1960, *ZSG*, xiii. 3346-417.

the disagreement arose from a political as well as ideological dispute: the CCP claimed that China, rather than the Soviet Union, was better qualified to lead the socialist bloc, and ensure that world Communism and workers' parties marched in the right direction. As Luthi notes, the Chinese articles 'opened the public Sino-Soviet polemics that would last until Mao's death'.¹

Khrushchev once warned anyone who tried to sow discord between the Soviet Union and China: 'Don't try to find a crack in a place without a crack.' It would not be found, 'as they will not see their own ears'.² But once the CCP's articles were in print, 'it seems there are two centres and two opinions'.³ According to the state department's China specialist, Allen S. Whiting, the publication of the articles was 'the first clear manifestation of the depth and seriousness of long-accumulating antagonisms'.⁴ To the West, however, the implications of 'the divergence of opinions between dragon and bear' remained unclear. It might only be about tactics.⁵

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CHINA'S IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGE to the Soviet Union was intended to warn Khrushchev not to make concessions to the imperialists at the four-power summit meeting between the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France to discuss Berlin, to be held at Paris in May 1960. Eisenhower did Mao a great service when, on 1 May, two weeks before the summit, a US U-2 spy plane was brought down over Soviet territory and its pilot, Captain Francis Gary Powers, admitted to spying.⁶ At the fifth session of the Fifth Supreme Soviet, on 5 May, Khrushchev accused the United States of invading Soviet airspace and warned the listening Western ambassadors that the Soviet Union, having set up a missile command, had the capability to respond.⁷

US aircraft had often invaded Soviet air space. But the downing of a spy plane placed Khrushchev, who had been preaching détente with the West, in a dilemma. On the one hand, he wished to avoid a crisis with the United States; on the other, he worried that the conservatives within the CPSU

¹ Luthi, *Sino-Soviet Split*, p. 163.

² Y. Chen, 'Zhong Su tongmeng shi shijie heping de qiangda baolei', *Renmin ribao*, 31 Jan. 1960.

³ *YSR*, i. 607-9.

⁴ A. S. Whiting, 'A Brief History', in *Sino-Soviet Rivalry: Implications for US Policy*, ed. C. J. Zablocki (New York, 1966), pp. 10-11.

⁵ *Neibu cankao* (1960), no. 3042, pp. 7-8, no. 3046, pp. 30-1.

⁶ See M. R. Beschloss, *Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair* (New York, 1986), pp. 121-2, 173, 372.

⁷ *Sulian gongchandang jiushisan nian - 1898-1991 nian Sugong lishi dashi shilu*, ed. Z. Shen and P. Yu et al. (Beijing, 1993), p. 544; *Neibu cankao* (1960), no. 3057, p. 25, no. 3059, p. 27.

would seize the opportunity to undermine him. To protect his own image and status in the international Communist movement, he had to respond to the Chinese media's claim that the character of the imperialists was immutable by taking a tough line with the United States.

On the 16th, at the preliminary session of the four-power summit, Khrushchev denounced the US invasion of Soviet airspace as bellicosity, and demanded that Eisenhower should punish the officials responsible. When Eisenhower only offered not to resume U-2 flights during the remainder of his administration,¹ the summit meeting was suspended. At a press conference on the 18th, Khrushchev gave warning that the Soviet Union would not only shoot down US spy planes but also destroy their bases. But he added that if the United States 'stopped provoking socialist countries in the next six to eight months, then we would meet with our partners to discuss and resolve international issues'.² Khrushchev had no wish to wreck the summit.

After Soviet radio had broadcast Khrushchev's remarks on the evening of 16 May, the next day more than one million people held more than five thousand rallies berating the United States for its provocation, which newspapers stigmatized as designed to wreck the summit, and the rank and file of the Soviet armed forces demonstrated in support of Khrushchev. The media insisted that for peaceful coexistence to work, the imperialists must give up their anti-Soviet habits.³

What mattered more, however, was China's response to the U-2 incident, which the West assumed the Chinese had co-ordinated with the Soviets.⁴ They had not. Mao and the CCP central committee tried to make use of the incident to lever Khrushchev into accepting their world view. With the development in the late 1950s of national independent movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, China supported the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggle in the Third World in a bid, through constant criticism of Khrushchev without mentioning his name, to win support from countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America for the obstruction of détente. In the CCP's view, the U-2 incident proved the correctness of its views, and the emptiness of 'the Spirit of Camp David'.⁵

The Chinese ambassador, Liu Xiao, who attended the meeting of the Fifth Supreme Soviet in early May, was delighted rather than alarmed at the U-2 incident. He saw it as proof that détente was a fallacy and as

¹ *Renmin ribao*, 20, 21 May 1960.

² *Ibid.*, 19 May 1960.

³ *Ibid.*, 18, 19, 21 May 1960.

⁴ *Neibu cankao* (1960), no. 3067, p. 17.

⁵ *Guanyu guoji gongchan zhuyi yundong zong luxian de lunzhan*, ed. Renmin Chubanshe (Beijing, 1965), p. 73.

warranting a firm response.¹ When the news arrived at Beijing, the CCP responded swiftly with an unusual media blitz. On 9 May, *Renmin ribao*, in the first public comment from the socialist bloc, published an editorial – ‘A Provocation to the Soviet Union Is a Provocation to the Entire Socialist Bloc’ – that described the U-2 incident as ‘the continuation of a long-adopted policy of a war of aggression by the US imperialist clique. This policy reflects the essence of imperialism.’ It added that the ‘US imperialist provocation of the Soviet Union ... is a provocation to 650 million Chinese people. We absolutely support the Soviet government and its people in protesting against and denouncing the US government.’²

Mao, meeting from 7 to 14 May with delegations from Asian, African, and Latin American countries, denounced the United States for war-mongering five times within ten days: ‘Our common enemy is the US imperialists. We strongly support all national liberation movements.’³ The frequency of the comments was unusual, for Mao rarely commented on policy more than two or three times a year. One US newspaper abstracted for the CCP’s leadership stated: ‘Mao’s oral attack makes the Paris summit dim [unlikely].’⁴

In a meeting with a delegation from Japan and Latin America prior to the summit, Mao was more explicit. He conceded that ‘we support the summit meeting,’ but added that however much progress it seemed to make, only the peoples’ struggle throughout the world would ensure peace.⁵ He described the U-2 incident as revealing the way in which the United States tried to disguise aggression as the promotion of peace,⁶ and mocked Khrushchev for being taken in by Eisenhower: ‘There are some people who said that Eisenhower is a peace-loving man. I hope that these people will gain some understanding from this event.’⁷ On 16 May, *Renmin ribao* reprinted an editorial from *Hongqi* that issued a warning against concessions to the United States because ‘US imperialism is the most vicious and aggressive imperialism of our time.’⁸

As Mao was Khrushchev’s only rival for the leadership of the international Communist movement, his comments influenced Khrushchev’s anti-US stance at the summit when he used phrases such as ‘US imperialism’ and ‘aggressive nature’ that he had not used for some time. To the CCP, Moscow’s watch now seemed to be synchronized with Beijing time,

1 *Neibu cankao* (1960), no. 3059, p. 27.

2 *Renmin ribao*, 9 May 1960.

3 *Neibu cankao* (1960), no. 3061, p. 23.

4 *Ibid.*, no. 3057, pp. 16-17.

5 *Renmin ribao*, 16 May 1960.

6 *Neibu cankao* (1960), no. 3060, p. 23, no. 3067, p. 17.

7 *Ibid.*, no. 3060, pp. 21-3.

8 ‘Jiecheng guangfan de tongyi zhanxian zhansheng diguozhuyi’, *Renmin ribao*, 16 May 1960.

and Khrushchev, at Paris, to follow China's anti-imperialist line. After the summit broke up on the 17th, the Chinese media remained in tune with the new Soviet rhetoric. Three days later, the Chinese government organized a mass rally in Beijing of 3.2 million people in support of Khrushchev.¹ By the 23rd, more than fifty-three million people had taken part in mass rallies throughout China.²

Mao's campaign in support of the Soviet Union, and in resistance to imperialism and the United States, surpassed the Soviets' own. The Western media abstracted for the CCP's leadership, in portraying Mao standing behind Khrushchev at Paris and giving him more backbone, implied that the CCP's view of world Communism took precedence over the CPSU's. The U-2 incident enhanced Mao's authority in that the CCP's disagreement with the CPSU, especially about peaceful coexistence, seemed to have been resolved. Some even predicted a powerful Moscow-Beijing axis.³ In sum, the summit's breakdown seemed to show that the CCP's analysis of world affairs was more accurate than the CPSU's, and that Khrushchev was moving closer, ideologically, to the CCP.⁴

The appearance of a shift, though, was deceptive. As Khrushchev had boasted of the 'three peaceful' lines in the Soviet Union's relations with the West, the U-2 incident, a slap in the face, left him no alternative but to hang tough in order to salvage his position as the leader of world Communism. But the manoeuvre was aimed, by forcing the United States to make concessions, to free himself from his embarrassments.

According to *Neibu cankao*, Mao and other CCP leaders attributed the shift to their leverage. On 21 May, Mao told the general secretary of the North Korean Communist Party, and the premier, Kim Il-sung:

Khrushchev was infatuated. He agreed to welcome Eisenhower at one time, but refused to do so at another. On 1 May, the US airplane was shot down, and the pilot was captured. On 2 May, Eisenhower admitted that he sent the pilot, and would continue to do so. This left our elder brother [the Soviet Union] no leeway. He thus decided to go to Paris, not to have a meeting, but to expose the United States.

The Chinese chargé d'affaires at London, Huan Xiang, in a report on the summit dated 28 May, wondered whether the Soviet Union had shifted from appeasement of US imperialism to resistance, owing to the U-2 incident, not owing solely to deeper understanding of imperialism and of the nature of war and peace. Thus, the CCP should expect the CPSU to vacil-

¹ *YSR*, i, 503.

² *Renmin ribao*, 21, 25 May 1960.

³ *Neibu cankao* (1960), no. 3061, p. 24, no. 3063, p. 23, no. 3067, pp. 12, 20.

⁴ *JYMZW*, ix, 263.

late. Mao, who agreed with the analysis, also doubted whether Khrushchev was changing for 'the better'.¹ On the 22nd, he told the politburo standing committee, meeting in Hangzhou, that 'Khrushchev has two sides ... [he] opts for revisionism over fundamental issues, but ... it is hard to say that he is a complete revisionist. In sum, we may say he is a half revisionist.'²

Mao, seeing Khrushchev as unpredictable but persuadable, reopened the debate over ideology. He began by describing the conference of seventeen Communist and workers' parties from European capitalist countries held at Rome in November 1959 as revisionist. 'There is no peaceful co-existence. There are guerrilla wars in Cuba, Algeria, the Philippines, and Paraguay. There is no peaceful coexistence with imperialists, only cold war coexistence.' Mao asked, 'Have your seventeen parties won political power? Not a little bit. Why have you been in a rush to issue a declaration to eliminate war? What does this mean? I think it only makes the capitalists happy.' Mao next criticized the theory of peaceful transition: 'Marxist doctrine is the thesis of class struggle ... Imperialism is war ... Some day, nationalistic capitalists would betray revolution. It is unrealistic to pin too much hope on these people ... We will need to settle the account some day.'³

* * * * *

IN 1957, THE CCP had endorsed the Moscow Declaration of twelve ruling parties from socialist countries – based on the decisions of the CPSU's twentieth congress and the peace manifesto signed by delegates of sixty-four Communist and workers' parties (including the Yugoslav Communist Party), which more closely reflected Khrushchev's views.⁴ Even though the CCP had accepted the programme of the twentieth congress as the guiding principle of the international Communist movement, it was only a matter of time before it challenged the CPSU's control over the majority of members of the socialist international organizations. In the wake of the U-2 incident, the CCP tried in these organizations to open a second front in its struggle with the CPSU; its declared goal was unity through criticism.

The eleventh meeting of the general council of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), one of the most important fronts for the Com-

1 *JYMZW*, ix. 200-20; memo, 'Mao Zedong huijian Jinricheng tanhua jilu', 21 May 1960, CCP, International Liaison Dept.: *M[a]o Z[edong] yu waibing tanhua jilu huibian*. Documents in Li collection. Between 1950 and 1960, Li Danhui's father, Li Zhengting, who was a leading official in the ministry of labour from 1954 to 1966, was responsible for the foreign experts in China. His collection of documents is now in the possession of his daughter.

2 Wu, *Shinian lunzhan*, pp. 270-2.

3 Memo, 'Mao Zedong huijian Jinricheng tanhua jilu', 21 May 1960; memo, 'Mao Zedong's jiejian Danmai gongchandang zhuxi Knude Jespersen tanhua jilu', 28 May 1960, *MZ*.

4 *JYMZW*, ix. 244.

munist movement, held in Beijing from 5 to 9 June 1960, was attended by sixty-four delegations from fifty-eight countries. The report of the secretariat had provoked disagreement between China and the Soviet Union ahead of the conference over the description of China's revolution. The Chinese objected that 'there are major mistakes in principle ... [And] it is wrong to refer to China's Great Leap Forward and the People's Communes with quotation marks. It is an indication of an unfriendly attitude towards the Chinese people.'

At a meeting on 1 June with the head of the Chinese delegation, Liu Ningyi, the head of the Soviet delegation and WFTU vice-president, Viktor Grishin, replied that the use of quotation marks was merely correct Russian usage. The next day, delegates attending a meeting of workers' party members from twelve socialist countries accused China of 'Left-Wing Infantile Disorder'. After the secretariat had revised the report on the 3rd and 4th, the Chinese, though still describing parts of it as 'erroneous', agreed to allow it to be discussed at the general council.¹ Liu stated that the CCP, out of respect for the views of the majority, would not repeat its criticism at the plenary sessions.²

At the opening plenary session on 5 June, a member of the secretariat, Marcel Boula, delivered a report on behalf of the president, Louis Saillant of France. Grishin followed in the afternoon. Their speeches touched on the invasion of Soviet airspace by U-2s, the threat from US imperialism to world peace, and the likelihood of a third world war.³ But the Chinese delegates, who heard what seemed to them to be a programme that aimed at promoting peaceful coexistence, peaceful competition, and peaceful transition, accused the CPSU of trying to impose its erroneous views.

In an attempt to anticipate open disagreement at the plenary sessions, the CCP central committee invited over forty trade union leaders from seventeen Communist and workers' parties to a meeting on the evening of the 5th, hosted by Liu Shaoqi, Zhou, and Deng, and asked them to report the CCP's views of the international situation to their central committees. When Deng elaborated on the CCP's views, the Soviets present accused him of the 'Trotskyism method', of imposing his own view on others. Grishin, having stated his objections, was the first to leave, despite Liu and Zhou's request to him to stay. The delegates from East European countries soon followed. The meeting had to be abandoned.⁴

¹ Interview, Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui with Zhu Tingguang, 5 June 2002. Zhu was chief of the international propaganda division of the CCP's propaganda department. The authors have not seen the text of the general report of the eleventh meeting of the general council of the WFTU.

² Report, Kozlov to central com., 13 July 1960, *ZSG*, xiii, 3346.

³ *Renmin ribao*, 6, 7 June 1960.

⁴ Interview with Zhu; *LS*, ii, 487-8; M. Yan, 'Peng Zhen zai Bujialesite huiyishang', *Dangdai Zhong-*

Owing to the Soviets' intransigence, the Chinese failed to modify the draft report. To promote their own programme, they publicized the CCP's views among delegates from other countries.¹ Zhou told an informal meeting of all the delegates on 6 June that peace 'depends on the people's struggle against imperialists ... Peace will never come if [you] beg the imperialists for it ... [As] the bellicose nature of the imperialists would never change ... [we should] resolutely expose the disguise of modern revisionist traitors.'² The following day's *Renmin ribao* became almost a special edition on 'anti-imperialism', 'anti-modern revisionism', and 'anti-colonialism'.

To elaborate the Chinese view, on 8 June the vice-chairman of the All-China Trade Union, Liu Changsheng, told a meeting of the WFTU's general council that the assumption that war could be avoided was wrong: 'We proposed peaceful coexistence between socialist and capitalist countries. But the imperialists headed by the United States insisted on a cold war policy of arms increases and preparations for war ... We should resolutely oppose imperialist cold war policy ... engaging in tit-for-tat struggle ... Only in this way, could we prevent cold war from evolving into hot war.' The speech, loudly applauded, was seconded by many delegates from Asia, Africa, and Latin America.³

Meanwhile, on the editorial committee, responsible for drafting the conference's general resolution and a resolution on anti-colonialism, the Chinese argued that the 'peaceful road is not relevant. Don't beg capitalists for peace!' They moved motions in support of Algeria's struggle for national independence, the struggle for liberation in Africa, and aid to Cuba. The secretariat, paralysed by the disagreement, at first proposed to adjourn the general council meeting in favour of a meeting of all delegates. After sustained haggling, an agreement was reached on 9 June, which, according to the Chinese, 'is much better than we expected'.⁴ In his report to the CCP's central committee, Liu Ningyi claimed that, for the first time, the trade union movement had agreed to resist half-revisionism.⁵

The Chinese had tried to lever Khrushchev into changing course by winning the backing of Asian, African, and Latin American countries that

guoshi yanjiu, iii (1998), 73. Cf., Wu, *Shinian lunzhan*, p. 276, that Liu Ningyi delivered a speech elaborating on the CCP's views at the meeting.

¹ Interview with Zhu.

² *Teshu er fuza de keti*, ed. Zhou and Chu, p. 521.

³ *Renmin ribao*, 9 June 1960; interview with Zhu; unpublished CCP documents, Li collection. Cf., Luthi, *Sino-Soviet Split*, pp. 167-8, who cites East German sources.

⁴ *Renmin ribao*, 10 June 1960; interview with Zhu; unpublished CCP documents, Li collection; report, Kozlov to central com., 13 July 1960, *ZSG*, xiii. 3346.

⁵ Interview with Zhu. Liu Ningyi, then chairman of the All-China Trade Union, did not record the meeting in his memoir: see N. Liu, *Lishi huiyi* (Beijing, 1996), pp. 143-4, 167-8.

were fighting wars of national liberation. As the CCP's deputy general secretary, Peng Zhen, explained later, on 3 February 1961:

In order to defend Leninism ... we have to struggle. We have thoroughly considered our speeches to the WFTU delegates ... The purpose of talking to the delegates is to drag him [Khrushchev] back. To tell the truth, we were not too ambitious at the time. [We heard that] they [the Soviets] were working on a new party constitution. [We] don't want him to go too far. So we published the three articles. We talked to the WFTU delegates several months later. Although they [the Soviets] have been attacking us on this issue, we have achieved our goal and dragged them back.¹

At the WFTU conference, China, for the first time, stated publicly its disagreement with the Soviet Union over both ideology and politics to the socialist international organizations.

The Soviets, naturally, resented being criticized in front of the WFTU, a non-Communist organization. They argued that the disagreement between the CCP and the CPSU would be exploited by capitalists and imperialists to undermine the Communist movement and the working class in the struggle for peace and socialism.² However, when the Communist members of the WFTU's general council refused to support China, the Chinese adopted new, more divisive, tactics. At meetings attended by both Communists and others, they criticized the approach of the CPSU and other Communist parties to all the substantive issues: the issue of transition from capitalism to socialism, peaceful coexistence with capitalist countries, and peaceful competition between socialism and capitalism.³ Thus, the Sino-Soviet disagreement ceased to be an argument among Communists. It was announced to the Western world,⁴ and the US central intelligence agency soon learned what had happened.

These tactics and the support for the Chinese from Asian, African, and Latin American delegates created a dilemma for Khrushchev. He had either to move towards China or to face the charge of splittism at meetings of socialist international organizations. Furious, he launched a counter-offensive. First, the Soviets accused the Chinese of factionalism.⁵ Second,

¹ Report, Peng, 'On Fifth National Foreign Affairs Working Conference', 3 Feb. 1961 [Changchun], J[ilin] P[rovincial] A[rchives], Q, no. 1, cat. 1-17, file no. 249, pp. 13-14.

² Report, Kozlov to central com., 13 July 1960, ZSG, xiii. 3346; 'Sulian gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui gei Sulian gejie dangzuzi he quanti gongchandangyuan de gongkaixin', *Renmin ribao*, 20 July 1963.

³ O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, *SuZhong guanxi, 1945-80* (Beijing, 1982), p. 174.

⁴ Memo, 'Sino-Soviet Relations', 9 Aug. 1960, [Washington, DC, US] N[ational] S[ecurity] A[rchives], fiche 64, item 255, NIE 100-3-60; memo, 'Authority and Control in the Communist Movement', 8 Aug. 1961, *ibid.*, fiche 84, item 318, NIE 10-61.

⁵ Report, Kozlov to central com., 13 July 1960, ZSG, xiii. 3346. Later, Liu Shaoqi claimed, in an incor-

when commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the publication of Lenin's article on 'Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder', the Soviet media published articles that repudiated Chinese leftist dogmatism, on the grounds that Lenin had criticized Communists who refused to work for 'reactionary' trade unions, join capitalist parliaments, or recognize the need for concessions under particular circumstances. A Soviet newspaper article on 10 June stated: 'At present, the leftists regard the realization of peaceful coexistence, the cessation of the arms race, and cordial relations between people in capitalist and socialist countries as forsaking Marxism-Leninism. They regard any deterioration in the international situation as proof of the correctness of their one-sided views.'

Two days later, *Pravda* added: 'We believe that the views of the Leftists in the international Communist movement are wrong. They claim, as we now have political power in hand, [that] we should be able to enter Communism right away, bypassing certain historical stages.' *Kommunist* declared on 23 June: 'Some political leaders regarded peaceful coexistence and disarmament as forsaking the Marxist-Leninist stance ... [they] show disbelief in the resolutions of the twentieth and twenty-first congresses of the CPSU on preventing war under current circumstances. This attitude can only be regarded as wrong, dogmatic, and left-wing.'¹ For his third counter-offensive, Khrushchev planned a surprise.

Peng later claimed that, ahead of the meeting at the WFTU conference at which Deng had offended the Soviets, 'we worked out the list of participants with Grishin.' The deputy premier of the Soviet Union, Anastas Mikoyan, immediately contradicted him: 'You invited them to a comradesly dinner, not a meeting ... [and] you openly publicized your special views to the trade union activists behind the back of Communist parties. You should not have done so. These issues should be discussed at the conference of leaders of Communist and workers' parties.'² China's offensive tactics at the conference explain the counterattack the Soviets and their East European allies launched at the Conference of Communist and

rect account, that 'our party engaged in no factional activities during the WFTU Beijing Conference. At the day of its opening, comrade Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and I were not present. We were not in Beijing. When I returned to Beijing, I was informed that the delegates were enthusiastically engaging in exchanging opinions on many important issues. I was invited to participate. At first, I suggested that the trade union delegates should debate among themselves, and I didn't participate. But later I agreed to deliver a keynote speech. We wanted to exchange ideas on five issues, but were only able to cover one issue. This shouldn't be regarded as factional activities. We invited those who disagreed with us. How could you engage in factional activities among your opponents?': memo, 'Mikoyan and Kozlov's Talks with Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Peng Zhen', 26 Nov. 1960, *ZSG*, xiv. 3476-96. On 5 June, Mao Zedong was not in Beijing, but Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai were. Liu was not in Beijing from 1 to 3 June. Zhou Enlai returned to Beijing from Mongolia on 1 June. See *ZE*, ii. 324.

¹ *China and the Soviet Union*, ed. Jones, pp. 18-19.

² Memo, 'Mikoyan and Kozlov Talks with Liu Shaoqi', *ZSG*, xiv. 3476-96.

Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries at Bucharest in June. As Suslov noted, the conference at Bucharest was called to reverse the result of the conference at Beijing.¹

* * * * *

ON 2 JUNE, PRIOR to the WFTU conference, the CPSU's central committee had invited the leaders of the ruling parties in socialist countries to meet at Bucharest later in the month during the Third Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party. The conference would discuss the international situation after the summit in Paris and 'exchange views in order to settle on our common policy'.² Everyone accepted but the CCP: Mao had instead decided to publicize the CCP's ideology and its disagreement with the CPSU in a bid to seize the leadership of the international Communist movement.

On 5 June, at a meeting with Kang and other CCP officials, Mao proposed to call a conference of world Communist and workers' parties for 7 November, not for June as the Soviets wished: 'We are busy in June and not able to attend.'³ If the Soviets agreed, the CCP would send a delegation to Moscow in August to draft the agenda. Two days later, on 7 June, the CPSU notified the CCP that the conference of delegates from Communist and workers' parties in the socialist bloc and the conference of the political consultative committee of the member states of the Warsaw Pact, scheduled for June, would be postponed. On the 10th, the CCP replied: 'We completely agree to postpone the two conferences,' but suggested that the conference of Communist and workers' parties should be enlarged to cover the whole world. As at Moscow in 1957, however, only the twelve ruling parties should issue the final declaration.⁴ The CPSU, which agreed in turn, advised all socialist parties that the discussions of international issues at Bucharest should not be framed as formal resolutions. Everyone seemed to be satisfied.⁵

The CCP expected the Soviet media to seek revenge for the humiliation of the CPSU at the WFTU conference. At an enlarged politburo meeting in Shanghai from 14-18 June, Mao read out a party report which stated that articles from the Soviet media commemorating the publication of Lenin's article on 'Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder' were counter-

¹ *YSR*, i. 544-5.

² Minute, Presidium of the CPSU central com., no. 284, 2 June 1960, in *Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii*, f. 3, op. 12, d. 1011, l. 23, cited from Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954-64, Tom 1, *Chernoye protokol'nye zapisi zasedanii stenogrammy*, ed. A. A. Fursenko (Moscow, 2003), pp. 443, 1075-6; 'Report, Kozlov to central com., 13 July 1960', *ZSG*, xiii. 3346-417; *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi*, ed. Wang, pp. 233-4.

³ *YSR*, i. 509.

⁴ *JYMZW*, ix. 204-5; *YSR*, i. 510.

⁵ Report, Kozlov to central com., 13 July 1960, *ZSG*, xiii. 3346.

attacking China and trying to undermine the CCP's influence by pinning on it the label of 'modern left opportunism', in order to discredit the views expressed in the three articles that had commemorated Lenin's birth.¹

On 16 June, Peng Zhen led a CCP delegation to the Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party to 'persuade' Khrushchev and the CPSU to rectify their mistakes.² En route, he held nine hours of discussion in Moscow with Kozlov, who told him that Khrushchev wished to 'persuade' the Chinese to admit that they had made mistakes in Beijing in order to forestall disagreement in Bucharest. With the question 'how could you seek anti-Soviet allies?', the Soviets reopened not only the issues of the likelihood of war, the nature of imperialism, and the viability of peaceful coexistence, but also criticized China's domestic policies such as 'let a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend,' and the General Line. The Chinese repeated their objections to the Soviet assessment of Stalin, peaceful transition, and to the decisions taken at the twentieth congress.³ Nothing substantive was agreed.

Khrushchev had supposed that Communist and workers' parties everywhere would treat the Moscow Declaration and the peace manifesto as an agreed programme that had settled outstanding issues. The CCP, however, claimed that many issues remained to be settled. On this pretext, the CCP disregarded the documents and, in doing so, took a stand that confronted not only the CPSU, but also the other Communist parties. The CPSU were counting at Bucharest on support from the other socialist parties.⁴ 'Kozlov repeatedly waved a thick document under Peng's nose,' and when asked what it was, replied: 'we will discuss that after we arrive in Bucharest.' It turned out to be 'a sixty-eight-page Soviet condemnation of Chinese politics'.⁵ Liu Xiao, predicting that at Bucharest Khrushchev would call a meeting of Communist parties to criticize the CCP, flew to Shanghai on 20 June to report to Mao and Liu Shaoqi and ask for instructions.⁶ They and the CCP central committee decided not to compromise: '[We have to] retort. The worst is to be crushed [*huandeding, wufei huimie*].'⁷

On 21 June, the second day of the Third Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party, the Soviet delegation distributed a memorandum that

1 Cf., 'Dangqian Sulian xin dongtai', *JYMZW*, ix, 211-12.

2 Report, Peng, 'Fifth National Foreign Affairs Working Conference', 3 Feb. 1961, JPA, Q, no. 1, cat. 1-17, file no. 249, p. 14.

3 Report, Kozlov to central com., 13 July 1960, *ZSG*, xiii, 3346; *Teshu er fuza de keti*, ed. Zhou and Chu, p. 521.

4 X. Liu, *Chushi Sulian banian* (Beijing, 1986), pp. 83-4.

5 Luthi, *Sino-Soviet Split*, pp. 169-70.

6 Liu, *Chushi Sulian banian*, pp. 83-4.

7 See Report, Peng, 'Fifth National Foreign Affairs Working Conference', p. 13.

described the events that had occurred at the WFTU conference and criticized the CCP's views on international affairs.¹ The next day, Khrushchev made a last, if misguided, attempt to mend fences. Having accused the CCP of sectarianism, he repeated the Soviet Union's wish for friendly relations. The CCP delegation, confronted with a series of allegations, refused to yield. As it knew that Khrushchev had made plans publicly to criticize the CCP at the Conference of the Communist and Workers' Parties, his attack on the 23rd did not take the delegates by surprise.² They were taken by surprise, however, when every other party except Albania's supported the CPSU.³

The Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries and the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties from Fifty-one Nations (generally known as the Bucharest Conference) were held in succession in Bucharest from 24 to 26 June. The central topic of both was the CCP's erroneous views of world affairs and of the Communist movement's strategy and tactics. The CCP was offered 'comradely help' – the euphemism for came under attack – from all sides, led by the CPSU, which admitted that the exchange of views had been prearranged.⁵

When Khrushchev, attacking the CCP by innuendo, said that 'Lenin would crawl out of his coffin to give your ears a pinch,'⁶ Peng, despite his 'glorious isolation', counterattacked vigorously in three speeches during the conference in which he did not answer questions asked by other delegates, but only repeated – so he said – what Mao had told him to say. He dismissed the CPSU's charges as 'slander and libel'.⁷

At the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, the proposal to issue a communiqué, endorsed almost unanimously, placed the CCP in a dilemma, whether or not the CPSU was responsible: either the Chinese delegation signed the communiqué, or they admitted the charge of sectarianism and splittism. The communiqué highlighted those ideas in the

1 Borisov and Koloskov, *SuZhong guanxi*, p. 175; *Tesku er fuza de keti*, ed. Zhou and Chu, pp. 521-2.

2 On 26 June 1960, the CCP central committee's account of the conference stated that Khrushchev 'proposed the draft declaration as a surprise attack' (*Guanyu guoji gongchan zhuyi yundong zong luxian de lunzhan*, p. 100). On 10 Aug., Mao stated at a central committee working conference, '[It's] "a surprise attack". [He] cheated our people. We wanted to reply in two days, they didn't agree at first. [They] agreed only after quarrelling. They presented us a declaration without allowing any change': FPA, Q, no. 101, cat. 12, file no. 119, p. 21. Here may be the origin of the so-called 'surprise attack'. Later, a *Renmin ribao* editorial titled 'Where Does the Divergence Come From? – A Reply to Comrade Thorez and Others' stated that at Bucharest, 'someone waved a baton and organized a surprise attack at the CCP'. All subsequent Chinese publications follow this inaccurate account.

3 Report, Kozlov to central com., 13 July 1960, ZSG, xiii. 3346.

4 *Guanyu guoji gongchan zhuyi yundong zong luxian de lunzhan*, pp. 73-5.

5 Report, Kozlov to central com., 13 July 1960, ZSG, xiii. 3346.

6 M. Yan, 'Huiyi liangci Mosike huiyi he Hu Qiaomu', *Dangdai Zhongguoshi yanjiu*, iii (1997), 14-15; idem, 'Sui Peng Zhen canjia Bujaiesite huiyi', *Zhonggong dangshi ziliao*, ii (2007), 35.

7 Report, Kozlov to central com., 13 July 1960, ZSG, xiii. 3346.

Moscow Declaration and peace manifesto of 1957, which supported the CPSU's viewpoints: the possibility of avoiding war, peaceful transition to socialism, and striving for peace as the primary duty of all Communist parties. The conference also authorized the CPSU to call a conference of world Communist and workers' parties in the autumn.¹ Thus, at Bucharest, Khrushchev regained the initiative in the international Communist movement from Mao.

The CCP preferred not to become the adversary of the other Communist parties. To avoid the 'destruction' (*huimie*) of a split with the CPSU, it 'attempted to leave some leeway and to give him [Khrushchev] a helping hand'. The central committee in Beijing instructed the Chinese delegation to sign the communiqué on 24 June; at the same time, they instructed them to distribute a written statement on the 26th that criticized Khrushchev by name, accused him of using the communiqué to make a surprise attack on the CCP, of tarnishing China's prestige in the international Communist movement, and of rudeness in imposing his will on others. The statement declared that the CCP would not yield before erroneous anti-Marxist-Leninist arguments. For the first time, the CCP criticized Khrushchev by name, while trying to play down the significance of having done so.²

Renmin ribao published the communiqué alongside the Moscow Declaration on the 28th, to point up the differences between them. The next day, it published an editorial, revised by Mao, entitled 'Upholding High the Revolutionary Banner of Marxism-Leninism of the Moscow Declaration'. Reaffirming the view that, 'as long as imperialism exists, there is the soil for war of aggression,' it laid out the CCP's view of the international situation and criticized the communiqué. According to Mao, 'those who laughed first are not going to prevail. Our policy is: Not to be afraid of isolation, and to gain mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck [*bupaguli, hougazhiren*].'³

The CCP's uncompromising stance provoked Khrushchev to try economic leverage. On 16 July, the Soviet Union notified China that it had decided, unilaterally, to recall all of the Soviet experts posted throughout China. On 25 July, it announced that the recall would take place between 28 July and 1 September, and it turned down a request to reconsider.⁴ In

¹ Report, Kozlov to central com., 13 July 1960, ZSG, xiii. 3346.

² Zhou Enlai zhuan, 1949-76, ed. C. Jin et al. (Beijing, 1998), ii. 1543-4; YSR, i. 514-15; Liu, Chushi Sulian banian, pp. 85-6; Guanyu guoji gongchan zhuyi yundong zong luxian de lunzhan, pp. 75, 100-3.

³ JYMZW, ix. 254.

⁴ See Z. Shen, Sulian zhuanjia zai Zhongguo (Beijing, 2003), pp. 386-94, 398-403. Cf., Luthi Sino-Soviet Split, p. 175: 'The trigger for the Soviet decision to withdraw all personnel was the Chinese attempt to pressure Soviet military specialists.'

Luthi's view, 'the crudeness of his [Khrushchev's] methods and his inability to restrain his anger at Chinese provocations since April only made the situation worse.'¹ Thus, the Sino-Soviet disagreement over ideology shifted to the political relationship between the two states. Both party-to-party and state-to-state relationships were on the verge of collapse. A split in the Sino-Soviet bloc appeared imminent.

* * * * *

CHINA, IN 1960, FACED both a domestic crisis and a deteriorating security environment. The Great Leap Forward of 1958 had caused 'three bitter years' of economic crisis from 1959 to 1961; probably more than twenty million people starved to death owing to the failure of Mao's bid for self-reliance.² Even before the withdrawal of the Soviet experts, Mao and his associates had been forced to reorient China's development strategy. China had, at the same time, to try to reduce the international pressure. Its relations with India were not cordial owing to the border conflicts in 1959,³ and with the increasing US military involvement in Indochina, frequent small-scale raids along the south-east coast by Nationalists from Taiwan, and the president, Jiang Jieshi's, threat to 'mount a (large-scale) counter-attack against the mainland', China faced rivals in both the south and the north.

The economic recession and the external challenges, which worried the CCP's senior members, led to calls for a comprehensive review of foreign policy. The politburo's standing committee, chaired by Mao from 7 to 17 January 1960, decided that 'strenuous and active efforts should be made to open a new prospect in China's foreign relations.'⁴ Mao, in setting priorities, stated: 'The resolution of the international issues is determined by the work we can achieve domestically. The defeat of revisionism depends not only on politics, but also on the economy.'⁵ Zhou added that 'unity [with the CPSU] is the priority (*tuanjiegao yuyiqie*) ... Criticism or struggle may not be valid. It needs patience and time.'⁶ According to Zhou:

The Soviet party has basically been anti-imperialist, has sustained socialism, and has advocated internationalism. Thus, although its mistakes are fundamental, the problem is only partial: Khrushchev is a half-revisionist. We might prepare for

¹ Luthi, *Sino-Soviet Split*, pp. 174-6.

² J. D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York, 1991), p. 583.

³ *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi*, ed. Wang, pp. 75-80.

⁴ Wu, *Shinian lunzhan*, i. 248.

⁵ *YSR*, i. 518-19; *JYMZW*, ix. 292.

⁶ Report, Zhou, 'Beidaihe Conference of Provincial, Municipal, and Autonomous Region Party Secretaries', 14 July 1960, *Zhou Enlai zhenglun xuan* (Beijing, 1998), pp. 807-10; *ZE*, ii. 332.

worse ... We should only discuss major issues and fundamental questions, and guide the CPSU to pay more attention to them and to principles. The CPSU has not deviated from the general direction of Marxism-Leninism. The sun will shine again after the rain in Sino-Soviet relations.¹

When the central committee sanctioned the policy 'uphold principle and attack later; uphold struggle but leave leeway; uphold unity and oppose split,' its aim was to achieve Sino-Soviet unity.² Pragmatists such as Liu Shaoqi, Zhou, and Deng treated national security as more important than ideology. They recognized that China needed Soviet help, not only to learn from the Soviet experience of building a socialist society, but also because cordial relations with the Soviet Union would lessen the threat from the United States and Jiang. The threat from the imperialist enemy obliged the CCP to make ideological concessions in an attempt to buttress rather than undermine its partnership with the CPSU.

The deterioration in Soviet-US relations obliged the Soviet Union to follow suit. During Khrushchev's second and last trip to the United States in September and October 1960, Eisenhower refused to meet him. As a result, in Luthi's words, 'the trip provided an important impetus for Moscow to improve relations with Beijing.'³

From August 1960, Chinese officials and the media emphasized the value of peaceful coexistence. On 1 August, Zhou, in a speech at the Swiss embassy in Beijing that illustrated the CCP's move towards the CPSU, stated that China was willing to coexist peacefully with all other countries, and suggested that the Asia-Pacific countries should sign a non-aggression treaty that made the region nuclear-free.⁴ The head of the CPSU's international liaison department, Yuri Andropov, reporting the speech to Khrushchev, proposed that the central committee should compare Liu Ningyi's speech at the Sixth International Conference on the Prevention of Atom and Hydrogen Bombs in Tokyo on 3 August 1960 with the one he had made at the WFTU conference. Two months earlier, in a meeting with Grishin, Liu had insisted that 'the talk about the possibility of peaceful coexistence would only make the imperialists happy because it excludes the possibility of a people's liberation war.' By August, he had changed his tune: 'The Chinese people have consistently advocated peaceful coexistence of countries with different political systems ... We are willing peacefully to coexist with Western countries including the United States.'⁵

The Chinese view on the inevitability of war had also softened. On 25

¹ JYMZW, ix. 291-3; ZE, ii. 340-5.

² Wang, *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi*, ed. Wang, p. 237.

³ Luthi, *Sino-Soviet Split*, pp. 184-6.

⁴ ZE, ii. 337.

⁵ Report, Andropov to central com., 17 Aug. 1960, ZSG, xiii. 3430.

August, Zhou told the US writer Edgar Snow that 'we would try to prevent the war if we could.'¹ Between the summer of 1960 and the Conference of World Communist and Workers' Parties in November, heated quarrels punctuated the talks between the CCP and other Communist parties. But the outcomes showed that the Chinese had been willing to compromise.

Before the conference, the CCP and the CPSU met twice at Moscow in an attempt to heal the rifts in world Communism. Deng, in Moscow between 17 and 22 September to meet Suslov, deliberately, for tactical reasons, tested Khrushchev by reciting a long list of Chinese grievances, including Stalin's violation of China's sovereignty in the Sino-Soviet treaty of February 1950 and the Soviets' proposal for a joint fleet in 1958. He declared that Sino-Soviet relations had to be based on equality, not on a Soviet claim to leadership. In the Soviets' view, the negotiations made no progress. Deng, however, tried to leave the door open by declaring that 'differences in opinions' would be overcome gradually through periodic consultation and the need to co-operate against 'the common enemy'.² On 1 October, Deng attended the meeting of the conference's editorial board, which consisted of the twelve ruling parties and the fourteen largest parties outside the socialist bloc. Although the discussion failed to lead to agreement, the CCP and the CPSU agreed to continue it in November.

Liu Shaoqi and Deng led the Chinese delegation to the conference, which opened on 5 November. When Khrushchev, on the 10th, made a speech criticizing the CCP in the presence of delegates from eighty-one countries, Deng, on instructions from the politburo, accused him of 'big nation' chauvinism and 'father party'. The speech, which provoked an uproar, seemed likely to break up the conference until a 'petition' organized by the Vietnamese leader, Ho Chi Minh, asked the Soviets and Chinese to try to avoid a split.³

On the 17th, the politburo laid down three principles that the Chinese delegation should uphold: revision of the views on war; no mention of the CPSU's twentieth and twenty-first congresses; and no mention of sectarianism. If any of them was mentioned in the final declaration, the delegates should not sign it. At a meeting with the Soviets on the 26th, Liu Shaoqi demanded that three statements should be deleted: on factional activities, on the significance of the twentieth and twenty-first congresses, and on nationalism.⁴

Of the three issues, the most vexatious was the treatment of the twentieth

¹ ZF, ii, 343.

² Yan, 'Huiyi liangci Mosike huiyi', p. 14; memo, 'Conversation between CCP Delegation and CPSU Delegation', *CWIHP Bulletin*, x (March 1998), 172-3; *YSR*, i, 547-8.

³ Wang, 'Quarrelling Brothers', pp. 49-53; Luthi, *Sino-Soviet Split*, pp. 188-91.

⁴ ZF, ii, 370; memo, 'Mikoyan and Kozlov Talks with Liu Shaoqi', 26 Nov. 1960, *ZSG*, xiv, 3476-96.

congress. First, the CCP objected to the proceedings of a party congress being turned into an international document that set out principles to be observed by all Communist parties. Khrushchev wished the final declaration to state that Communist parties throughout the world unanimously agreed with the analysis of the international situation and the international Communist movement made at the twentieth congress, and that the new theories proposed at that time were a significant development of Marxism-Leninism.¹ If the statement was not included, the declaration made at the twentieth congress would appear to be erroneous. Second, the CCP refused to accept that the prohibition of sectarianism was a warning to all parties, not solely to it, and, third, that the prohibition of nationalism was a warning solely to the Yugoslavian party.² As neither China nor the Soviet Union was willing to compromise, the conference became deadlocked.

To break the deadlock, Liu tried to engineer a compromise that could serve as a new basis for Sino-Soviet relations.³ The CCP and the CPSU agreed that the final declaration should both echo the Moscow Declaration's evaluation of the twentieth congress and state the CCP's views on peaceful coexistence, peaceful transition, and peaceful competition.⁴ Liu and Khrushchev also agreed not to quarrel in public: every issue should be discussed between the CCP and the CPSU, then discussed with other Communist parties, and only then be brought before a plenary session.⁵ The day before the conference ended, Liu, Deng, and Peng met, therefore, with Khrushchev, Kozlov, and Suslov. All of them expressed the wish to put a stop to the unfriendly propaganda and to restore party-to-party relations to their condition in 1957. When the conference reaffirmed the Moscow Declaration on 1 December,⁶ Khrushchev, at the signing ceremony, became so excited that he hugged the Chinese delegates several times.

The final declaration represented a compromise that left China and the Soviet Union to stress the parts of it they chose. But the CCP had conceded more than the CPSU, because the declaration reaffirmed the role of the twentieth congress in guiding the international Communist movement. The CPSU's programme, rather than the CCP's, became the norm.

The final declaration stated that world Communism determined social development worldwide. It assumed that a new world war could be prevented because international Communism was strong enough to restrain

1 YSR, i. 610-11; Y. Li, *Waijiao wutaishang de xin Zhongguo lingxiu* (Beijing, 1994), pp. 182-4.

2 Memo, 'Mikoyan and Kozlov Talks with Liu Shaoqi', 26 Nov. 1960, ZSG, xiv. 3476.

3 Liu, *Chushi Sulian banian*, pp. 101-2.

4 YSR, i. 624-6; Liu, *Chushi Sulian banian*, pp. 96-7; Yan, 'Huiyi liangci Mosike huiyi', pp. 19-20; *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi*, ed. Wang, p. 238; ZSG, xiv. 3476-9.

5 L. Wang, *Xianchang lishi: wenhua da geming jishi* (Hong Kong, 1993), p. 22.

6 Yan, 'Huiyi liangci Mosike huiyi', p. 20; YSR, i. 627-9.

imperialism, however aggressive. Thus, it departed from the Marxist-Leninist theory that war was inevitable. And it recognized that dogmatism and sectarianism might become the major threat to parties at different stages of development. At its core was Khrushchev's ideology of socialist internationalism: that the interests of the socialist bloc corresponded with the interests of all peoples, and that the interests of the socialist bloc took precedence over national interests, and inter-party relationships over state-to-state relationships. On 7 December, *Pravda* published an editorial entitled 'The Marxist-Leninist Programme of World Communists', which declared that the congress had not only reaffirmed that the twentieth congress had drawn up the programme for the international Communist movement, but had also affirmed the Soviet Union's position as its head and Moscow's as its centre.¹

In late November, prior to the signing of the declaration, Zhou remarked at a meeting of the politburo: 'The Moscow conference is a copy and continuation of the Bucharest conference. It is a conference of struggle against the Chinese party and an anti-China conference ... we must issue a statement whether we sign the declaration or not ... this conference has created another unbearable evil case under the bad influence of Khrushchev and the Soviet delegation.' After being told of Zhou's remarks, Mao minuted that he agreed in principle.² Nonetheless, the CCP did not issue such a statement. Its decision to humour Khrushchev laid the foundation for a temporary Sino-Soviet détente that enhanced the CPSU's assumption that the international Communist movement was united in following its leadership.³

The Sino-Soviet détente lasted from the late summer of 1960 to the autumn of 1961. During this period, in the sphere of ideology, the Chinese ceased to publish articles on Sino-Soviet divergence.⁴ In the sphere of politics and diplomacy, the CCP adopted a policy of self-restraint over the split between the Soviet Union and Albania, and co-operated with the Soviet Union in resolving peacefully the crisis in Laos.⁵ Last, during the Berlin crisis of 1961, China joined the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries in signing a peace treaty with Germany.⁶ As Deng noted, 'Sino-

¹ *Remin ribao*, 8 Dec. 1960.

² *ZE*, ii. 372-3.

³ Chen Yi later stated that 'the Party Centre and Chairman Mao made the decision. Members of our Party's delegation did a great job': report, Chen, 'On International Situation and Foreign Policy', 5 Jan. 1961, JPA, Q, no. 1, cat. 1-17, file no. 249, p. 32.

⁴ 'Transcripts of the Conversations (excerpts) [of Chervonenko] with the General Secretary of the CC CCP Deng Xiaoping', 1 March 1962, *CWIHP Bulletin*, x (March 1998), 175.

⁵ *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi*, ed. Wang, p. 311; memo, 'Conversations between Zhou Enlai and Chervonenko', *ZSG*, xiv. 3532.

⁶ *ZE*, ii. 431; *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi*, ed., Wang, p. 311; Kulik, *Sovetsko-kitaiskii*

Soviet relations have developed smoothly after the Moscow conference. China and the Soviet Union have established very good co-operation in the international arena.¹ The co-operation extended to the military, national defence, economics, and to science and technology.

According to Chen Yi, the adjustment of the CCP's stance towards the Soviet Union was a type of 'toleration in the major aspect' (*daderongren*), a so-called 'revolutionary compromise' and 'reconciliation', and thus could only have been 'transitional'.² The underlying cause of the Sino-Soviet divergence remained unresolved, rendering the détente fragile. It could not develop after the ideological divergence, only suspend or dilute it while the two parties focused on particular common interests.³

In October 1961, in order to prolong the détente, the CCP adopted a policy of covert, rather than overt, struggle at the CPSU's twenty-second congress, at which developments trod on Mao's and the CCP's sensitive toes. First, the Party of Labour of Albania, which had supported the CCP, was excluded and criticized by name; second, the congress adopted a new Soviet party programme that the CCP perceived to be a comprehensive expression of revisionism. Given the relative improvement in China's domestic economic situation and its decision to defend the Albanian party, the CCP prepared for a new round in its ideological struggle with the CPSU. The Sino-Soviet détente came to its end. The split became inevitable.

* * * * *

FOR TWO YEARS, the CCP and the CPSU had tried to restore the relationship damaged by their quarrels in October 1959. But each upheld the correctness of its position, and each assumed that the other should move ideologically closer. As both treated the issue as a matter of principle, neither gave ideological ground. In Mao's view, Soviet revisionists should no longer guide the international Communist movement; as the focal points of revolution had shifted to Asia, Africa, and Latin America, China should replace the Soviet Union as the guide.⁴

The Sino-Soviet alliance rested on the so-called 'principle of the unity of proletarian internationalism and patriotism',⁵ a contradictory combination

raskol, p. 310.

¹ Memo, 'Conversations between Deng Xiaoping and Chervonenko', 30 Sept. 1961, ZSG, xiv. 3542.

² Report, Chen, 'On the International Situation and Foreign Policy', 5 Jan. 1961, JPA, Q, no. 1, cat. 1-17, file no. 249, pp. 34-5.

³ J. Niu, '1962: Zhongguo duiwai zhengce 'zuo'zhuan de qianye', in *Lengzhan yu Zhongguo de zhoubian guanxi*, ed. D. Niu and Z. Shen (Beijing, 2004), p. 580. For an English version, see Niu, '1962: The Eve of the Left Turn in China's Foreign Policy', *CWIHP Working Papers*, xlv (2005).

⁴ *JYMZW*, ix. 281-2.

⁵ Chen, 'Zhong Su tongmeng shi shijie heping de qiangda baolei'.

of internationalism with nationalism, and ideology with national interests, marred by inherent structural defects. When national interests conflicted with the interests of the socialist bloc, it proved impossible to reconcile proletarian internationalism with patriotism in international relations. The Sino-Soviet partnership became fragile owing to the lack of a mechanism for compromise.

The split in the Sino-Soviet bloc arose partly from the different stages of the historical development of Communism in the two states. In addition, while the Soviet Union played a leading role in the international system, China was excluded from it. Misled by the United States' policy of containment, the CCP's senior members, who underrated the strength of the worldwide demand for peace in a nuclear age, and the effects of the development of modern capitalism, supposed that the modern world was characterized by war and revolution. Once both the CPSU and the CCP took for granted that one, on the side of history, represented true Marxism-Leninism, while the other was a heretic, the Sino-Soviet split was only a matter of time.

The split arose from the inherent structural defect in the world Communist system, which emphasized the primacy of one party over all of the others. But if the Soviet Union and China shared the responsibility for the split, the CCP was the more responsible of the two. Its leftist thinking deviated from the mainstream, and its aspiration to lead the international Communist movement led to the split not merely in the relationship between the two parties, but also in that between the two states.

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